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00:00

it’s been a long time since we were here

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together and so Gettysburg is our topic

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as I’m sure you remember and I want to

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start tonight by seeing if there are

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things that have occurred to you in this

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interval that you want to bring up any

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leftover things from last time or any

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nagging problems or aggravating

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statements that you’ve been mulling over

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since we last met Scott you look like

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you’re assuming the asking a question

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position is that correct I do have a

question I one of the things that I as

like a historian of the Civil War and

you kind of touched on this in the essay

you wrote on here the struggle to like

figure out who to believe and who did

not believe and how you decipher all

these different accounts and I feel like

in this book which one are you pointing

to Alexander yeah versus some of other

things we’ve read he has a different

perspective on like whether they should

have continued the battle on the first

day and that he’d be he offered the

opposite point of view I thought that in

a number of instances than what we read

and I struggle especially because a lot

of this stuff is written so far after

the war to decipher like you know and

particularly you who’ve studied a more

asking how do you understand and how do

you kind of consolidate two different

perspectives and who’s right and you

would actually have you you read a lot

of things and play them off against one

another and make judgments about which

people which historical actors tend to

be reliable and which are liars that a

number of them are just in better Liars

they lie about everything he is he is I

told you before everybody else came in I

think he is the single best writer about

the war among all the people who

experienced the war and wrote about it

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from the Confederate side and I think on

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the Union side the only one

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better than geniuses u.s. grant us grant

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and Porter Alexander are the two best

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memoirs military memoirs of the Civil

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War he wrote another book as you know if

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you read the introduction in here

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carefully that he published in nineteen

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seven and Alexander did called military

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memoirs of a Confederate it’s so good

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that it has never been out of print

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two hundred and thirteen years later

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that books never gone out of print

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he wrote this one however before he

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wrote military memoirs and military

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memoirs has a misleading title because

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it isn’t a memoir it’s really a history

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of the Army of Northern Virginia

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he wrote this one first wrote it only

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for his children which gives him a tone

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that simply is almost never present in a

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memoir as you know he’s very hard on

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robert e lee in various places in there

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almost no former Confederates were hard

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on these very hard on Stonewall Jackson

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he quotes profanity he quotes instances

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of cowardice he’s absolutely up front

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about Confederate soldiers who killed

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black soldiers who tried to surrender at

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the Battle of the crater he’s not very

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matter-of-fact they killed them they

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came they heard there were black

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soldiers they came from way down at the

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other end of the line so they could kill

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one of them it’s it’s it’s an amazing

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book in many ways and it was a

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revelation to me not only to me but to

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people who knew Alexander well and in

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the literature very well I think that

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has become the single most quoted book

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on Lee’s army by anyone who was in his

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army and it’s just because he’s I’ve

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been able to check lots of things over

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the years his descriptions and so forth

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and he he’s amazingly accurate was an

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engineer he’s really smart he’s

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obnoxious Lee smart can tell by reading

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this that he was a pain to a lot of

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people because he was smarter than they

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were and they knew he was smarter than

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they were one of one of those kinds of

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people we all know those people we maybe

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those people but anyway he’s one of

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those people and he had there’s a

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description in there of a place on the

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North Anna River he was at that place

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one time for 30 minutes in his life and

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he described how the Federals started to

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shell that position and how the house

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had recessed windows

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said they thought they were about a foot

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and he jumped up in one of the windows

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and pressed himself against that as the

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shells came in and one of the union

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shells hit a chimney that was up to to

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his left and destroyed part of it and we

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took a tour there this has been 15 years

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ago now got to that house and it’s

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exactly as he described it recessed

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windows a chimney with a repair on the

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top of it right to the top left of the

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window which was on the side of the

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house where he said he was it’s just

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astonishing of what his memory was like

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but he also had a diary that helped jog

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his memory

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and he had letters that he’d written

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during the war that he also used when he

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wrote this so it’s so it’s an amazing

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account that doesn’t mean it’s

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infallible and it doesn’t mean there’s

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no second guessing there’s always second

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guessing in a memoir even more generally

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I mean it talks about in the the other

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book about how even in the war council

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would need like there were all the

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different people who were there and have

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first-hand accounts have dipped recount

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like the weather men had reservations

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about and they don’t all agree and if

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three weeks from now somebody looked all

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of us up and asked us to give them an

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account of this class meeting there

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would be many things that would be

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difficult to reconcile we would you’re

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all going to very different memories of

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what goes on in here you hear different

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things you process different things

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differently and you’ll just have

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different memories I think I’m very

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suspicious of oral histories as a

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category of evidence they’ve they’re

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very much used now they’re going to be

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used more and more because people don’t

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write letters anymore and they try to

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destroy email even though they really

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can’t but they get it beyond the reach

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of historians so it’s going to be a real

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problem I think an even bigger problem

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than it has been in the past

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yes and

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worse because if we were sharing our

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view of this class we wouldn’t have an

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agenda oh you might have an agenda

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we might everybody has an agenda I’m not

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that compared to people who are trying

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to chose not comparative people whose

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reputations are on the line

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yes not compared to Daniel sickles

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arguing with George Gordon Meade about

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what went on on the second day of the

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Battle of Gettysburg no they have a lot

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right now I have a lot riding on that

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yes I think kind of a different way that

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liyan means are treated is really

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interesting it seems like Lee gets away

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with making a lot of mistakes and

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everybody forgives him and his

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reputation still really strong and it

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seems all neat successes are kind of

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characterizes not sort of good luck you

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mean his successes at Gettysburg yeah

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good kind of good fortune and I is it

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does we get away with it because of the

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charisma because I want to know what you

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think the answer to your own question is

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that was the one thing I could come up

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with and also maybe Longstreet just

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going on such a tiring after Gettysburg

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probably helpfully out in a huge way but

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it did it I think if we could bring Mead

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and Lee into this room and have them

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here they would leave and then we would

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talk about them and you would have a

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very different impression of lead than

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you did me no matter what you thought

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and you might have an impression going

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in by the time they left I think you

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would leave was just one of those people

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who commanded spaces and impressed

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people even people who didn’t especially

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think they wanted to like him me was

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grumpy and he doesn’t have a lot of

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successes over all his career I mean Lee

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comes into Gettysburg with this resume

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with a number of really quite

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spectacular successes on it almost all

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against the odds and me doesn’t have

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that on these resume

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never has that on his resume and has the

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bad fortune about a year after

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Gettysburg to find himself traveling

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he’s still the commander the army but

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grant is traveling with the army and so

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it’s not means army it’s grants army if

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anything good happens it’s grants army

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if anything bad happens it could be

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means army well so what

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you never think that lea would do

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something like media Chamberlain like

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give him like 120 men and just like well

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me didn’t do that to Chamberlain

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underlings did it I mean it happened it

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was way down the chain of command it was

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the brigade commander who told

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Chamberlain a guy named strong Vincent

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and you’ll see his little marker where

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he was mortally wounded strong Vincent

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told Joshua Chamberlain strong Vincent

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commanded this brigade and in the fifth

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Corps and Joshua Chamberlain’s main

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regiment was one of the regiment’s in

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that when you walk along Little Round

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Top when you’re there they’re the main

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regiment then there’s an 83rd

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Pennsylvania and there’s a Michigan

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regiment and a New York regiment those

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are the four regiments in a brigade and

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it just so happened that Chamberlain

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ended up on the left but of course you

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mean what would we put soldiers in a

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position like that yeah

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just like that oh he would just

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absolutely like that

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yep yep say though that meat has like

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nothing like what Lee has on his resume

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but he was the commander of the army

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when the Union won the biggest battle of

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the war so isn’t that a huge resume

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building no because it’s grants army in

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everybody’s mind it’s because US Grant

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is with that army the entire way

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once he gets east which is to say the

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only battle where George Meade is really

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the commander of the army of the coma is

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this one but it’s a big one but it is a

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big one it’s a really big one it’s a big

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one that left

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Abraham Lincoln with what idea about me

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did he let Lee get away and finished you

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had a chance to really finish the job

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and he didn’t do it didn’t do it

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immensely frustrated by this once grant

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comes Meade is part of the eye and I

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think meat was a good soldier don’t get

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me wrong but meat is not the soldier

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could win the war for the United States

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I mean there’s not the slightest chance

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that he could have been a soldier who

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won the war the United States he just

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doesn’t just doesn’t have it why do you

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think he was so and and I was surprised

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by the essay on meeting here because

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he’s like touted as this great very

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positive este positive but when you read

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it there he doesn’t do that much he just

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like repositions some people and gets a

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lot of credit for that but obviously

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clearly Sowers is he’s very good at

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repositioning you know that sounded so

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snarky actually was good at

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repositioning and that is important

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we’ll taco I mean this is yeah so we’ll

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talk about that what’s your body is

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narrow if you got bottom line to this

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particular set of comments all effort

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those trying to dish I was trying to

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defend the point that meat had nothing

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on his resume because well coming into

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Gettysburg here’s range resume he was a

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pretty good division commander he

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commanded the Pennsylvania reserves he

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commanded the division at Antietam then

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he’s promoted the corps commander he’s a

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corps commander at Chancellorsville but

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he doesn’t really do anything he was

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still a division commander at

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Fredericksburg and his guys got shot

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just like everybody else’s he did okay

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but he didn’t really stand out so he’s

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an okay corps commander he was a pretty

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good division commander and he’s an army

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commander who’s been in command for

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three days that’s a pretty blank resume

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I think for someone who’s an i and in

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contrast Lee has the seven-day second

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Bull Run the Maryland campaign

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Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville on

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his resume vastly different maybe back

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to Kara’s question a little bit Scott’s

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um does the difference between what

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Howley and he’ll meet or perceived as a

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maybe to some of that stem from they’re

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just they’re different leadership styles

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as well the fact that it does seem like

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pretty consistent Lili is the central

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figure right he’s figurehead he’s an

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idol all all decisions flow to him he

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has a very small staff and much too

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small right and

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admittedly and and at the same time mead

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is having counsels and group discussions

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and votes about what should be done and

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I wonder if that distributive form of

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power just that kind of a distributive

12:52

power structure if maybe that also these

12:54

because it makes it easy for meets

12:56

critics to look them and say oh he

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didn’t decide anything the group did

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okay right but at the same time in my

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mind it seems like that actually might

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be a more effective more effective but

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that was one of the questions that I

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wanted to talk about that I wanted to do

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at last but I don’t care how we do this

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I will get to lots of things tonight and

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since this is supposed to be a more

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freeform evening we can do just exactly

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whatever you want to do as long as you

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don’t get wildly out of control but if

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we want to talk about that I’m happy to

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talk about that they have very different

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leadership styles leak and make a

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decision Lee doesn’t need votes to

13:34

decide what he’s going to he talks to

13:35

people talks to Longstreet every day

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we’ll do more of this next week talking

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about the subordinates goes and talks to

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you’ll and his subordinates on the night

13:43

of the first talks to you again that

13:45

night he’s worried about you all he’s

13:47

already figuring out that you’ll he’s

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not Stonewall Jackson which he didn’t

