In light of the United States’ decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, journalist Steve Coll’s podcast appearance from 2018 shows exactly why the U.S. was always doomed in Afghanistan. Ana Kasparian and Cenk Uygur discuss on The Young Turks. Watch LIVE weekdays 6-8 pm ET. http://youtube.com/theyoungturks/live
Checkmate, Lincolnites! Debunking Lost Cause myths – as well as more benign common misconceptions – about the military leadership of the Civil War. Did the South really have all the best battlefield talent? Was the key to Union victory a simple strategy of overwhelming the Confederate army with numbers and resources? Who was better at their job, Ulysses S. Grant or Robert E. Lee? I’d say watch and find out, but the answer is obviously Grant. Support Atun-SheiFilms on Patreon ► https://www.patreon.com/atunsheifilmsLeave a Tip via Paypal ► https://www.paypal.me/atunsheifilmsOriginal Music by Dillon DeRosa ► http://dillonderosa.com/Facebook ► https://www.facebook.com/atunsheifilmsTwitter ► https://twitter.com/atun_shei ~REFERENCES~ Andy Hall. “With One Hand Tied Behind its Back” (2013). Dead Confederates Blog https://deadconfederates.com/2013/11/… G.S. Boritt. Why the Confederacy Lost (1992). Oxford University Press, Page 39-40 Richard E. Beringer. Why the South Lost the Civil War (1986). University of Georgia Press, Page 8-24 Borritt, Page 24-30 Charles Royster. The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans (1991). Vintage Civil War Library, Page 76 “Lincoln’s Unsent Letter to General Meade.” American Battlefield Trust https://www.battlefields.org/learn/pr… Eric J. Wittenberg. “A Civil War Witch Hunt: George Gordon Meade, The Retreat from Gettysburg, and the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War” (2015). Emerging Civil War Blog http://emergingcivilwar.com/2015/07/0… Report of the Joint Select Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Condition of Affairs in the Late Insurrectionary States, so Far as Regards the Execution of Laws, and the Safety of the Lives and Property of the Citizens of the United States and Testimony Taken (1872). https://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/moa/ACA4… Andy Hall. “Nathan Bedford Forrest Joins the Kl@n” (2011). Dead Confederates Blog https://deadconfederates.com/2011/12/… Andy Hall. “Confederate Veterans on Forrest: ‘Unworthy of a Southern Gentleman’ (2013). Dead Confederates Blog https://deadconfederates.com/2013/08/… Edward Bonekemper. Ulysses S. Grant: A Victor, Not a Butcher (2004). Regnery History, Page 89-92 Mary Boykin Chestnut. A Diary of Dixie (1905). D. Appleton and Company, Page 350  Ernest B. Ferguson. “Catching Up With ‘Old Slow Trot’” (2007). Smithsonian Magazine https://www.smithsonianmag.com/histor… Bonekemper, Page xii Bonekemper, Page 308-309 Bonekemper, Page 192-193 Bonekemper, Page 201-203 Justin D. Murphy. American Civil War: Interpreting Conflict Through Primary Documents, Vol. II (2019). ABC-CLIO, Page 331 Bonekemper, Page 121 & 243-245 Elizabeth Brown Pryor. Reading the Man: A Portrait of Robert E. Lee Through his Private Letters (2008) Penguin Books, Page 335 Sean Kane. Myths and Misunderstandings: Grant as a Slaveholder (2017). The American Civil War Museum https://acwm.org/blog/myths-misunders… “Letter from Robert E. Lee to Mary Randolph Custis Lee (December 27, 1856).” Encylopedia Virginia https://encyclopediavirginia.org/entr… Pryor, Page 144-150 “Ulysses S. Grant and General Orders No. 11” National Park Service https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/ulys…
“Since 1979, do you know how many times China has been at war with anybody?” Carter asked. “None. And we have stayed at war.” The U.S., he noted, has only enjoyed 16 years of peace in its 242-year history, making the country “the most warlike nation in the history of the world,” Carter said. This is, he said, because of America’s tendency to force other nations to “adopt our American principles.”
