Martin Gilens – “Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America”

Martin Gilens, professor of politics at Princeton University and a member of the executive committee of the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics, discussed his new book as part of the Wilson School’s “Talk of 2012: The Upcoming Presidential Election” thematic lecture series. The discussion was co-sponsored by the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics and the Department of Politics.

 

so in the mid-1960s in my
quantitative analysis
was a period of very low association
between public preferences and policy
outcomes the opposite set of political
conditions and the strongest period of
association between public preferences
and policy outcomes was much to my great
surprise during the early years of the
george w bush first term and when i did
that analysis and saw that not only
where the policy is adopted in 2001 and
2002 consistent with what affluent
Americans wanted but we’re also the most
consistent with what the middle class
and the poor wanted from any period of
in my data set it was fairly certain
there must be some sort of error there
in coding or something must have gone
wrong so like you know a good social
scientist that Ike scoured the data to
see like where this error had emerged
but the fact of the matter is that there
was no error there and the policies that
were adopted during those early Bush
years were in fact quite popular across
the income spectrum so so let me remind
you that you know Bush ran in 2000 as a
compassionate conservative right he
talked about his bipartisan work with
Texas Legislature and and so on and you
know I think a lot of people on the Left
kind of dismissed that as kind of a
cynical posturing but the truth is that
when Bush came into office you know
after a very close election and after
having lost the popular vote the the
most prominent policies that were
adopted were broadly supported centrist
policies in some cases bipartisan
policies adopted that he worked with
Democratic legislators so I’m thinking
of things like the Medicare drug benefit
a long-standing Democratic Party
priority No Child Left Behind education
reforms which whatever you may think of
them now was a bipartisan
policy that you know senator Kennedy
worked with the administration on Bush’s
faith-based initiative very popular
across income levels his compromise on
stem-cell funding which contrary to
widespread views actually increased the
like the range of stem cells that were
eligible for federal funding and even
his tax cuts which clearly provided most
of the benefits in terms of dollars to
the most well-off Americans were
strongly supported across the income
spectrum so so a lot of what happened
then was very consistent with what the
public wanted including what the middle
class and the poor wanted but it’s not
because of any sort of particular
commitment on the part of Bush or his
administration to you know serving as
advocates for the poor but it was
political circumstances so Congress in
2001 was more closely divided than it
had been at any time in half a century
right you may remember when Bush came
into office the Senate was split 50-50
with the vice president serving as a
deciding vote the Republicans had a very
slim majority in the house they lost
even that sort of you know deciding vote
majority in the Senate after Jim
Jeffords abandoned at the Republican
Party a couple months into the Bush’s
first term so it was a very closely
divided Congress with control being up
for grabs at the next election right and
this is the opposite of what we saw in
the mid-1960s and this these two periods
represent a consistent pattern within my
data that when control of government is
divided and uncertain you get policy
outcomes that more strongly reflect the
Preferences of the public and more
equally reflect the Preferences of low
and high-income Americans and when one
party has dominant control then you see
responsiveness to any group
the public decline and in fact that’s
exactly what happened when the
Republicans increased their control of
Congress so if you compare the
preference policy Association in the
first two years of Bush’s first term
with the first two years of Bush’s
second term right when Republicans for
the first time in half a century had
unified control of the national
government and strong majorities fairly
strong majorities in Congress not like
the 1960s but but relative to recent
years then what you saw is that the
responsiveness to the public plummeted
now I should mention if you are
concerned that 9/11 and the war on
terror and the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq are responsible for these
relationships I was concerned about that
too I redid these analyses after
excluding all the policy questions
having to do with defense and terrorism
and in the wars and so on and when you
see the same pattern so that is some of
what was popular about the early years
of Bush’s first term was things like the
war on terror and some of what was less
popular in Bush’s later years but the
patterns remain the same even if we’re
only looking at domestic policy and
excluding things like on terror okay so
so the point here is that political
conditions right make a difference and
that’s one of the perhaps few sort of
hopeful findings from what for people
concerned about sort of normative
democratic concerns is in general and
not particularly hopeful or optimistic a
research project but but control of
government does matter and that means
parties can be constrained to pursue
policies that are more consistent with
what the public wants under the right
circumstances so there’s there’s a ray
of hope there you might expect if there
if that political circumstances to say
the tenuous nature of government control
makes a difference well so might some
other ..

What happens when the intelligence community decides that Trump is too dangerous to be president?

A surge of public activism by former CIA personnel is one of the most unexpected developments of the Trump era

Two former CIA officers — both Democrats, both women, both liberal — were elected to Congress on November 6. Abigail Spanberger, former operations officer, was elected in Virginia’s 7th District. Elissa Slotkin, former analyst, won in Michigan’s 8th District. Both Spanberger and Slotkin incorporated their intelligence experience into their center-left platforms. Their victories tripled the number of CIA “formers” in Congress.