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know before now he’s figuring that out

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but he never says let’s vote never says

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that’s all getting the room and vote

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that’s not he does not need to do that

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but me certainly you can have some

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sympathy for being in this situation

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that having been in command for three

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days and never been an army commander

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before he’s junior to some of the pizza

14:14

some of the other corps commanders he

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isn’t even the senior corps commander

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he’s junior to John Reynolds he’s junior

14:19

to John Sedgwick it’s not even the

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senior corps commander in the army and

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people in the army are very meticulous

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about rank during the Civil War and even

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now but then they certainly were if I’m

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a Major General and Bryce is a

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major-general but I was a major-general

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a month before Bryce I’m not going to be

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entirely comfortable if Bryce is put in

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charge of me because I rank him

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and that’s the case with me at

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Gettysburg it’s two of his subordinates

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who are senior to him in the army Justin

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I was gonna say isn’t someone telling as

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well at one time that he did pole that

14:56

he wanted to kind of back away the

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reposition and was it all the corps

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commanders we wanted to stay all the

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ones who were awake yes and one was

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asleep and one didn’t vote but yes all

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those who voted but what is the point

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this essay this favorable essay to him

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what’s the point that he makes in that

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essay that’s a decision that people

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appointed too many times this show that

15:18

me just can’t meet has to get he needs a

15:20

consensus he needs to find out what

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everybody wants to do what’s the yes I

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say about that said he’d already made up

15:29

his mind to stay before he asked for the

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vote but he hadn’t made up his mind

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about was whether to remain on the

15:37

defensive or to attack the next day but

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he’d already made the decision and

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already sent a message to the War

15:42

Department about his intention to stay

15:46

so he made one decision without talking

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to but of course that raises the

15:51

question what if what if six of the nine

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people in the room and said well we

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think we need to go we don’t think we

15:57

should stay then I think George mean why

16:02

not of stage who knows we can’t know

16:05

about that but I think that police is

16:09

right behind this specific better which

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is a big one isn’t better this kind of

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leadership style because you have so

16:17

many battle fronts and then you can

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instead of like waiting the kind of

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hours to come to talk to you and send

16:23

another decision like everybody just

16:25

decide by themselves and you know you

16:28

kid

16:29

on a faster speed than the enemy because

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it’s so centralized it they cannot go as

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fast as you can no because no and that’s

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so that’s smart so he brings everybody

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in and he asks Hancock what’s going on