Conflict Combatant 1 Combatant 2 Result for the United States and its Allies American Revolutionary War
(1775–1783)Location: Eastern North America, Southern North America, Gibraltar, India, Caribbean Sea, and the Atlantic
US-allied victory Cherokee–American wars
(1776–1795)Part of the American Indian Wars
Location: Old Southwest
Cherokee US-allied victory Northwest Indian War
(1785–1793)Part of the American Indian Wars
Location: Northwest Territory
Western Confederacy US-allied victory Quasi-War
(1798–1800)Location: Atlantic Ocean, the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean
France Convention of 1800
- Peaceful cessation of Franco-American alliance
- End of French privateer attacks on American shipping
- American neutrality and renunciation of claims by France
- Advisory role from the forming of the MAAG in Vietnam to the Gulf of Tonkin incident.
- Direct U.S. involvement ended in 1973 with the Paris Peace Accords. The Paris Peace Accords of January 1973 saw all U.S forces withdrawn; the Case–Church Amendment, passed by the U.S Congress on 15 August 1973, officially ended direct U.S military involvement .
- The war reignited on December 13, 1974 with offensive operations by North Vietnam, leading to victory over South Vietnam in under two months.
Conflict Combatant 1 Combatant 2 Result for the United States and its Allies War in Afghanistan
(2001–present)Part of the War on Terror and the War in Afghanistan (1978–present)
Resolute Support Mission
Taliban splinter groups
- Wilayat Khorasan (ISIL-K)
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
- United States invasion of Afghanistan (2001)
- List of drone strikes in Afghanistan (2001)
- Destruction of al-Qaeda and Taliban militant training camps (2001)
- Fall of the Taliban government (2001)
- Establishment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan under the Karzai administration
- Start of Taliban insurgency
- Drone strikes in Pakistan
- Death of Osama bin Laden in May 2011
- Death of Mohammed Omar in July 2013
- Over two-thirds of Al-Qaeda’s operatives killed or captured
- International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) disbanded in December 2014
- Commencement of Resolute Support Mission in December 2014
- All US troops to withdraw by September 11, 2021
(2003–2011)Part of the War on Terror
- Invasion and occupation of Iraq
- Overthrow of Ba’ath Party government
- Execution of Saddam Hussein
- Emergence of significant insurgency, rise of al-Qaeda in Iraq, and severe sectarian violence
- Subsequent reduction in violence and depletion of al-Qaeda in Iraq
- Establishment of democratic elections and formation of new Shia-led government
- U.S.–Iraq Status of Forces Agreement
- Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011
- Stronger Iranian influence in Iraq[dubious ]
- Escalation of sectarian insurgency after U.S. withdrawal leading to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the successor of al-Qaeda in Iraq
- Iraqi Civil War (2013–2017)
- Return of US forces to Iraq in 2014
Second U.S. Intervention in the Somali Civil War
(2007–2021)Part of the Somali Civil War (1991–present) and the War on Terror
- Drone strikes in Somalia
- Raids against al-Shabaab militants conducted by U.S. Special Operations Forces
- African Union Intervention
- U.S. backed Ethiopian invasion in 2006
- Kenyan intervention
- Newly formed federal government established in 2012
- Power struggle within Al-Shabaab
- Majority of US Troops withdraw in January 2021
Operation Ocean Shield
(2009–2016)Part of the War on Terror
Location: Indian Ocean
Somali pirates US-allied victory International intervention in Libya
(2011)Part of the Libyan Crisis and the First Libyan Civil War
United Arab Emirates
Libya US-allied victory
- Overthrow of the Gaddafi government and the killing of Muammar Gaddafi
- Assumption of interim control by National Transitional Council (NTC)
- Diplomatic recognition of NTC as sole governing authority for Libya by 105 countries, UN, EU, AL and AU
- Post-civil war violence in Libya leading to the second civil war in 2014
Operation Observant Compass
(2011–2017)Part of the War on Terror
Central African Republic
Lord’s Resistance Army Ongoing
- Founder and leader of the LRA Joseph Kony goes into hiding
- Senior LRA commander Dominic Ongwen surrenders to American forces in the Central African Republic and is tried at the Hague
- Majority of LRA installations and encampments located in South Sudan and Uganda abandoned and dismantled
- Small scale LRA activity continues in eastern DR Congo, and the Central African Republic
American-led intervention in Iraq
