Kellogg workers strike as the pandemic compounds the problematic long-standing working environment.
During Covid, employees worked 12 hour shifts 7 days per week.
Kelloggs threatens to move jobs to Mexico if workers don’t accept cuts.
Why do CNBC and Fox Business channel only cover stock prices and the CEOs?
Why don’t these “business” channels cover workers and their experience.
The historian Beverly Gage, who has run the Grand Strategy course since 2017, says the university failed to stand up for academic freedom amid inappropriate efforts to influence the curriculum.
The Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy is one of Yale University’s most celebrated and prestigious programs. Over the course of a year, it allows a select group of about two dozen students to immerse themselves in classic texts of history and statecraft, while also rubbing shoulders with guest instructors drawn from the worlds of government, politics, military affairs and the media.
But now, a program created to train future leaders how to steer through the turbulent waters of history is facing a crisis of its own.
Beverly Gage, a historian of 20th-century politics who has led the program since 2017, has resigned, saying the university failed to stand up for academic freedom amid inappropriate efforts by its donors to influence its curriculum and faculty hiring.
The donors, both prominent and deep-pocketed, are Nicholas F. Brady, a former U.S. Treasury secretary under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, and Charles B. Johnson, a mutual fund billionaire and leading Republican donor who in 2013 made a $250 million donation to Yale — the largest gift in its history.
Days after the 2020 presidential election, Professor Gage said, an opinion article in The New York Times by another instructor in the program calling Donald J. Trump a demagogue who threatened the Constitution prompted complaints from Mr. Brady.
Four months of wrangling over the program later, Professor Gage resigned after the university administration informed her that a new advisory board it was creating under previously ignored bylaws would be dominated by conservative figures of the donors’ choosing, including, against her strong objections, Henry A. Kissinger, the former secretary of state under President Richard M. Nixon.
Her resignation, which Yale has not yet made public, raises the question of where universities draw the line between honoring original agreements with donors and allowing them undue sway in academic affairs. It’s a question that can become turbocharged when colliding political visions, and the imperatives of fund-raising, are involved.
Since taking over the program, Professor Gage has expanded the syllabus to include grass-roots social movements, like the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong and the civil rights movement in the United States. Until late last year, she said, she had received no criticism from the donors or the administration about the course’s direction.
In a statement, Yale’s president, Peter Salovey, offered praise for her teaching and scholarship. But the administration disputed her claims that Yale had given in to donor pressure.
Pericles Lewis, the university’s vice president for global strategy and vice provost for academic initiatives, said the university was simply adhering to its 2006 agreement with the donors, which Professor Gage had resisted.
“It wouldn’t have a controlling power,” he said of the board. “But I can understand why that would not be her cup of tea.”
What the administration sees as legitimate oversight, Professor Gage, who remains a tenured professor in the history department, sees as a sudden effort by the donors to establish “some form of surveillance and control” over the program.
“It’s very difficult to teach effectively or creatively in a situation where you are being second-guessed and undermined and not protected,” she said in an interview.
The idea was to teach leadership through an eclectic curriculum of classic texts, case-studies and crisis simulations, incorporating thinkers and topics from Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and Machiavelli to the Cold War.
The course “arose out of the desire to reaffirm the power of the big idea,” the journalist Molly Worthen wrote in “The Man on Whom Nothing Was Lost,” her 2005 biography of Mr. Hill. “It came from the professors’ alarm at the rise of the ‘wonk,’ the Clinton-era policy expert with no concept of broad context.”
The course quickly drew admirers (and imitators) well beyond Yale, along with plenty of suspicion on the predominantly liberal campus, where some saw it as a cultish bastion of retrograde “great man” history.
In 2006, it was formally endowed with a combined gift of $17.5 million from Mr. Johnson and Mr. Brady. In a 2013 article in The Yale Daily News, Professor Gaddis said Mr. Brady had given a single directive: “Teach common sense.”
“Grand Strategy” is a capacious but slippery concept, one that has generated continuing debates about its meaning. In his 2018 book “On Grand Strategy,” Professor Gaddis defined it as “the alignment of unlimited aspirations with necessarily limited capabilities.”
Professor Gage, 49, has incorporated social movement strategy into the course. (In a recent essay, she described herself as someone who “was as likely to be a protester as a policymaker.”) She said she has sought to bring in a demographically, politically and intellectually diverse group of practitioners as teachers and guest speakers. Recent invitees have included the former defense secretary James N. Mattis; the conservative intellectual Yuval Levin; the civil rights lawyer Vanita Gupta, and the racial justice activist Heather McGhee.
Professor Kennedy said he supported the direction of the course under Professor Gage. “She is a very gifted leader and teacher,” he said.
Professor Gaddis echoed the sentiment, adding: “I don’t think the Yale administration has sufficiently insulated her. It is traditionally thought that the faculty determine the curriculum, and I think that’s how it should be.”
Professor Gage, who was recently nominated to the National Council on the Humanities, was renewed by Yale as program director in July 2020. (She is also a contributing writer for The New York Times Magazine and has written opinion pieces for The Times.) She described her previous relationship with the donors as supportive.
But she said the tone abruptly changed last November, a week after the presidential election, when Bryan Garsten, a Yale political scientist who teaches in the program, published an opinion article called “How to Protect America From the Next Donald Trump.”
The next day, Professor Gage received an email from Mr. Hill saying Mr. Brady had called “to grouse” about the article, “complaining that there was no grand strategy in it.” According to the email, which was viewed by The Times, Mr. Brady also said that “this is not what Charlie Johnson and I signed up for.” (Mr. Hill died last March, at 84.)
In a phone call with Professor Gage that day, Mr. Brady reiterated his view and began asking about the syllabus and practitioners. “It was strange, because none of that had changed much in the past three years,” she said.
Representatives for Mr. Brady, 91, and Mr. Johnson, 88, said they were unavailable for comment.
In another phone call, on Nov. 13, Professor Gage said, Mr. Brady lamented that the program isn’t “what it was.” When she pressed for specifics, he said she wasn’t teaching Grand Strategy “the way Henry Kissinger would.”
“I said, ‘That’s absolutely right. I am not teaching Grand Strategy the way Henry Kissinger would,’” she said.
Later that day, Mr. Brady sent her an excerpt from the 2006 donor agreement, outlining an outside five-member “board of visitors” that would advise on the appointments of the practitioners.
Professor Gage had never heard of this board, which had never been established. Dr. Lewis, the vice provost, told her he would look into it. Two weeks later, Dr. Lewis said he had confirmed details in the donor agreement, and Yale had a legal obligation to create the board.
Professor Gage wasn’t happy. But if it were created, she insisted to Dr. Lewis, it would need diversity across generational, ideological, methodological, racial and gender lines. And the donors could not be allowed to appoint its members.
Yale, she said, seemed to agree. What followed were nearly two months of back and forth, with Dr. Lewis sending along a string of suggestions — most of them Republicans or conservatives, Professor Gage said. She said she told him most would be fine, as long as the board had a diverse mix.
But in late February, things “started to head downhill.” she said. In a phone call, she said, Dr. Lewis told her that the donors were threatening to sue to reclaim the remaining Grand Strategy endowment. And it was suggested that Mr. Johnson’s $250 million donation might also be in doubt.
Dr. Lewis also said that Mr. Brady wanted a researcher whom he had previously commissioned to write a 2016 book about the program to observe class and report back.
On March 4, things came to a head. According to Professor Gage, Dr. Lewis told her that Mr. Johnson had what Dr. Lewis said was a mistaken impression that he could choose the board, and that he wanted to name Stephen J. Hadley, former national security adviser to George W. Bush; Thomas H. Kean, the former Republican governor of New Jersey; and Mr. Kissinger.