16:46

in your part of the line and he asks

16:47

Warren let’s go what have you seen I

16:49

mean and everybody can tell him bring

16:52

their intelligence from the very parts

16:53

of the line sure that’s I would think

16:55

that’s a smart

16:56

to do that’s a smart thing to do for the

16:58

next day to plan is wailing and again

17:01

for the same day battles but once the

17:04

battle starts then of course it becomes

17:05

very difficult because communication is

17:07

so problematical on a Civil War

17:10

battlefield really problematical you

17:12

want to send a message to Hancock and

17:15

you so you get your staff officer Scott

17:19

and start point him in the direction of

17:21

where you think Hancock is supposed to

17:23

be and he goes and well Hancock has gone

17:26

over to talk to somebody else so he’s

17:28

not there or Scott gets shot on the way

17:31

over or he gets lost or his horse gets

17:33

shot I mean anything it’s really really

17:36

difficult to maintain what we would

17:40

consider reasonable control of a

17:42

battlefield when you’re talking about

17:43

there are 160,000 men on that

17:48

battlefield within a few miles of one

17:50

another

17:51

Jake said that was a question I had

17:52

reading the paper we’re talking the

17:55

first day a lot about we was exerted

17:58

yeah I actually talked about that but

18:00

you’re being kind yeah how much the

18:06

communication of the time I mean how

18:08

much it was can user well here’s the

18:10

influence he can exert on the first day

18:12

the waited what did Lee wants what are

18:14

these orders in his army what’s the

18:17

situation on the first day is Lee is

18:19

riding toward Gettysburg that morning of

18:24

July 1st anybody to have to avoid a big

18:26

engagement he has ordered his

18:28

lieutenants not to bring on a general

18:30

engagement quiet his whole army isn’t

18:33

done yet Longstreet pickets armies all

18:35

over southern Pennsylvania he wants them

18:37

back together it’s the same thing

18:38

happened to her in the Maryland campaign

18:40

his army was scattered all over Maryland

18:42

and he was pushed into a fight so here

18:45

he wants the army back together before

18:47

he gets into a fight those are the

18:50

instructions the night before oh so what

18:52

happens in the morning okay ap Hill

19:00

tales

19:01

Henry Heath he can walk into Gettysburg

19:03

to look for shoes who is not doing this

19:07

job right there what what is what

19:09

missing component here Jim Stewart if

19:13

Jeff Stewart had been there with the

19:14

cavalry we would have known there were

19:16

pebbles in Gettysburg you would have

19:18

known and Henry Heath would not have

19:20

walked into Gettysburg with his big

19:22

clunking division which is not what big

19:25

clunking divisions of infantry do you

19:27

don’t line 7,000 guys up on the road for

19:30

a breast and walk toward something

19:32

you’re not sure about but that’s what

19:34

was that’s what happened just annoying

19:36

is what was the definition of general

19:38

engagement in terms of so in my mind and

19:40

reading kind of essentially this was you

19:43

know heavy reconnaissance this was you

19:45

know there’s some engagement but it

19:46

wasn’t the full-on Army’s colliding well

19:49

what happens when you start shooting at

19:50

each other

19:51

put the Hoosier how many are shooting it

19:53

does doesn’t it but button but let me

19:56

reframe my question what can happen when

19:59

you if you have an infantry division

20:00

that starts shooting at other people

20:02

that can easily turn you together I mean

20:05

the best way not to bring on a general

20:07

engagement is don’t go start shooting at

20:09

somebody if you’re an infantry division

20:11

let your cavalry sort of do what cavalry

20:14

do and don’t send an infantry division

20:17

forward and so by the time

20:21

soli hears this firing in the direction

20:24

of Gettysburg and decides to go take a

20:27

look so he gets there – any of you

20:30

remember about when you got there up to

20:33

Oklahoma about two o’clock he shows up

20:35

on her Ridge you’ll see her ridge when

20:37

you get there it’s one Ridge over from

20:39

McPherson Ridge so here comes Lee here’s

20:43

Gettysburg here’s Burridge merson’s

20:47

Ridge seminary Ridge Oak Hill and

20:52

Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill wildly out

20:55

of proportion but generally the soli

20:58

shows up here to what has gone on down

21:02

to that point in the day what’s the

21:04

situation when he gets there can anybody

21:07

give us a quick account 25 seconds

21:12

what’s happened

21:13

he’s moving in on this road he come in

21:16

two on the Chambersburg pike modern

21:18

route 30

21:19

with his 7000 infantry

21:21

and he gets this far he gets to her

21:24

Ridge any runs into Buford’s cavalry

21:28

which is here and on McPherson Ridge and

21:30

the cavalry make heath deploy which

21:33

takes them takes a long time to get 7000

21:36

men from being four abreast walking

21:40

along road to in battle lines like this

21:43

so you go for its call from going you’re

21:46

in column on the road and you go into

21:48

line into a battle formation takes an

21:50

hour for Heath to do that then they

21:54

fight here and it’s a and the battle is

21:57

on an east-west axis we’ve talked about

21:58

all of this the cavalry fights about an

22:01

hour and then John Reynolds comes up

22:04

with the first Corps and then it becomes

22:05

an infantry fight Justin this is why

22:07

it’s you don’t want your infantry

22:08

walking along Pennsylvania and running

22:11

into somebody now you have an entire

22:14

infantry Corps fighting a Confederate

22:17

division now you’ve got $15,000 17,000

22:21

guys shooting at each other that’s

22:22

getting very close to being a general

22:24

engagement already but you get a

22:27

stalemate here because the Federals are

22:30

in a good position on McPherson’s Ridge

22:32

you’ll see that ground it’s very good

22:35

ground

22:35

some veterans are on her rich but just

22:39

before Lee gets on the battlefield

22:42

Robert Rhoades is division of Richard

22:46

Ewell’s Corps shows up on Oak Hill and

22:50

when you stand on Oak Hill it’s a

22:51

stunning aspect from Oak Hill the Union

22:55

battle line is like this facing it that

22:58

way

22:59

Confederate artillery on Oak Hill and

23:01

they’re looking right down the whole

23:03

Union line it’s an artillerist dreams

23:06

you can’t miss if you shoot a little bit

23:09

short you’ll hit Federals here if you

23:11

shoot a little bit long you’ll hit

23:13

Federals here you’d have to be an

23:15

absolute dope knocking at federal

23:18

somewhere if you’re an artillerist up

23:20

here where they come in then Confederate

23:23

infantry shows up here and that

23:25

reorients the entire battle now the

23:27

Federals have to bring the 11th Corps

23:29

they bring the 11th Corps out here and

23:31

part of the first Corps now has to

23:33

which and paste that way now it’s a

23:36

battle that has a north-south axis and

23:39

an east-west axis and when Lee gets here

23:41

what he sees is the Confederates it’s

23:44

sheer luck as we talked about last time

23:46

they’re coming in at exactly the right

23:49

place every time the Federals get a

23:52

battle line in place Confederates come

23:54

in beyond their line and so Lee sees

23:57

that and he is the one who makes the

23:59

decision here

24:00

he says push it so he has changed his

24:04

orders at that point don’t bring on a

24:05

general engagement oh wait a minute this

24:08

general engagement looks like it’s

24:09

really going our way and so here is

24:12

combative aggressive side comes out and

24:15

he says push it but that’s a key

24:17

decision for him to make but he makes it

24:20

on the basis of what he can actually see

24:22

from there he can see the elements

24:24

coming together tactically it makes

24:27

sense we see Iran when I began I had to

24:29

that’s do you see retreat right he what

24:32

retreat or like doesn’t get into

24:35

engagement convenient many things you

24:37

said no don’t fight roll like don’t

24:39

retreat if you need to then yeah not so

24:42

much reach but yes and what had happened

24:44

to very the the day before this big

24:49

brigade under the bright North

24:51

Carolinian we talked about James

24:52

Johnston Pettigrew he had taken his

24:55

Brigade just the way heat went in on the

24:57

first Pettigrew did it on the 30th he

24:59

saw Union cavalry and what did he do he

25:01

immediately withdrew because his orders

25:04

were not to bring on a general

25:05

engagement that’s the other reaction

25:07

that is the reaction that that are that

25:10

reaction is the one that these orders

25:12

make pretty clear to anybody who has the

25:15

uniform on is desired reaction do not

25:18

start a fight because once you start a

25:21

fight anything can happen anything can

25:24

happen so Pettigrew hadn’t started a

25:27

fight the day before he gets into a

25:29

fight here but by the time Lee gets

25:31

there too these elements are coming

25:33

together and it seems to make sense to

25:37

let that let them but the by and go yes

25:40

so

25:41

there was a problem I know in other

25:42

battles used hot air balloons table you

25:44

might have been don’t know high air

25:45

balloons here that Confederates Porter

25:48

Alexander talks about the only instance

25:49

in the entire war for the Confederates

25:52

use a hot air balloon it’s during the

25:53

the Peninsula Campaign and it became

25:56

unboard and just floated down the James

25:57

the the Federals have a balloon core

26:01

sort of under a man named Thaddeus Lowe

26:04

who had balloons up during the seven

26:08

days balloons up at credit sure they’re

26:09

very unwieldy and in a really active

26:12

campaign like this the odds would be

26:14

against having them move with the army

26:17

and low fell out with the government the

26:19

government was paying him so much to be

26:21

a balloon guy it wasn’t in the army then

26:24

they they said willing to pay you half

26:26

as much and he said we’ll go to hell I’m

26:28

going to California and and that’s he

26:30

ended up out in Pasadena and mount Lowe

26:32

out there’s a named after low so they

26:34

have balloonist but Melinda’s are on

26:36

only a handful of battlefields in the

26:38

civil war they work you could get up see

26:41

everything they’d run a telegraph wire

26:42

up and so the balloonists are up there

26:44

tapping out what they can see down below

26:46

and the other side is trying to shoot

26:49

them down they dig holes put the trails

26:51

of the cameras in so they can get more

26:52

elevation and try to shoot them down but

26:54

they they don’t play a crucial role on

26:57

any battlefield okay sisters absence

27:01

that we talked about last night I feel

27:03

like I think it’s three days and

27:05

Gettysburg kind of offers him some

27:07

excuses and terms of only Alan Nolan

27:10

does because Alan Nolan wants all of it

27:12

on Lee so how does he let Stewart off

27:13

the book he says the league is in

27:15

country king borders and that he wants

27:19

him to protect the right flank but he

27:20

also you

27:22

I was hitting spy I uh you know what my

27:28

feelings are about is I I don’t think

27:30

you can let Stewart off the hook because

27:32

Stewart knew what his job was there’s

27:34

absolutely no question that he knew what

27:37

his job was his job was to screen the

27:40

armies movement is it went north and

27:41

gather intelligence about the Federals

27:44

that’s what his job is he’s really good

27:47

at it really good at it but he wasn’t

27:51

really good at it here in Allen who’s

27:53

the lawyer a really good lawyer Allen

27:56

was the senior partner in the biggest

27:58

law firm in Indiana and was on the

28:00

Harvard Law Review and he writes and

28:02

thinks like a lawyer which means he

28:05

doesn’t know how to use evidence because

28:07

lawyers here’s how lawyers use evidence

28:10

huh I want to argue a I’ve got 30 pieces

28:16

of evidence 11 of them support a 19 of

28:22

them support B but I want to argue B so

28:25

I’m going to use my 11 piece of evidence

28:27

and are you a that’s how you win cases

28:30

in a court you don’t have to tell about

28:32

the 19 pieces of evidence to the jury

28:34

but if you’re a historian and you’ve got

28:37

30 pieces of evidence and 2/3 of them

28:40

say me not a you have to think pretty

28:43

hard about arguing hey keep your

28:46

historian not if you’re a lawyer Alan

28:48

and I have many great discussions fueled

28:51

by he liked a really good scotch and

28:54

cigars and we would argue about this and

28:57

they’d say no historians don’t know how

28:59

to use evidence and I’m saying you know

29:01

really Alan come to terms with this but

29:05

that is that is how he makes his case

29:08

against Lee what’s the gist of a

29:10

lanolin’s case against Lee what is out

29:14

what really gets under Alan’s skin about

29:17

Stewart left some Calvary for him in a

29:20

broader sense oh no he did Stewart did

29:22

Lee cavalry he did leave cavalry you’re

29:24

running a company all of you you’ve got

29:28

six key subordinates you’ve got paid

29:32

really wonderful you’ve got be who’s

29:35

mighty damn good

29:36

you’ve got see who’s almost mighty damn

29:38

good you’ve got Dee who’s a complete

29:41

pain in the ass and can’t get along with

29:43

anybody else but it’s pretty good at

29:44

what he does you’ve got II who should be

