People can work in two-week cycles, on the job for four days then, by the time they might become infectious, 10 days at home in lockdown.
If we cannot resume economic activity without causing a resurgence of Covid-19 infections, we face a grim, unpredictable future of opening and closing schools and businesses.
We can find a way out of this dilemma by exploiting a key property of the virus: its latent period — the three-day delay on average between the time a person is infected and the time he or she can infect others.
People can work in two-week cycles, on the job for four days then, by the time they might become infectious, 10 days at home in lockdown. The strategy works even better when the population is split into two groups of households working alternating weeks.
Austrian school officials will adopt a simple version — with two groups of students attending school for five days every two weeks — starting May 18.
Models we created at the Weizmann Institute in Israel predict that this two-week cycle can reduce the virus’s reproduction number — the average number of people infected by each infected person — below one. So a 10-4 cycle could suppress the epidemic while allowing sustainable economic activity.
Even if someone is infected, and without symptoms, he or she would be in contact with people outside their household for only four days every two weeks, not 10 days, as with a normal schedule. This strategy packs another punch: It reduces the density of people at work and school, thus curtailing the transmission of the virus.
Schools could have students attend for four consecutive days every two weeks, in two alternating groups, and use distance-learning methods on the other school days. Children would go to school on the same days as their parents go to work.
Businesses would work almost continuously, alternating between two groups of workers, for regular and predictable production. This would increase consumer confidence, shoring up supply and demand simultaneously.
During lockdown days, this approach requires adherence only to the level of distancing already being demonstrated in European countries and New York City. It prevents the economic and psychological costs of opening the economy and then having to reinstate complete lockdown when cases inevitably resurge. Giving hope and then taking it away can cause despair and resistance.
A 10-4 routine provides at least part-time employment for millions who have been fired or sent on leave without pay. These jobs prevent the devastating, and often long-lasting, mental and physical impacts of unemployment. For those living on cash, there would be four days to make a living, reducing the economic necessity to disregard lockdown altogether. Business bankruptcies would also be reduced, speeding up eventual economic recovery.
The cyclic strategy is easy to explain and to enforce. It is equitable in terms of who gets to go back to work. It applies at any scale: a school, a firm, a town, a state. A region that uses the cyclic strategy is protected: Infections coming from the outside cannot spread widely if the reproduction number is less than one. It is also compatible with all other countermeasures being developed.
Workers can, and should still, use masks and distancing while at work. This proposal is not predicated, however, on large-scale testing, which is not yet available everywhere in the United States and may never be available in large parts of the world. It can be started as soon as a steady decline of cases indicates that lockdown has been effective.
The cyclic strategy should be part of a comprehensive exit strategy, including self-quarantine by those with symptoms, contact tracing and isolation, and protection of risk groups. The cyclic strategy can be tested in limited regions for specific trial periods, even a month. If infections rates grow, it can be adjusted to fewer work days. Conversely, if things are going well, additional work days can be added. In certain scenarios, only four or five lockdown days in each two-week cycle could still prevent resurgence.
The coronavirus epidemic is a formidable foe, but it is not unbeatable. By scheduling our activities intelligently, in a way that accounts for the virus’s intrinsic dynamics, we can defeat it more rapidly, and accelerate a full return to work, school and other activities.
Recognizing the Scapegoating Dynamic: Coronavirus Scapegoating
Why the bulls are wrong
Equity markets have bounced well over 20% since the lows just over a month ago, so technically we are already back in a new bull market. With peak new cases now behind us in Australia, business is agitating to reopen and governments are starting to ease restrictions. With the biggest fiscal programs since WW2 and huge monetary stimulus in the pipes, are the bulls about to be proven spectacularly right? No. Not even close, according to Jerome Lander who manages the Lucerne Alternative Investments Fund.
In this 25-minute outdoor video interview, Jerome first set the stage by giving three reasons the bulls are wrong before then saying the bottom for the market could be more than 40% below where it is now:
“… it’s very easy to come up with figures around, 1600 or 1800 on the S&P 500. Obviously we’re up at 2800 on the S&P at the moment”.
Citing the risks of ongoing virus infestations, credit defaults, geopolitical risks, poor consumption and investment spending going forward, he paints a picture of a future that is vastly different from the past.In this new paradigm, he argues, investors face the very real prospect of long-term asset price deflation as fundamentals reassert themselves, and that in this environment investors will require a completely different approach to the one that has worked for the last 40 years.