Professor Gage told him the board lacked the necessary variety, and that she objected to Mr. Kissinger. “He represents the opposite of the generational shift I have been trying to make,” she said in the interview.
The next week, Professor Gage said, Dr. Lewis said Dr. Salovey was moving ahead with a board including those three men. And it would not include anyone with social-movement expertise, because the donors didn’t want that.
That evening, she spoke with Dr. Salovey, who asked her to see things “from the university’s perspective,” as she recalled it, describing it as a donor-management situation that would likely settle down.
She told him that unless Yale came out more strongly in favor of academic freedom and in support of the current program, she would resign. Several days later, she did so, effective in December.
Dr. Lewis called Professor Gage “an outstanding historian and a great teacher.” But in an interview with The Times, he pushed back on the notion that Yale had been swayed by donor pressure. Aside from a strong desire for Mr. Kissinger, he said, the donors did not pick any board members, beyond wanting an international relations focus (which he called “the original remit of the program”).
Dr. Lewis said the donors had not relayed any political concerns about the board or the program. “The way they expressed to me, it was more about wanting to be sure the goal of international engagement and so on was there, and that we had distinguished practitioners,” he said.
As for the suggestion that Mr. Brady’s researcher might attend class and report back, Dr. Lewis said the thought was that it might be time for “an update” to her book, which was published in 2016 — an idea, he said, that he ruled out.
Asked about Professor Gage’s claim that Dr. Salovey informed her that he intended to include three people on the board she has been told Mr. Johnson wanted, a spokeswoman for Yale declined to comment. “We’re not going to confirm this level of detail about private conversations,” she said.
Dr. Lewis said he did not recall if Mr. Johnson’s $250 million donation came up. Nor did he recall any threats of legal action, though there had been discussion whether the remaining funds could be put to other uses “if for some reason we felt Grand Strategy had reached the end of its time.”
Despite those conversations, Dr. Lewis said there were no plans to discontinue the program, which he called “one of the jewels in the crown of the Yale curriculum.”
Professor Gage said that at a time when many people are concerned about the lack of political diversity at elite campuses, it was ironic that the Grand Strategy program had come under fire.
“This program really tried to be something that lots of people say they want universities to be: a place of open engagement across ideological lines,” she said.
House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy issued a threat to phone and social media companies that cooperate with the House select committee investigating the Capitol riot.
Saudi Arabia is threatening to sell its oil in currencies other than the dollar if Washington passes a bill exposing OPEC members to U.S. antitrust lawsuits, three sources familiar with Saudi energy policy said.
They said the option had been discussed internally by senior Saudi energy officials in recent months. Two of the sources said the plan had been discussed with OPEC members and one source briefed on Saudi oil policy said Riyadh had also communicated the threat to senior U.S. energy officials.
The chances of the U.S. bill known as NOPEC coming into force are slim and Saudi Arabia would be unlikely to follow through, but the fact Riyadh is considering such a drastic step is a sign of the kingdom’s annoyance about potential U.S. legal challenges to OPEC.
In the unlikely event Riyadh were to ditch the dollar, it would undermine the its status as the world’s main reserve currency, reduce Washington’s clout in global trade and weaken its ability to enforce sanctions on nation states.
“The Saudis know they have the dollar as the nuclear option,” one of the sources familiar with the matter said.
“The Saudis say: let the Americans pass NOPEC and it would be the U.S. economy that would fall apart,” another source said.
Saudi Arabia’s energy ministry did not respond to a request for comment.
A U.S. state department official said: “as a general matter, we don’t comment on pending legislation.”
The U.S. Energy Department did not respond to a request for comment. Energy Secretary Rick Perry has said that NOPEC could lead to unintended consequences.
NOPEC, or the No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act, was first introduced in 2000 and aims to remove sovereign immunity from U.S. antitrust law, paving the way for OPEC states to be sued for curbing output in a bid to raise oil prices.
While the bill has never made it into law despite numerous attempts, the legislation has gained momentum since U.S. President Donald Trump came to office. Trump said he backed NOPEC in a book published in 2011 before he was elected, though he not has not voiced support for NOPEC as president.
Trump has instead stressed the importance of U.S-Saudi relations, including sales of U.S. military equipment, even after the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi last year.
A move by Saudi Arabia to ditch the dollar would resonate well with big non-OPEC oil producers such as Russia as well as major consumers China and the European Union, which have been calling for moves to diversify global trade away from the dollar to dilute U.S. influence over the world economy.
Russia, which is subject to U.S. sanctions, has tried to sell oil in euros and China’s yuan but the proportion of its sales in those currencies is not significant.
Venezuela and Iran, which are also under U.S. sanctions, sell most of their oil in other currencies but they have done little to challenge the dollar’s hegemony in the oil market.
However, if a long-standing U.S. ally such as Saudi Arabia joined the club of non-dollar oil sellers it would be a far more significant move likely to gain traction within the industry.
Saudi Arabia controls a 10th of global oil production, roughly on par with its main rivals – the United States and Russia. Its oil firm Saudi Aramco holds the crown of the world’s biggest oil exporter with sales of $356 billion last year.
Depending on prices, oil is estimated to represent 2 percent to 3 percent of global gross domestic product. At the current price of $70 per barrel, the annual value of global oil output is $2.5 trillion.
Not all of those oil volumes are traded in the U.S. currency but at least 60 percent is traded via tankers and international pipelines with the majority of those deals done in dollars.
Trading in derivatives such as oil futures and options is mainly dollar denominated. The top two global energy exchanges, ICE and CME, traded a billion lots of oil derivatives in 2018 with a nominal value of about $5 trillion.
Just the prospect of NOPEC has already had implications for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Qatar, one of the core Gulf OPEC members, quit the group in December because of the risk NOPEC could harm its U.S. expansion plans.
Two sources said that despite raising the dollar threat, Saudi Arabia did not believe it would need to follow through.
“I don’t think the NOPEC bill will pass but the Saudis have ‘what if’ scenarios,” one of the sources said.
In the event of such a drastic Saudi move, the impact would take some time to play out given the industry’s decades-old practices built around the U.S. dollar – from lending to exchange clearing.
Other potential threats raised in Saudi discussions about retaliation against NOPEC included liquidating the kingdom’s holdings in the United States, the sources said.
The kingdom has nearly $1 trillion invested in the United States and holds some $160 billion in U.S. Treasuries.
If it did carry out its threat, Riyadh would also have to ditch the Saudi riyal’s peg to the dollar, which has been exchanged at a fixed rate since 1986, the sources said.
The United States, the world’s largest oil consumer, relied heavily on Saudi and OPEC supplies for decades – while supporting Riyadh militarily against its arch-foe Iran.
But soaring shale oil production at home has made Washington less dependant on OPEC, allowing it to be more forceful in the way it deals with Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern nations.
Over the past year, Trump has regularly called on OPEC to pump more oil to lower global oil prices, and linked his demands to political support for Riyadh – something previous U.S. administrations have refrained from doing, at least publicly.
