The Supreme Court Gaslights Its Way to the End of Roe

There are many reasons for dismay over the Supreme Court argument in the Mississippi abortion case, but it was the nonstop gaslighting that really got to me.

First there was Justice Clarence Thomas, pretending by his questions actually to be interested in how the Constitution might be interpreted to provide for the right to abortion, a right he has denounced and schemed to overturn since professing to the Senate Judiciary Committee 30 years ago that he never even thought about the matter.

Then there was Chief Justice John Roberts, mischaracterizing an internal memo that Justice Harry Blackmun wrote to his colleagues as the Roe v. Wade majority was discussing how best to structure the opinion Justice Blackmun was working on. The chief justice was trying to delegitimize the place of fetal viability in the court’s abortion jurisprudence, where for nearly 50 years, viability has been the unbreached firewall protecting the right of a woman to choose to terminate a pregnancy.

“It’s an unfortunate source, but it’s there,” he said, referring to Justice Blackmun’s papers, on file and open to the public at the Library of Congress. “In his papers, Justice Blackmun said that the viability line was — actually was dicta.”

“Dicta” is a dismissive word that refers to asides in an opinion that are not actually part of the court’s holding. The entry in the Blackmun papers to which the chief justice was most likely referring was a memo of Nov. 21, 1972 that the author of Roe v. Wade sent along with a new draft opinion to the other justices, noting: “In its present form it contains dictum but I suspect that in this area some dictum is indicated and not to be avoided.”

In that memo, of course referring to what was still a work in progress, Justice Blackmun proposed that the right to abortion be fully protected only until the end of the first trimester of pregnancy. “This is arbitrary,” he wrote, “but perhaps any other selected point, such as quickening or viability, is equally arbitrary.”

But two weeks later, after consulting with other justices, including Lewis Powell and Thurgood Marshall, Justice Blackmun circulated another memo endorsing the viability line. Far from describing this determination as arbitrary, he wrote in a memo dated Dec. 11, 1972, that viability “has logical and biological justifications,” namely, that “few could argue, or would argue, that a state’s interest by the time of viability, when independent life is presumably possible, is not sufficiently developed to justify appropriate regulation.”

In other words, by the time the court issued the final opinion in January 1973, viability was not dicta but rather an essential element of the decision. Chief Justice Roberts may not like viability — as clearly he doesn’t, observing to Julie Rikelman, the lawyer for the Mississippi clinic challenging the state’s ban on abortion after 15 weeks of pregnancy, that “viability, it seems to me, doesn’t have anything to do with choice” — but he was flatly wrong to suggest that it was an unconsidered aspect of Roe v. Wade.

(And of course it is extremely odd for a Supreme Court justice to dig into the court’s private work papers to cast aspersions on a published opinion.)

In fact, as the second Blackmun memo makes clear, the court that decided Roe saw a direct link between the viability line and a woman’s ability to choose abortion. In that second memo, Justice Blackmun referred to the “practical aspect” of the viability line, observing that “there are many pregnant women, particularly younger girls, who may refuse to face the fact of pregnancy and who, for one reason or another, do not get around to medical consultation until the end of the first trimester is upon them or, indeed, has passed.”

And then there was Justice Brett Kavanaugh, who rattled off a list of “the most consequential cases in this court’s history” that resulted from overruling prior decisions. If the court had adhered, for example, to the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson rather than overruling that precedent in Brown v. Board of Education “the country would be a much different place,” he told Ms. Rikelman. “I assume you agree with most, if not all, the cases I listed there, where the court overruled the precedent,” Justice Kavanaugh continued. Why then, he asked, should the court stick with a case it now regarded as wrongly decided?

More gaslighting: The superficial plausibility of Justice Kavanaugh’s analogy between Plessy v. Ferguson and Roe v. Wade dissolves with a second’s contemplation. For one thing, Plessy negated individual liberty, while Roe expanded it. For another, Justice Kavanaugh’s list could have been 1,000 cases long without casting any light on whether today’s Supreme Court should repudiate Roe v. Wade.

