As someone outside the Chinese firewall, I can compare the Chinese version of google, with the regular version. For some searches, the results can be quite dramatic:

Take for instance tiananmen vs tiananmen.

via the Floating Sun Weblog

I’m normally the type of person who would favor add-on tools like Google’s Autolink. But then I remembered a site I read several months ago that used Intellitxt. Google has a good reputation, but I fear their software will be imitated by others and pretty soon we’ll have a companies like Juno and Netzero adding Intellitxt-type advertising to everything through a default browser plug-in.

Here’s a sample of Intellitxt in use. Note that the green advertising links appear on my Windows PC [screenshot], but not my Mac. .

This got me thinking about where to draw the line.

I start by making a distinction between:

• Explicit links – are visible links which encourage the reader to follow them
• Implicit links – are potential, invisible links which are activated by an action of the reader. (ie right clicking)

If Google Autolink is only providing a useful service, it shouldn’t mind being part of the right click menu instead of part of the page. But if Google Autolink is really about advertising and affiliate dollars, they will be tempted to go explicit.

I imagined a “link fight” back in November of 2000, but I didn’t anticipate that it would be initiated by a major vendor like google.

In the future, I’d like to see new features like highlighting added (more later) to the browser, but I think it’s important to draw a line somewhere.

For me the line is: no third party explicit links.

Related

• NYTimes: Ads Embedded in Online News Raise Questions
• A future post about adding “Highlighting” to the Browser

Some readers of my proposal for Spam Guarantees believe that my solution is too complex or costly. I concede that simpler approaches, such as authentication will be tried first, and will provide temporary relief, but ultimately a market-based solution will be necessary.

When such a market is created, it will appear gradually, and it will need to use real money, or it will be unable to police fraud.

It will not eliminate all spam, but offer a way for legitimate senders to avoid becoming spam filter false positives.

Here’s an overview of my views on whether market-based solutions should use “Computer-Time” or “Real Money”. The issue reminds me of Hayek and the “Calculation Debate“.

Anti-Spam Currencies: Computational vs Monetary

Two of the biggest obstacles to implementing a market-based solution to spam are:

1. Expense: the cost of administering and billing for each email transaction; and
2. Fraud: the inevitable attempts to capture the newly created currency

Expense

The “computational” school of thought argues that a postage or guarantee system that uses real money will cost too much to administer.

Accounts will need to be created, tracked, and billed. With so many transactions, the overhead will be enormous.

A system that requires computers to solve a math problem will require no accounts, tracking or billing.

Fraud

Both approaches are vulnerable to fraud.

If the system uses real money, hackers will surely attempt to steal a sender’s key and use it like a stolen credit card.

If the system treats computer-time as currency, hackers will surreptitiously commandeer computers to poach the postage.

Scope Modesty: Certified Mail for the Web

With my proposal for email guarantees, I don’t pretend to the immediately eradicate all spam forever. Imagine instead a system that starts as a premium service, much like current-day certified and registered mail.

People and businesses who really value the email they send will set up accounts to guarantee their mail. This will ensure that their messages make it through the spam filters unscathed.

Not all transactions will need to be tracked for billing purposes, only those messages unwanted by their recipients.

Monetary Incentives

Because senders have to pay for “cashed” email, they will limit the unwanted messages they send, limiting the transaction load that their Credit Company needs to process. The Credit Companies can charge a fee to cover the cost of processing the “cashed” email.

To limit the amount of fraud, Credit Companies will track the amount of guarantees that have been collected. Accounts that reach their limit will be frozen.

Credit Companies may offer to absorb the cost of stolen keys, provided that account holders follow certain security practices. If not, the account holder would be liable, up to the limit of their account.

Computational Incentives

In the computational model, senders and computer owners take no responsibility for securing their systems.

A hacker could install a program on my computer that allows him to offload email computations to my computer.

If my credit card is not being charged for the postage he counterfeits, and the hacker is smart enough not to make my system unusable, I am unlikely to devote the resources necessary to:

• avoid getting the program in the first place
• removing it, once I have it

Holding someone liable for poor security creates an incentive to limit the exposure of currency and tighten up security.

Some people may decide that their security is so poor that they are unable to offer a guarantee.

Their messages may still make it through the spam filter, but they run a greater risk of being overlooked.