Reporting by Dmitry Zhdannikov and Alex Lawler in London and Rania El Gamal in Dubai; additional reporting by Timothy Gardner in Washington; editing by David Clarke
In Jan 1975, Commentary Magazine argued that the US should threaten to invade the Persian Gulf if they did not:
- agree to price oil exclusively in dollars, thereby generating demand for dollars
- save oil profits in US Treasury bills, thereby financing the US debt
- buy American weapons, including surplus Vietnam war equipment, and future US weapons, thereby financing the military industrial complex
There remains the argument that military intervention in the Persian Gulf would on moral grounds alone not be countenanced by domestic public opinion. Nor is it only the public that would presumably find in the act a manifestation of complete moral bankruptcy. One has the distinct impression that the foreign-policy elite shares this view and that in the certitude with which the public’s supposed reaction is diagnosed there is something close to a wish-fulfilling prophecy. It is a curious reaction coming from those who once found no great difficulty, moral or otherwise, in supporting the intervention in Vietnam or who, in finally abandoning their support for intervention, did so not on moral grounds, but because they concluded Vietnam could not have a successful outcome or that, whatever the outcome, the costs had become disproportionate to the interests at stake. Perhaps their present reaction to the prospect of armed intervention in the Persian Gulf is not so curious, though, given this record. It is not surprising that, having lacked a sense of balance, moral and otherwise, in that most painful experience, they should lack a sense of balance today, and that we should find the law of compensation—or rather of overcompensation—at work.
At issue here is not whether there is some clear moral or legal basis for justifying armed intervention in the Persian Gulf, but whether public opinion would be morally outraged by the action. Though it is not uncommon to find them confused, these are two quite different questions. There is no need for positive moral approval, let alone moral fervor, by the public so long as it consents to the need for the action. There may even be considerable gain in the absence of that element which has so often attended policy in the past. The difficulty, of course, is that the public has been long habituated to support the use of force only in cases which have been made to appear as necessary for the containment of Communism, in turn equated with the nation’s security. Could the public be induced, in the shadow of Vietnam, to support a military intervention that bore no apparent or tangible relation to the containment of Communism, itself a factor of diminishing importance in determining the public’s disposition? No one can say. Put in the abstract, the question itself may be rather meaningless. It would take on meaning only after a concerted effort had been made to persuade the public that the alternatives to intervention were laden with dangers to the nation’s well-being. Even then it remains an open question whether an administration could obtain public support, or tolerance, for intervention in the absence of events at home that, once plainly visible, would require little further effort in persuasion. In this instance, the choice might well be between a public that would oppose intervention so long as the interests at stake were not clear, and could not readily be made clear, and a public that would support intervention only when these interests had unfortunately become only too clear.
The point is worth emphasis that we simply do not know what might bring the public to support intervention in the Persian Gulf. If the public viewed such intervention as another Vietnam, they would most assuredly oppose it. But if intervention were to promise success at relatively modest cost, opinion might well move in the direction of support, and particularly if unemployment were to rise to 8 or 9 per cent. Moreover, in this instance, by contrast to Vietnam, the existence of an all-volunteer military force would preclude the painful issues once raised by the draft. Nor is it at all clear that the Left would take the same position toward intervention in the present case as it did toward Vietnam. For the effects of the current oil price on many poor countries do not endear the major oil producers to much of the Left. The relative ease with which Vietnam could be depicted as an attempt to preserve American domination over the developing states, a domination alleged to serve only American interests, would be difficult to repeat today, and this despite the inadequately perceived effects of the oil crisis.
To overcome the gridlock, the US sought to apply pressure on Saudi Arabia by openly discussing the military option of occupying Saudi Arabia. On 1 January 1975, Commentary magazine published
one of the most famous articles in the history of American foreign policy.
The article was written by Robert W. Tucker, head of the American Foreign Policy Institute
and a member of the inner circle of the White House. The title was “Oil: The Issue of American Intervention” and it made explicit references to the military scenario the US was working on. The article served its purpose and convinced
the Saudis to sign the deal. Despite a range of highs and lows, all administrations
ever since President Carter have shown commitment to the ma ntra of a “strong dollar.” For 35
years, from 1975 to 2010, the Petrodollar deal has remained intact, despite oil price
increases and dollar volatility. The dollar has solidified its role as the leading reserve
currency and the leading payments currency. By 2009, a new economic crisis eroded the
stability of the Petrodollar deal. In September of the same year, world leaders gathered for
the G20 Leaders’ Summit and President Obama proposed a plan to boost world growth based
on a simple idea: Each major economic block or region would commit to move away from a
sector it has over-relied and toward an area that offered growth potential.
For China and Japan, this would mean moving from capital investment to consumption. Europe
would move from exports to investment and the US itself would take on the task of increasing
exports. The main obstacle in attaining a growth in
export was that without being able to double the size of labour force or the productivity
of labour (the main drivers of industrial production growth), the only viable option
would be to cheapen the currency. By July 2011, just 18 months after the meeting,
the dollar index stood at 80.48, which represented a decline of 8% and a new all-time low. A currency war had started which continues to survive until today.
Relations between Saudi Arabia and the US have deteriorated sharply over the course
of the Obama administration. There are a number of causes:
* The Iran-US nuclear negotiations and the US acknowledgment of Iran as the leading regional
power. * The release of a top-secret 28-page section
of the 9/11 Commission Report that clearly reveals links between members of the Saudi
royal family and the 9/11 hijackers. The Saudis have threatened to sell their US Treasury
securities in response but they have so far failed to keep their word.
* The US is now a net exporter of energy, and supposedly, has the largest oil reserves
in the world
In response to the weakening of the US dollar, several OPEC nations are allowing oil transactions
to be carried out in other currencies:
* In January 2016, India and Iran agreed to settle their oil sales in Indian rupees.
* In 2014, Qatar agreed with China to be the first hub for clearing transactions in the
Chinese yuan. * In December 2015, the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) and China created a new currency swap agreement for the yuan.
All the above strongly indicate that the Gulf States are taking measures to reduce their
dependence and exposure to the US dollar. All of the conditions that gave rise to the
Petrodollar agreement now stand in the exact opposite position of where they were in 1975.
Neither the US nor Saudi Arabia have much leverage over the other.
A new oil pricing mechanism is possible, and once identified and announced, it will signify
the end of the US dollar as the leading currency. The oil price will pave the way and will certainly
soon be followed by other goods and commodities. Will this be the start
of a new era?
In this special crossover episode, People I (Mostly) Admire host Steve Levitt admits to No Stupid Questions co-host Angela Duckworth that he knows almost nothing about psychology. But once Angela gives Steve a quick tutorial on “goal conflict,” he is suddenly a fan. They also talk parenting, self-esteem, and how easy it is to learn econometrics if you feel like it.
Listen and subscribe to our podcast at Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or elsewhere. Below is a transcript of the episode, edited for readability. For more information on the people and ideas in the episode, see the links at the bottom of this post.
* * *
Stephen DUBNER: Hey there, it’s Stephen Dubner. If there’s one thing we’ve all learned from a year-long pandemic shutdown, it’s that no two people respond exactly the same way to a year-long pandemic shutdown. Around here, we responded by starting some new podcasts. You may already know this, if you follow us closely. The first show we called No Stupid Questions, and it’s kind of a Freakonomics Radio for psychology. It is hosted by me and Angela Duckworth, who teaches psychology at the University of Pennsylvania and she wrote the book Grit: The Power of Passion and Perseverance. Angela is brilliant, and a force of nature; I love the conversations we have on No Stupid Questions. Like this one:
Angela DUCKWORTH: Stephen, I’ve been wondering about how different I am in different situations, so I have a question for you. Are you ready for it?
Stephen DUBNER: Yes, I am.
DUCKWORTH: So, I wonder about myself, about how different I can act at home versus if I am with colleagues — how different I can think, and even how different I feel. And it’s as if there are multiple “mes,” multiple Angelas, and I wondered whether you have multiple Stephens.
One of our other new shows is hosted by Steve Levitt, my Freakonomics friend and co-author, who’s an economist at the University of Chicago. Levitt’s podcast is called People I (Mostly) Admire. He’s been having some truly memorable conversations with truly remarkable people. Like these:
Robert SAPOLSKY: So I was gifted my baboons and I stuck with them on and off for 33 years.
Marina NITZE: And then the White House appointed me to be the C.T.O. of the V.A.