But the justice’s goal was not to invite contemplation. It was to normalize the deeply abnormal scene playing out in the courtroom. President Donald Trump vowed to end the right to abortion, and the three justices he put on the court — Neil Gorsuch, to a seat that was not legitimately Mr. Trump’s to fill; Amy Coney Barrett, whose election-eve nomination and confirmation broke long settled norms; and Justice Kavanaugh — appear determined to do just that.

It was Justice Sonia Sotomayor who asked the uncomfortable question. “Will this institution survive the stench that this creates in the public perception that the Constitution and its reading are just political acts?” she demanded of Scott Stewart, a former law clerk to Justice Thomas who argued for Mississippi as the state’s solicitor general. Listening to the live-streamed argument, I first heard “political acts” as “political hacks,” I suppose because still in my mind were Justice Barrett’s words when she spoke in mid-September at a center in Louisville, Ky., named for her Senate confirmation mastermind, Senator Mitch McConnell. “My goal today is to convince you that the court is not comprised of a bunch of partisan hacks,” she said then.

Justice Barrett’s performance during Wednesday’s argument was beyond head-spinning. Addressing both Ms. Rikelman and Elizabeth Prelogar, the U.S. solicitor general who argued for the United States on behalf of the Mississippi clinic, Justice Barrett asked about “safe haven” laws that permit women to drop off their unwanted newborn babies at police stations or fire houses; the mothers’ parental rights are then terminated without further legal consequences. If the problem with “forced motherhood” was that it would “hinder women’s access to the workplace and to equal opportunities,” Justice Barrett asked, “why don’t safe haven laws take care of that problem?”

She continued: “It seems to me that it focuses the burden much more narrowly. There is, without question, an infringement on bodily autonomy, you know, which we have in other contexts, like vaccines. However, it doesn’t seem to me to follow that pregnancy and then parenthood are all part of the same burden.”

I’ll pass over the startling notion that being required to accept a vaccine is equivalent to being forced to carry a pregnancy to term. “Gaslighting” doesn’t adequately describe the essence of what Justice Barrett was suggesting: that the right to abortion really isn’t necessary because any woman who doesn’t want to be a mother can just hand her full-term baby over to the nearest police officer and be done with the whole business. As Justice Barrett, of all people, surely understands, such a woman will forever be exactly what she didn’t want to be: a mother, albeit one stripped of her ability to make a different choice.

I will give the gaslighting prize to Justice Kavanaugh and his suggestion that the court should simply adopt a position of “neutrality” with respect to abortion. Abortion is a contentious issue with important interests on both sides, he said to Solicitor General Prelogar. “Why should this court be the arbiter rather than Congress, the state legislatures, state supreme courts, the people being able to resolve this?” he said. “And there will be different answers in Mississippi and New York, different answers in Alabama than California because they’re two different interests at stake and the people in those states might value those interests somewhat differently.”

Justice Kavanaugh painted a soothing description of a down-the-middle resolution, but Solicitor General Prelogar, for one, wasn’t fooled. “The nature of fundamental rights is that it’s not left up to state legislatures to decide whether to honor them or not,” she responded.

Can Justice Kavanaugh really believe what he said? We’ll see soon enough. Last month, the court heard arguments in a case that challenges New York’s strict requirement for a license to carry a concealed weapon. Most states have looser restrictions. New York, through its legislative process, is in a minority.

Will Justice Kavanaugh and those of his colleagues who glorify a recently manufactured version of the Second Amendment allow New York City to keep going its own way on gun safety in the name of “letting the people decide”? That’s about as likely as the chance that those very same justices will decide to keep the right to abortion on the books. In both cases, we know what they’re going to do. The only mystery is how they will explain it.

If the Supreme Court Won’t Prevent Gerrymandering, Who Will?

A progressive take on states’ rights can come to the rescue.

Progressives have long looked to federal courts to guard the rights of racial minorities and dissenters. But that protection is weakening. Faced with the enormous injustice of partisan gerrymandering, the Supreme Court last month permitted politicians drawing election district maps to discriminate by party and even potentially mask their racial “packing” and “cracking” as mere partisanship. To fill this growing gap, reformers should take an unexpected route: states’ rights.

