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A Reckoning for Western Liberalism
08:28uh the the thesis of the book we were08:31asking08:31why is it that democratization produced08:34a politics of grievance and resistance08:37and resentment and one the simplest08:40answer08:41is that uh democratization was imitation08:44and imitation08:45uh uh is associated with the confession08:48that the other is superior you’re08:50inferior08:50and of course that produces resentment08:53but more08:54particularly if i could give you just08:55one i think uh08:57very revealing example09:00of how this uh how this developed let’s09:03take hungary as an example09:05the hungarians took standard model09:08thatcherite09:09privatization which uh uh developed in09:12the west09:13they tried they applied it in a society09:15with no private capital09:17the consequence of this was in a way we09:19should have seen it ahead of time09:21was that managers took the assets of09:24their enterprises09:25and uh used that to buy the enterprises09:27for themselves09:28creating their own private wealth and uh09:32this was the beginning of the09:34development of an appalling inequalities09:36in these uh in east european societies09:38post-communist societies unjustifiable09:41inequalities which were resented but not09:43only that09:45the the language of liberalism which is09:48the language of human rights individual09:49rights09:50was not able to capture or to articulate09:54the grievance uh experienced by those09:56who watched the public patrimony of09:58their country09:59put into the pockets of individuals who10:01were insiders10:02so the privatization of polypatrimony10:06was a uh was was experienced as an abuse10:09as a10:09as a as a crime but it couldn’t be10:12articulated in the language10:13of individual rights of liberalism and10:16indeed10:17the language of liberalism particularly10:18the language of private property rights10:20be uh beca banned blessed or justified10:24this process which was widely viewed as10:27illegitimate and unjustifiable and and10:30of course10:31personally painful if you are your best10:33friend10:34you have two friends uh uh they’re very10:37equal one day10:38in a couple years one of them is riding10:40around in limousines10:41the other can’t afford a bus ticket one10:43is eating at fish restaurants every10:45night the other10:46can’t afford a piece of fresh fruit that10:48produces resentment so the10:50the the westernization process created10:53traumas in these societies which we10:55didn’t foresee and didn’t predict10:57but that was the seedbed for this11:00populist revolt against the liberal11:02order11:03now for those of us who grew up during11:04the cold war this is going to sound11:05passing strange but there are many on11:07the right11:08in eastern and central europe that11:10consider the european union to be the11:12new11:12soviet union how can that be11:15yeah this is a very strange development11:17interesting and kind of11:18complicated so the first thing is that11:21reform elites11:23in eastern europe were very eager to uh11:26to join in the accession process to the11:29european union11:30and therefore accepted the post-national11:32rhetoric11:33of the european union that if you11:35remember was really developed to help11:37germany11:38overcome its nationalistic past so it11:40was a very post-national language11:42and that um meant that this these reform11:46elites11:47were leaving behind in their own country11:50national symbols11:51national traditions they kind of didn’t11:53speak about them11:54and therefore when resentment uh or when11:57when the west entered into crisis11:59particularly in 200812:01and the western model seemed to be less12:04than it was cracked up to be12:05and to present problems um a counter12:08elite emerged12:09in eastern europe in central eastern12:11europe mostly of provincial origins12:13who blamed everything that went wrong12:17on the fact that they the reform elite12:19had abandoned the nation12:20had abandoned national traditions so12:22this was a uh12:24the the accession process was a viewed12:26as a12:27betrayal of national authenticity12:31uh in in addition there’s another very12:34interesting factor which is that the12:35european union was12:36asking all in and hungary become12:39democratic12:39you must learn how to become democracies12:42like we in the west12:43at the same time brussels was saying we12:46are going to write all of your laws12:48so while you’re becoming democratic12:50actually your laws are going to be12:51written in brussels12:52this produced also resentment and a12:54feeling that there is something12:56uh perverse or uh arrogant about12:59brussels obviously brussels is not13:02moscow it doesn’t have a boot13:04on their throats but it did it does did13:06convey13:07a sense of uh superiority judgmentalism13:10and then i i need to uh emphasize that13:13although13:14the west did not impose democracy and13:18liberalization13:19it did judge the progress of13:22democratization and liberalization13:24and in a way westerners when they13:26visited eastern europe i saw this a lot13:28i worked there of course in the 90s13:30uh it was as if it’s in the way tourists13:33visit a zoo you know13:34you go to the zoo you look at the13:36primates you say well13:38uh they’re like us but they’re lit13:40missing something they don’t have an13:42opposable thumb13:43or they don’t have the rule of law so13:45you’re