(2014–present)Part of Operation Inherent Resolve, the Iraqi Civil War, the Spillover of the Syrian Civil War, the War on Terror and the International ISIS campaign
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Ongoing
- Tens of thousands of ISIL fighters killed
- American-led forces launch over 13,300 airstrikes on ISIL positions in Iraq
- Heavy damage dealt to ISIL forces, ISIL loses 40% of its territory in Iraq by January 2016, and all of its territory in Iraq in December 2017
- Multinational humanitarian and arming of ground forces efforts
- 200 ISIL created mass graves found containing up to 12,000 people
- Ongoing US-led Coalition advising and training of Iraqi and Kurdish ground forces
- US maintains limited military presence in Iraq
American-led intervention in Syria
(2014–present)Part of Operation Inherent Resolve, the Syrian Civil War, the War on Terror and the International ISIS campaign
Israel (limited involvement; against Hezbollah and government forces only)
Free Syrian Army (2011–2017)
al-Qaeda linked groups:
Syria (limited encounters with US and Israel)
- Over 11,200 American and allied airstrikes hit ISIS and other extremist groups within Syria
- Thousands of ISIS targets destroyed and thousands more militants captured or killed
- ISIL lose Mosul and Raqqa (2017), then other most of territory in Iraq and then Syria
- Syrian government Chemical attack in Ghouta (2013) leading to OPCW-UN Joint Mission in Syria
- American support for anti-government rebels
- Deployment of U.S. Marines and Special Forces
- Massive amounts of human rights violations and war crimes, in particular by Syrian government forces
- Semi-regular chemical attacks attributed to the Assad regime leads to condemnation and threats of measures to enforce the chemical weapons convention and the Geneva protocol to which Syria is a party. Chemical attack in Khan Shaykhun results in a retaliatory naval strike on the Syrian government-controlled Shayrat Airbase, Douma chemical attack results in retaliatory strikes/
- Various confrontations and airstrikes, including a downing of a Syrian SU-17 between the United States and Syrian government and the shoot down of a Turkish F-4 by the Syrian government
- Multiple incidents between Israel and Syria, including several Syrian S-200 missiles launched toward Israeli fighter jets during an Israeli Air Force mission inside Syrian territory, and an Israeli F-16 shot down by Syrian Air Defense forces after retaliatory strikes against Iranian targets near Damascus after a Syrian drone crossed into Israeli airspace
- ISIS detainee crisis takes hold in northern Syria
- Civilian deaths due to Coalition airstrikes in Syria and Iraq: over 1,300 according to Coalition, 8,267–13,168 according to independent estimates.
American intervention in Libya
(2015–2020)Part of the Second Libyan Civil War, the War on Terror, and the International ISIS Campaign
Islamic State in Libya US-allied Victory
- Liberation of Sirte
- Hundreds of airstrikes carried out in Libya against Islamic State affiliated militant groups
In Jan 1975, Commentary Magazine argued that the US should threaten to invade the Persian Gulf if they did not:
- agree to price oil exclusively in dollars, thereby generating demand for dollars
- save oil profits in US Treasury bills, thereby financing the US debt
- buy American weapons, including surplus Vietnam war equipment, and future US weapons, thereby financing the military industrial complex
There remains the argument that military intervention in the Persian Gulf would on moral grounds alone not be countenanced by domestic public opinion. Nor is it only the public that would presumably find in the act a manifestation of complete moral bankruptcy. One has the distinct impression that the foreign-policy elite shares this view and that in the certitude with which the public’s supposed reaction is diagnosed there is something close to a wish-fulfilling prophecy. It is a curious reaction coming from those who once found no great difficulty, moral or otherwise, in supporting the intervention in Vietnam or who, in finally abandoning their support for intervention, did so not on moral grounds, but because they concluded Vietnam could not have a successful outcome or that, whatever the outcome, the costs had become disproportionate to the interests at stake. Perhaps their present reaction to the prospect of armed intervention in the Persian Gulf is not so curious, though, given this record. It is not surprising that, having lacked a sense of balance, moral and otherwise, in that most painful experience, they should lack a sense of balance today, and that we should find the law of compensation—or rather of overcompensation—at work.