Discussion points through the interview
– Three reasons the bulls are wrong
– What could drive the bear market and how low it could go
– What the most imminent risks are, including conflict
– What ‘the new normal’ might look like
– The biggest mistakes most investors are making
– The lens investors should now view the market through
– Investment styles that reduce market risk
– A message for all anxious investors out thereYou can access the full transcript here: https://www.livewiremarkets.com/wires/why-the-bulls-are-wrong
00:03
I think firstly the Bulls are pretending
00:07
this virus itself the problems gone away
00:09
and the problem hasn’t been solved so
00:11
although we’ve reached a peak in daily
00:13
new cases we we still haven’t got an
00:16
effective treatment or an effective
00:18
vaccine for the virus firstly secondly
00:22
we have valuations at all-time record
00:24
for earnings levels not with saying the
00:27
economic settings we have had we have
00:29
and thirdly I think the Bulls really
00:31
ignore the overall picture which is that
00:33
we have unsustainable and unsustainable
00:36
amounts of debt driving our economic
00:39
growth for many years now and that we
00:41
may well be becoming to the end of a
00:43
long term debt cycle which makes it
00:45
really very difficult to be optimistic
00:47
about the returns that you’re going to
00:48
get from traditional asset classes
00:50
there’s a lot of people out there who
00:52
just seem overly optimistic to me given
00:54
the the the settings we have at the
00:56
moment for investment markets so we
00:58
think about where we’re at we have
01:01
economies which are really operating
01:03
unsustainably still we keep on putting
01:06
on more and more debt we have
01:10
unsustainable situation whereby we we
01:13
keep trying to pretend that we can just
01:15
layer and layer upon layer of extra
01:17
extra debt and create some sort of
01:20
nominal growth the low amount of growth
01:21
given the amount of debt we’re putting
01:23
on and that somehow we’re going to we’re
01:25
going to be able to continue doing that
01:27
forever and I think the balls really
01:29
ignore those things so the Bulls often
01:32
focus on very short term short term sort
01:36
of settings and they’re overly
01:40
optimistic by Nature
01:41
I suspect so I think when you’re
01:46
investing it’s ideal to be flexible so
01:48
you want to be bullish sometimes very
01:50
sometimes neutral at other times and be
01:52
able to adjust yourself to the settings
01:54
and the opportunities that you have if
01:56
you think about where we’re at now we’re
01:59
in a position where valuations are
02:01
expensive you know we actually when you
02:03
price what markets are going to deliver
02:05
just normally based on historical
02:07
context given how they’re being priced
02:10
you come up with very low returns from
02:12
traditional asset markets
02:13
if you then layer on top of that you
02:17
know we’re at economically we’re really
02:20
we really look to be coming towards the
02:21
end of the long term debt cycle whereby
02:24
it’s becoming increasingly obvious and
02:26
increasingly challenging to actually
02:28
keep economic growth going given the
02:30
type of economic settings we have we
02:33
have a very imbalanced economy so we
02:35
have a lot of wealth in the hands of
02:37
relatively few parties and we have a lot
02:40
of people living unsustainably on the
02:42
basis of the fact they can keep on
02:44
borrowing money to to buy what they need
02:46
and that doesn’t really create a
02:49
virtuous circle in the long run or a
02:51
situation which can really resolve
02:53
itself favorably I think sure so if you
02:56
look at a traditional bear market you
02:57
know it sort of takes place over many
02:59
months so you don’t suddenly you don’t
03:01
see the bear market over in a one-month
03:03
period of time so if we are in a bear
03:05
market there would be strong reason to
03:07
suspect that it will take many months
03:09
for it to play out we might for example
03:12
see a significant default cycle over
03:13
time we might see further waves of virus
03:17
infestations should we not be in a
03:19
fortunate position to come across you
03:20
know better treatments or were
03:22
unfortunate with mutations or whatever
03:24
we might see all sorts of ramifications
03:26
further shocks to the system from
03:28
geopolitical risks there’s lots of X
03:31
factors that can still occur to mean
03:33
that shocks the system that mean that
03:36
people really re reassess whether their
03:39
prices they’re paying at the moment in
03:41
this rally actually are supported by the
03:44
fundamentals at the moment the the rally
03:46
the bear market rally you know is
03:48
supported by by the fact that that we
03:51
have got you know daily new cases piki
03:53
have piqued by optimism around that but
03:56
mainly really by massive central bank
03:58
liquidity and that central bank
04:01
liquidity there is a fight between bulls
04:04
based which the bull case is really
04:06
based upon central bank liquidity and
04:07
bears based on fundamentals and the
04:11
strong possibility of a high default
04:12
cycle and poor consumption and poor
04:15
investment spending etc going forward
04:18
and so you know that’s gonna be the
04:20
tussle back and forth now this this bear
04:22
market doesn’t have to be like any other
04:23
bear market we’ve seen before it can
04:24
definitely be different so I think while
04:26
history can inform
04:27
what we might expect going forward it
04:29
could equally be very very different the
04:32
thing that’s of concern to me I guess is
04:33
that many investors are assuming that
04:35
we’re going to go back to normal or that