kind of saying you’re you’re kind13:46of a copy of us but you’re not a very13:48good copy13:49and probably you’ll never be much good13:51so there was a feeling of13:52being looked down upon uh which also13:55stirred resentment uh and let me just13:59say one other thing about14:00i think authenticity the sense these14:02populists are claiming that they14:04are those in touch with the authentic14:06tradition which has been14:08lost by westernization and14:10democratization so14:12in 1989 uh it’s clear that the14:16nationalists were allied with the14:19liberals in the revolt against moscow’s14:21empire14:22so in poland there was a lot of14:24basically trying to get away from russia14:25was a very important motivation now they14:28didn’t14:29speak the language of nationalism at the14:31time probably because it was not a14:32language welcome in brussels14:34but also because this was the period of14:36milosevic you know the bloody side of14:38nationalism and milosevic was a14:40communist communist so a man like14:42kaczynski would never14:43echo milosevic so there was the language14:46of nationalism was subdued14:49and when after 2008 2014 the immigration14:52crisis14:53these populist knees near felt freed14:56from having to14:57to cover their nationalism with the14:59language of liberalism so15:01it it it had felt like a kind of cage15:04in which they were trapped and they15:06broke out of it15:07and returned to this kind of nativist uh15:10way of feeling which had always been15:12there but had been muffled so it was15:15that’s part of the why populism seems15:18authentic to them15:19well let’s extend your metaphor a little15:22further if we want to talk about the15:24number one primate in the zoo boy this15:26is a terrible analogy15:28uh should we ask about russia here why15:30didn’t i i mean15:31the the many of the central and eastern15:33european countries did sort of flirt15:35with15:35liberal democracy for a while before15:38adopting illiberal democracy that they15:40have today but russia never did15:41why why did russia never try it well i15:44mean first of all you have to remember15:45that in the soviet union15:46elites have been have found it very easy15:49to15:50fake democracy have fake elections15:52because they’ve been faking communism15:53for at least two decades before15:55uh they were sort of dressed up this way15:58let’s pretend we’re having to15:59have elections these are all rigged of16:01course uh16:02and uh we know he’s going to win and16:04there’s not really any competition16:06that was very easy for them to do they16:07also in russia by the way16:10they they had a communist training told16:12them that democracy is just16:14a trick by which elites uh deceive their16:17publics16:18and hold on to power capitalism is just16:20really an elite project to16:22exploit the working classes and so on so16:25they were16:25very comfortable with that idea of16:27capitalist democracy16:29but in the end basically uh russia16:33was so injured i mean the main thing to16:36understand about the russian16:37situation is they lost huge part of16:40their territory16:41uh a huge number of their population16:43they lost their superpower status it was16:45a16:46it was a huge injury to the self-image16:48of russians which was not true in16:49eastern europe that they didn’t16:51eastern europeans didn’t have this16:52imperial swagger this imperial16:54claims that they were you know on the16:57top of the world16:58uh and actually exporting their own17:01model17:01elsewhere so that was a very strong and17:04i think the so the russians for17:06a couple decades were pretty happy with17:08just faking democracy and17:10but in the end as putin came to power17:13the resentment of being treated as17:16second-class17:16citizens as being looked down upon as17:18being taught lessons17:20by the west boiled over and uh the17:23russians17:24went from this like faking a democracy17:28to a what we call aggressive imitation17:31uh that is17:32imitation of the west which is designed17:35to humiliate the west17:36uh which is designed to show that the17:38west is hypocritical so for example17:41in the speech he gave putin gave17:44justifying the annexation of17:46crimea he basically imitated word for17:49word17:49uh western speeches about the17:51independence of kosovo17:53human rights national self-determination17:56and so forth but this was17:57very much a kind of imitation meant to18:00expose the west’s18:01hypocrisy and uh yes i think that’s18:05i think that’s a good uh way to18:07understand the putin regime which is not18:09people often uh act as if putin is a18:12great strategist and it is true that18:13he’s played18:14beforehand well but he’s not a great18:16strategist his18:17his main aim which is not strategic and18:20is not18:21helping russia redevelop itself is to18:24expose the west as hypocritical that’s18:26his18:26obsession uh and i think that’s a18:29blind alley that’s a dead end maybe a18:31blind alley but most days of the week18:33it’s not that hard to do18:34whoops there’s my little editorial18:36comment uh let me try this18:39do we have to come to the unhappy18:40conclusion therefore18:42that liberalism as we understand it is18:45really not exportable18:47to cultures that are if i can put it18:49this way wired differently18:51from those of us in the west i think18:54one of the big lessons of the 2003 war18:58in iraq18:59is that uh trying to impose a19:02democratic