At issue here is not whether there is some clear moral or legal basis for justifying armed intervention in the Persian Gulf, but whether public opinion would be morally outraged by the action. Though it is not uncommon to find them confused, these are two quite different questions. There is no need for positive moral approval, let alone moral fervor, by the public so long as it consents to the need for the action. There may even be considerable gain in the absence of that element which has so often attended policy in the past. The difficulty, of course, is that the public has been long habituated to support the use of force only in cases which have been made to appear as necessary for the containment of Communism, in turn equated with the nation’s security. Could the public be induced, in the shadow of Vietnam, to support a military intervention that bore no apparent or tangible relation to the containment of Communism, itself a factor of diminishing importance in determining the public’s disposition? No one can say. Put in the abstract, the question itself may be rather meaningless. It would take on meaning only after a concerted effort had been made to persuade the public that the alternatives to intervention were laden with dangers to the nation’s well-being. Even then it remains an open question whether an administration could obtain public support, or tolerance, for intervention in the absence of events at home that, once plainly visible, would require little further effort in persuasion. In this instance, the choice might well be between a public that would oppose intervention so long as the interests at stake were not clear, and could not readily be made clear, and a public that would support intervention only when these interests had unfortunately become only too clear.
The point is worth emphasis that we simply do not know what might bring the public to support intervention in the Persian Gulf. If the public viewed such intervention as another Vietnam, they would most assuredly oppose it. But if intervention were to promise success at relatively modest cost, opinion might well move in the direction of support, and particularly if unemployment were to rise to 8 or 9 per cent. Moreover, in this instance, by contrast to Vietnam, the existence of an all-volunteer military force would preclude the painful issues once raised by the draft. Nor is it at all clear that the Left would take the same position toward intervention in the present case as it did toward Vietnam. For the effects of the current oil price on many poor countries do not endear the major oil producers to much of the Left. The relative ease with which Vietnam could be depicted as an attempt to preserve American domination over the developing states, a domination alleged to serve only American interests, would be difficult to repeat today, and this despite the inadequately perceived effects of the oil crisis.
Once the F-22s are airborne, there isn’t anything in the PRC’s military arsenal that can touch them. The F-22 has no peer in air to air combat and F-22s flying from their air bases close to China can shut down any airspace they can cover with their range and munitions.
There’s talk about China’s development of the J-20 and J-31 and how they can go toe to toe with the F-22 but this is incorrect in my opinion: These aircraft were not designed to fight other stealth fighters like the F-22. They were built to use their stealth to engage support aircraft like AWACs, Air refuellers, Recon aircraft and non-stealth combat aircraft using their long range missiles and with their stealth being used to hide them from counter retaliation from F-22s and F-35s in the area as much as possible.
In effect, the J-20 and J-31 are stealth so they can operate in the same airspace as a hostile F-22 with their stealth as a protective measure from the F-22’s radar.
The Chinese media and public may offer up certain military capabilities to assure the nation that they have assets comparable to the F-22 for domestic political consumption, but the Chinese military understands well that there is nothing in their arsenal that can threaten an F-22 once it’s airborne. Any non-stealth assets they have will be shot down before they even get close and the stealth assets are too valuable to be thrown against F-22s, they are better used being preserved for missions against the support infrastructure that surrounds the F-22. With the understanding that the performance of the F-22 would degrade overall if too many support aircraft fall victim to long range missiles from PLAAF stealth fighters.
This doesn’t mean that the PRC has nothing in it’s arsenal to go against the F-22. What they do have is just not the PLAAF, it’s the PRC rocket force.