Chief Justice John Roberts wrote an opinion that allowed two gerrymanders, one committed by Republicans in North Carolina and one by Democrats in Maryland, to stand. His reason? He could not find a standard to judge when an offense had occurred. He rejected a considerable body of empirical research, including suggestions by my colleagues and me in an amicus brief.

Federalism, in which regional governments retain considerable power, has been invoked in the past to take away representational rights. But a local approach, properly applied, can also restore them. In a stinging dissent, Justice Elena Kagan pointed out that where the Supreme Court had failed to define and regulate partisan gerrymandering, four lower federal courts had succeeded.

State courts can do so, too — without federal approval. The elections clause of the Constitution gives states broad authority over redistricting as long as the actions do not run afoul of federal law. Chief Justice Roberts conceded that states can act on their own by “actively addressing the issue through state constitutional amendments and legislation.” Now that Republicans and their designates control the Supreme Court, the Senate and the presidency, reformers should embrace what Heather K. Gerken, the dean of Yale Law School, callsprogressive federalism.”

The Princeton Gerrymandering Project, which I founded, has investigated federalist approaches to redistricting reform. We found 27 instances in which a district map was overturned on the basis of state law. Recently, Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court overturned an unfair congressional map, citing the state Constitution’s free and equal elections clause, a phrase that is also found in 27 other state Constitutions.

And 47 Constitutions prohibit government discrimination based on political viewpoint, a principle also found in the First Amendment, which Justice Kagan has argued should protect partisan voters. Drawing a district’s boundaries to dilute a voter’s influence violates the principle of equal protection under the law as found in the 14th Amendment — and in 24 state Constitutions.

The use of federalism to protect voter rights will be tested in a trial this month in North Carolina, where General Assembly districts are being challenged as a partisan gerrymander. Since North Carolina law does not require the governor’s approval for maps, state court may be voters’ best and last chance at fair districts there.

Proving the case should be straightforward. Computer simulations can quickly explore thousands of alternatives to determine whether a map is an extreme partisan outlier. For example, in the Supreme Court case, which concerned a congressional map, Jonathan Mattingly, an expert witness, demonstrated that one congressional districting plan was more extreme than more than 99 percent of over 24,000 possible alternatives that honor city and county boundaries. Simpler mathematical formulas, which detect inequities of opportunity and outcome, can also help diagnose astate legislative map as extreme.

These technologies will soon be within reach of nearly everyone. Thomas Hofeller, a redistricting expert who died recently, drew North Carolina’s gerrymander. He was a Picasso of partisan maps. But thanks to data-sharing projects like OpenPrecincts and the Public Mapping Project, as well as free software like Dave’s Redistricting and PlanScore, citizens in every state will be able to draw their own maps — and expose partisan malfeasance the moment it emerges.

Federalism can also be imposed by voters directly. In 2018, redistricting reform initiatives passed in Colorado, Michigan, Missouri and Utah. These reforms earned 8 to 19 percentage points more support than the Democratic vote share in statewide races, showing that reform has bipartisan support.

The Colorado and Michigan initiatives establish independent redistricting commissions, in which passing a plan requires votes from independents or members of both parties. The political scientist Alex Keena and collaborators have shown that independently drawn maps are more balanced than maps drawn by either party alone. These commissions can also ensure representation for racial minorities and other communities. Citizens can change the law in the 24 states that allow voter-initiated ballot measures, and local reformers are now working to qualify such a measure for the ballot in Arkansas.

The spoils from gerrymandering are enormous. After a wave election in 2010 favoring Republicans, Republican-drawn gerrymanders in 10 states tilted the balance of power in Congress by nearly 20 seats, a modern high, and took hundreds of legislative seats out of contention.

With increased local power in the redistricting cycle of 2021, Democrats may be tempted to play tit-for-tat, imposing their own gerrymanders. But a proposed constitutional amendment that would have insulated Democrats from voters failed in New Jersey, in part because of popular anger. Rather than reducing electoral competition further, Democrats should seek representational balance by taking the high road of reform. They would be in step with over 70 percent of Americans who agree that gerrymandering should be curbed.