At the halfway point in Trump’s first term, these formers see themselves as a bulwark of an endangered democracy. The president and his supporters see a cabal of “deep state” radicals out to overturn the will of the people. With the appointment of Matthew Whitaker, an unqualified political operative, as Attorney General, Brennan said a “constitutional crisis” is fast approaching. The clash between a willfully ignorant commander in chief and a politicized intelligence community seems sure to deepen.

..I think the blatant disregard for the threat of foreign influence in our election and the demonization of the Intelligence Community was a turning point for a lot of us,” former branch chief Cindy Otis told me in an email. “. . . Critics can call me ‘The Deep State,’ but I joined the CIA under George W. Bush and the vast majority of people at CIA lean conservative on foreign policy/natsec [national security] issues.”

.. in the 1980s, former director Bush and a host of senior agency operatives joined the Iran-Contra conspiracy. They sought to subvert the Democratic majority in Congress that had banned covert intervention in Central America. The agency’s rank and file did not object. Indeed, many applauded when President Bush pardoned four CIA officials who had been indicted in the scandal.

..After the 9/11 attacks, the consensus in Langley that torture was a permissible, effective and necessary counterterrorism technique no doubt struck many intelligence officers as apolitical common sense. But, of course, adopting “extreme interrogation tactics” was a deeply political decision that President Bush embraced, and President Obama repudiated. The agency deferred to both commanders in chief.

.. The problem with Trump in the eyes of these CIA formers is almost pre-political. The president’s policy decisions matter less than his contempt for intelligence and the system that collects it.
.. When we see things that are blatantly wrong, and the president is responsible, it is fair to speak out,” Bakos said in an interview. “If you’re silent, you’re part of the problem.”

.. Former personnel know better than anyone that the CIA has a license to kill. The agency can spy, capture, bomb and assassinate. It can overthrow governments, foster (or smash) political movements, even re-organize entire societies, according to the inclinations of the president and his advisers.CIA operatives could trust both neoconservative George W. Bush and internationalist Barack Obama with that arsenal because they believed, whatever their politics, both presidents were rational actors. With Trump, they can have no such confidence.

Trump’s contempt for the intelligence profession, weaponized in his “deep state” conspiracy theories, has agency personnel feeling professionally vulnerable, perhaps for the first time. An irrational chief executive has shattered their apolitical pretensions and forced them to re-examine what their core beliefs require.

.. Larry Pfeiffer, former chief of staff to Hayden, told me, “Until now I’ve been mostly a Republican voter at the national level because Republicans shared my views on national security. For a lot of people inside the national security community, that is not necessarily the case anymore. The Republican Party under Trump has abandoned people like us.”

.. When Pfeiffer told me, “Who knows? I might have to vote for Elizabeth Warren, or Bernie Sanders in 2020,” he sounded amazed by the possibility but not averse to it. Two years of Trump can do that to a former spy.

The point is not that the CIA is getting more liberal, says John Prados, author of “The Ghosts of Langley,” a history of the agency. Rather, the election results show that the voting bloc that supports the president now skews even more to the hard right. “The migration of [the] political spectrum to the right makes the agency look more liberal than it is,” he said in an interview.

.. “I find it sad — and maybe a few other adjectives — that Brennan now gets a pass for some of [the] things he did as director, just because he’s combatting Trump,” Prados said.

.. “If Trump is going to carry out a secret war against Iran as he seems to want to do, who is our ally?” Prados asked. “Mossad [the Israeli intelligence service]? Who can work with Mossad? The CIA. If that is Trump’s Middle East agenda, the interests of current CIA people and the formers may diverge.”

.. “Trump is not only relying on lies and falsehoods in his public statements, but I have to believe he is pushing back on the realities that are brought to him. Imagine Gina Haspel goes to the White House with a briefer to talk about the latest intel on — fill in the blank:

  • North Korea’s missile program.
  • What China is doing to supplant America in Asia.
  • Where Europe wants to go with NATO.

Does the president listen or care? Or even understand? We’re not in crisis on any one issue, but can we really say the government is functioning?

.. Harrington expects the mistrust between the president and the intelligence community to grow in the next two years.

“No director of any federal agency can turn away the inquiries of the Democratic House,” Harrington said. “CIA people have to deal head on with the consequences of a president who is fundamentally not dealing with reality.”

If there’s one thing to be learned from talking to former CIA personnel, it’s the sense that the CIA system — powerful, stealthy, and dangerous — is blinking red about the latest news of an authoritarian leader in an unstable nation.