system after a six-week19:04military campaign19:05in a country where three-quarters of the19:06population married their first cousin19:08and so19:08it’s a completely different social world19:10you can’t just you know uh19:12impose something like this and that that19:15was such a lesson even though19:16our uh uh international internationalist19:21humanitarian internationals uh went over19:24there19:25with the uh crude and i think uh19:28defenseless uh idea that the only19:31legitimate authority with whom we are19:33going to deal are going to be authority19:35that’s elected19:36i think it’s very good to help so the19:38listeners to contrast what19:40how we behaved in afghanistan and how19:42the americans behaved in afghanistan and19:44how they behaved19:45in iraq and afghanistan we had been19:47there for decades we19:49knew all the warlords we didn’t say to19:51the warlords you must be elected19:53before we negotiate with you but in iraq19:56the religious leaders the tribal shakes19:57were set aside we had this19:59fake ideological belief that we have to20:02create authority by elections which of20:04course is a20:05is a uh it is based on historical20:08ignorance20:09democracy is a tiny spot in human20:11history20:12it has cute enormously complicated20:14preconditions20:16it doesn’t we we’re confusing the20:18absence of obstacles with the presence20:20of preconditions we thought if you get20:21rid of saddam20:22you’re going to have democracy just like20:24if you get rid of communist elite you’re20:26going to have democracy20:27and this was an illusion it’s a20:29democratic ideology that20:31idea was uh is is is it20:34uh uh ex exposes a kind of disgraceful20:38historical ignorance which was uh at the20:41basis of much of american foreign policy20:44in the post-cold war era we’ve got about20:46five minutes to go here so let me try a20:48couple more questions with you20:49your book now suggests that we’ve20:51entered an age of illiberal20:53imitation how do you see that20:56well it’s a strange uh fact that uh21:00president trump seems to be uh uh21:03accepting putin’s uh a strategic goal of21:07dismantling the european union21:09of destroying all of the international21:11organizations created by the united21:12states after world war21:14ii uh and he’s at war not only with the21:17wto the who in21:19all the world america made seems to be21:21uh uh21:22the liberal world order seems to be21:24something that trump himself21:26is uh attacking so that is a a kind of21:29imitation of and he’s using the rhetoric21:32nationalist rhetoric anti-immigrant21:33rhetoric21:34of orban and kaczynski uh and the21:38anti-western21:39uh language and also by the way21:42uh he’s the first american president who21:45has not said we deserve to rule the21:47world because we’re morally superior21:49i mean that’s a kind of not a very21:52likable uh uh position to take but every21:55american president has taken that21:57basically21:58trump says no no we’re just like21:59everyone else uh22:01well what i was personally don’t you22:03think22:04is that again be a tough case for him22:06personally to make it22:07imitate him personally yes i would say22:10but he of course22:11his basic uh thing is he resents22:14this is sort of the trump world view is22:16he resents terribly22:18the countries that imitate our uh22:21economic productivity22:22or or are horning in on our market share22:25and so on so22:26he’s a person who has claimed i think22:28the first american president ever22:30to say that america is the greatest22:33victim of the americanization22:34of the world so that’s part of it but i22:37wouldn’t like uh to say a word about22:40uh the current crisis we’re in and i’m22:43i’ve been asking myself and my colleague22:45yvonne krustev22:46we’ve been speaking about this as well22:48what does the was the current pandemic22:51tell us about the trauma of liberalism22:54and the the competition between22:56liberalism and populism22:57uh because in a way uh the23:01the previous crises of liberalism 1923:04uh the uh 2001 in which it turned out23:07that23:08defending human rights the whole uh idea23:11of defending human rights as the primary23:12value23:13seemed to give way to the battle against23:15terrorism in which rights were viewed as23:17a trojan horse for our enemies23:192008 which really showed that our23:22economic elite23:23i didn’t know what it was doing so that23:25also uh really hurt our prestige to uh23:28201423:29in which the migrant crisis uh made23:32people feel like open borders23:33were a threat to western civilization23:36and so on all these things have23:37combined and and we’re under a23:40uh we’re living in a time where those23:43three crises have seemed to be23:45accumulating in the present one23:46and weakening the liberal commitment to23:50globalization and so forth23:51openness uh at the same time23:54every political order has its own23:57disorders and populism23:59is producing its own discontents and24:01these populist leaders24:02bolsonaro trump authoritarians like24:05putin24:06strangely enough they are very afraid of24:09this crisis24:10they are not you know taking hold of it24:12and using it24:13to uh to uh uh to their benefit24:16uh there’s a way in which this kind of24:19crisis has24:20uh had is is challenging any kind of24:23regime24:24the archaeon regimes we saw that in24:25china where they’re hiding evidence24:27we see it in the west some