John DONOHUE: I’m frequently called a treasonous enemy of the Constitution.
Susan WOJCICKI: Going and saying, “Hey, let’s go buy YouTube,” was a really big decision.
Sal KHAN: I want to create a world where for close to free, you can essentially get everything that you need to know to work, to get a job, to go to grad school.
Amaryllis FOX: Human intelligence is based on building trust and relationships with groups that are trying to attack us or members of governments that are at war with us.
Greg NORMAN: Hitting the perfect golf shot is better than having an orgasm, right?
If you are the kind of person who loves it when worlds collide, then today is a very good day. Because today, in our best impression of a complicated Russian novel, we’re playing for you a conversation that Levitt recorded for People I (Mostly) Admire with Angela Duckworth from No Stupid Questions and that we thought was so great that it should play here, on Freakonomics Radio. You should, of course, follow all three of these shows — as well a fourth show that we’ve just launched. It’s called Sudhir Breaks the Internet; we’ll tell you more about that one later. For now, I hope you enjoy this special bonus episode of People I (Mostly) Admire with Steve Levitt and Angela Duckworth.
* * *
I first encountered Angela Duckworth 15 years ago when she came to the University of Chicago Department of Economics to give an academic seminar. I don’t remember many details, only that my colleagues, who are always raucous and rude, were particularly outspoken that day. It was the first time I remember a psychologist being invited to give a seminar in the economics department — and also the last. I’m not sure what my colleagues so disliked about Angela’s work back then, but I think it’s fair to say that Angela has definitely had the last laugh. It is hard to imagine how anyone could have been much more successful than she has been over the last 15 years, both inside and outside of academics. Let me make a prediction before we get started today. Officially, I’m supposed to be interviewing Angela, but I’m pretty sure, given my past conversations with her, it won’t take long before I become the interviewee and she the interviewer.
Steve LEVITT: Angela Duckworth, it is so great to get to talk to you today. People get to hear you chatting with Stephen Dubner on a regular basis on your joint podcast No Stupid Questions, but I suspect you and I will have a very different sort of conversation today, for better or for worse.
DUCKWORTH: I look forward to it. I’m going to call you Levitt throughout this conversation so I don’t get confused.
LEVITT: All right. That’s how I feel most comfortable. So, let’s start with Grit. In 2016, you wrote a book called Grit that really touched a nerve in society. It became a mega-bestseller. Could you give us the two-minute version of Grit?
DUCKWORTH: The two-minute version of Grit is that when you look at high achievers, so Olympic athletes and frankly, Steve, people like — oh, Levitt — people like you, entrepreneurs who are really successful across all these different fields, they have one thing in common. Likely not the only thing, but one common denominator that I’ve studied as a psychologist is this combination of perseverance and passion over really long periods. That’s what I call grit. And I think if you wanted a one-word synonym, it would be stamina.
It turns out that these Nobel laureates and Olympic athletes and high achievers across other domains try to do things that are really hard. They’re typically trying to achieve a certain thing. So, they’re not waking up every day working really hard on a variety of different pursuits. They are trying to achieve what I sometimes call a top-level goal, something that might take years or decades or a lifetime, but which is for them worth pursuing at the cost of other, maybe easier, maybe more novel directions.
LEVITT: So, what I think often gets lost in the shuffle, is that grit isn’t actually a characteristic of a person. It’s an interaction between a person and a project. And that’s one thing that’s frustrated me in the broader discussion. For instance, you have this grit test you can take online where there are a bunch of questions. And then, I, as a person, am given a grit score. But don’t you think that mixes up the message? You wouldn’t want to be gritty about everything. You want to be gritty about the right thing.
DUCKWORTH: So, I do think that grit is a quality of the individual. And I also think you can’t be gritty in a vacuum. You have to be gritty about something. But when I say it’s a characteristic of a person, imagine that there was a universal law that Levitt couldn’t do what he’s doing now or that Angela Duckworth wasn’t allowed to be a psychologist. The question is, in this hypothetical world where you can’t do this thing that you’ve been doing for really your whole professional life, what would you do? Would you become a dilettante? Would you retire?
I believe that I would try to do something else that took years of effort and focus and consistency. In other words, I think grit is trait-like in the same way that extroversion or agreeableness or open-mindedness might be trait-like, in that people carry this tendency with them in life. And you can answer that question, Levitt — I can’t call you Levitt. I call you Steve. Steve, what will your answer be to that?
LEVITT: So, you did actually characterize me very well there, Angela, because I am a dilettante and—.
DUCKWORTH: Oh, you think you’re a dilettante?
LEVITT: It’s true that I can be extremely gritty about particular things. So, I’ve been very gritty about golf in my life, for instance, and I was gritty about research for a while. I would love to have a slightly modified concept of grit, which I would call maximum grit. And maximum grit is my ability, when I get engaged in the topic — how gritty I am in that scenario. But what I worry about with grit — let me take the Ph.D. students I see in economics. They’re all very gritty. To survive our program, you have to be gritty. But they’re gritty in the worst possible way, in that they latch onto some hopeless topic, and they pound away furiously for years, when anyone with common sense would have stopped at the beginning and refocused on something better.
And that’s my fear, is that you, as the priestess of the grit temple, understand exactly what you mean by it. And you mean, “Okay, grit is a great trait to have when applied to a big, life-long problem.” But the parents who read it are going to say, “Oh, my kids aren’t gritty enough. I need to train them to persevere, no matter how difficult a problem is and how useless it is,” and that people will use your concept in the wrong way. Does that make any sense to you?
DUCKWORTH: First, let me violently agree with you and elaborate. Human beings have goals at different levels of abstraction. The concrete, specific, tactical, really tactical — like, “must open my MacBook Pro and plug in my Rode microphone” — these are goals. And then, as a human being, I execute them. Then, I have really abstract goals. So, for the last five years, I’ve been walking around the planet Earth with the top-level goal in my head of: Use psychological science to help kids thrive. But I think there’s even a more abstract goal that I’ve realized that really subsumes everything I really want to do and that is: To increase psychological literacy, period.
Okay. Human beings not only have a spectrum of goals from the specific to the abstract, but they’re arranged hierarchically where the more abstract goals, the long-term goals, are more identity-relevant. They’re more important to us as people. If somebody said, “You know what? You cannot open your MacBook Pro at 9 a.m. Eastern Time,” I’d be disappointed. Maybe a mistake that people make is to think that grit is about being tenacious about these tactical goals. But if you said to me, “You cannot pursue your top-level goal of increasing psychological literacy,” that’s where I’m going to push back. That’s where I’m going to say, “No. There has to be a way that I can do that. Let me keep trying.” So, I think the idea is flexibility and giving up at the bottom of your goal hierarchy.
And then, at the top, these are the goals that rule the other goals. The reason why you have these tactical goals is so that you can further the master goals. So, there’s a psychologist that I greatly admire named Paul Rozin. I’m sure you’ve heard of Paul Rozin. He’s now in his 80s. And his number one piece of advice for graduate students is to give up easily. He says, “You’re trying to do a study on disgust and pigs. And pigs aren’t going to eat the Cheetos. Just give up. Walk away. Find another animal. Find another measure.” So, I think the secret of applying grit correctly — and you’re right, it is nuanced, so as the high priestess, maybe I should preach a little more effectively — is to be tenacious at the right level of your goal hierarchy.
LEVITT: So, that was an interesting answer. I don’t have goals exactly. I have things that I like to do. And what I love to do is I love to play with data. And I love to play with ideas. I love it when there’s a difficult problem, and it seems like it can’t be solved. And then, with a twist of the wrist that allows you to see the problem differently, a solution emerges. But I just got tired of academics. For me, once Stephen Dubner and I wrote Freakonomics, I realized that the outside world for me was much more fun than the academic world, that the opportunities that would be afforded me were just better. What am I doing trying to publish these papers that get 25 citations when I can be on the Freakonomics podcast and talk to millions of people? It no longer made any sense to me.