I have been writing about this subject a bit in the past, so I’ll quote from an older answer here:
However, the US lead in stealth has some major problems that should be addressed. The problem is the basing of these stealth fighters. The US has 6 major bases in Japan and 1 in Guam. The USAF does not use the 80–90 airbases that the Japanese air force uses, and this might be because of how the US wants to control access to it’s stealth fighters but also because it has to equip its bases with perform the complex maintenance that it’s stealth fighters require.
So in theory, there’s only 7 total major bases you can place your stealth fighters at where you can control access to them and also do the whole fancy maintenance they require like re-applying coating etc.
That is…not good, because it means the Chinese don’t have to worry about shooting down these stealth fighters. They just need to concentrate their ballistic missile bombardment on those 7 bases with stealth fighters to knock those bases out or at least interdict operations out of them.
The USAF has realized this problem and are trying to see if they can spread the fighters out a bit more to the 90 bases the Japanese operate but it’s still a work in progress.
There is one other thing: There’s something called the “German Disease” where you get trapped in the idea that as long as you make a VERY high quality platform, it’s gonna be worth 10 of the enemy’s platforms and that’s better than matching the enemy head to head. This is very seductive thinking for a wealthier, more technically advanced power. But it means you are fighting a war with platforms you aren’t willing to lose which is not a good proposition.
The F-22 is a bit of a German Disease for the USAF because there’s only like 170 of them left and they aren’t making any more of them. Each F-22 lost is a permanent loss for the USAF and if a war against China drags on and attrition becomes a factor, a lot of these very high quality assets that the USAF isn’t willing to lose will need to be pulled from the theater after a while once their losses reach 33% per squadron. Now, no one has ever fought the US in a conventional war since Vietnam and managed to drag it out.
But if that does happen, and the US is losing say 2 F-22s a day on average from ballistic missile strikes on bases, losses due to accidents, very rare occasions when an F-22 is show down by the Chinese, this kind of loss rate might start to hurt a month into the conflict. And the USAF would have to withdraw the F-22s at some point so they still have some left in reserve and put the 4.5+ Gens into the missions the F-22s were doing. Very rare a war would last that long with China and for that high a loss rate, but you never know. The F-22s would primarily suffer more from being forced away from their 7 bases in the first island chain and being forced to operate at their max ranges from second island chain bases, but the loss rate from conflict as well in a long war cant be ignored.
The US may be planning for a short war with China given their preference for Shock and Awe tactics using their overwhelming conventional strength, but as the old axiom goes: Those who plan for short wars tend to lose long ones.
The current concentration of F-22s (and possible F-35s) in seven major basis is not just a threat to the platforms themselves though but the pilots as well.
Recall that the Iranian bombardment of US military bases was done in a way that they deliberately avoided targeting areas where US troops were housed to avoid escalation but they still fired in the proximity of the base to send a message.
This bombardment led to major health issues in US troops stationed on those bases:
A total of 50 U.S. service members suffered traumatic brain injury from this month’s Iranian missile attack on Iraqi bases hosting U.S. troops, the Defense Department said Tuesday.
Traumatic brain injury, or TBI, can include concussions. Of the 50 patients, 31 were treated in Iraq and have returned to duty, Army Lt. Col. Thomas Campbell, a spokesman for the Pentagon, said in a statement.
F-22 pilots aren’t exactly a dime a dozen, and they are pretty much elite pilots of whom a limited pool exists. The impact on their physical health from being stationed on seven bases under intense ballistic missile bombardment leads to the question of pilot attrition rather than F-22 attrition: That is, can the Chinese cause enough physical degradation in the health of F-22 pilots with constant missile bombardment to the point that there aren’t enough pilots in forward positions left to carry out a large enough number of sorties to make a difference in combat. Say you are into week 2 of the war and approximately 40% of your pilots have suffered brain injuries from the bombardment (if not killed outright). You might have to drop your F-22 sortie rate from say 100 a week to 40 a week to conserve your pilots and your aircraft assets (i’m not even taking into account sorties reduced due to airbase disruptions from the missile strikes).