some24:29democratic societies have done well some24:31authoritarian societies have done okay24:33it doesn’t seem to fit well into our24:36ideological24:37uh polarities so i think that’s and the24:39way i would put this in the end the24:40question open to us24:42is now in the future is is the pandemic24:45going to24:46increase our reliance on science and24:49rationality24:50belief in fact consciousness or is it24:53going to24:54uh create a uh is the panic24:57of and fear going to lead to more25:00conspiracy theories25:01uh and more xenophobia uh uh25:04migrant bashing uh so we’re on a knife’s25:08edge25:08i think and the the fate of the liberal25:11model and the liberal commitment to25:13rational decision making25:14uh and uh the uh uh25:17and its competition with these populist25:21myth makers25:22sloganeers who are always trying to sell25:24something has not been decided25:26i definitely do not think the populists25:29have the upper hand25:30i think the populists are also25:32struggling and they’re25:33not finding this an easy crisis to deal25:36with25:36so although i don’t believe that the25:39west is covering itself with glory25:41either25:42uh the whale and liberal regimes are25:44also struggling because25:46uh the the disease is hard to understand25:49and it’s hard to master25:50i i definitely don’t believe that uh the25:54current crisis is going to25:56really decide the question in favor of26:00of the populists well why don’t i26:02freelance then and just uh re-title your26:05book the light that’s failed26:07so far and we’ll leave it there uh26:10i want to thank you very much professor26:11holmes for joining us on tvo tonight26:13congratulations again on your gelber26:15prize26:15uh for anybody who wants to pick it up26:17yvonne krastieff and stephen holmes26:18collaborated on the light26:20that failed are reckoning take good care26:22and thanks for joining us on tvo tonight26:25thank you steve26:30the agenda with steve pakin is brought26:32to you by the chartered professional26:33accountants of ontario26:35cpa ontario is a regulator an educator26:38a thought leader and an advocate we26:40protect the public26:41we advance our profession we guide our26:44cpas26:45we are cpa ontario and by viewers like26:49you26:49thank you
Eastern Democracy was based on Imitation, which confesses others are Superior
08:28
uh the the thesis of the book we were
asking
why is it that democratization produced
a politics of grievance and resistance
and resentment and one the simplest
answer
is that uh democratization was imitation
and imitation
uh uh is associated with the confession
that the other is superior you’re
inferior
and of course that produces resentment
but more
particularly if i could give you just
one i think uh
very revealing example
of how this uh how this developed let’s
take hungary as an example
the hungarians took standard model
thatcherit
privatization which uh uh developed in
the west
they tried they applied it in a society
with no private capital
the consequence of this was in a way we
should have seen it ahead of time
was that managers took the assets of
their enterprises
and uh used that to buy the enterprises
for themselves
creating their own private wealth and uh
this was the beginning of the
development of an appalling inequalities
in these uh in east european societies
post-communist societies unjustifiable
inequalities which were resented but not
only that
the the language of liberalism which is
the language of human rights individual
rights
was not able to capture or to articulate
the grievance uh experienced by those
who watched the public patrimony of
their country
put into the pockets of individuals who
were insiders
so the privatization of polypatrimony
was a uh was was experienced as an abuse
as a
10:09
as a as a crime but it couldn’t be
10:12
articulated in the language
10:13
of individual rights of liberalism and
10:16
indeed
10:17
the language of liberalism particularly
10:18
the language of private property rights
10:20
be uh beca banned blessed or justified
10:24
this process which was widely viewed as
10:27
illegitimate and unjustifiable and and
10:30
of course
10:31
personally painful if you are your best
10:33
friend
10:34
you have two friends uh uh they’re very
10:37
equal one day
10:38
in a couple years one of them is riding
10:40
around in limousines
10:41
the other can’t afford a bus ticket one
10:43
is eating at fish restaurants every
10:45
night the other
10:46
can’t afford a piece of fresh fruit that
10:48
produces resentment so the
10:50
the the westernization process created
10:53
traumas in these societies which we
10:55
didn’t foresee and didn’t predict
10:57
but that was the seedbed for this
11:00
populist revolt against the liberal
11:02
order
11:03
now for those of us who grew up during
11:04
the cold war this is going to sound
11:05
passing strange but there are many on
11:07
the right
11:08
in eastern and central europe that
11:10
consider the european union to be the
11:12
new
11:12
soviet union how can that be
11:15
yeah this is a very strange development
11:17
interesting and kind of
11:18
complicated so the first thing is that
11:21
reform elites
11:23
in eastern europe were very eager to uh
11:26
to join in the accession process to the
11:29
european union
11:30
and therefore accepted the post-national
11:32
rhetoric
11:33
of the european union that if you
11:35
remember was really developed to help
11:37
germany