In states without the initiative process, legislators themselves will occasionally agree to give up power. The New Hampshire legislature has sent a reform bill to Gov. Chris Sununu. The Virginia legislature is considering a constitutional amendment for the 2020 ballot, though perhaps not entirely out of altruism: The current Republican majority may lose seats and fall victim to a future Democratic gerrymander.

A final route to reform uses the governor’s veto to check legislatures. Maryland has a Republican governor, counterbalancing the Democratic legislature. Wisconsin, site of one of the most extreme Republican gerrymanders in the nation, now has a Democratic governor. Depending on three competitive governors’ races this November, bipartisan control may spread to Kentucky, Louisiana and Mississippi.

Putting all federalist routes together — courts, voter initiatives, laws and elections — I estimate that reform is actually possible in the vast majority of states, even without the Supreme Court’s help.

In biological systems, my other area of expertise, self-correction prevents living systems from going off-kilter. If we don’t sweat, we overheat. When cells disregard the boundaries of the organ where they belong, the result is cancer. So too in democracy: Without a mechanism to ensure fair districts, a political party can ensconce itself in power indefinitely. By introducing self-correction mechanisms, we can reverse the erosion of faith in democracy that comes from gerrymandering.

Sex, Ducks, and The Founding Feud

Jilted lovers and disrupted duck hunts provide a very odd look into the soul of the US Constitution.

What does a jilted lover’s revenge have to do with an international chemical weapons treaty? More than you’d think. From poison and duck hunts to our feuding fathers, we step into a very odd tug of war between local and federal law.

When Carol Anne Bond found out her husband had impregnated her best friend, she took revenge. Carol’s particular flavor of revenge led to a US Supreme Court case that puts into question a part of the US treaty power.

Producer Kelsey Padgett drags Jad and Robert into Carol’s poisonous web, which starts them on a journey from the birth of the US Constitution, to a duck hunt in 1918, and back to the present day … it’s all about an ongoing argument that might actually be the very heart and soul of our system of government

Goldberg: Seeking Tolerance and Reprieve from Culture Wars

.. the Offended Wars are a kind of Potemkin conflict for the true battle over double standards.

The assumption is that liberals’ hearts are in the right place, thus, when they stray off the path rhetorically or in some other way, it’s not seen as revelatory of something darker or more sinister. Of course, conservatives do the same thing. We assume the best of our own tribe and can dismiss a joke or errant tweet quite easily from one of our own.

.. I think one of the reasons we got here is that liberals were truly blind to the double standard they benefit from and the norms they were happy to see violated when the people violating them were “the good guys.”

.. the principle of religious tolerance was a last resort, an utterly utilitarian practical compromise, after the combatants in Europe’s religious wars recognized what C. V. Wedgwood called “the essential futility of putting the beliefs of the mind to the judgment of the sword.”

.. First, we need to return to the idea of ideological and theological pluralism but moral consensus. People are free to believe whatever they like, and they are free to act on those beliefs so long as they don’t harm others. Second, we need a lot less nationalism (for want of a better term). What I mean by that is that the federal government and various national elites need to stop thinking that the whole country needs to think and act in one way.

..  Fox News likes to do stories that boil down to “Can you believe someone in San Francisco believes X!?” MSNBC likes stories that boil down to “We have troubling reports that someone in Wyoming believes Y!” The underlying assumption is that in America everyone is supposed to think alike. Well, unless someone is actually being harmed — and I don’t mean in the terminally asinine construction, “words hurt”

.. Lastly, we need to get as much power out of Washington as conceivably possible.

.. As long as we think that the federal government, especially the executive branch, has monarchical power to impose a vision on the whole country, we will turn political contests into cultural warfare. The Whigs couldn’t abide a Catholic on the throne because they believed the king would impose his vision on all of England. The Catholics felt the same way about the prospect of a Protestant crown. The solution is to restrain the power of the crown — so that the faith of the monarch doesn’t matter.