This has the effect of reducing the effectiveness and presence of the F-22 to make a meaningful difference in the overall war without actually having to shoot down the F-22.
The solution, as mentioned above is to distribute your stealth fighters across the 90 bases the Japanese have and hope this dilutes the effectiveness of Chinese missile strikes but with a significant increase in your resources spent equipping all these bases to carry out the complex maintenance an F-22 requires (the stealth coating itself is a hassle), making sure the bases are secured from PRC spies trying to get close to F-22s and that all of these bases are capable of withstanding a PRC rocket force barrage.
There is of course the option of trying to knock out PRC missile bases on the mainland to reduce the barrage. But for the most part, even with all the US’s recon and surveillance capabilities, I doubt they can stop the movement and operations of these in a meaningful manner:
The PRC ballistic missile force’s primary goal is to make US bases unusable. The short range missiles are aimed at the US bases in Okinawa while the more medium range missiles are designed to disrupt operations from bases in Japan.
And the DF-26 is designed to make even operations from bases like Guam risky if not maybe as disrupted as the other bases.
The PRC ballistic missile threat is in part inspired by the US military’s failure to effectively hunt and destroy SCUDs in Iraq during the first Gulf War. Which leads the PRC to believe that if they have mobile, solid fueled missile systems, they would not be as prone to destruction from US military forces and pose a considerable threat for the duration of any war with the US. These kinds of missiles are hard to hunt, can quickly break from cover, set up and fire before the enemy can fire back at them.
With a mobile missile system like the SCUD, you have a 15 minute window to detect and destroy it once it breaks from cover. This is currently not within the capability of the US military.
My current feeling is that, for the most part, Japanese and US bases will see a constant stream of attacks from the Chinese Strategic Rocket force that will disrupt and hinder operations for the duration of the war (or till the Chinese run out of missiles).
There are unseen variables here. How well the US changes up their base designs, how well they integrate their airforce elements with Japanese airbases to withstand missile bombardment (particularly after reflecting on the lessons of the Iranian missile strike).
There are also unseen variables on the side of the Chinese: What’s the state of their strategic Rocket Force? The current reports coming out of China are that the Strategic Rocket Force (BTW I think their new name is Strategic Support Force) are the worst in terms of mental and physical health among all the armed forces. They spend long amounts of time underground away from sunlight, exposed to chemicals in the air from rocket fuel which is above the health and safety limit. The morale isn’t exactly peak and unit readiness obviously has to be called into question.
The Chinese are trying to improve this through a number of fronts: Increasing the rotation of troops so they spend less time underground due to shorter stints, more VR based training to help them deal with the stress of war when their positions are being bombed and they are constantly hunted when out on mobile launchers, increased access to mental health facilities.
People often forget that war is at the end of the day fought by people, not just platforms. The same way the Traumatic brain injuries of an F-22 pilot can determine the war, the mental health and lung damage of a PRC Rocket force soldier can also determine it.
The PLAAF has done it’s own bit of upgrading and modernizing their force structures. They have broken down from the soviet era brigade structures to smaller structures called flights (similar to squadrons in the west). They have increased the level of pilot participation in flight planning, increased the pilot autonomy in the air and moved away from ground based interception tactics. They have their own Red vs Blue exercises and VR training programs as well.
However, my guess is that these won’t make difference in preparing the PLAAF for fighting against F-22s for the simple reason that even USAF pilots in F-15s and F-16s who are veterans are unable to beat F-22s in air combat. The tech gap is simply too large.
The only benefit of these modernizations I see is that the J-20 pilots whose job it is to skim around the F-22s, using their stealth to protect themselves from the F-22’s missiles, can carry out more effective missions hunting the support aircraft that support the F-22s.