29:47

sent to Siberia and kept away from Wars

29:49

and you’ve got it who is worse than e

29:52

Jeff Stewart takes these three with him

29:54

and leaves those three with lead so yes

29:58

he doesn’t need cavalry with Lee and

30:00

these two are cavalry who would fit into

30:04

the bar seeing in Star Wars this one is

30:07

good well you can’t get along with

30:09

anybody so it’s true that he leaves

30:12

cavalry that’s the truth but it’s not

30:15

cavalry that’s very good and so if you

30:19

have if you have a really critical

30:21

operation you’ve got three really good

30:23

underlings and three who are not really

30:27

very good and you decide these are the

30:30

ones you’re going to let it just me

30:32

that’s not a close call just to push

30:34

back inside though it wasn’t that big

30:36

failed at Gettysburg these three you

30:38

know deeper back it’s that you weren’t

30:39

even there

30:40

I mean why would you well the best one

30:43

the best one d and I’ll put a name on

30:46

him his name is William e Jones and his

30:48

nickname was grumbled that’s his actual

30:51

nickname he was known as grumble Jones

30:53

in the army

30:55

grumble Jones was left basically

30:58

watching the rear echelons of the army

31:00

which is an important place for him to

31:01

be the other two guys Beverly Robertson

31:05

who was a North Carolinian who should

31:07

have been court-martialed just before

31:09

the campaign started the other was a guy

31:10

named Albert

31:11

Jenkins who commanded this cavalry from

31:14

the western part of Virginia’s it was

31:15

just unspeakably unreliable they’re the

31:19

ones who were closest to what’s going on

31:21

with the army so it’s an Jeff Stewart

31:23

has Wade Hampton and fits you and he’s

31:26

got his best bits laid he’s got his very

31:28

best people with him up by Carlisle

31:32

Pennsylvania on the 1st of July

31:34

I mean they’re just they know but the

31:36

main thing the main thing as I said

31:37

before it isn’t even which subordinates

31:40

are or aren’t there the main thing is

31:41

the Jeff Stewart he’s the key

31:44

he’s the one he said that he’s in charge

31:45

of this so should we have given him that

31:49

responsibility of course he should

31:50

because he’s never letting down he’s

31:52

been a superb cavalry officer even

31:56

though it’s he’s been superb as long as

31:58

leads he’s been there ever since Lee’s

32:01

been in the Army Jeff Stewart has been

32:02

there right from the beginning and his

32:04

absolutely reliable just as reliable

32:08

does the way Longstreet has nothing

32:11

prepared lead for how long he’d be hated

32:13

Gettysburg not be prepared Lee in

32:15

contrast to you’ll whom Lee didn’t know

32:19

very much about he knows about Stewart

32:21

Stewart is an absolutely known quantity

32:23

to lead and so’s Longstreet okay I

32:28

didn’t get we’re trying to get like with

32:30

the cavalry I mean how custard assign

32:32

each cover he would take and did he need

32:36

because Lee Lee style of command we

32:39

talked about this before it’s a very

32:41

it’s a very loose rein that he exercises

32:44

over these people he really trusts he

32:46

tells Stewart what he wants him to do

32:48

and then what’s worrying about it and

32:50

just assumes that Stewart will do it

32:52

because Stewart has always done it

32:54

before so Stewart what Lee didn’t know

32:56

is it Stewart was going to take these

32:58

three brigades and ride off to the east

32:59

and end up out of contact with the army

33:03

through the absolutely critical part of

33:06

the campaign there was no way he could

33:08

have anticipated that no way and for his

33:11

thoughts did he need the best cover he

33:13

or Lee no it’s true Stewart was it

33:16

necessary or no could have performance

33:19

well if any of us I mean if we had been

33:22

if I were Jeff Stewart I would have

33:24

taken those guys too and so would any of

33:26

you because they’re the people you rely

33:28

on the most it’s not their fault it’s

33:31

not his subordinates Stewart’s fault

33:33

yeah yeah yeah sure I would have taken

33:34

the best ones he did not think he was

33:38

good he didn’t think that he was leaving

33:39

Lee in the hands of these other

33:41

cavalryman’s Stewart did not think that

33:43

Stewart thought he was gonna be doing

33:44

what he was supposed to be doing he

33:46

didn’t know the army the Potomac was

33:48

going to start moving with him on the

33:50

other side of it and there they go

33:53

stuck

33:54

bryce what wasn’t that part of was it

33:57

nolan’s

33:57

I think it was no arguing that wasn’t

34:00

that part of it the breakdown was that

34:02

Lee had given Stuart so many orders

34:05

three or four different directives like

34:07

Alan argues that poor Jam would have

34:10

just been confused about what I was

34:12

supposed to defend and screen and gather

34:16

resources and swing around the army but

34:19

not too far but not too close he did not

34:21

tell him to swing around the in army to

34:23

be 12 but that’s a big okay if you do

34:26

they tell we did not come to swing

34:28

around the Union Army that’s Jeff York’s

34:30

decision okay that that would I don’t

34:34

think there I think if he thought he was

34:36

going to retrieve the reputation that

34:37

was taken a blow at brandy station or

34:41

Stuart almost lost the biggest cavalry

34:43

battle of the war after he’d been in his

34:45

peak Hokkien best of having big reviews

34:49

and balls tonight and having everybody

34:52

come and look at how wonderful he was

34:54

all those things and they was almost

34:56

defeated and he was humiliated

34:58

is it reasonable to expect that he could

35:01

have been confused by what seemed to be

35:04

contradictory orders you know what I

35:06

think he would have said if he was

35:08

confused he would have said generally

35:09

I’m not quite sure what you want me to

35:12

do here please clarify that’s all he

35:15

would have had to do if he would I don’t

35:17

think he was confused but if he were

35:19

confused that’s what you would do that’s

35:22

what anybody would do let me just make

35:25

sure this is what you want me to do

35:26

that’s all it would have taken they’re

35:27

together they’re in the same place he

35:30

can just go to Lee’s tent and say may I

35:33

have five minutes with the general I

35:34

have one thing I would like to clarify

35:35

what he thought we would have had to do

35:40

Dannan then my question is when he’s

35:42

dealing with someone like you all who

35:44

was not a known quantity who is

35:46

completely paralyzed by yes we know that

35:50

right he didn’t know that right so

35:52

that’s so that then that’s the question

35:54

is how does he deal with someone like

35:55

that you know in in a big confrontation

35:58

like Gettys

35:59

to say you know it indicates that you

36:03

were going to be paralyzed by my lack of

36:06

how did lady when did lead begin to have

36:09

it’s a real doubts about you Karen he

36:14

said that you should take it practical

36:16

and it’s that evening I think that Lee

36:20

began to think oh this isn’t okay it’s

36:24

not Stonewall Jackson and I better go

36:26

see just how far from Stonewall Jackson

36:28

this is soon wrote over to yields

36:30

headquarters that night and what have

36:32

you find when he got there when he let

36:34

them know that he wanted to maintain the

36:36

aggressive the next day what was the

36:38

reaction at at mules its you’ll and

36:41

Jubal Early who’s a division commander

36:43

Robert Rhoades who’s a division

36:45

commander those are the main people in

36:47

place there what’s their response the

36:52

response is just a passenger they try to

36:55

test the authenticity we don’t want to

36:58

be the main part of this offensive why

37:00

don’t you let somebody else be the main

37:02

part and we’ll we’ll play a secondary

37:04

role isn’t what Lee wanted to hear from

37:07

them not what he wanted to hear in that

37:09

room and not what he would have heard

37:12

from I hate to say it again Stonewall

37:14

Jackson it isn’t what he would have

37:16

heard from Stonewall Jackson and it’s

37:18

not what he would have heard from

37:19

Longstreet in most instances either he’s

37:21

spending at least gonna get a number of

37:23

little wake-up calls on July 1st at

37:26

Gettysburg ease already had one about

37:28

Stewart and he gets one about you he

37:31

gets one about Longstreet when they have

37:33

their first sort of tense conversation

37:36

in the afternoon Brian yeah kinda on

37:38

that that one more interesting passages

37:41

was Craig talking about the leading

37:43

causes of southern fetus first Stewart’s

37:47

absence second I guess you’ll Xin

37:50

competence right third long he puts on

37:52

cheek confidence brought you agreeing

37:53

with that I you know I think Stewart is

37:58

in a separate category because if

38:00

Stewart’s that there wouldn’t even have

38:01

been a battle if Stewart had been doing

38:03

what Stewart was supposed to do once

38:04

they’re on the battlefield I think I

38:07

think Longstreet is more culpable

38:09

I think poor you’ll have

38:10

reasons for not attacking late in the

38:13

afternoon he knew things that Lee didn’t

38:15

know he said he would attack if ap Hill

38:17

supported him on the right Lee was

38:20

literally with ap Hill when he got that

38:23

word from you and Lee never told AP hill

38:25

to attack which seems that seems odd to

38:29

me that Lee would sort of not have he’ll

38:31

attack but would expect you’ll to attack

38:33

and it seems reasonable to want a

38:36

coordinated attack so I I think Lee is

38:38

culpable there and I don’t know he never

38:40

explained why he didn’t tell Hill to

38:43

attack Hill had one division that hadn’t

38:45

fired a single shot his biggest division

38:47

hadn’t even been in the action yet

38:49

commanded by a guy named Anderson from

38:52

South Carolina hadn’t even been in the

38:54

fight so I don’t know what’s going on

38:57

with Lee there that to me is

38:58

inexplicable but boy did he he put a

39:02

black mark next to eul’s name

39:06

metaphorically at that point and it and

39:09

it never got erased it only has any put

39:11

up more but this is the first one that

39:13

night first he had an attack then he

39:16

didn’t seem aggressive when Lee went and

39:18

talked to him leave with Lee it’s pure

39:21

one of his subordinates you might not

39:24

always succeed but he would want you to

39:28

be aggressive and want to succeed and

39:31

want to harm the enemy if he doesn’t get

39:35

that kind of vibe from you it’s not good

39:38

for you terms about he’s going to think

39:41

about you

39:46

basically said that Lee was on the field

39:49

it was with health would would you let

39:51

some to some extent I said that I did at

39:58

0.2 like this were like a business and

40:01

your CIO yeah not doing well it’s gonna

40:04

be a CEO that takes responsibility takes

40:06

the fall

40:07

I agree completely I don’t understand

40:09

why unless it in legal terms of is just

40:12

all charisma at some point a remand ago

40:16

does the tax except Lee estates all

40:18

culpability and it seems like these

40:19

commanders are the scapegoat he other

40:23

people made everyone but lead the

40:25

scapegoats at Gettysburg and I think

40:27

there’s plenty of blame to pass around

40:29

but you can’t Lee doesn’t get a pass

40:30

here he is the one and he is on the

40:33

scene with Hill he’s right there so that

40:36

is in he is he’s the one who decides to

40:38

make it a big battle he’ll doesn’t

40:40

decide to make it a big battle Lee

40:41

decides to make it a big battle when

40:43

he’s on the scene and then he decides

40:46

not to do something else with he’ll he’s

40:48

but once he gets once he rides Traveler

40:52

up off the Chambersburg pike on to her

40:56

Ridge it is his battle down til then you

40:59

can point to lots of people why did

41:01

he’ll let Heath go in why did he do that

41:02

where’s Jeff Stewart once Lee is there

41:05

and the chalk is smacking all over the

41:08

ground then he’s the heat there we agree

41:13

with you completely the responsibilities

41:14

on his shoulders absolutely on his

41:16

shoulders then his defenders would say

41:19

well Lee wanted to do this and his

41:21

subordinates letting down he hoped they

41:24

would do this and they didn’t do that

41:25

and he but he is in charge once he gets

41:29

to the field at two o’clock I agree was

41:33

that part of what

41:35

he was official communications never

41:39

disingenuous about what happened or

41:42

maybe not disingenuous but he put it in

41:44

an air that he was trying to get certain

41:46

things done but trying to be defensive

41:49

if at all possible he was forced into

41:52

this and ultimately I guess passed a

41:54

little bit of the buck in terms of the

41:56

fact that it was his decision well I

41:59

actually know I don’t think Lee I think

42:02

one of the things I think is Admiral

42:04

badly is that he does take

42:05

responsibility he took the

42:07

responsibility in a letter the Jefferson

42:09

Davis right after he said I’m I it’s my

42:11

fault I asked the troops to do more than

42:13

they can do it’s my fault now he in his

42:16

post-war conversations which he didn’t

42:19

think would ever become published and

42:21

which did eventually become published he

42:24

he had a hierarchy of blame and he did

42:28

blame Jeff Stewart and he was hard on he

42:32

lumped all his corps commanders together

42:33