11:38
overcome its nationalistic past so it
11:40
was a very post-national language
11:42
and that um meant that this these reform
11:46
elites
11:47
were leaving behind in their own country
11:50
national symbols
11:51
national traditions they kind of didn’t
11:53
speak about them
11:54
and therefore when resentment uh or when
11:57
when the west entered into crisis
11:59
particularly in 2008
12:01
and the western model seemed to be less
12:04
than it was cracked up to be
12:05
and to present problems um a counter
12:08
elite emerged
12:09
in eastern europe in central eastern
12:11
europe mostly of provincial origins
12:13
who blamed everything that went wrong
12:17
on the fact that they the reform elite
12:19
had abandoned the nation
12:20
had abandoned national traditions so
12:22
this was a uh
12:24
the the accession process was a viewed
12:26
as a
12:27
betrayal of national authenticity
12:31
uh in in addition there’s another very
12:34
interesting factor which is that the
12:35
european union was
12:36
asking all in and hungary become
12:39
democratic
12:39
you must learn how to become democracies
12:42
like we in the west
12:43
at the same time brussels was saying we
12:46
are going to write all of your laws
12:48
so while you’re becoming democratic
12:50
actually your laws are going to be
12:51
written in brussels
12:52
this produced also resentment and a
12:54
feeling that there is something
12:56
uh perverse or uh arrogant about
12:59
brussels obviously brussels is not
13:02
moscow it doesn’t have a boot
13:04
on their throats but it did it does did
13:06
convey
13:07
a sense of uh superiority judgmentalism
13:10
and then i i need to uh emphasize that
13:13
although
13:14
the west did not impose democracy and
13:18
liberalization
13:19
it did judge the progress of
13:22
democratization and liberalization
13:24
and in a way westerners when they
13:26
visited eastern europe i saw this a lot
13:28
i worked there of course in the 90s
13:30
uh it was as if it’s in the way tourists
13:33
visit a zoo you know
13:34
you go to the zoo you look at the
13:36
primates you say well
13:38
uh they’re like us but they’re lit
13:40
missing something they don’t have an
13:42
opposable thumb
13:43
or they don’t have the rule of law so
13:45
you’re kind of saying you’re you’re kind
13:46
of a copy of us but you’re not a very
13:48
good copy
13:49
and probably you’ll never be much good
13:51
so there was a feeling of
13:52
being looked down upon uh which also
13:55
stirred resentment uh and let me just
13:59
say one other thing about
14:00
i think authenticity the sense these
14:02
populists are claiming that they
14:04
are those in touch with the authentic
14:06
tradition which has been
14:08
lost by westernization and
14:10
democratization so
14:12
in 1989 uh it’s clear that the
14:16
nationalists were allied with the
14:19
liberals in the revolt against moscow’s
14:21
empire
14:22
so in poland there was a lot of
14:24
basically trying to get away from russia
14:25
was a very important motivation now they
14:28
didn’t
14:29
speak the language of nationalism at the
14:31
time probably because it was not a
14:32
language welcome in brussels
14:34
but also because this was the period of
14:36
milosevic you know the bloody side of
14:38
nationalism and milosevic was a
14:40
communist communist so a man like
14:42
kaczynski would never
14:43
echo milosevic so there was the language
14:46
of nationalism was subdued
14:49
and when after 2008 2014 the immigration
14:52
crisis
14:53
these populist knees near felt freed
14:56
from having to
14:57
to cover their nationalism with the
14:59
language of liberalism so
15:01
it it it had felt like a kind of cage
15:04
in which they were trapped and they
15:06
broke out of it
15:07
and returned to this kind of nativist uh
15:10
way of feeling which had always been
15:12
there but had been muffled so it was
15:15
that’s part of the why populism seems
15:18
authentic to them
15:19
well let’s extend your metaphor a little
15:22
further if we want to talk about the
15:24
number one primate in the zoo boy this
15:26
is a terrible analogy
15:28
uh should we ask about russia here why
15:30
didn’t i i mean
15:31
the the many of the central and eastern
15:33
european countries did sort of flirt
15:35
with
15:35
liberal democracy for a while before
15:38
adopting illiberal democracy that they
15:40
have today but russia never did
15:41
why why did russia never try it well i
15:44
mean first of all you have to remember
15:45
that in the soviet union
15:46
elites have been have found it very easy
15:49
to
15:50
fake democracy have fake elections
15:52
because they’ve been faking communism
15:53
for at least two decades before
15:55
uh they were sort of dressed up this way
15:58
let’s pretend we’re having to
15:59
have elections these are all rigged of
16:01
course uh
16:02
and uh we know he’s going to win and
16:04
there’s not really any competition
16:06
that was very easy for them to do they
16:07
also in russia by the way
16:10
they they had a communist training told
16:12
them that democracy is just
16:14
a trick by which elites uh deceive their
16:17
publics
16:18
and hold on to power capitalism is just
16:20
really an elite project to
16:22
exploit the working classes and so on so
16:25
they were
16:25
very comfortable with that idea of
16:27
capitalist democracy
16:29
but in the end basically uh russia
16:33