04:37
although the asset prices are justified
04:40
and I think that I think that they’re
04:42
not there’s been lots of work done on
04:44
this to say well what is this support
04:45
what is a supported evaluation for these
04:47
markets and if we think about what what
04:51
earnings are doing this year and where
04:52
bear markets historically sort of get to
04:55
you know historically we’ve seen
04:57
valuations you know bottom at much lower
05:00
multiples and what we see now we’ve
05:03
obviously got earnings coming off a long
05:04
way this year so it’s very easy to come
05:06
up with figures around you know 1600 or
05:08
1800 on the SP obviously we’re up at you
05:11
know 2800 on the SP at the moment so
05:13
that would be a fall around circa 50%
05:16
plus to get to what you might argue is a
05:18
fair valuation level for the market now
05:20
clearly we’re not in a situation where
05:23
central banks have any interest or
05:25
wanting to allow valuations to fall to a
05:28
normal valuation level or experience
05:32
that sort of situation so they’re
05:35
fighting very hard to keep the bubbles
05:36
alive and they’re providing massive
05:38
amounts of liquidity and stimulus to to
05:41
to keep that secured basic prices afloat
05:44
now at the end of the day will that be
05:47
successful we don’t know you know how
05:49
long will they be able to do that for we
05:50
don’t know but there’s clearly a lot of
05:52
risk to the downside should for any
05:54
reason central bank’s not be successful
05:56
at continuing to stimulate stimulate
05:59
asset prices and support our set prices
06:01
one of the things I raised concerns
06:03
about was the valuations of commercial
06:06
property unlisted property and and where
06:11
that would go to going forward so you
06:12
think about the situation now with
06:14
everybody having you know a lot of
06:16
people being at home working from home
06:18
and a lot of people actually saying we
06:20
can actually work at home effectively
06:22
and employers saying well actually we
06:24
can have our employees and working from
06:25
home and they’re more productive you
06:28
simply aren’t going to have the same
06:29
sort of demand or need for office space
06:31
coming out of this coming out of this
06:33
crisis they needed before not to mention
06:35
the fact that you know unemployment
06:36
levels will be higher probably a
06:38
substantially higher so the demand for
06:41
commercial
06:41
property won’t be what it was and that
06:43
means that a lot of those you know those
06:45
evaluations probably are not sustainable
06:47
and you’re likely to see a lot of
06:49
pressures on on property property
06:52
evaluations moving forward also with
06:54
respect to you know residential property
06:56
we have to ask ourselves you know
06:58
depending upon what the unemployment
06:58
picture does and and how ugly this gets
07:01
are those valuations justified you know
07:04
can we can we really support valuations
07:06
purely on the basis of cheap money or do
07:09
we have to have people in employment
07:10
with good employment prospects being
07:12
able to grow their incomes over time and
07:16
people with the confidence to be able to
07:18
take out big loans banks with the
07:21
willingness to lend people in those
07:22
situations lots of money so they can
07:25
continue to pay the the high prices that
07:27
we have on on property more generally I
07:30
think one other issues I raised was the
07:33
valuations that are that you know that
07:34
are being used of unlisted assets within
07:36
super funds and so forth and there’s now
07:38
been more published on that whereby
07:39
people have raised the fact that you
07:41
know that valuations arguably weren’t
07:44
being priced fairly such that if you
07:46
think take the bottom of the market the
07:48
the short-term bottom in the market back
07:50
in March and the recovery since that
07:51
time a lot of super funds haven’t
07:54
actually recovered with the markets over
07:55
that period of time so if you had
07:56
actually invested at that time thinking
07:58
you were getting the bottom one of the
07:59
markets all had a been fortuitous enough
08:01
just to just to be in that situation and
08:03
you had of invested in one of these
08:04
super funds you were actually buying
08:05
into unlisted property prices unlisted
08:08
infrastructure price unlisted private
08:10
equity prices at at prices which were
08:13
inflated which didn’t really reflect
08:14
reality your fair valuation and those
08:16
valuations will need to now gradually
08:18
come back to what they really worth and
08:20
and that means is that there’s an
08:22
inequity in the way those those
08:24
investors are actually being treated
08:25
there is actually a much higher risk of
conflict post post two pandemic
interestingly enough and certainly when
you start doing funny things with your
money then also there’s a high risk of
conflict when you look at political
cycles and you think about people trying
to retain power there’s also an
incentive incentive there for them to
you know try and remove trying to move
the the attention of the populace onto
some external focus because they know
that if you’re at war with someone
you’re much more likely to vote in ink
to be conservative in that regard so you
can certainly come up with situations
whereby the likelihood of conflict you
know you can certainly assess the like
little conflict as being higher now than
what we’ve seen before now of course we
already have a lot of conflict in the
world we have we have we have trade war
you know that’s been going on for some
time between China and us you know fight
for supremacy there we have cyber war