he said they fought the battle in a

42:35

halting way and his clear you’ll would

42:38

be at the top of that list but but

42:40

healing is on happening with the ellen

42:41

long stream as well so yes he does point

42:43

the finger at people but doesn’t in his

42:45

official report and he doesn’t publicly

42:47

and he didn’t with his own men right

42:49

after the battle he rode right out among

42:51

them you walk out on that part of the

42:53

field and said this is all my it’s all

42:55

my fault not it’s all my fault that’s

42:57

mostly my fault or it’s our fault it’s

42:59

my fault he said I salute also thinking

43:07

only and going to this point that was

43:11

also him complaining a lot about not

43:13

having commanders or generals to talk

43:16

with a versity but that he was already

43:18

in the war for a while so he’s an he’s

43:21

also his folk that he didn’t develop to

43:24

other Cornell’s or general brigades

43:29

because you know he knew the size was

43:31

getting in he knew he wanted to spread

43:34

out

43:35

more they corpse but he didn’t do well

43:41

bring you up more officers right well

43:44

here’s the here’s we talked about this

43:46

problem before and when you’re all

43:48

running high-powered country there are

43:49

companies you’ll probably find this out

43:52

too it’s hard to be certain that

43:55

somebody who’s done very well at this

43:57

level is going to do very well at this

44:00

level you just can’t tell sometimes they

44:03

do sometimes they’re spectacular

44:04

sometimes they end up with your job

44:06

button you try all the fuel somehow and

44:08

what he’s trying this is their first

44:10

battle since Stonewall Jackson died so

44:13

this is the very first time that his to

44:15

unknown quantities are going to be corps

44:18

commanders hill and you’ll they’ve never

44:20

commanded this many men before it’s new

44:23

for them this is their first time at bat

44:26

at that level of command so no he has no

44:29

record to go on there no record to go

44:31

there is no the way to try them all well

44:35

the other way to try them out is they

44:36

command at the next lowest level he’s

44:38

not going to tell Stonewall Jackson take

44:39

a battle op I want to see how he’ll does

44:41

as a guard commander know it’s donal

44:44

jackson’s their stonewall jackson’s in

44:46

charge it’s a it’s a brutal process in

44:51

the Civil War when do you have to

44:52

replace someone usually someone who’s

44:54

any good when they’re killed that’s when

44:57

you have to do it so Jackson is dead

45:00

what are we going to do one of the key

45:02

decisions that we made right after

45:05

Jackson died is the army had always been

45:07

in two pieces Jackson and half of it in

45:10

Longstreet had half of it Lee decided

45:13

that he probably shouldn’t trust anyone

45:16

else with that much so he may cut it

45:18

into three pieces instead of two and so

45:21

whereas Jackson and Longstreet that each

45:26

had a core with four divisions in it

45:28

that’s the old army in Northern Virginia

45:30

eight divisions in two Corps when they

45:33

create the new 3rd Corps they take that

45:36

division goes there that division goes

45:39

there and they bring a new division into

45:41

the army so it is so now James

45:44

Longstreet score is smaller than it was

45:46

before Richard you’ll got a smaller

45:48

version of the Corps that that Jackson

45:51

had commanded in AP Hill got a brand new

45:54

Corps that had his old division in it

45:56

which came out of Jackson’s court plus

45:59

one division from Longstreet’s Corps and

46:01

then the new one that hadn’t been with

46:03

the army before

46:03

that’s one decision Lee made and I think

46:06

that decision in itself shows that he’s

46:09

Lewis that’s almost one way to see how

46:12

these guys will do you’re giving them

46:13

not as quite as much responsibility as

46:16

Longstreet and Jackson had under the old

46:19

organization you’ve reorganized the army

46:21

and reduced the amount of responsibility

46:24

that each of your first tier of

46:26

subordinates has but it was a

46:29

requirement to do West Point

46:31

no it’s not a requirement but the other

46:37

side they had channels that were gone

46:41

they had one yeah one Corps commander

46:44

Dan sickles

46:46

is the only car commander in either army

46:48

who didn’t go to West Point in the

46:50

general to get religion there are lots

46:54

of Colonels lots of because there aren’t

46:56

enough West pointers to command these

46:58

gigantic armies so the vast majority of

47:00

officers in the armies did not go to

47:03

West Point but the top echelon of

47:06

command in both armies overwhelming in

47:10

all the Civil War armies overwhelmingly

47:12

went to West Point sickles is the only

47:14

one who didn’t and sickles is sort of

47:16

the odd man out in the army a lot of the

47:19

other officers don’t like him he’s not

47:22

part of the club in any way that didn’t

47:25

blade for Lydia also a problem to

47:28

choosing officers high rank because oh

47:30

you have to be West Point so don’t know

47:31

certainly gyro classic he would have

47:34

just know everybody he considered was a

47:37

West pointer everybody who was

47:39

conceivably a candidate to be a corps

47:41

commander

47:42

see that there was also like necessary

47:46

or he was too careful no I don’t think

47:50

there was anybody if I were at least I

47:51

wouldn’t even know where you’d have to

47:53

go so far down to get somebody who was

47:55

in the West pointer the idea of taking

47:57

them from they might be a brigade

47:59

commander so you go from commanding 1500

48:01

min to 20,000 men that’s too that’s too

48:03

big a jump to take too big a jump at the

48:06

very end of the war there was a man

48:08

named John Gordon who you’ll you’ll see

48:13

where they’ll talk about him at

48:15

Gettysburg Marines will I’m sure when

48:17

you’re there he ends up as a corps

48:19

commander at the very at Appomattox he’s

48:21

a Corps commander he’s a non West

48:23

pointer who’s just a kind of brilliant

48:25

military figure but he takes him a long

48:28

time and the only reason he gets up

48:29

there is because everybody else is

48:31

getting shot and he ends up in that

48:34

position

48:41

there’s a pause here yet yes do we start

48:45

a new line yes let’s start a new thread

48:47

I’m going to make another feeble attempt

48:50

to get you to say something nice about

48:51

books I’d say a lot of nice things on

48:53

long street when I was free was very

48:55

tall but I was going what I was trying

48:59

to find when I was digging through my

49:00

mom Street this was some I remember

49:02

reading at some point there was some

49:04

study someone did they actually tried to

49:07

duplicate his large on the second day

49:11

and they said and I wanted no fingers I

49:14

remember that he got to a point where he

49:18

was exposed so we had to backtrack and

49:20

take a look around can do you know yeah

49:23

do you know what I’m talking about

49:24

I guess I’ve made them you tell me I’ve

49:26

taken many groups on that March it is

49:28

it’s it’s an importer Alexander he talks

49:31

about it he they wanted to get around to

49:34

the Union left and you you come down a

49:38

road and I don’t know whether the

49:39

Marines maybe they’ll take you on the

49:40

smart shoe you come up to this little

49:42

piece of high ground you’re looking a

49:43

little ramp up and round top and their

49:46

Union signalman up there and they don’t

49:47

want to be discovered so when they see

49:49

that they drop back down off it RIA

49:51

today does this long counter March and

49:52

gets down in the bottom he’s got a gap

49:54

of about five hundred yards you need to

49:56

get from here to right down here without

49:58

being seen so he does this long well

50:00

Porter Alexander reached that same place

50:02

earlier in the day for his artillery

50:04

caught up and all they saw that what was

50:07

his solution to the problem he dropped

50:09

down went about 400 yards off to his

50:12

right and ended up down where he was

50:13

supposed to be cooking maybe 20 minutes

50:15

to do it 20 minutes with him when he

50:17

goes well yeah I was artillery the

50:19

artillery was out in front of the

50:21

infantry it’s not how many guys you have

50:22

it’s how do you solved the problem he

50:24

solved the problem in a very efficient

50:26

indirect way Longstreet solved the

50:28

problem in the most cumbersome

50:30

imaginable way but ate up lots of

50:32

precious time and Alexander remarked in

50:35

another context he didn’t see why the

50:37

infantry when they got there just didn’t

50:38

follow his horse droppings around to see

50:41

how they got where they were going

50:43

because it’s just and when you stand

50:44

there the ground just lays out the

50:47

camera is Little Round Top we’re

50:49

standing on this little road here

50:50

there’s of the ridge goes just like this

50:52

and we drop back this

50:54

our and we just come around go around

50:58

the back row and we end up where the

50:59

camera is and nobody can see us

51:02

I mean you can see it all from right

51:03

there can see how so you could have to

51:07

find another thing to get Longstreet up

51:09

okay that was not going to work that one

51:11

he should have been able to figure out

51:12

he did things he didn’t start to get his

51:17

column ready to march until his last big

51:19

aid was up and now this is inside the

51:22

beltway minutia but I mean this is he

51:24

waits for a bit for his very last reggae

51:26

to get out before he starts to get ready

51:28

to go why didn’t he get ready to go and

51:31

when the last Brigade comes up go but

51:34

didn’t he do that because he didn’t

51:35

agree with the orders and yes yeah what

51:38

kind of subordinate does that because it

51:39

doesn’t agree with the orders I mean

51:42

really if he really doesn’t want to do

51:44

it then say General Lee I can’t I’m

51:46

sorry I disagree so violently with what

51:49

you’re doing that I think you should put

51:51

someone else in my place that’s what you

51:53

do if you’re not gonna try your best

51:55

that’s what you do get out of the way I

51:58

hate to play you called Payton so I’m

52:01

only going to run at half speed on this

52:03

account I know the ball is gonna come to

52:04

me but I’m not going to run very fast I

52:06

think you should have called a slam yes

52:09

kind of a go you don’t get to do that if

52:12

you’re the receiver and Peyton Manning

52:14

calls the play or you what our I

52:16

guarantee you you won’t be a receiver

52:18

very long if you do that two or three

52:20

times and he knows you’re doing it you

52:23

don’t get to do that in an army and and

52:27

I do and I think you put your finger

52:29

right on I think that’s exactly what

52:30

Longstreet was doing he’s making a point

52:32

but let’s save him for next week we’ll

52:35

talk about Longstreet a lot next week

52:37

we’re supposed to focus on need and Lee

52:41

Jenny right I’m buying you affirm but I

52:46

thought we were doing tonight

52:47

that’s why I feel so empowered but

52:50

talking about we and just shouldn’t go

52:54

in across some timing

52:56

that’s a huge that’s what I had actually

52:58

intended to start with tonight but this

53:00

is sort of stream of consciousness the

53:03

way we’re coming out this so now we’re

53:04

back in the aftermath of

53:06

Chancellorsville right should he have

53:08

even gone

53:09

what does Alan know and think about that

53:10

well he kind of displays the argument a

53:13

bit yes and they’ll take it to the north

53:16

but it seems that it’s too aggressive

53:18

like Alan think you said pee on my ear

53:20

yeah

53:21

what should we have done according to

53:23

Alan I should have just gone a bit

53:25

defensively hunker down baby and select

53:28

the Yankees come to you just like at

53:30

Fredericksburg right oh I see the whole

53:33

points we talked about last class by

53:35

going to the Nord lure the army away

53:37

from Richmond you know using your army

53:39

to just dissipate making Morgan’s have a

53:43

call for peace but I feel like it’s a

53:46

huge hold of the guy and I don’t see why

53:48

the North with so many more men couldn’t

53:51

split their army and sack Richmond as

53:54

well as engaged Lee in Pennsylvania did

53:56

they all they just took him to

54:00

Pennsylvania right there I mean yes that

54:02

mate they left they left away what did

54:04

occur want to do when we march north he

54:08

wanted to go to Richmond but but why did

54:12

I mean but Lee understands what are the

54:14

realities what what would the northern

54:16

population say if General Lee’s headed

54:19

for Pennsylvania and the Army of the

54:22

Potomac goes the other way how is that

54:24

going to play behind the lines in the

54:25

United State is not it is not an option

54:28

there’s the biggest most famous rebel

54:31

army is in the United States what’s the

54:34

reaction you go get them and get them

54:37

out of the United States you don’t get

54:38

to go the other way but no they have

54:41

enough men to they can you babe I mean

54:42

there’s a how many armies do they have

54:45

next to Washington one one they have the

54:49

army Potomac what’s the army of the

54:50

tomek’s job deal with the army in

54:54

Northern Virginia where the army

54:55

Northern Virginia goes the army Potomac

54:58

god damn better well though or there are

55:00

going to be problems they’re going to be

55:02

tremendous problems for the Lincoln it