DUCKWORTH: Going back to the goal hierarchy idea, I wonder whether you got maybe disenchanted with the returns on investment in economics and discovered an alternative life and world that had greater returns. Or whether there was a different way to achieve a high-level goal for you, which was probe human nature. I mean, I’m trying to shove you into my goal hierarchy model. But it’s partly because I really do think that people tend to not wake up and be a totally different human who — “Oh, I realized that I just like surfing more and I want to start” — but more that they are essentially discarding some lower, relatively speaking, level goal for an alternative path, or having more clarity about a top-level goal. So, I’m trying to suggest that this podcast and Freakonomics and all that was just another way of realizing what you’re really interested in that’s different. But it’s tactical shifting. It’s not like the destination is entirely different.
LEVITT: It’s really interesting to me how much disciplines shape the way we view the world. And I have to say, I barely know what you’re talking about. And in general, I think that psychology and economics are kind of at odds in that economics really has very simple foundations. And any kind of complexity makes economists’ heads spin. And I think that psychology is based in complexity, in part because it’s trying to link back to the brain and who knows what’s going on inside the brain. To that point, I don’t really talk to psychologists. You’re about the only psychologist—.
DUCKWORTH: Really? You don’t? Wow.
LEVITT: Yeah. You and I talk maybe once a month. And every time we talk, you say, “Well, you know this psychologist.” And I’ve never told you, I haven’t heard of a single one of the psychologists you’ve ever mentioned. I literally never know what you’re talking about. You’re one of the only psychologists, I think, who talks to economists on a regular basis. Could you describe a little bit of what you see as the key ideas, the underpinning ideas of psychology? And how do economists and psychologists think differently?
DUCKWORTH: As a denizen of the realm of psychology, let me tell you what my people are like and our traditions, our customs. I think I first crossed the border into the world of economics either my last year of graduate school or my first year as an assistant professor. And I met an economist named Jim Heckman, whom you know well and is not only a denizen of the land of economics, but also a denizen of University of Chicago economics. So, he reached out to me and asked me to give a talk in his lab. And I said yes, flew to Chicago—.
LEVITT: And I was there. I was there, Angela.
DUCKWORTH: Oh, yeah, that’s right. So, I remember at that meeting, there being hands up. I think there were seven people — maybe you were one of them, Steve, who objected at the title slide. Literally, I was on the title slide. I was like, “Do you not like the font? What is this land of economics?” I was presenting standard psychology-style research on self-control predicting academic achievement. As was quickly pointed out to me in my presentation by the numerous economists who objected, I was presenting linear models. They were parametric. I hadn’t really thought about all of the reasons why self-control doesn’t cause academic achievement, but merely might be a confound — nothing that was said was something I hadn’t thought of even.
I was like, “Yeah, I know my models are linear and parametric. But what I’m interested in is why it is that when students don’t succeed at school, why it’s not for an intellectual reason, but more because of a volitional reason.” And I’ve since learned that University of Chicago is like a caricature. You can tell me if I’m wrong, but there is a cultural difference, not only in a favoring of simplicity, over complexity — which I think, in psychology, it’s, “Let me come up with a theory just to describe one phenomenon, like why people eat cheese. And then, I’m going to come up with another theory for why people eat chocolate.” And there is no grand unifying framework.
So, I see this cultural difference play out in meaningful ways, but also just the norms are different. And I think in psychology we have a norm of, well, for example, letting people get past their title slide. So, we do live in different countries. And I think a lot of the reasons why you and I have both had some success, visibility, is because we’re in the minority of people who like to get a passport and traverse to the other country.
LEVITT: I think you and I are different in a lot of ways, and I wonder how much it relates back to our fathers. Because you’ve very publicly talked about how your father’s criticism of you has been a motivating force in your life. Do you want to talk about that a little bit?
DUCKWORTH: Only if you tell me about your dad. But one of the reasons why — when I got back on the plane from visiting University of Chicago as a really green academic — why I didn’t completely disintegrate into a puddle of insecurity is because I already had experience with people like that from my dad. I was like, “Oh, your unvarnished criticism and your excessive irritation at tiny, little mistakes is just like the way my dad used to talk to me. And I know how to handle you.”
I think my dad growing up was not in a great mood most of the time. I think he had frustrated ambitions. He was an automotive refinishing chemist by training. And I think personally he felt somewhat disappointed in not achieving the Nobel Prize in chemistry. And I think one of the reasons why I also could handle the criticism — I think I understood that it was intended in part just to get at truth. I was like, “Oh, these are immature people who are trying to advance the conversation to truth.” I don’t think it’s efficient. I don’t think it’s necessary. But like my dad, they want to know what the right answer is. And I admire that.
LEVITT: So, your dad repeatedly told you you were not a genius.
DUCKWORTH: He would tell everybody in my family. Like, I would save up, for example, all year. And then I would go to Woolworth’s and buy my dad some ugly sweater. And I would wrap it. And I would give it to him for Christmas or Father’s Day. And he would take it out of the box, and he would hold it up, and he would say, “I don’t want this.” He wasn’t doing it, I think, to be abusive. It was just unedited. And that’s how I perceived these University of Chicago economists. I was like, “Clearly there’s not enough prefrontal function to inhibit that thought.”
And so my dad, as my mother was frequently pointing out, was talking to himself as much as he was talking to me. And so, when he said things like, “You’re no genius,” or to my mother, “You’re no Picasso,” because she was an artist, or to my sister and me, “You’re not winning any beauty pageants,” he was just in an unedited way, expressing himself. Because I think his deepest frustration was not with his children, but was with his own thwarted ambitions.
LEVITT: Okay. So, that’s your dad. So, my dad had some similarities in that he was really — he is, I mean, my dad is alive. He was focused on achievement. And he cared a lot about achievement. But unlike your dad, he instilled in me from a very early age the idea that I was special and that I would do great things. And he did it in the cleverest possible way. So, he is and was a medical researcher. And he would come home from work — now, I’m maybe 7 years old — and he would lay out some problem in some experiment he was doing. “So, I have these rats in a cage and I expected to find this, but I found something totally different. And I presented this to the medical students. And they were so stupid. None of them could figure it out. So what’s going on?”
And he would give me just enough clues that, as a 7-year-old, I could figure out the problem. And so, without ever saying to me, “Hey, you’re a genius,” or, “Hey, you’re going to do great things,” he just let me think that, “Wow, I’m a 7-year-old, and I’m smarter than the medical students. I must be really special.” He just instilled in me both high expectations about what I could accomplish, but some kind of crazy self-confidence at the same time, which has weirdly never been shaken.
When I talk to you, I sense that a lot of your motivation comes from a sort of underdog perspective. You try hard because you want to show people that you can do it because of your dad. Is that a fair assessment?
DUCKWORTH: I don’t think I have quite the underdog mentality. I think it actually has more in common with what you talk about, this buoyant self-confidence, maybe gotten to in a slightly different way. But I do think that gritty people, when they’re not the smartest person in the room or when they just screw up royally or they can’t understand something or they make a mistake, they have a self-confidence to keep trying. They’re like, “If I spend five more minutes or if I ask another person, maybe I’ll figure it out.”
The self-confidence to keep going is elemental to grit. I think it’s elemental to the “I’ll show you” response in the face of “You can’t do this.” “Oh, I’ll show you.” And my self-confidence, I think, has a lot in common with yours — it’s not that I’m not capable of feeling bad about myself, but eventually the confidence returns. The origins of that may not be that my father carefully scaffolded mental challenges in a way that I experienced small wins — which, by the way, Al Bandura, one of the greatest psychologists, ever—.