going on this is not something that
people necessarily focus on I talk about
but we have lots of that going on at the
moment already so the war doesn’t have
to necessarily be in the in terms of
physical confrontation we have economic
war going on at the moment and and that
can certainly be you know exaggerated
there’s a lot of focus in the media
recently on you know what was the real
cause of this forest did China you know
did China handle this appropriately when
they did certain things and certainly
you can point to those things very
easily and and be quite upset about the
fact that that maybe this problem should
have been contained a lot of earlier
than it was and it shouldn’t have been
the problem shouldn’t become the problem
that it did if certain state actors had
09:58
it behaved very differently than what
10:01
they had ever had that then they’d have
10:03
done so you know there might be a focus
10:06
of attention turned towards that and and
10:08
that might create you know D
10:11
globalization terms of people looking to
10:12
there’s a need that in fact for people’s
10:14
supply chains become much more resilient
10:16
out of this to move to move certain
10:18
industries which are strategic and
10:19
necessary or at least diversify them but
10:22
move some of them back to to kind of
10:24
more familiar territory and more home
10:26
territory in order to ensure they have
10:27
supplies of essential goods and services
10:29
for their economy so there’s a lot of
10:31
things that can happen out of this and
10:33
there is certainly a much higher risk of
10:35
conflict and I think he’s being
10:37
appreciated it’s one of those X factors
10:38
that’s out there in terms it’s not just
10:41
China there’s obviously the possibility
10:43
of conflict in the Middle East again all
10:45
prices have dropped very significantly
10:47
that’s going to be putting a lot of
10:48
pressure on those budgets and a lot of
10:50
those a lot of those those those
10:53
countries there’s obviously the the
10:56
tensions with Iran
10:57
there’s tensions with Venezuela there’s
10:59
lots of Powder Keg some places around
11:01
the world where
11:02
this can go wrong I think it’s some
11:04
things are definitely going to change as
11:05
a result of of this shock to the system
11:09
I think certainly we’re not going to go
11:12
back in a hurry to the levels of
11:13
unemployment that we had previous to
11:15
this shock very easily so we now have in
11:18
the US unemployment fast approaching
11:22
about 20% of the population and although
11:24
we may on the other side of this once we
11:26
do and if we do get to a solution to the
11:30
coronavirus have a rapid sort of
11:32
comeback in unemployment
11:35
it won’t quickly come back at all to
11:37
where it was before so we’re going to
11:39
come out of this with a lot more
11:41
unemployment and certainly a much more
11:44
challenged consumer than what we had
11:46
before and that will mean that will come
11:51
back with a lot of people much more
11:52
hesitant in the way they go about their
11:53
daily business and the way they choose
11:54
to interact with the world is it safe to
11:57
go and do the things you did before do I
12:00
you are you are you willing to sort of
12:02
travel overseas and go to exotic places
12:04
like you were before are you in a
12:06
situation financially where you can even
12:08
afford to do that will you be confident
12:11
in your ability to take on long term
12:13
debt and your ability to pay pay off
12:15
that debt given the fragility that
12:18
you’ve just learned with respect to your
12:21
employment prospects there’s a lot of
12:22
there’s a lot of reason to think things
12:24
will some things will change permanently
12:26
as a result of this crisis one of the
12:29
concerns I have is that when you look at
12:31
the big picture we have an economy
12:33
that’s operating it
12:34
you know that’s this size say you know
12:36
we’ve got an economy sort of this size
12:37
and we have asset prices which are this
12:39
size so there’s a massive misalignment
12:43
between the size of our asset prices and
12:45
the size of our markets and the size of
12:47
our real economy and furthermore we’re
12:49
not really growing this real economy you
12:51
know we don’t have and and this crisis
12:52
is really going to accentuate that even
12:54
further we’ve got a kind of low
12:56
productivity economy we haven’t actually
12:59
got the right settings to grow the
13:01
economy strongly and it’s laden with
13:04
debt you know basically and with the
13:06
debts been used to boost asset prices to
13:08
these levels and that’s just not a
13:09
sustainable picture long-term so
13:11
investors really should be conscious of
13:13
that in the back of their heads they
13:14
should be thinking and
13:16
really safe if I just go and buy you
13:18
know a broad basket of equities so I
13:20
just invest in a traditional way
13:21
am I really safer I’m really taking the
13:23
risk that one day this big these asset
13:26
prices that are all the way out here
13:28
this massive on the back of this massive
13:29
financialization and massive easy money
13:31
on that central banks have provided gets
13:34
collapse towards the size of the real
13:35
economy alternately do I really believe
13:38
with the way we’re operating the
13:39
economies today are we going to grow
13:41
those economies rapidly so they ask they
13:44
grow you know they grow the asset
13:45
they’re going to be asset prices so to
13:47
speak I think if you look at either
13:49
those situations there’s strong reason
13:51
to think that there’s going to be at
13:52
some stage you know you know there’s a
13:54
there’s a gravity that’s pulling asset
13:56