was so injured i mean the main thing to
16:36
understand about the russian
16:37
situation is they lost huge part of
16:40
their territory
16:41
uh a huge number of their population
16:43
they lost their superpower status it was
16:45
a
16:46
it was a huge injury to the self-image
16:48
of russians which was not true in
16:49
eastern europe that they didn’t
16:51
eastern europeans didn’t have this
16:52
imperial swagger this imperial
16:54
claims that they were you know on the
16:57
top of the world
16:58
uh and actually exporting their own
17:01
model
17:01
elsewhere so that was a very strong and
17:04
i think the so the russians for
17:06
a couple decades were pretty happy with
17:08
just faking democracy and
17:10
but in the end as putin came to power
17:13
the resentment of being treated as
17:16
second-class
17:16
citizens as being looked down upon as
17:18
being taught lessons
17:20
by the west boiled over and uh the
17:23
russians
17:24
went from this like faking a democracy
17:28
to a what we call aggressive imitation
17:31
uh that is
17:32
imitation of the west which is designed
17:35
to humiliate the west
17:36
uh which is designed to show that the
17:38
west is hypocritical so for example
17:41
in the speech he gave putin gave
17:44
justifying the annexation of
17:46
crimea he basically imitated word for
17:49
word
17:49
uh western speeches about the
17:51
independence of kosovo
17:53
human rights national self-determination
17:56
and so forth but this was
17:57
very much a kind of imitation meant to
18:00
expose the west’s
18:01
hypocrisy and uh yes i think that’s
18:05
i think that’s a good uh way to
18:07
understand the putin regime which is not
18:09
people often uh act as if putin is a
18:12
great strategist and it is true that
18:13
he’s played
18:14
beforehand well but he’s not a great
18:16
strategist his
18:17
his main aim which is not strategic and
18:20
is not
18:21
helping russia redevelop itself is to
18:24
expose the west as hypocritical that’s
18:26
his
18:26
obsession uh and i think that’s a
18:29
blind alley that’s a dead end maybe a
18:31
blind alley but most days of the week
18:33
it’s not that hard to do
18:34
whoops there’s my little editorial
18:36
comment uh let me try this
18:39
do we have to come to the unhappy
18:40
conclusion therefore
18:42
that liberalism as we understand it is
18:45
really not exportable
18:47
to cultures that are if i can put it
18:49
this way wired differently
18:51
from those of us in the west i think
18:54
one of the big lessons of the 2003 war
18:58
in iraq
18:59
is that uh trying to impose a
19:02
democratic system after a six-week
19:04
military campaign
19:05
in a country where three-quarters of the
19:06
population married their first cousin
19:08
and so
19:08
it’s a completely different social world
19:10
you can’t just you know uh
19:12
impose something like this and that that
19:15
was such a lesson even though
19:16
our uh uh international internationalist
19:21
humanitarian internationals uh went over
19:24
there
19:25
with the uh crude and i think uh
19:28
defenseless uh idea that the only
19:31
legitimate authority with whom we are
19:33
going to deal are going to be authority
19:35
that’s elected
19:36
i think it’s very good to help so the
19:38
listeners to contrast what
19:40
how we behaved in afghanistan and how
19:42
the americans behaved in afghanistan and
19:44
how they behaved
19:45
in iraq and afghanistan we had been
19:47
there for decades we
19:49
knew all the warlords we didn’t say to
19:51
the warlords you must be elected
19:53
before we negotiate with you but in iraq
19:56
the religious leaders the tribal shakes
19:57
were set aside we had this
19:59
fake ideological belief that we have to
20:02
create authority by elections which of
20:04
course is a
20:05
is a uh it is based on historical
20:08
ignorance
20:09
democracy is a tiny spot in human
20:11
history
20:12
it has cute enormously complicated
20:14
preconditions
20:16
it doesn’t we we’re confusing the
20:18
absence of obstacles with the presence
20:20
of preconditions we thought if you get
20:21
rid of saddam
20:22
you’re going to have democracy just like
20:24
if you get rid of communist elite you’re
20:26
going to have democracy
20:27
and this was an illusion it’s a
20:29
democratic ideology that
20:31
idea was uh is is is it
20:34
uh uh ex exposes a kind of disgraceful
20:38
historical ignorance which was uh at the
20:41
basis of much of american foreign policy
20:44
in the post-cold war era we’ve got about
20:46
five minutes to go here so let me try a
20:48
couple more questions with you
20:49
your book now suggests that we’ve
20:51
entered an age of illiberal
20:53
imitation how do you see that
20:56
well it’s a strange uh fact that uh
21:00
president trump seems to be uh uh
21:03
accepting putin’s uh a strategic goal of
21:07
dismantling the european union
21:09
of destroying all of the international
21:11
organizations created by the united
21:12
states after world war
21:14
ii uh and he’s at war not only with the
21:17
wto the who in
21:19
all the world america made seems to be
21:21
uh uh
21:22
the liberal world order seems to be
21:24
something that trump himself
21:26
is uh attacking so that is a a kind of
21:29
imitation of and he’s using the rhetoric
21:32
nationalist rhetoric anti-immigrant
21:33
rhetoric
21:34
of orban and kaczynski uh and the
21:38
anti-western
21:39
uh language and also by the way
21:42