LEVITT: Never heard of him.
DUCKWORTH: Wait, really? Seriously?
LEVITT: Yeah, I’ve never heard of any psychologist.
DUCKWORTH: How have you not heard of Al Bandura? Al Bandura actually — there’s a list. Literally, there’s a list of the most eminent psychologists. And Bandura is the most eminent living psychologist. He’s at Stanford. He’s in his 90s. And his signal contribution, I think, to our understanding of human nature is that so much of what drives what we do and what we don’t do is confidence. His term was self-efficacy. But the idea really is that you believe that you can do something if you try — not that you believe that you can already do something, say econometrics or nonparametric modeling of the sort I was supposed to be doing, according to the audience at University of Chicago when I visited.
The idea of self-efficacy is, “I don’t know how to do that. And maybe actually I’ll be terrible at it at first. But I will be able to do it if I try.” And I have that kind of confidence. And well, “If my dad didn’t carefully scaffold my growing confidence from these little mental problems the way Levitt’s dad did, where did it come from?” I think there was in my early childhood a lot of positive reinforcement from other sources. So, first of all, my dad taught me thermodynamics when I was very young because — I don’t know, what else would you talk to a little kid about? So he would delight when I got the second principle of thermodynamics as a young girl. But also, I got a lot of positive reinforcement socially. So, I figured out, maybe modeling my mother, not my dad, how to get people to like me.
And then, I achieved a kind of mastery experience from like, “Oh, if I smile at you and I look for things that I like about you and I also show you that I like myself, I can almost always make you my friend.” And so, there were all these mastery experiences in my life, some intellectual, like thermodynamics, a lot of them social. And for those reasons, I think — although I can’t be sure, it’s a reconstructed memory of my childhood — I think that’s why when I go to the University of Chicago and I’m told, “That’s ridiculous. It’s stupid,” I get back on the plane and I think, “I don’t know what econometrics is but I could probably learn it if I tried.”
LEVITT: My own parallel to that is — I had always felt really smart and really good at school. And then, I came to M.I.T. to get a Ph.D. in economics. And it was obvious to me within days that, No. 1, I was horribly underprepared and didn’t have the right prerequisites. And No. 2, that everyone else was just incredibly smart. And what was interesting to me is that I had a reaction I never would have anticipated, which was joy. It was pure joy at the idea that I was surrounded by these amazing people who were so much better than me. And I reveled in it. And it was exciting to try to learn from them and watch them. I can’t even really explain it. I don’t know why my ego wasn’t more deeply involved.
DUCKWORTH: I was going to ask you to analyze yourself there. Isn’t that interesting?
LEVITT: Somehow I think my identity wasn’t tied to being smart, even though I’d always felt smart. And the same thing happened when I got to Chicago. I would sit around the table at lunch. And I would look from person to person. And I would say, “Wow, I am clearly the dumbest person at the table. This is awesome.”
DUCKWORTH: Well, what is your identity tied to if it’s not being smart?
LEVITT: I think it’s tied in some ways to being different, that I just accept myself as being different. And it doesn’t bother me that I can’t succeed in conventional ways. What’s interesting when you said, “There’s this idea that I may not be good at something, but if I wanted to, I could be good at it.” So, that’s not me at all. So, in fact, you talked about nonparametric econometrics, and another strange experience I had was in my second year of grad school, a professor named Whitney Newey taught nonparametric econometrics. And I honestly did not understand a word of the entire class. It was completely beyond me. And I thought, “Wow, I’ve heard other people say this before and now I’m experiencing it.”
And it was exciting to experience it. It didn’t bother me. I have this limit. And I’m just going to stay as far away from this particular thing as possible. And a couple of times I’ve needed it in my professional life. And I said, “Well, I’m not going to waste one minute thinking about that because that is beyond me. And so, I’m going to call in one of the hundred people I know who’s great at that. And they’re going to do it for me.”
DUCKWORTH: On a scale from zero to 10, how would you rate your self-esteem — 10 being the highest?
LEVITT: Self-esteem? Probably a 9 or 10. I mean, I know I’m not very attractive. And I know that I have a lisp. And I’m not that great an athlete. Whatever. But I’m really comfortable, by and large, with my limitations. I know a lot of people have this negative self-talk in their head where there’s this monkey sitting on their shoulder telling them they’re not good enough. But the monkey that sits on my shoulder just chats with me about the world. What does the monkey on your shoulder say?
DUCKWORTH: I think my monkey would be like, “Hi, you’re great.” I think self-esteem has gone out of fashion. Since you say that you don’t know a lot about psychology, I will just give you self-esteem 101, a brief history of self-esteem. Self-esteem is the idea of liking yourself, holding yourself in high regard. And even though there’s “self-esteem,” which suggests it’s about how you esteem yourself, there is built into the idea of self-esteem how you believe others regard you. That’s largely because we’re social creatures. We exist in hierarchies in society. And so, it is a spontaneous appraisal of how you think you’re doing and how you think other people think you’re doing.
And the reason why self-esteem went in and out of vogue, I think, is that there was a time in the mid-20th century, like 1960s, where everyone thought, “Oh my gosh, self-esteem is how we should raise our children. And the name of the game of good parenting is to increase the self-esteem of your daughters and sons.” And then, what happened is that this whole idea of self-esteem went out of vogue — largely, I think, because there was work led by Roy Baumeister, who I’ll just tell you, Steve, is a very famous psychologist, but you probably have heard of him.
LEVITT: No, I haven’t.
DUCKWORTH: You haven’t heard of Roy Baumeister? Oh, my God. But Roy Baumeister had this paper about how when you look at all these correlational studies of self-esteem and good outcomes — high grades, job performance, not being depressed — all of the positive things that self-esteem had been correlated with, he said, “We’ve got the causal arrow wrong.” I mean, economists would have stood up and cheered. He said, “Really, if you carefully look at these studies, there’s not a shred of evidence that self-esteem causes these outcomes.” So, then it went out of vogue.
But very recently, another eminent psychologist — I basically only hang out with really eminent people in their 90s — so Tim Beck, who is the creator of psychotherapy, modern cognitive therapy anyway, he is going to be 100 this summer. And I asked him recently, “What is your grand theory?” And he said, “I actually have one. I’m working on my magnum opus right now,” as he put it. He literally said, “This is my E equals MC squared.” And he said, “The fundamental drive of what all people want and what gets us far in life, but also gets us into trouble, is the need for self-esteem.”
And he said, “I know that’s really out of fashion, but I think when you have sadness, it is because you perceive a loss of self-esteem. When you have anxiety, you worry that your self-esteem is going to go down in the future. When you’re angry, it’s because you feel like somebody has threatened your self-esteem. And when you have happiness and joy is when you have an increase in your self-esteem.”
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DUBNER: Hey there, it’s Stephen Dubner again. You’re listening to a special episode of Steve Levitt’s show People I (Mostly) Admire in which he interviews the University of Pennsylvania psychologist Angela Duckworth, who’s cohost of the podcast No Stupid Questions. Both of those shows are part of the Freakonomics Radio Network, as is another brand-new show called Sudhir Breaks the Internet. It’s hosted by Sudhir Venkatesh, a sociologist at Columbia University. He spent the first part of his career embedding himself with the criminal underworld — and the last five years working at Facebook and Twitter. Now he’s returned with the inside story of what these digital giants have done wrong — and right.