prices down there’s a force there that
13:58
asset prices actually naturally want to
14:00
collapse and the settings were right now
14:01
we have massive deflationary forces
14:02
operating on our set prices they want to
14:05
collapse the only thing that’s keeping
14:06
them up is really central bank easy
14:09
money and and that’s that’s becoming
14:13
harder and harder to do the real
14:15
question mark out of this is whether we
14:16
gonna get one more bubble you know
14:18
whether they manage to float those I set
14:19
prices higher again into one more even
14:21
bigger bubble how long will that last if
14:24
they manage to do that or whether this
14:26
is it this is the end of the long term
14:28
debt cycle and we have to change the way
14:30
we everything will change basically all
14:32
the things will change to mean that you
14:34
know the the returns you get from being
14:36
invested in a traditional way
14:38
long equities long property all along
14:41
all these long debt basically lot read
14:43
through an assets gets collapsed down
14:45
and so you know for me I can’t go to I
14:47
can’t I can’t sleep at night if I was
14:49
operating under that paradigm with that
14:51
with what I know now I wouldn’t I
14:53
couldn’t sit there and look at that
14:54
setting and say I should put all my
14:56
investors into that sort of risk in a
14:57
very concentrated fashion and just hope
14:59
it’s all okay because I think there’s no
15:01
reason when you look at it I think that
15:03
it will be okay in the long run so you
15:05
have to operate on the assumption that
15:07
that can collapse and therefore you have
15:08
to do things very differently from the
15:10
way most people are actually doing it
15:11
most investors are really operating
15:13
under a traditional or historic paradigm
15:15
so they’re really they’re really you
15:17
know they’ve got their equity dominant
15:18
portfolios and they really operate under
15:21
the assumption that this is a strategic
15:22
asset allocation type framework which is
15:24
based on historical returns and they’re
15:26
basically assuming that
15:28
the portfolio’s ahead for the last 40
15:30
years are the right portfolios are run
15:32
with going forward now I don’t believe
15:34
that is the case I think they’re quite
15:36
clearly we can mount a very very strong
15:38
case for why real returns will be very
15:41
low from here looking forward on the
15:43
basis of valuations or pond on the basis
15:45
of the unsustainable economic settings
15:47
we have and on the basis of all the
15:49
risks that are out there that were that
15:50
the world’s facing that investors are
15:52
facing that just aren’t being priced
15:53
into markets and and on the basis of
15:56
that I think you really need to you know
15:58
if you’re really assessing the world or
16:00
thinking about how risk it really is and
16:02
also thinking about what investors
16:04
really want for their money
16:05
you know this is don’t want a roller
16:06
coaster ride they don’t want to go up
16:07
and down like a yo-yo and end up going
16:09
nowhere at the end of that they want to
16:11
actually have absolute returns with low
16:13
risk of large you know substantial
16:15
losses and have their money protected
16:17
and genuinely diversified and if you’re
16:19
just running a portfolio which depends
16:21
purely upon you know interest rates
16:23
moving from very high to very low and
16:25
upon debt levels continuing to expand at
16:27
extraordinary and unsustainable rates
16:30
you’re not really running running a
16:32
portfolio that’s suited for what we’re
16:33
facing the next five or ten years I
16:36
think one of the things investors often
16:38
underappreciated as well is that you
16:39
know it’s geometric returns that matter
16:41
to most investors over time it’s not
16:43
arithmetic ones so if you return ten
16:45
percent this year ten percent next year
16:47
and ten percent the year after that but
16:48
then you do you do minus 30% you know
16:51
you’ve actually you’ve actually lost
16:52
investors a lot of money overall and
16:54
achieve nothing so the whole the whole
16:57
name of the game investing for the long
16:59
term is to make sure you avoid large
17:01
losses because if you have if you
17:03
experience large losses and you exposing
17:04
vistas to large losses and you’re not
17:06
you’re not giving them what they need or
17:08
want and you’re not really doing a good
17:10
job for them and I think our industry
17:11
really at the moment under the
17:12
traditional paradigm it’s it’s operating
17:15
under is really giving investors that
17:17
experience and it’s it’s really
17:19
necessary for a lot of people to sit
17:20
back and think you know given what given
17:22
what you know from operate from first
17:23
principles is this the way it would
17:25
design a portfolio for today or is this
17:27
the way the portfolio has been designed
17:28
a long time ago on a very with very very
17:32
different investment settings you’ve got
17:34
to assume that that asset prices are
17:36
going to be very low in the long run
17:37
you’ve got to assume that you know
17:39
crises are a normal part of the way
17:42
you know you manage money you have to be
17:43
your portfolio has to be resilient to
17:45
crises basically because this isn’t
17:47
gonna be the last crisis we face we
17:49
can’t just sit here and say this is a
17:50
one in a hundred year event and it’s
17:51
gonna go away even if we do somehow
17:53
manage to go over the coronavirus very
17:55
soon which as we’ve talked about there’s
17:57
no strong reason to think that will be
17:59
the case but let’s let’s say that we do
18:01
they’ll still be further crisis because
18:03