There are some last issues that could impact how China’s fight against American American stealth fighters will play out:
- American Production Lines
- American Joint operations with allies
On the issue of production lines:
The F-35 production line right now is 15 aircraft a month at peak production. This is considered low by some standards but to be honest, considering that it’s a very advanced fighter it doesn’t seem to matter much. The problem however, is that this is under the assumption that every single F-35 produced will be deployed against China which is not true because the US has to manage multiple theaters (Russia-Europe, Home Air Bases etc.).
Also, the F-35 is a multi national project, so those 15 F-35s being made every month have to shared between 12 Airforces, 1 Marine Corp and 2 Navies across the planet. Further reducing the number of stealth fighters the US can deploy against China.
At the moment the US has built around 600 F-35s but not all of them have been deployed against the PRC in the Pacific theater. A good chunk of these have gone to allied forces who might not participate in a war against China or to squadrons the US might not redeploy to the Pacific. The 15 a month production line means it will be some time till the US can field the same hundreds of F-15s/F16s/F-18s that they fielded against Iraq or deployed around Iran.
The F-22 has no production lines anymore so every F-22 lost is a permanent loss.
The PRC on the other hand gets to field every single stealth fighter they build to the Pacific theater and don’t have to share the production lines with allied forces.
But as discussed above, this might be a bit of a moot point since the PRC could deploy their J-20s or J-31s to missions that don’t bring much chance of air to air combat against other stealth fighters.
The second is that the US has to coordinate military activities with allies like Japan and Taiwan. NATO and the US-South Korean militaries are heavily integrated already at the moment but it’s unclear how well the US and Japanese militaries or the US and Taiwanese militaries will work together. The Pentagon bureaucracy is appallingly bad while the US works with militaries world wide, actively integrating them into the overall command structure led by the US for a war against China is a bit of a new thing for them to do.
The PRC, being a single entity, does not face this problem.
Missile Defense and Missile Defeat
The US has begun to understand the lethality of the Chinese missile arsenal and the threat it poses to US naval and airpower assets in the Pacific which is why they have begun to invest in the idea of 2 forms of counter missile operations:
- Missile Defense
- Missile Defeat
The missile defense aspect is the idea that you have platforms capable of shooting down enemy missiles in a way that moves away from the kinetic interceptor technology of today.
The current interceptor technology of Patriots and THAADs are incredibly expensive which is why you can only deploy them in a low density manner to counter isolated missile launches such as ICBMs from North Korea.
The cost of individual interceptors is so high that you would bankrupt yourself making enough of them to shoot down missiles that cost a fraction of the interceptor’s cost. If you are building 2 $50 million dollar interceptors to shoot down 1 $10 million dollar missile, you are bankrupting yourself.
The only cost effective way to shoot down swarms of Chinese missiles is using energy based weapons but that is not something that’s deployable today as the technology is still being developed.
Missile Defeat is the second form of defense: Where you saturate your conflict zone with sensors so that you can have longer early warnings of missile launches and be able to target them and defeat the missile launches before they actually launch. So basically, solve the problem of the 15 minute window that the US faced when scud hunting in the Iraqi desert.
This is currently being developed as well and is not in a finalized solution.
And of course, the Chinese aren’t sitting around either and will come up with ways to counter energy based missile defense and sensor networks attempting to defeat missile launches.
At the end of the day, the US military is no joke and the F-22 is probably the single most deadliest fighter ever created, probably even more so than the F-35 which funnily enough is crippling the US economy in peacetime with it’s $30–50,000 dollar per hour maintenance cost.
Stealth fighters are great to have in a war but terrible to have in a peace and at a time when US social unrest is at an all time high due to economic inequalities, perhaps the greatest threat to F-22s are congressional budget hearings rather than any weapon in the Chinese arsenal.
Nevertheless, the PRC has been investing heavily in denial weapons that would deny free air and sea access to the US military operating close to the Chinese seaboard (and keep them away from Taiwan).
