China’s recent introduction of yuan-denominated oil futures has attracted some fairly extensive press commentary. Partly this is down to a habit of over-interpreting everything happening in China as just more evidence of their unstoppable rise to global superpower status, but it is also due to some profound misconceptions about the importance of oil as a commodity. It is widely thought, for example, that oil somehow underwrites the global financial system and guarantees the U.S. dollar’s hegemonic status.
Inevitably, stories about the toppling of the “Petro-dollar” and the long yearned for rise of an alternative reserve currency, one not dependent on the whims of a capricious political elite in Washington, have proliferated across the alter-net and on the state-backed media platforms of Russia and China.
But we should be clear: the Petro-dollar does not exist, and really hasn’t done in any meaningful way since the 1970s, therefore the “Petro-yuan” has no future. This is not to say that oil will never be traded in yuan, that is likely, but it is to say that trading oil in yuan will not suddenly transform the currency into the global reserve many claim is inevitable. 1
Origins Of The Petro-Dollar
The myth of the Petro-dollar comes from efforts in the 1970s to prevent the U.S. suffering severe negative effects in its balance of payments from rising oil prices.2 Until the late 1960s the U.S. had been an oil-exporter, but by also being an oil consumer they had never sought to maximize the rent from oil production by driving prices upwards. OPEC countries, however, never had such qualms 3 when the opportunity arose as the U.S. became an importer, happily restrained supply to drive prices, and their own national incomes, higher. The U.S. was worried about the resultant trade deficit caused by suddenly having to pay vast amounts for necessary imports, and so secured the agreement of Saudi Arabia to only trade oil in U.S. dollars, meaning the U.S. could pay for oil in their own currency. Saudi Arabia, for their part, accumulated huge reserves of U.S. dollars, investing some of them back into the U.S. economy.
The enormous lake of U.S. dollars this created augmented the role of the dollar as the global reserve currency, being a highly liquid, easily-exchanged claim on the products, services and investment potential generated by the U.S. economy. But this was merely one step in the rise of the greenback as the global reserve. The next step came when other economies–East Asia in particular–followed the lead of the oil producers and also built up huge reserves of U.S. dollars, all of which was made possible by the abandonment of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s. This practice helped to keep exchange rates for exporters low, and kept a lid on inflation in the U.S., which suited everyone up to a point.
Bringing this up to date, it was a long time ago when the link between oil and the dollar mattered much at all beyond the financial returns of non-dollar based oil companies. Since the 1980s, the dollar has been consolidated as the global reserve currency because of the strength and dynamism of the U.S. economy, and oil exporters have demanded to be paid in U.S. dollars because that’s the currency they prefer to hold on to. To do otherwise is to take on exchange risk. Exporters can, and routinely do, accept payment in whatever exchange medium they wish — tanks, planes and construction services — but their central banks demand dollars for reasons entirely unconnected to oil. Because the U.S. dollar is a hard currency, easily exchangeable, underwritten by the U.S. taxpayer, and founded upon decades of broadly consistent macro-economic policy management.
Those who believe that oil being traded in U.S. dollars gives the U.S. economy a unique advantage in the global economy have it exactly the wrong way around. The U.S. economy is the central economy in the global system because it is the most open, innovative, and productive economy in the world, and because of this, the U.S. dollar is the most convenient, liquid and reliable medium of exchange. 4 One can imagine another currency challenging it at some point in the future, but only on the basis of the openness of its underlying economy, and the depth of the capital markets denominated in it. And if the euro can’t do it yet, why does anyone imagine the yuan is up to the job?
Furthermore, the U.S. dollar’s position as the global reserve currency has been underwritten by Chinese economic policy. China has deliberately built up a huge pile of U.S. dollar-denominated reserves which, contrary to much press coverage and occasional threats of a big selloff from China, confirms rather than undermines the dollar’s status.
Yuan-Denominated Oil Futures?
When China, like any other economy, allows the trading of oil futures in yuan, the contract merely promises dated delivery of oil in exchange for yuan. The contract does not supply the oil, it does not forward the yuan to an oil producer, it is merely a transaction that allows a buyer guaranteed delivery of oil by paying for it in yuan. The counter-party has to supply the oil in exchange for the yuan. Somewhere along the supply-chain someone will be paying in U.S. dollars, unless the ultimate supplier wishes to hold yuan. And despite the fanfare over the last few years, the yuan still comprises a tiny share of foreign exchange reserves held globally. Indeed, at 1.1% of the total, the yuan is significantly behind both the Australian and Canadian dollars, meaning that–with pound sterling–Queen Elizabeth II’s head appears on 7.5 times more foreign currency reserves than Mao’s. If China wants to change that, it will need to open up its economy, liberate its capital account and start living up to, rather than repudiating, its reform promises. Shanghai-traded oil futures in themselves have nothing to do with it.
(It may be true that the Petro-yuan has no future, or that a change won’t be “sudden”, but this doesn’t prove that having oil trade in dollars isn’t still very important to the US)↩
(Couldn’t it be said that the cause of these deficits was also, in part, cold war military spending and the Vietnam war) ↩
(To portray this as financial opportunism by OPEC ignores other factors, such as the US’s significantly increasing the price it charged for wheat and supporting their enemy – Israel). Whether you approve or disapproval, isn’t it simplistic or misleading to attribute oil price increases to the idea that “OPEC never had such qualms”.↩
(This is the argument that the US Dollar deserves its dominance and the advantages the petrodollar gives it, not that it is unimportant to the US that oil trade in dollars)↩
For decades Donald Trump sought a deal in Russia, a country he once reportedly heralded as “one of the hottest places in the world for investment.” A new filing from special counsel Robert Mueller suggests just how lucrative a move into Moscow might have been for the Trump Organization.
“If the project was completed,” Mueller, who is investigating alleged Russian interference in the 2016 election, wrote in a court filing released Friday, “the company could have received hundreds of millions of dollars from Russian sources in licensing fees and other revenues.”
The deal never came to fruition. But hundreds of millions would have been a massive haul, even for a man worth an estimated $3.1 billion. Most of Trump’s wealth is tied up in skyscrapers, golf courses and other real estate projects that are hard to sell. Forbes estimates that the president only has about $150 million worth of cash and other liquid assets.
Trump Tower, the president’s most famous building, is worth an estimated $323 million before debt. It took in an estimated $33 million in revenue in 2017. But running a building means paying for taxes, utilities, insurance and maintenance. So Trump Tower’s 2017 profits, measured in net operating income, were just $13.9 million.
The president’s licensing business, however, does not have the same big overhead expenses, meaning a new tower in Moscow could have presumably been a cash cow. Sure, striking such a deal might require a few flights and some legal fees, but there don’t seem to be many hard costs to letting someone else use your name. The proposed deal, the details of which remain unclear, could theoretically have also included an agreement for Trump to manage the property or given him a cut of condo sales in the building, potentially worth millions of dollars.
If Mueller is right, and the deal could have yielded “hundreds of millions,” that would mean a single Moscow deal may have brought in more money than the president’s entire annual rent roll, which generates an estimated $175 million for the Trump Organization. And it would certainly seem to be enough to cover the $66 million Trump personally put into his 2016 presidential campaign.
Lawrence says he’s “been waiting for the dam to break!” on Trump’s commerce secretary Wilbur Ross—he talks to reporter Dan Alexander who wrote the bombshell new report for Forbes magazine about Ross being accused of stealing $120 million.
At the office of the special counsel, Mueller’s team was reportedly considering having Trump swear on something that was more meaningful to him than the Bible, such as a rolled-up copy of Forbes.