of the way we’ve set everything out and
18:04
because of the risks that there are in
18:05
the real world so we have to build a
18:06
portfolio that’s resilient to Christ as
18:08
it can still make us money and still
18:09
meet the objectives that we have now to
18:11
do that unfortunately we can’t all do
18:13
that
18:14
we can all do that by just investing in
18:15
a traditional way so we can’t say let’s
18:17
go and invest in a risky way let’s go
18:19
and chase equity risk and property risk
18:20
it inflated valuations and which is what
18:23
by the way think just about the entire
18:25
industry does so what I’m saying is that
18:27
the way the entire industry operates is
18:29
is flawed that’s what I’m basically
18:31
saying and in terms of what the
18:33
individual investor actually needs it’s
18:35
based on historical paradigm that
18:37
probably isn’t going to work very well
18:38
so we have to think how do we get away
18:40
from those risks you know if the stove’s
18:41
gonna be really hot and really dangerous
18:43
to touch how do i how do i trying to
18:46
avoid touch that i have to think very
18:47
differently you have to do something
18:49
very differently to what to what they’re
18:51
doing have to expose myself I have to
18:52
minimize that risk basically so you need
18:55
to have a lot less risk exposed to the
18:57
traditional long-only type of investing
18:59
and you have to move much more into a
19:01
more conservative more active more more
19:07
sort of long-short way of looking at the
19:09
world
19:09
so more skill-based
19:13
strategies basically so a lot of so a
19:17
lot of what I focus on is you know
19:18
finding skilled strategies that I can
19:22
use combined combined in a portfolio to
19:24
mean that I can get a return which is
19:25
along with what investors actually won
19:27
which isn’t as dependent upon
19:29
traditional asset process and
19:31
traditional asset Marcus remaining
19:32
inflated because that’s a very binary
19:34
risk so if you really want to build a
19:36
diversified or balanced portfolio you
19:38
need to think about how do i how do I
19:40
minimize the exposure to interest rate
19:42
risk you know how do I minimize the
19:44
exposure this asset price inflation risk
19:47
how do I make sure the portfolio can
19:50
survive the cry
19:51
SIB again face going forward so with
19:54
life basically what we do is we look at
19:56
we look for skills underlying
19:58
investments managers and strategies that
20:00
really bring something different to the
20:01
portfolio there’s not heavily dependent
20:04
upon you know markets so you want to
20:06
find sources of return that don’t depend
20:08
upon the markets basically going up to
20:11
achieve a good result for investors and
20:13
that’s why we’ve had such resilient
20:16
returns assess resilient results put
20:17
part whose have managed to find those
20:20
returns and we’ve managed to combine
20:21
them in a way such that we manage a lot
20:23
of the risks that are that are out there
20:25
and ensure that you know investors have
20:28
a have a have a true to label type
20:30
experience now investors in life you
20:34
know are basically looking for absolute
20:36
returns we have low risk of large
20:37
capital losses I mean one of the things
20:40
are published on as an example of
20:41
something we have used in the portfolio
20:43
which is a more traditional sort of type
20:45
of exposure in a sense but which you
20:48
know even other investors could could be
20:49
using a lot more of is precious metals
20:53
precious metals have been in a bull
20:55
market for some time now there’s still
20:57
strong reason to expect that bull market
20:59
might continue it’s amazing when you
21:01
look at you know your every Superfund or
21:03
average large institutional investor out
21:06
there how little if anything for having
21:09
precious metals it’s incredible giving
21:11
the settings we actually have at the
21:12
moment and it’s just an example of what
21:13
I was talking about before that most
21:15
investors really aren’t thinking outside
21:17
the square and aren’t really trying to
21:19
adjust their portfolios from a
21:21
historical paradigm to one which is
21:22
better suited to the sort of situation
21:23
we face today if you actually looked
21:26
under the hood of the way a lot of these
21:27
these investors operate you would
21:29
realize that bringing in an idea that’s
21:31
kind of considered you know
21:32
non-consensus is getting it into the
21:35
portfolio is actually quite difficult so
21:37
there might be in individual investors
21:39
within large institutions who actually
21:41
believe and who are themselves investing
21:43
in gold but they won’t be able to get it
21:45
in past Syria their investment
21:46
communities or their investment boards
21:48
and get it into the portfolio in any
21:50
meaningful degree I mean I saw a study
21:51
recently suggesting that even though
21:53
historically institutions had a couple
21:55
of percent of their portfolio in gold
21:58
more recently was only half a percent
22:00
which is incredible in this massive bull
22:02
market that were actually been on for
22:03
some time now
22:04
it’s amazing so some of the long short
22:06
exposures we have for example there’s
22:08
that one of the strategies that’s that’s
22:10
worked for a long period of time is in a
22:11
long short land it’s basically being
22:13
long you know higher quality companies
22:15
and low you know lower quality companies
22:17
there’s a generic sort of buckets so we
22:19
think about that there are a lot of
22:21
companies on the stock exchange which
22:23
really aren’t good companies you know
22:24
you shouldn’t be investing in them so