55:04

station so that is not an option to go

55:07

the other way not an option

55:08

Italy understood that even though hooker

55:11

having been crushed mentally by Li at

55:14

Chancellorsville wanted to do that I

55:17

still find that sort of hilarious that

55:19

the army commander would say well I want

55:20

to go the other way I know he’s headed

55:22

to the United States now’s my perfect

55:24

chance to go to Richmond but he didn’t

55:27

understand this Richmond is not the key

55:28

the key is Lee’s army so you thinking

55:31

sacrifice men we were just gone on

55:33

terrorizing Pennsylvania throughout I

55:35

mean I think there was no chance he was

55:37

going to sacrament there’s a zero

55:39

percent chance that politically he would

55:42

be allowed to do that this absolutely no

55:44

chance not a slim chance no chance that

55:47

he’s going to be allowed to do that

55:49

these are two Democratic Republic’s at

55:52

war this is one of the things we talked

55:54

about the first day politics and

55:56

military affairs are like this the

56:00

military the armies do not operate in a

56:03

military vacuum they operate in an

56:06

intensely politicized atmosphere and

56:08

people pay attention people being

56:10

civilians at home the boat pay attention

56:14

oh there’s no chase I’ll be right back

56:16

there in just a second oh sorry cuz last

56:18

class you said that he had to take the

56:22

army out of Virginia he said that yes

56:25

ledian yeah so how else you do that

56:28

without going to know that’s the only

56:30

way to do that we haven’t talked about

56:32

the main reason he said he wanted to get

56:34

it out of Virginia what’s the main

56:36

reason Lee wants to get the army out of

56:39

Virginia and then they want to give him

56:40

a chance to regrow there it’s logistics

56:42

he wants to give the farmers in Virginia

56:45

respite and he wants to get into

56:47

Pennsylvania and just siphon everything

56:50

his army can use out of that lush

56:53

central Pennsylvania countryside that’s

56:55

I think that’s the number one thing on

56:57

his mind

56:59

number two is he says you’re talking

57:01

about how big the armies are what is he

57:03

20 so he says if we don’t if we just sit

57:05

and wait what is going to happen we say

57:08

okay we won the Battle of

57:09

Chancellorsville I’m just gonna sit here

57:11

at Fredericksburg what’s going to happen

57:15

what’s going to happen what are the

57:17

federals could have do what are the

57:19

faendal is going to do in from Lee’s

57:21

perspective what does he say what’s the

57:24

scenario that he sketches out basically

57:26

he sees the war of attrition with the

57:28

north continuing to engage and bring the

57:30

war to the south one danger wherever

57:33

they choose to bring it he says they’re

57:36

bigger than we are they have more men

57:38

than we have if we just sit here we’re

57:41

going to allow our more powerful

57:42

opponent to take their time perfect

57:45

their plans and project their power at

57:48

the point of their choice and eventually

57:52

where does he say the army Northern

57:54

Virginia will end up yes it will end up

57:56

defending Richmond will end up in

57:58

Richmond and when he gets in Richmond

58:00

his view is the war is over

58:02

because it will end up as a siege and a

58:05

siege can only end one way with a

58:08

smaller force hunkered down and a larger

58:10

force enveloping it and he will do

58:14

almost anything to avoid death what

58:16

makes the comparison between Lee and

58:18

Washington wasn’t that was pretty

58:19

interesting yes Washington walking his

58:21

Lee’s idle right Washington let’s the

58:24

British take New York he lets them take

58:26

Boston you doesn’t have anything they

58:27

want we didn’t exactly let them take New

58:30

York they took New York the enthusiam

58:32

out but yes so the be moving into

58:35

Pennsylvania is basically the same as

58:37

Washington going to Valley Forge and

58:40

just kind of making his way down selves

58:41

and having to catch for loss at Yorktown

58:44

so from that perspective the war of

58:47

attrition isn’t a bad thing for Lee Lee

58:50

does not fight the war the way

58:51

Washington fought the revolution

58:52

absolutely Washington avoids big battles

58:54

but when Lee is afraid of this war of

58:57

attrition should he have been he’s

59:01

afraid of being besieged in Richmond

59:03

yeah he absolutely should have been what

59:04

how did the war in when he got besieged

59:06

in Richmond and Petersburg that’s when

59:08

the war ended yeah but like politically

59:11

the North was going to get tired of this

59:13

if we had avoided the big battle is that

59:15

fair to say if there weren’t big battles

59:18

the United States civilian population

59:21

probably wouldn’t have gotten tired of

59:23

it

59:23

as they got tired of it when their

59:25

soldiers were suffering hideous

59:27

casualties in these big bells it’s a

59:30

it’s a it’s this race for the

59:33

Confederates from Lee’s perspective a

59:35

race between attrition that comes with

59:40

winning the kinds of victories you’re

59:41

winning the depressed northern morale

59:42

and how quickly northern morale which is

59:45

going to have it is the North going to

59:46

give up first or we can run out of em

59:48

first that is the equation that Lee has

59:50

in his mind in an end the northern

59:53

morale proved resilient enough to absorb

59:56

a third of a million casualties and

59:58

still push on through all both came very

60:01

close in the summer of 64 not the

60:03

sticking to it I mean this close this

60:06

close you can you can make a great case

60:10

that it would have been better if Lee

60:12

hasn’t suffered so many casualties we’d

60:14

have to be an idiot not to make that

60:15

case but what you can’t supply and what

60:18

Alan Nolan could never answer I would

60:22

ask you how do you guarantee a supply of

60:24

Ambrose Burnside’s

60:26

to give you a bunch of battles of

60:28

Fredericksburg where you put your army

60:29

and really strong ground and your

60:31

opponent comes up and just attacks

60:32

uphill against you all day you only ever

60:36

found one of those guys in command of

60:38

the Union Army

60:39

excited about you know that that is what

60:44

caused the Union at that moment divided

60:46

what you do the same in the opposite way

60:48

because they would have all day fighting

60:51

uphill attacking a very entrenched

60:53

position they were going to lose I’m

60:55

Linda Park and right what worse what

60:59

you’re saying that while is that he

61:00

should have known that he would fail at

61:02

Gettysburg and should have known that

61:04

attacking a nindroid position uphill at

61:07

that moment is also the timing to be

61:11

affable

61:11

here’s the problem with that thinking he

61:15

did that it gains his mill in late June

61:19

18 he had a 50,000 man assault that

61:21

gains his smell biggest assault of the

61:23

war early that succeeded he had

61:27

assaulted Chancellorsville exactly two

61:29

months before the picket Pettigrew

61:32

assault where his infantry who were

61:34

outnumbered were attacking

61:36

who retrenched and they succeeded there

61:39

are and I think this is what led him I’m

61:42

not getting I’m just trying to explain

61:44

why I think he did this and it’s because

61:46

I think he believed in the end that his

61:49

infantry could just take care of

61:52

business no matter what the obstacles

61:55

because he had seen them do it in an

61:59

offensive mode 4 times before Gettysburg

62:03

but when you stand there and look across

62:06

you’ll stand on Cemetery Ridge and look

62:08

across at Cemetery Ridge and I mean you

62:11

I’m sure you’ll thank gosh we’re going

62:13

to line up here and walk over there with

62:17

people seven tenths of a mile with

62:19

people shooting at us with cannons and

62:20

mutlu whew it’s it’s it’s really

62:26

distressing to do that so should he have

62:30

nothing he had this great quotation

62:32

later he said i bided known that it

62:34

wouldn’t work even as dull a fellow as i

62:36

am would have done something different

62:39

but he didn’t know it wouldn’t work

62:42

Longstreet thought it wouldn’t work

62:44

and I think Longstreet Jim for all your

62:47

posturing about how I don’t like

62:49

Longstreet I think Longstreet’s idea was

62:51

better at getting Braddock Porter

62:53

Alexander’s idea is the best what if he

62:55

say Lee should have done after his big

62:57

victory on the first day Alexander says

63:00

there are three options and he says the

63:02

best one is one for the Confederates yes

63:06

hunker down we smacked the Federals

63:10

around on the first day they’re there on

63:12

this line here here we are on seminary

63:16

Ridge which is a nice defensive position

63:18

as well just we’ll hunker down and make

63:21

them attack us they never drive us from

63:24

positions said and Alexander said the

63:27

onus is on them to get us out of the

63:29

United States the place where Lee was

63:32

most disingenuous in his official report

63:34

is when he said that he the battle was

63:37

forced on him because his supply

63:39

situation was tenuous and in the essence

63:41

he had to attack that that is just not

63:43

true now Alexander calls him on that

63:46

he said well we stayed there for three

63:48

more days and fought a big battle and

63:50

then we stayed another 10 days north of

63:53

the Potomac if he had published that

63:57

book if Alexander had when he wrote it

63:59

he would have come in for incredible

64:01

criticism across the south incredible

64:03

for being so harsh on Lee anybody want

64:06

to do something else would leave right

64:08

now or shall we give this did this class

64:10

is no different than any other class

64:11

where it’s all about Lee we haven’t

64:13

spent much time on George media but any

64:16

kind of Lee aftershocks I’ll say after

64:22

I’ve made the answer to that note but we

64:25

are going to circle back to leave Mead

64:29

we’ve had a semi elephant defensively as

64:33

someone who was who did a very good job

64:36

in difficult circumstances I want to

64:39

hear someone offer a critique of need

64:42

that might not be quite so positive

64:44

if anyone reached that kind of

64:47

conclusion about it are you all need ice

64:49

in there so have a crack at a gym yes

64:58

that’s yes basically defending me and

65:03

saying that it really was a critical

65:05

place seemed to me to be mostly about

65:16

and it was you’ll see his he wasn’t

65:19

blown up but there were lots of

65:21

cannonballs coming around and then so he

65:22

left so the entire narrative of his

65:26

actions during the day seemed like he

65:29

wasn’t really interesting that much the

65:31

biggest effect that’s all I came out

65:33

about him was that he yes he did make

65:34

this a that one decision early on

65:36

brought everyone together to get

65:39

information out of a consensus

65:41

the decision but everything else seems

65:45

to just fall into place because the boom

65:49

commanders or his subordinates did their

65:53

job well or just kind of happened when

65:57

did he get to the battlefield when this

65:59

meat show up and get his birth the night

66:04

of day one how late on the night of is

66:08

almost midnight

66:09

so almost midnight so that’s

66:11

everything’s over with he has to make a

66:14

decision that night too I mean he there

66:17

he has a decision to make am I going to

66:19

stay here tomorrow or not what about on

66:23

the second

66:23

what are his biggest what’s his biggest

66:26

crisis on the second sickles yes what’s

66:34

what so what’s the deal with sickles

66:38

you’re George Gordon Meade what do you

66:41

think is happening on your line on the

66:44

second until you find out differently

66:46

you put your line together how are you

66:49

thinking what the hell are you doing

66:51

well no now wait a minute I said what

66:53

are you thinking before you find out

66:54

what’s it doing how would you put your

66:56

line together in a nice interior lines

66:59

on high ground you don’t probably don’t

67:01

even it’s right goes from it goes from

67:03

cold tail this is such a mess here now

67:05

we’re going to start over like you’re

67:08

doing with all these warranties

67:10

this is great we have boards and boards

67:13

co-ceo Cemetery Hill which confusingly

67:18

has the same initials Cemetery

67:22

there’s a little brown top so you think

67:26

you have a West Point case there so his

67:31

original lie on the second goes like

67:34

this and sickles is supposed to be in

67:37

the farthest left it kind of goes down

67:39

to Little Round Top that’s what he

67:41

thinks is is happening and then early in

67:45

the afternoon what does he find out cuz

67:47

happened what what is sickles done so

67:51

all the little kids work advance here’s

67:53

the peach orchard which is higher than

67:56

so sickles has just taken his his core

67:59

this is the Emmitsburg Road coming into

68:02

town he’s taking his core he’s put it

68:04

one division there and then the other

68:06

one my map is so bad it comes down to

68:09

Devil’s Den which he will see and he

68:11

didn’t what did he tell me about this

68:16

nothing did not tell me he did this so

68:21

now the Union line just stops right here

68:23

and what’s the weakness of sickles isn’t

68:27

that sickles the point is that this is

68:28

higher than this ground and sickles is

68:30

sensitive about that because of what

68:32