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Do you remember the prediction I made before the interview that it wouldn’t take long before Angela started interviewing me? I would say I called that one perfectly. So, one thing I find really special about Angela is that when I talk to her about regular everyday stuff, she almost always manages to say things that sound simple and obvious. But somehow had never occurred to me. It’s bizarre how often I’ve left conversations with her thinking about the world differently. So, in the time we have left, I’m just going to ask her some questions that I really care about, like how to raise happy kids and whether being gritty gets in the way of being happy to see if she can work her magic.
LEVITT: So, I have all these kids and I want them to grow up happy. And I want them to — secondarily, to achieve. But most importantly, I want them to be happy and content and inquisitive. So, does any of this give us a guide to how parents should raise their children?
DUCKWORTH: I do think that the idea that you should raise your kids to feel that they are worthwhile — I mean, to have high self-esteem in the sense that, “I am a worthwhile person, worthy of my own admiration and the admiration of others” — I think that is a good idea. But there’s a semicolon in the sentence. I think that kids should not be raised to think that you can have high self-esteem and be dishonest or sit around all day eating Cheetos and not do anything productive and useful. I think the thing that parents need to do is both give kids a sense of unconditional love — I will love you no matter what and therefore you have this foundation on which to build your self-esteem and your life — but also, to feel like that part of their existence has to be based on their merits, for lack of a better word.
My daughters are — I only have two. So, I have a third the number of children that you do. But they’re both actually incredibly hard-working. I wondered how it was that they turned out that way. They woke up before dawn most days of high school without me telling them to. Like, I was busy doing my own work. And I don’t think it’s because they’re insecure in that they don’t think Mom loves them or Dad loves them. But I think they have a sense that part of life is to do things well.
LEVITT: I had a similar experience with my daughter, Lily. And she was maybe 13 years old. And it was after midnight. I saw the light was still on in her room. And I said, “Lily, what are you doing?” She said, “Well, I have to finish my Chinese homework.” And I said, “No, you don’t. You’re 13 years old. No one cares about whether you do your Chinese homework. It doesn’t even matter. Sleep’s important. You don’t have to be so intense.” She said, “Dad, there’s nothing more important than doing my homework.” And I said, “Okay.” And I stepped back. And I thought, “Wow, that is weird.” Because that is honestly not a trait I ever tried to build into my kids.
DUCKWORTH: Not explicitly. You weren’t like, “I’m going to make them feel like work is the most important thing.”
LEVITT: And what was so interesting about it is that it actually had a transformational effect on what I was doing research-wise, because at that time we had started a preschool, John List and Roland Fryer and I. And we also had started something called a parent academy, where we were bringing in parents of young children and we had been training them to be lifetime teachers of their kids, so how to teach them math and how to teach them reading. And it suddenly occurred to me that actually what we really wanted to teach these parents is whatever it was that got instilled in my daughter, Lily. She had just internalized the idea that—.
DUCKWORTH: You modeled it, then.
LEVITT: Exactly. If we were going to try to teach parents something, it should be, “How do you model behaviors that your kids can follow?” That really framed my view of the world, which is that I’m not sure what you say to your kids matters very much. I think at some fundamental level, it’s what you model 24-hours-a-day in your own behavior. So, I think what my kids saw was they saw me willing to get up at 5 in the morning to go to the golf course to practice doing the same thing over and over. And that somehow instilled in them the idea that, even though it was golf, which seems stupid, that hard work and diligence paid off.
DUCKWORTH: Let’s not forget, by the way, you were also modeling your work as an economist. Yes, you were devoted to golf, but—.
LEVITT: Yeah, I was pretty lazy about academics by the time the kids came around, to be honest. I think I didn’t model as well as I probably should have. It seems to me that this modeling part, you can’t really fake because it’s 24-hours-a-day and it’s who you are. Do you actually think there are things you can actively do, other than who you are as a parent, that will help kids?
DUCKWORTH: Yeah. Bandura — remember the Stanford guy, 90s, really eminent? Okay. So, that was a huge part of his research. So, when he talked about self-efficacy, he also relatedly was talking about modeling. When you have a mom or a dad who wakes up at 5 in the morning and works on their golf stroke, or persists through a problem for months and then make some inroads, that is increasing the self-efficacy of the child watching because you’ve shown what’s possible. You might not have even dreamt it before, but then you saw somebody do it. So, most of the great teachers that I have studied are great models.
And they’re quite explicit about telling the students like, “Oh, by the way, the moral of the story here, while we persisted through this very difficult math problem, is that there are a lot of things in life that are hard. And you’re going to feel discouraged when you first try them. And you’re going to feel stupid. And what we did here together is we showed persistence or grit.” And then, I will say also make a kid feel like they’re loved unconditionally, but also that part of life is to challenge themselves and to try to do better, to become more honest, more kind, more empathic, more skilled.
I mean, you could boil that down to supportive and demanding. And there’s a lot of research, decades of it, showing that parents who can say to their kids or show to their kids, “You are supported unconditionally. You have a firm foundation on which to build your self-esteem.” But also demanding, like, “I’m going to give you things that you can’t yet do. And I’m going to give you that work ethic probably through modeling and explicit speeches and sermons.” I think that’s the recipe for good parenting.
LEVITT: So, it’s obvious that grittiness is associated with achievement. I’m not sure it’s highly correlated with happiness. And here’s what I mean. So, obviously, when you’re gritty about something, when you’re really obsessed and pursuing it, there’s enormous joy that comes from that task. But what I found in my own life is that when I’m engaged in that kind of behavior, the rest of my life becomes a burden. So, I find this tension where I’m often happiest in a time when I’m very present, where whatever I’m doing is good enough. Whereas when I’m super motivated by something else, I’m not that happy because every moment I’m not doing it, I’m like, “Why am I not doing that?” And it gets in the way of living life. Have you experienced anything like that?
DUCKWORTH: I think happiness is the feeling of pursuing goals that are intrinsically rewarding — the goals themselves are inherently interesting and aligned with my core personal values. They’re fully owned by me. I’m pursuing them. And I’m making some progress. I think that is happiness. Unhappiness is, I think, a goal conflict. “Hey, I want to do this, but oh my gosh, I have this other goal. It’s also really important to me. And I can’t do both at once.” For example, I want to be on vacation with my kids in Florida. But I also want to finish this manuscript that I’ve been working on. Goal conflict, I think, is one way to be unhappy. You feel this ripping apart psychologically and it’s incredibly corrosive and aversive.
LEVITT: I love that. Okay, goal conflict — I’ve never heard of that concept before. So, what do you do about it?
DUCKWORTH: Sometimes you’ll reflect and you’re like, “You know what? This other thing, eh” — it kind of evaporates. And then, that is one easy way to dissipate goal conflict. But I think more often than not, the goals are real. I have a goal to spend time with my 17-year-old before she ships off to college and I become an empty-nester. But I also have the goal to do all these things professionally. Like, I want to actually create a unifying theory of behavior change. But, I can’t have breakfast with Lucy, but also work on my unifying theory of behavior change at the very same time. So, I think there are some insoluble goal conflicts. But I do think that reflection allows you at least to sequence things.
I can say to myself, “I’ve got these two important goals. They are mutually exclusive. But I’ve decided, I’m going to have breakfast with my daughter and spend a good 45 minutes making avocado toast. And then, I’m going to switch over into work mode.” And I think it doesn’t make the goal conflict evaporate, but it does allow you to at least align your daily activities in ways that you know you’re doing the best you can. And I think the reason why goal conflict can be especially corrosive in the absence of reflection is that you never get to this revelation that you can’t do everything and you’re constantly laboring in this illusion that you can do all possible things, which you can’t.
LEVITT: I really like that because the only thing I’ve learned about parenting is that I cannot parent and do anything else. Which is what I mostly try to do anyway, even though I know I shouldn’t do it. I’m like, “I think I could probably read this book at the same time that I watch my kids.”