22:25
when you buy an index fund you’ve got an
22:27
exposure automatically to all these
22:29
crappy companies you’ve got exposure to
22:30
everything
22:31
you know actually differentiating
22:32
between the good companies and the bad
22:33
companies people are actually adding
22:34
economic value of creating value over
22:36
time and people who aren’t so the
22:39
benefit of being long short is that you
22:40
can you can you can actually say look
22:43
these are these are good companies these
22:44
are actually adding you know creating
22:46
value for their shareholders over time
22:47
and on the other hand here we have a
22:49
whole bunch of let’s call them bad
22:51
companies in and sometimes these bad
22:54
companies are really are really bad
22:55
companies they’re fraudulent for example
22:57
there’s a lot of frauds fraudulent
22:58
companies that are on stock exchanges
23:00
around the world and in the long run
23:02
they’re going to burn their investors so
23:04
if you’re able to create a basket of of
23:06
shorts to sort of fraudulent companies
23:09
or mismanage companies or highly
23:11
indebted companies at a time when the
23:13
economy’s turning south all sorts of
23:15
different strategies you can use as a
23:16
longshore manager to to have that bucket
23:19
of low quality companies and over time
23:21
the strong reason to expect you get a
23:23
you get a relative return out of that
23:24
that the good companies will actually
23:26
outperform the poor quality companies
23:28
and you’ll be able to extract a return
23:30
that’s not depend upon whether the
23:31
markets go up or down but it’s dependent
23:33
upon whether those good companies
23:35
outperform those bad companies over time
23:36
and and that sort of strategy is one of
23:39
the strategies we use if you think about
23:41
traditional asset assets if you like the
23:43
original asset classes are things like
23:45
you know equities bonds cash property
23:49
you know these are all considered sort
23:50
of traditional asset classes the ones
23:52
that make people feel most comfortable
23:54
most familiar with the ones that are
23:56
most mainstream and most you know used
23:58
in a traditional sort of paradigm you
24:00
think about alternate eternities they’re
24:02
really everything else so alternatives
24:04
can can be alternative asset classes so
24:06
things like precious metals often
24:07
considered alternatives some people even
24:10
think about
24:10
unlisted versions of of listed asset
24:13
classes as being alternative I don’t
24:14
really see them as alternatives I see
24:16
them as unlisted
24:17
unlisted versions of the listed version
24:19
but they still expose the underlying
24:21
similar economic risks for me but when I
24:25
think about alternatives I’m thinking
24:27
more about liquid alternatives so ways
24:29
of taking traditional asset classes but
24:31
operating with them very differently so
24:32
for example you know market neutral so
24:34
your long one company your short another
24:36
company against it you’re taking out the
24:38
market that you you you you taking it
24:41
down to another level and saying you
24:42
know within that within that asset class
24:44
what is there that I want to own what is
24:47
there that I don’t want to own what can
24:48
i what is going to outperform something
24:50
else so you totally getting a different
24:52
return stream out of it and that’s
24:54
that’s an alternative strategy in my
24:56
book it’s understandable that investors
24:59
are confused because lots of things are
25:01
changing and it’s important that your
25:03
investment approach also changes will be
25:05
my message
25:06
if investment markets if you don’t
25:08
believe investment markets are going to
25:10
offer strong returns going forward if
25:12
you don’t believe like I do that
25:13
economies are well set up to encourage
25:15
high productivity growth that the
25:18
valuations are attractive that settings
25:20
are sustainable that we don’t have a
25:22
debt bubble that’s a big problem in this
25:23
sort of thing like if you if you believe
25:25
everything is okay and you can continue
25:27
to invest in a traditional way and have
25:28
your portfolio or your your wealth and
25:30
your future dependent upon that but if
25:32
you think things that you know if you
25:34
think things aren’t like that and think
25:35
the world’s different place from that
25:36
now I think you really need to think
25:38
have I got the right investment approach
25:40
at all haven’t got the right investment
25:41
partners do I need to do something very
25:43
differently than what the industry at
25:44
large offers me and I think you do I
25:47
think people absolutely need to think
25:48
differently about how they manage money
25:50
and what’s a line with what they’re you
25:52
know not knowing that the way the world
25:54
is but what they are trying to achieve
25:55
for their portfolios the truth is most
25:57
of us don’t want a rollercoaster ride we
25:59
don’t want to be on this you know seesaw
26:01
and end up going nowhere we want to
26:03
actually have you know steady more
26:05
reliable more skill-based returns for
26:08
investment managers that aren’t depend
26:10
upon everything being okay and I don’t
26:12
expose us to so much crisis risks that’s
26:15
out there so my message to investors
26:17
will be just that you know really think
26:19
about whether you’ve got the right
26:20
alignment for what you’re trying to
26:21
achieve and is there a better way is
26:22
there a different way and do I need to
26:23
think
26:23
do I need to make sure I’ve got the
26:24
right investment partners for that
What are the ingredients which Suggest a Financial Crisis?