uh he’s the first american president who
21:45
has not said we deserve to rule the
21:47
world because we’re morally superior
21:49
i mean that’s a kind of not a very
21:52
likable uh uh position to take but every
21:55
american president has taken that
21:57
basically
21:58
trump says no no we’re just like
21:59
everyone else uh
22:01
well what i was personally don’t you
22:03
think
22:04
is that again be a tough case for him
22:06
personally to make it
22:07
imitate him personally yes i would say
22:10
but he of course
22:11
his basic uh thing is he resents
22:14
this is sort of the trump world view is
22:16
he resents terribly
22:18
the countries that imitate our uh
22:21
economic productivity
22:22
or or are horning in on our market share
22:25
and so on so
22:26
he’s a person who has claimed i think
22:28
the first american president ever
22:30
to say that america is the greatest
22:33
victim of the americanization
22:34
of the world so that’s part of it but i
22:37
wouldn’t like uh to say a word about
22:40
uh the current crisis we’re in and i’m
22:43
i’ve been asking myself and my colleague
22:45
yvonne krustev
22:46
we’ve been speaking about this as well
22:48
what does the was the current pandemic
22:51
tell us about the trauma of liberalism
22:54
and the the competition between
22:56
liberalism and populism
22:57
uh because in a way uh the
23:01
the previous crises of liberalism 19
23:04
uh the uh 2001 in which it turned out
23:07
that
23:08
defending human rights the whole uh idea
23:11
of defending human rights as the primary
23:12
value
23:13
seemed to give way to the battle against
23:15
terrorism in which rights were viewed as
23:17
a trojan horse for our enemies
23:19
2008 which really showed that our
23:22
economic elite
23:23
i didn’t know what it was doing so that
23:25
also uh really hurt our prestige to uh
23:28
2014
23:29
in which the migrant crisis uh made
23:32
people feel like open borders
23:33
were a threat to western civilization
23:36
and so on all these things have
23:37
combined and and we’re under a
23:40
uh we’re living in a time where those
23:43
three crises have seemed to be
23:45
accumulating in the present one
23:46
and weakening the liberal commitment to
23:50
globalization and so forth
23:51
openness uh at the same time
23:54
every political order has its own
23:57
disorders and populism
23:59
is producing its own discontents and
24:01
these populist leaders
24:02
bolsonaro trump authoritarians like
24:05
putin
24:06
strangely enough they are very afraid of
24:09
this crisis
24:10
they are not you know taking hold of it
24:12
and using it
24:13
to uh to uh uh to their benefit
24:16
uh there’s a way in which this kind of
24:19
crisis has
24:20
uh had is is challenging any kind of
24:23
regime
24:24
the archaeon regimes we saw that in
24:25
china where they’re hiding evidence
24:27
we see it in the west some some
24:29
democratic societies have done well some
24:31
authoritarian societies have done okay
24:33
it doesn’t seem to fit well into our
24:36
ideological
24:37
uh polarities so i think that’s and the
24:39
way i would put this in the end the
24:40
question open to us
24:42
is now in the future is is the pandemic
24:45
going to
24:46
increase our reliance on science and
24:49
rationality
24:50
belief in fact consciousness or is it
24:53
going to
24:54
uh create a uh is the panic
24:57
of and fear going to lead to more
25:00
conspiracy theories
25:01
uh and more xenophobia uh uh
25:04
migrant bashing uh so we’re on a knife’s
25:08
edge
25:08
i think and the the fate of the liberal
25:11
model and the liberal commitment to
25:13
rational decision making
25:14
uh and uh the uh uh
25:17
and its competition with these populist
25:21
myth makers
25:22
sloganeers who are always trying to sell
25:24
something has not been decided
25:26
i definitely do not think the populists
25:29
have the upper hand
25:30
i think the populists are also
25:32
struggling and they’re
25:33
not finding this an easy crisis to deal
25:36
with
25:36
so although i don’t believe that the
25:39
west is covering itself with glory
25:41
either
25:42
uh the whale and liberal regimes are
25:44
also struggling because
25:46
uh the the disease is hard to understand
25:49
and it’s hard to master
25:50
i i definitely don’t believe that uh the
25:54
current crisis is going to
25:56
really decide the question in favor of
26:00
of the populists well why don’t i
26:02
freelance then and just uh re-title your
26:05
book the light that’s failed
26:07
so far and we’ll leave it there uh
26:10
i want to thank you very much professor
26:11
holmes for joining us on tvo tonight
26:13
congratulations again on your gelber
26:15
prize
26:15
uh for anybody who wants to pick it up
26:17
yvonne krastieff and stephen holmes
26:18
collaborated on the light
26:20
that failed are reckoning take good care
26:22
and thanks for joining us on tvo tonight
26:25
thank you steve
26:30
the agenda with steve pakin is brought
26:32
to you by the chartered professional
26:33
accountants of ontario
26:35
cpa ontario is a regulator an educator
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26:40
protect the public
26:41
we advance our profession we guide our
26:44
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26:45
we are cpa ontario and by viewers like
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you
26:49
America’s Parasite
Frankly, Trump doesn’t give a damn.