happened to in the Chancellorsville and

68:33

when you go there you’ll see that the

68:35

peach orchard is higher than this but

68:37

when he moves out there what is the

68:41

defensive problem with his being out

68:43

there along the Emmitsburg Road you can

68:45

just get cut off this flank was in the

68:48

air this life is in the air he’s just

68:50

floating out there all by himself with

68:52

his ten thousand men and so needs

68:56

what’s needs reaction to this what is

68:58

possible reactions to this what could he

69:01

do when he finds out this is HAP I don’t

69:03

mean he cursed he cursed a lot but Mead

69:05

Mead had a very rich vocabulary hubbub

69:08

vulgar isms and blasphemies that he

69:12

would deploy at the drop of a hat but

69:13

apart from that what what are the what

69:17

could he do here okay darn it sickles

69:20

has gone out there golly

69:23

no oh fudge he’s not worried supposed to

69:26

be he tried he thought about but yeah he

69:33

went out and looked

69:34

why can’t he order him back because this

69:36

started fighting the Confederates are

69:38

showing that’s right the Confederates

69:40

are showing up so yes he does he pulls

69:48

in troops from two other Corps to try to

69:50

shore up this this weak line and

69:53

somebody made the semi dismissive

69:57

comment Justin I don’t know who did that

69:59

what me did was move people around and

70:01

he gets a lot of points for that that is

70:04

essentially what he does his move people

70:06

around he moves them around so that his

70:09

life is strongest at the point of

70:11

greatest danger he moves them from culty

70:15

virtually strips everybody from our far

70:17

right CH site and moves them down here

70:21

so there’s hardly anybody left up there

70:23

anyways other people it’s all about

70:25

supporting his left flank

70:27

which is in real danger throughout the

70:30

fighting on the second and he uses these

70:33

inferior lines very well so he doesn’t

70:35

good he does a very good job of that but

70:38

that would be something you’d have to be

70:42

a really bad officer not to know how to

70:45

use interior lines because that’s one of

70:47

the things that everybody knew I mean

70:49

that’s a huge advantage everybody

70:51

nobody’s but still let’s give him points

70:52

for that he did a good job of that what

70:56

else did we do that we find that

70:58

especially impressive to us I mean I

71:00

could never understand why sequels who

71:02

went what why did sickles go out there I

71:05

could not Michelle wants to know why I

71:09

have chalk all over my pants and why

71:11

sickles went out from his line on

71:13

Cemetery Ridge why did he do that and

71:16

somebody but not you Jim I don’t want

71:19

you to answer this I want somebody else

71:21

to answer tab and Chancellor bill yeah

71:23

higher position those order to get it up

71:25

called Hazel Grove yes and what happened

71:28

when he gave it up that thing the United

71:31

States positive battle that’s right

71:33

other than that nothing bad happened

71:35

done canary so was so it’s all about

71:39

Chancellorsville it’s all about

71:41

Chancellorsville what does I mean he

71:43

just says and he told Henry hunt who’s

71:46

the union artillerist our chief of

71:48

artillery I can defend better from that

71:50

high ground than I can from back here

71:53

but the fallacy in that is have enough

71:55

men to make a line that makes sense by

71:59

going out to the peach orchard and

72:00

defending that high ground so that’s a

72:04

good argument in theory but on the

72:06

ground it doesn’t stand up all those

72:09

sickles dependent and sickles said What

72:12

did he say his move did retrospectively

72:16

when they’re arguing about who’s his

72:18

arguments what the caused me to send

72:23

reinforcements sooner which was kind of

72:26

again for to it what did it do with the

72:27

Confederates according to sickles

72:30

anybody picked up on that yeah and get

72:33

like saved the Union mind because the

72:35

killer would have gotten around their

72:36

flank because they were throwing dirt

72:38

around hops so the confederation said

72:40

attacked him up in the peach orchard and

72:42

that cave it’s almost like a delaying

72:44

action made them focus there and they

72:47

broke a lot of their strength trying to

72:50

carry this ground that sickles took up

72:52

and by the time they over ran the peach

72:54

orchard and wheat field they ran up

72:57

against Union lines that by that point

72:59

we’re able to hold on the high ground so

73:01

he argues it saved the battle and his

73:04

critics said it came this close to

73:06

undoing the army you idiot political

73:11

craven political Tammany Hall tool you

73:14

almost lost the battle by what you did

73:17

in his responses no that’s exactly wrong

73:19

by moving out there I made Longstreet

73:22

deployed farther away than he would have

73:24

and he broke himself on my line which

73:27

was farther to the West than it would

73:29

otherwise yes I would I wouldn’t part of

73:35

this because he was and no one else was

73:44

yes and so there was already a lot of

73:46

bad baggage to begin with and so there

73:49

was no trust there’s no respect and so I

73:52

don’t

73:52

I wonder if sickle would have made the

73:55

same decisions to disobey the orders had

73:57

they actually gotten along if he made he

73:59

had gotten along right regardless the

74:01

chance or a hooker had given him the

74:02

orders or someone that he got along with

74:04

him given the orders I think that I

74:07

think there’s no way we can let him off

74:10

the hook for not telling his army

74:12

commander what he was doing I mean you

74:13

just can’t do that you can’t move an

74:15

entire infantry Corps out of where

74:19

you’re ordered to be without letting

74:21

your commander know what you’re doing so

74:23

I don’t think we can let him off the

74:24

hook there but I do think he is it’s

74:27

it’s understandable because he is an

74:29

almost complete outsider in the high

74:32

command but not only because he got

74:34

along with hooker who was a West pointer

74:36

but because he is he’s a politician he’s

74:38

not a West pointer he has this very

74:40

clouded and controversial and notorious

74:44

history that he brought with him as well

74:47

and was not considered the gentleman and

74:49

was not coming he just doesn’t fit in it

74:50

doesn’t fit in at all with this in the

74:53

culture of the Army of the Potomac

74:55

but even saying all of that he’s still a

74:58

soldier and a subordinate and you just

75:01

can’t do that even if it’s the right

75:03

move if he had told me initially that

75:06

meat cooks that okay you go there and

75:08

we’ll do this in this and this as we set

75:10

up the line the Marines I’m sure are

75:12

going to talk to you about that line the

75:15

line in a number of places that hooker

75:17

that sickles put together didn’t have

75:19

enough infantry to make an infantry line

75:21

there are lots of places where you had

75:22

artillery and in the Civil War you can’t

75:26

have artillery all by itself it can’t be

75:28

by itself because it’s absolutely

75:30

vulnerable to infantry if it’s all by

75:32

itself so it was a terrible line didn’t

75:34

have enough men to do that it’s on the

75:37

other hand it took the Confederates a

75:40

lot of casualties to get

75:41

sicles line so and it’s impossible to

75:46

decide which of them is absolutely right

75:48

or absolutely wrong but I don’t think

75:52

it’s impossible to decide that he can’t

75:55

have a principal subordinate who is

75:57

freelances this way in a situation like

76:00

that but I but I want somebody to argue

76:02

with me if you think that that if there

76:04

are circumstances when you should have a

76:05

subordinate do that when it makes sense

76:08

right poor hands wet up let’s go isn’t

76:10

that the way that lead kind of ran

76:12

things right I mean to a certain extent

76:14

certainly not to to the point of

76:16

insubordination but he didn’t he push

76:19

down certain decision-making power and

76:21

say if you get to a point in the battle

76:22

and I’m not there and there’s a decision

76:25

to be made you make it and you become

76:27

the aggressor and so it seems like if

76:29

sickles had been in Lee’s army Lee might

76:32

have almost praised him for taking that

76:35

kind of an initiative I mean at what

76:38

point is an insubordination and at what

76:40

point is it just taking the initiative

76:42

and taking higher ground that you see is

76:43

better it’s that the problem with taking

76:47

the higher ground I think I think that’s

76:49

a great way to put it I think there

76:50

would be much more leeway in Lee’s army

76:52

than in the Union Army to do that but

76:54

the problem with the action is that he

76:56

doesn’t improve the army situation there

76:59

he creates this salient where he is hope

77:01

or is now completely vulnerable and

77:04

unless people do other things to rectify

77:07

that situation he’s he’s put at risk

77:10

basically 1/5 of the army here so I

77:13

think that’s his problem it’s it’s not

77:15

as if he’s pushing and aggressive he’s

77:17

not going after the Confederates here

77:19

he’s just funding the defensive

77:20

alignment but I think your point about

77:23

whether this kind of behavior at least

77:26

to a degree would be more acceptable in

77:28

Lee’s army I think the answer is yes to

77:30

that how can you explain good then we

77:33

didn’t let Longstreet or Hood go around

77:36

the flank in us exactly Lee Lee’s not

77:38

part of that equation

77:39

that’s Longstreet being a bad

77:41

subordinate again in my view hood should

77:43

have been allowed to do that Lee would

77:45

have allowed to do that because Lee had

77:48

allowed Longstreet to do

77:50

at Manassas he had allowed Jackson to do

77:52

it at Chancellorsville you get to the

77:53

ground and you see that the situation is

77:55

different and you know something that I

77:58

don’t know then you’re allowed to adjust

78:01

the circumstances on the ground and

78:02

that’s what hood was asking to do

78:04

it’s Longstreet who said no General Lee

78:07

told us to do it this way and we can’t

78:09

change General Lee’s orders

78:10

well Longstreet knew that wasn’t true

78:12

because Longstreet had changed these

78:14

orders at different points because all

78:16

of that on Longstreet I put 100% of that

78:19

on Longstreet because Lydia is way back

78:21

up by Lee has no idea what’s going on

78:23

and they’re not communicating with Lee

78:26

Longstreet is just saying Lee would not

78:28

allow that and so we can’t do that

78:34

getting back to me so the part of waters

78:37

kind of imposing your will of the enemy

78:39

was there ever a time that the Meade

78:41

attempted to do that because I feel like

78:43

he was just reacting a large part this

78:45

is all reactive yes right and so that

78:49

brings us to the next lead question and

78:51

Mary I saw your hand go up I’ll come

78:53

here in just a minute

78:53

what where is Meade’s opportunity to

78:56

impose his will on the army Northern

78:58

Virginia does he have any option

79:06

as as he’s watching the detritus of the

79:10

picket Pettigrew assault in front of him

79:14

it seems and when he has the sixth core

79:17

right behind him which is the biggest

79:19

core in the army the Potomac and it

79:20

hasn’t fought yet it seems like there’s

79:23

an option there for him to do something

79:25

I saw other hands go up too is that what

79:29

everyone was going to say now what’s the

79:32

counter-argument to that why what would

79:37

prevent his doing that give us some

79:39

factors late Brian it’s late is it

79:43

almost dark what time’s it get dark in

79:47

Gettysburg Pennsylvania in July of 1863

79:53

what isn’t there in the summer of 1863

79:57

the reason daylight savings time gets

79:59

dark around 8 by 8 o’clock

80:02

through the guard so imagine you’re in

80:05

Arizona and that’s what time is like in

80:08

Pennsylvania what and what time in the

80:11

afternoon is Pickett’s charge over with

80:14

about four we’ve got four hours of

80:16

daylight left now that’s either a lot of

80:21

time or not much time to move 15,000 men

80:24

around and get them to do something it

80:26

takes a long time to move a lot of men

80:28

around and get them in position to do

80:30

something why else might he not have

80:36

done anything here yeah

80:43

the tonier voice is so you’re I mean

80:46

your heart is not in that and another

80:48

thing maybe this and that and you know I

80:50

might have said you have like that or

80:51

yeah it seems like after a victory like

80:54

that put yourself in need skin what’s

80:58

going through your head right now

81:00

they’re retreating

81:02

I’m sorry go ahead here make your point

81:04

before I thought you also or I my

81:07

impression from the reading

81:08

that he was still worried that the

81:10

Confederates might recruit that they

81:12

weren’t done he’d seen so much success

81:15

letting them mess up on their own behalf

81:17

that I think that probably gave him the

81:20

confidence to just hang on the defense

81:22

even let him attack again right Scott

81:25

well the if I was him I would have felt

81:30

like we won this battle and I don’t want

81:33

to risk anything we would have exhaled

81:34

and thought wow but the big argument in

81:38

the essay I believe is that like in all

81:41

this repositioning everything every

81:43

other chorus had gotten like so mixed up

81:45