DUCKWORTH: I could think through this theorem while also singing this lullaby.
LEVITT: But I love the words you used for it — the sequencing. When I’m being a parent, I have to be a parent. And when I’m not being a parent, I shouldn’t be a parent. Like, it’s so obvious. And I’ve understood it. But I think that’s going to help me in my everyday life. That was really useful.
DUCKWORTH: And you said you liked to be present. That hints of mindfulness, right? The experience of being present or mindful, I think, is the very absence of goal conflict. You’re not in two places, motivationally and mentally. You’re in one place. And because you have reflected in advance, you know that there’s going to be a time where you’re going to shift into the next thing. But you do it sequentially. So this life that we lead with 168 hours a week, whether you’re a mere mortal or somebody who’s really accomplished, you get the same 168 hours. I think the idea of pursuing goals that are, upon reflection, the ones you fully want to own and then doing things sequentially when needed, to me, that’s why achievement and happiness are not necessarily in tension.
And when I look at really unhappy people, it’s actually something about either goal conflict that hasn’t been resolved and hasn’t been reflected upon — or they just don’t have any goals at all that they’re pursuing, and that is its own special torture. So, I think there is the pursuit of happiness, but really I think happiness is in the pursuit. Did I convert you, though? Because earlier you said that — you were like, “Oh, I don’t know, maybe I’m not like you. I don’t really pursue goals. And I just like to do things I like.”
LEVITT: No, I pursue goals. The goals I pursue are not part of some bigger scheme of making the world better. So, I am trying to make the world better at R.I.S.C., my U. of C. center. But it’s not because I have this burning desire. It’s because I thought, “Well, what’s really fun are problems. And I tried consulting. And I didn’t like the way that problems came out there. And I tried academics and I didn’t really like the way problems got solved there. Maybe if I can find this do-gooder space, I’ll have the opportunity to tackle really interesting hard problems in a way that I can’t otherwise.” Because I have this basic view of the world that in doing social good, all of the easy problems have been solved. And so, the only ones that are leftover are the really hard ones.
DUCKWORTH: So social change is just the Sunday crossword puzzle to you? You’re like, “Oh, this will be more fun and challenging, and as a byproduct lives will be saved, and children will grow up to be their best selves.” Really? I think one of the misunderstandings of grit is that the sound of the word is like you grit your teeth. But really, I think, it is about pursuing things that are things you like to do. And I do enjoy what I do. I mean, today I woke up. It was before dawn. And my first thought was, “Hmmm, I’m going to read that paper on self-control strategies and experience sampling method that I didn’t get to finish last night. I can’t wait.”
I enjoy what I do. I don’t find it drudgery. But my elevated sense of self-worth — and I’m sure it’s a vanity of itself — is like, “Oh, and it will help kids do better if I figure out what this paper said.”
LEVITT: But you have all the opportunities in the world. You can do whatever you want. I’m surprised you still read these papers. I’m surprised you’re still willing to do the slog.
DUCKWORTH: Why do you not read papers? Papers are great.
LEVITT: I know, but you have the ability to reach audiences and to compel people through your amazing speaking abilities and your writing abilities. I’m just surprised that you still find an attraction in the details.
DUCKWORTH: Do you not? Really?
LEVITT: Not in the details of academics. I want to live in a space of ideas, and strangely, academics turns out not to be the best space to pursue ideas, is my own experience.
DUCKWORTH: When I wrote Grit, I thought to myself, “Well, I guess I’ll just try to explain without jargon things that psychological scientists would be able to appreciate with jargon.” But I have to say, it was the most intellectually challenging thing I had done because I had to put things together without the artifice of jargon. And also, I had to put everything together, because the naive reader actually has a much higher intellectual standard than a reviewer for a paper because they want to know how this makes common sense. It was an intellectually heroic act relative to anything else I had done.
So, I don’t want to disagree with you there, but I continue to read papers because I think that, for me, there is definitely some value in the empirical work of scientists who publish a paper that has an insight that I wouldn’t have been able to figure out on my own or through reason or just by reading poetry.
LEVITT: I’m not sure you know this about yourself, Angela, but everybody loves you. I can barely have a conversation with someone either in the education space or the behavioral-economics space without someone expressing adoration for you — and not just for your work, but you personally. Why do you think people love you so much?
DUCKWORTH: Well, first of all, that’s very nice. I will say this. Sometimes I meet people — and this is rare, but you know those people where you’re like, “They are so great, they are so nice.” I can name a few people, but they’re all psychologists so you’ll be like, “Who?” But I remember thinking to myself at some point earlier in my career, I want to be that person who they’re like, “Oh, just a fantastic human being. So kind, so generous, so uplifting.” And I’m not saying I am those things, but I really explicitly aspire to that. And the worst thing is to be a jerk. I want to be my mother’s daughter. If you ever meet my mom, she is the nicest human being. I would love to live a life where I’m not only my father’s daughter, but my mother’s daughter, too.
LEVITT: I think you’re doing a really good job at that, to be honest. Because the first time we really met — so, I sat in your seminar, but we didn’t really talk. But the first time we really met was when you came out to Chicago with Stephen Dubner to tape an interview for us on some anniversary of Freakonomics.
DUCKWORTH: Oh, yeah. I think it’s the reissuing of Freakonomics.
LEVITT: Yeah, exactly. So, I will say I was primed not to like you. I expected to hate you. I wanted to not like you.
LEVITT: Because I don’t really like psychology that much. And—.
DUCKWORTH: And because you’d been hanging out at University of Chicago economics for decades and it seeped into you.
LEVITT: But I have to say that within 10 minutes of meeting you, I was just like everyone else. I loved you. And I couldn’t get enough of Angela. Oh, my God. How can we make Angela part of Freakonomics? So, I think you’re doing a really good job at that.
DUCKWORTH: Well, here’s the two-part recipe. We moved houses in third grade. And I had to make all new friends in the middle of the school year, very traumatic. And my mom taught me that if you like yourself and if you genuinely like the other person, then they will automatically like you back. And I do like myself and, Levitt, I like you. So, no surprise you like me back.
Talking with Angela got me thinking about my early days at the University of Chicago Department of Economics. Everybody thought I was crazy to go there at the time, but it’s hard to argue, looking back, that things could have turned out much better for me. I don’t often talk about this, but there was one thing that particularly attracted me to Chicago, and it was the fact that the old professors, the ones in their 70s, 80s, even their 90s, were still passionate about academics. Just like the psychologists that Angela was mentioning today, who all seem to be in their 80s and 90s.
In contrast, the older faculty at Harvard and M.I.T., they were mostly distracted by other things, advising governments, working with companies or God forbid, enjoying their leisure time. I really wanted to be the kind of person who loved academics so much that I did it into my 80s. And I thought surrounding myself with those types of people would make that happen. Well, like so many things I believed about myself and about the world in my 20s, that turned out completely wrong. Pure academics was a terrible fit for me. I found that the real world was much more fun. And it took a long time, decades to admit that to myself, when it probably should have been obvious much earlier. If only Angela had explained goal hierarchies to me 20 years ago, I might have saved myself so much time.
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People I (Mostly) Admire is part of the Freakonomics Radio Network and is produced by Freakonomics Radio and Stitcher. This episode was produced by Morgan Levey; Dan Dzula was the engineer. Our staff also includes Alison Craiglow, Greg Rippin, Mark McClusky, Zack Lapinski, Mary Diduch, and Emma Tyrrell. The music you hear on People I (Mostly) Admire, like the music on Freakonomics Radio, was composed by Luis Guerra. You can subscribe to Freakonomics Radio and People I (Mostly) Admire on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, or wherever you get your podcasts.