It’s funny that Donald Trump doesn’t like a movie about con artists who invade an elegant house and wreak chaos.
He should empathize with parasites.
No doubt the president is a movie buff. He has been known to call advisers in the wee hours to plan movie nights at the White House for films he wants to see, like “Joker.” And, in an early sign of his affinity for tyrants, he told Playboy in 1990 that his role model was Louis B. Mayer running MGM in the ’30s.
Trump interrupted his usual rally rant Thursday night to bash the Oscars, saying: “And the winner is a movie from South Korea. What the hell was that all about? We got enough problems with South Korea with trade. On top of it, they give them the best movie of the year?”
He added: “Can we get ‘Gone With the Wind’ back, please? ‘Sunset Boulevard.’ So many great movies. The winner is from South Korea. I thought it was best foreign film, right? Best foreign movie. No. Did this ever happen before? And then you have Brad Pitt. I was never a big fan of his. He got upset. A little wise guy statement. A little wise guy. He’s a little wise guy.” (When he accepted his Oscar, Pitt complained that the Senate did not let John Bolton testify.)
Our president is nostalgic for a movie romanticizing slavery and a movie about an aging diva swanning maniacally around a mansion, living in a vanished past. (I am big. It’s the party that got small.)
Trump’s xenophobic movie criticism, combined with his mocking pronunciation of the name “Buttigieg,” harked back to the days when George H.W. Bush ran in 1988 wrapped in the flag, saying he was on “the American side,” while his celebrity endorser Loretta Lynn complained that she couldn’t even pronounce the name Dukakis. Too foreign-sounding.
It also echoed a segment on Laura Ingraham’s show, in which it was suggested that Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman, an American war hero who immigrated from Ukraine, might be guilty of espionage.
And in his Vegas rally on Friday, Trump was again calling his predecessor “Barack Hussein Obama.”
This was another bad, crazy week trapped in Trump’s psychopathology. No sooner was the president acquitted than he put scare quotes around the words justice and Justice Department and sought to rewrite the narrative of the Mueller report, whose author warned that Russia was going to try to meddle in the U.S. election again.
Philip Rucker wrote in The Washington Post: “As his re-election campaign intensifies, Trump is using the powers of his office to manipulate the facts and settle the score. Advisers say the president is determined to protect his associates ensnared in the expansive Russia investigation, punish the prosecutors and investigators he believes betrayed him, and convince the public that the probe was exactly as he sees it: an illegal witch hunt.”
Trump, who moved from a Fifth Avenue penthouse to the White House, is sinking deeper into his poor-little-me complex, convinced that he is being persecuted.
His darker sense of grievance converges with a neon grandiosity. Trump is totally uncontrolled now. Most presidents worry about the seaminess of pardons and wait until the end. Trump is going full throttle on pardoning his pals and pals of his pals in an election year.
The Republicans have shown they are too scared to stop him and won’t. The Democrats want to stop him but can’t. (Although if they win the Senate back, Democrats will probably end up impeaching him again and this time have plenty of witnesses.)
Now, in a frightening new twist, the president is angry at his own intelligence team for trying to protect the national interest. He would rather hide actual intelligence from Congress than have Adam Schiff know something that Trump thinks would make him look bad politically.
As The Times reported, the president’s intelligence officials warned House lawmakers in a briefing that Russia was once more intent on trespassing on our election to help Trump, intent on interfering in both the Democratic primaries and the general. (They also told Bernie Sanders that the Russians were trying to help his campaign.)
News of the House briefing caused another Vesuvian eruption from the mercurial president, who is hypersensitive to any suggestion that he isn’t winning all on his own.
The Times story said that “the president berated Joseph Maguire, the outgoing acting director of national intelligence, for allowing it to take place,” especially because his nemesis Schiff was present.
A few days ago, the president replaced Maguire as acting director with Richard Grenell, the sycophantic ambassador to Germany whose qualifications for overseeing the nation’s 17 spy agencies include being a former Fox News commentator and Trump superfan who boasts a gold-level card with the Trump Organization.
As the Democrats sputter and spat and fight over federal giveaways and N.D.A.s, the unfettered president is overturning the rule of law and stuffing the agencies with toadies.
Nothing is in the national interest or public good. Everything is in the greater service of the Trump cult of personality.
In “Gone With the Wind,” Atlanta burned to the ground. In Trump’s version, Washington is aflame.