and everything was just kind of they

81:48

were this defensive position and it was

81:51

all patchwork and to Hancock was wounded

81:54

and if the reason three courts I think

81:57

it said yeah had all been badly wounded

81:59

and to try to regroup and get people

82:02

where they needed to be deleted charge

82:04

would have been very difficult and I

82:08

think your point about me he’s really

82:10

new on the scenes this is Earth’s huge

82:12

battle he’s in charge of the entire army

82:13

to see success and then say okay and now

82:16

I’m going to go

82:17

the Confederates firm and the you know

82:21

leadership styles stuff it seems like

82:23

that would be a big stretch for Emily at

82:26

this point yeah I personally think

82:30

that’s a lot of what’s going on but just

82:33

flip this the scenarios though can you

82:35

imagine that Lee would let an

82:38

opportunity like that go by I really

82:41

can’t imagine that I think he would have

82:43

put something together and tried to do

82:45

something – because it’s chaotic I mean

82:48

it wait

82:49

how many we’ve been I can’t remember I

82:51

know I asked him how many of you been to

82:52

Gettysburg how many they’ve stood on

82:53

Cemetery Ridge and looked I mean you

82:56

know what that Vista is like and to see

82:58

nothing but defeat and chaos on the part

83:03

of your opponent as far as you can see

83:07

in both directions in front of your line

83:08

I mean that is something Porter

83:12

Alexander he talks about the Union

83:14

experience of Chancellorsville when they

83:16

started to retreat from the clearing of

83:19

Chancellorsville and Alexander hurried

83:21

his guns his battalions of artillery

83:23

down into position to where they could

83:26

fire into this is he put a defenseless

83:29

mass of retreating man he said that’s

83:31

the part of a battle that can be

83:33

denominated pie that’s what you wait for

83:36

that’s what you dream up and then you

83:38

just inflict the greatest possible

83:41

damage at that point and that’s not

83:43

happening in the wake of the picot

83:45

Pettigrew assault it’s not at all what

83:49

about over the next several days what

83:52

what happens over the next one what is

83:54

Lee what date is Lee retreat the port

83:59

same day Vicksburg surrenders God is on

84:03

the side of the United States is what

84:05

the people in the United States decide

84:07

it’s the fourth of July and we’ve won

84:09

two big victories so Lee hands for the

84:12

Potomac

84:13

what is he fine

84:18

he’s retreating in this gigantic

84:21

rainstorm the rivers up and he can’t get

84:25

across how many days before he can get

84:29

across and ten days he can’t get across

84:36

and how much fighting takes place in

84:39

those ten days

84:42

no it’s God but but that’s probably good

84:46

for the Union because at least the way

84:49

that Alexander described it they’ve

84:51

become so entrenched in that defensive

84:53

position even though that their backs

84:55

are to the river into the wall that they

84:58

were like hoping for a battle at that

85:00

point they were they were I’ll just ask

85:04

you to flip this around again the

85:05

Federals are hunkered down along the

85:07

Potomac they’re about forty-five

85:08

thousand of them and there are 80,000

85:13

Confederates who are coming after them

85:15

and they want the Confederates to attack

85:18

I think the can think it’s just it’s

85:20

just an interesting contrast in mindsets

85:25

or cultures of command or whatever you

85:28

want to call it it’s a very striking

85:30

contrast it really is it’s I mean Lee is

85:36

encumbered by these huge trains of

85:38

wounded man I’m trains wagon trains they

85:40

call them trains his train stretched

85:43

total supplies and wounded he has more

85:49

than 40 miles of trains on different

85:52

roads heading for the Potomac forty

85:54

miles as he leaves the battlefield that

85:57

seems like a pretty vulnerable target

86:00

yeah I’m shocked even if the union’s

86:03

head and kind of surrounded them or

86:05

Indian just lightly engaged you have

86:08

kept them from crossed they can’t cross

86:09

if they’re engaged wait yeah they’re not

86:12

even pressing all-out attack but just no

86:13

need to harass and then definitely half

86:16

of them yeah but they can’t cross if

86:18

they’re under fire right and in the end

86:20

Lee gets across in one night crosses his

86:23

army in one night he did the same thing

86:25

after Antietam one night that’s

86:28

incredibly efficient going across the

86:30

Potomac there it’s I I think I think

86:36

Meade is in a really hard position and

86:39

does a really good job in a lot of ways

86:41

but I can understand Lincoln’s

86:44

frustration in the wake of Gettysburg

86:48

I really can relying upon the council

87:02

officers I didn’t get the sense that

87:05

there was a big boys repelling there’s

87:09

not there’s there’s there’s not there’s

87:13

no one saying you must you’ve got to let

87:16

me do this just let me go even if no one

87:18

else goes let me know I think

87:30

I think it’s cultural I think it’s I

87:33

think that the whole reaction on the

87:36

part of these union officers is part of

87:39

this McClellan culture that was so

87:43

profoundly important in the forging of

87:47

the army and it’s absolutely and the

87:49

clouds absence makes no difference and

87:51

is still there even though McClellan

87:53

isn’t there anymore and this most

87:55

aggressive corps commander is Hancock

87:57

and Hancock is his wound is really badly

88:02

wounded and and Reynolds his most senior

88:06

corps commander is dead so not that he

88:09

was that aggressive but that may be part

88:11

of it so you’ve got new people in

88:13

command of those Corps to just as usual

88:15

as new and who knows what he’s going to

88:17

do now you have new people in command

88:19

and sickles so there’s somebody new in

88:21

command of the 3rd Corps in command of

88:23

the 1st Corps incoming it’s in command

88:24

of the 2nd Corps but the 6th Corps

88:28

hadn’t even thought it’s the biggest one

88:29

in the Army it seems like the 6th Corps

88:31

would have been available for at least

88:36

light harassing duty something something

88:41

Scott is another kind of positive on me

88:46

one of the things that I saw is a

88:47

contrast and images because and they

88:50

have just been because of the situation

88:51

was when the Federals were under fire

88:56

and and you know he was taking his

88:58

headquarters were taking fire he still

89:01

like got out there and went and like

89:04

checked in with almost around Anders and

89:07

what I mean they have a good story about

89:09

the he tells the story about the guys

89:12

hip standing behind the wagon and how it

89:14

didn’t give any more protection yeah

89:16

whereas it seems like me at least in

89:18

this situation is very removed

89:22

any of the actual combat and I know I

89:25

saw that as something that was an act of

89:28

valor to still be out there in the

89:30

trenches when he’s at risk right well he

89:35

definitely is moving around the

89:37

battlefield he lead acted that way at

89:39

Antietam moving all over the line and

89:40

coming under fire I think we pretty much

89:43

stayed close to where the Virginia

89:45

Monument is now when you’re there you’ll

89:46

have a good sense of where he was and he

89:48

was and just sort of yeah listening to

89:51

fighting to his left fighting to his

89:53

right and he’s not moving all around

89:56

nope nope I’m not sure what his presence

89:59

his presence down were hood in

90:01

Longstreet were would have made a

90:03

difference I think because i i’ve no

90:05

doubt leo said well sure move around

90:06

there that makes sense you can get clear

90:09

around the flank that way but anyway

90:12

hood didn’t get to go and then hood got

90:14

shot almost immediately

90:17

hideous wound a very bad wound for old

90:20

hood

90:26

nobody’s gotten a neat tattoo I guess

90:28

since we met last time not a single one

90:30

I think need but I’m also I have a real

90:35

sense you’re much more interested in Lee

90:37

here he seems more interesting to you

90:42

why is that how why is he more

90:44

interesting to you so take us back

91:00

Alexander account he was even proper

91:04

enough to go to Tennessee and I think

91:06

Longstreet Montreat want wanted to yeah

91:08

yeah oh no no absolutely and it’s a

91:17

question it underscores how important he

91:20

was because virtually everybody else we

91:22

talked about this I think we did I can’t

91:24

remember I’m pretty sure we did they

91:27

debated this in April and May the

91:28

Confederates how to allocate their

91:30

resources and most people politicians

91:32

generals and Jefferson Davis favored

91:35

weakening Lee and reinforcing either the

91:38

army dependent Vicksburg or Braxton

91:40

Bragg’s army which was essentially

91:42

defending Chattanooga and they made good

91:46

arguments and but Lee said no and in the

91:49

end Davis

91:50

wouldn’t go against me which is a

91:52

measure of the argument in a loans are

91:57

in him the two books that you are

92:00

looking at non Connelly that argue that

92:03

Lee was just one of many generals he

92:05

says the same as all the others he’s not

92:06

the same as all the others he’d be they

92:08

get five votes and he gets five and a

92:10

half boats in this Lincoln when he took

92:13

when he pulled his cabinet and everybody

92:14

voted no and he voted yes and then he

92:16

said the eyes have it it’s that kind of

92:18

thing with Lee it’s hard to go against

92:21

the only guy who ever wins anything for

92:23

you it’s really hard to do Harriette

92:25

anything though if we move so far you

92:28

don’t remember what

92:29

going to say well I think it’s

92:31

interesting that we find leave we

92:34

definitely may because we brought a lot

92:36

more about him but at the end of the day

92:38

I’d rather be mean with the right

92:39

strategy than charismatic slightly

92:42

dogmatic and Lee with the wrong strategy

92:44

so it’s just really interesting to think

92:47

that Mead because he didn’t go on the

92:50

offensive to be more likely his harshly

92:52

criticized and Lee who basically loses

92:55

the war because he will not do anything

92:58

but be the aggressor now you’re

93:01

channeling now I know him that’s right

93:03

Lee loses the war because he’s too

93:05

aggressive you could also say that means

93:07

not be you don’t say means not be more

93:09

likely because obviously he’s not be

93:10

more like grant who also would have done

93:13

something to hurt the rebels after

93:15

pursuing grant would have been all over

93:17

them to me does empower people though

93:21

right like he just empowers the top

93:23

level at the decision-making point and

93:25

then expects people to listen well by

93:29

empower you mean listens to their

93:31

arguments and then makes it yeah sure

93:34

yeah he does he does yep I wouldn’t say

93:38

that I think you know you look at the

93:39

two people that from the war that are

93:42

still have these huge sizes these are

93:43

Lincoln and Lee and I think that the

93:44

reason they had this perceived or

93:47

publicly perceived ideology that they

93:49

were operating on and I think that’s

93:50

what people like find fascinating that

93:52

they were so yeah there’s a slower Lee

93:56

being driven by it is like love for home

93:58

and Lincoln major by you know his like

94:02

love of country or however you know and

94:05

the whole nation and so I think that

94:06

people find that fascinating that they

94:08

were so Dhirubhai that that that it like

94:10

dictated all of their actions and in

94:12

fact of the way and so I think that’s

94:14

why you know ends up being this

94:15

long-term fascination whereas me like

94:17

did the right things but it’s like

94:18

there’s not a backstory there I think

94:20

it’s harder to like connect with why he

94:22

did the things he did

94:25

and with Lee it’s also I think I mean if

94:28

you all of these qualities that people

94:31

like would have meant nothing if he

94:33

haven’t won a bunch of victories in 1862

94:35

and 1861 the matter oh he’s a great

94:37

Christian gentleman yeah but he’s a

94:39

loser let me toss to all these battles I

94:41

don’t care buddy but letting be a

94:43

preacher not a general because he’s not

94:45

many battles that’s the key that’s the

94:47

real people Lee is that he wins battles

94:49

and gives civilians hope that’s the key

94:53

all the other stuff is nice wonderful

94:56

dressing in gigas and scrollwork and

94:58

crown moldings but the basic thing is

95:03

that he’s successful and successful to

95:08

the degree that Gettysburg isn’t held

95:11

against him that’s what to me is one of

95:13

the most remarkable aspects of his

95:16

position in the Confederacy Gettysburg

95:18

essentially has no impact on his

95:21

reputation none none it’s amazing but

95:29

true amazing but true it really is okay

95:34

we’re a minute over will do subordinates

95:38

next week I’m going to bring a musket

95:40

next week I have to drive to Washington

95:42

or would have brought it tonight and who

95:43

knows in Washington with a musket what

95:45

might happen to me but I will have it

95:47

next week when we end what I already

95:51

gave you hardtack tonight I didn’t bring

95:56

hardtack know you’ll get hardtack to

95:58

hardtack and a must

96:01

you’ll be the only kids on your block

96:03

with hardtack I promise

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