One potential scenario is that assuming the US doesn’t rebase the F-22s to the 90 Japanese air-fields but keeps them concentrated in the current 8 or so bases they have:
The F-22s would probably not face that many losses from missile strikes but pilot rotation would have be high due to high churn over because of mental/physical strain from constant Chinese missile bombardments on F-22 airfields. F-22s would be more at risk of malfunction due to disruptions in their maintenance routines because of missile strikes. They would probably also fly lower numbers of sorties than optimal because of constant bombardment and these would normally be air defense or air escort sorties for aircraft trying to get closer to the Chinese sea board for recon or to disrupt Chinese air support for any potential invasion of Taiwan. They could also be used for strike missions on the mainland on high value military targets that non-stealth fighters would not be able to reach.
Edit: Thanks to Walter Tak in the comments pointing out that a fully loaded F-22 might only be restricted to hitting coastal targets rather than anything deep inside Chinese territory due to range limitations.
The F-22s would have to face several situations where they were operating at the edge of their combat radius because of the constant threat to air refuellers from Chinese stealth aircraft that would utilize their stealth to hunt for USAF/Japanese AWACS, EW, Recon and Refueling platforms in contested airspace. The F-22s would also be paired with a drone UCAV wingman that the F-22 would control remotely when operating in high-danger environments where the F-22 can’t be risked and a remotely piloted wingman from the invisible F-22 would take on the risk instead (assuming stable links can be maintained in the face of Chinese EW). If such comm links are disrupted, the UCAV would have to operate autonomously using onboard AI.
The longer the war drags on however, the worse it is for the F-22s as the US would have to begin pulling F-22 pilots from squadrons not based in the Pacific as the problem they would face is pilot shortages rather than F-22 shortages. A small but significant number of F-22s might be lost due to destruction on the ground or air crashes due to maintenance disruptions (more so the latter than the former). But the primary issue the USAF would face is that their F-22 pilots on the 8 air bases facing constant missile bombardment would begin to face serious mental and physical health problems due to concussions/mental strain/shell shock. They would need to be rotated out of combat in tours as short as a few days given how intense a US-China open conflict would be. The sortie rate could be maintained as long as pilots are able to recover and cognitively function once returned to combat after their tour. If they don’t and their mental/physical injuries are more permanent or long duration, the F-22 fleet would have to drastically reduce sorties correspondingly.
This strain isn’t a one way thing either: Chinese Rocket Force troops who are in underground silos, launching hundreds of missiles a day, breathing in toxic fumes from rocket fuel and facing constant bombardment of their own from US assets would face similar strains and have to be rotated constantly.
As mentioned earlier, in war we sometimes focus too much on the platform aspect and forget that it’s real human beings fighting it. And the question of the F-22 in the Pacific might ultimately boil down to which side has enough soldiers standing and in fighting condition at the end of the day: A tale as old as war itself
Edit: Thanks to JL Shin for the correction: the Strategic Rocket Force is still separate from the Strategic Support Force and both exist as separate entities so the ballistic missile force referred to in this answer would be the Strategic Rocket force.
Because they thought the enemy were like them. They thought that if for instance Tokyo fell, then it would be the rape of Tokyo (just like they did the rape of Nanjing).
It’s well known that when the Philippines fell the Japanese were very surprised of the amount of U.S prisoners and they were simply not prepared to house so many prisoners but i ask…
How many U.S soldiers would surrender if they knew that slavery, torture, starvation, humiliation and maybe death was going to await them at the Japanese prisioner camps?
Not many. Many would have fought to the death. Just like the Japanese fought rather than falling to the horrors they thought would await them at the hands of the westerners.
I’m actually now thinking in the female fighters of the middle east.
We have heard the cases of Syrian, Israeli, Kurdish, and other female fighters against ISIS that choose suicide over capture. Quite simply because they know that what awaits them. It’s rape, slavery or at least execution.
There were some Japanese women who committed suicide over capture for the same reason.
I don’t think they knew about the rape of Nanjing. But I think they were warned by soldiers and officials of what may happen to them.
Can Zhang gave an amazing answer (sorry I don’t know the link ) but I think it needs some more comments with this..
Disclaimer: Western Allies, Japan, Soviets, Chinese, and Axis all committed atrocities, but all on different levels. We just cannot compare the worst of the Allies with the worst of the Axis. They are on different levels.