@RaoulGMI identified the following factors contributing to a crisis, before Coronavirus:
- Stocks: Largest Equity Bubble of All Time: (Pension Crisis & Buyback Bubble)
- Demographics:
- Largest Retiree Wave, all wanting to sell stocks and bonds at the same time
- Millennials are too poor and indebted (make 20% less than parents)
- Corporate Credit: Largest Credit Bubble of All Time
- ($10 Trillion + Off balance Sheet = 75% of GDP)
- Student Loan Bubble:
- $1.6 Trillion
- Auto Loan Bubble
- ($1.2 Trillion)
- Indexation Bubble
- ETF/Market Structure Bubble
- Foreign Borrowings (Dollar Standard Bubble)
- Monetary Policy Bubble (The Central Bank Bubble)
- EU Banking Crisis
- why they hired Christine Lagarde, for her political negotiating skills to deal with the nationalization of the European banks (which are facing insolvency) not for her economic or financial skills
- A Trade War:
- The Trade Wars “shattered” supply chains
- Coronavirus
- Largest Supply & Demand Shocks of all Time
Big Picture:
Central Banks have been fighting for the last 20 years:
- Full Scale Debt Deflation and a Solvency Crisis
Turns into:
- A loss of confidence in the Dollar Standard and the Entire Financial Architecture
(page 29-30)
“Down The Rabbit Hole” – The Eurodollar Market Is The Matrix Behind It All
Submitted by Michael Every of Rabobank
Summary
- The Eurodollar system is a critical but often misunderstood driver of global financial markets: its importance cannot be understated.
- Its origins are shrouded in mystery and intrigue; its operations are invisible to most; and yet it controls us in many ways. We will attempt to enlighten readers on what it is and what it means.
- However, it is also a system under huge structural pressures – and as such we may be about to experience a profound paradigm shift with key implications for markets, economies, and geopolitics.
- Recent Fed actions on swap lines and repo facilities only underline this fact rather than reducing its likelihood
What is The Matrix?
A new world-class golf course in an Asian country financed with a USD bank loan. A Mexican property developer buying a hotel in USD. A European pension company wanting to hold USD assets and swapping borrowed EUR to do so. An African retailer importing Chinese-made toys for sale, paying its invoice in USD.
All of these are small examples of the multi-faceted global Eurodollar market. Like The Matrix, it is all around us, and connects us. Also just like The Matrix, most are unaware of its existence even as it defines the parameters we operate within. As we shall explore in this special report, it is additionally a Matrix that encompasses an implicit power struggle that only those who grasp its true nature are cognizant of.
Moreover, at present this Matrix and its Architect face a huge, perhaps existential, challenge.
Yes, it has overcome similar crises before…but it might be that the Novel (or should we say ‘Neo’?) Coronavirus is The One.
So, here is the key question to start with: What is the Eurodollar system?
For Neo-phytes
The Eurodollar system is a critical but often misunderstood driver of global financial markets: its importance cannot be understated. While most market participants are aware of its presence to some degree, not many grasp the extent to which it impacts on markets, economies,…and geopolitics – indeed, the latter is particularly underestimated.
Yet before we go down that particular rabbit hole, let’s start with the basics. In its simplest form, a Eurodollar is an unsecured USD deposit held outside of the US. They are not under the US’ legal jurisdiction, nor are they subject to US rules and regulations.
To avoid any potential confusion, the term Eurodollar came into being long before the Euro currency, and the “euro” has nothing to do with Europe. In this context it is used in the same vein as Eurobonds, which are also not EUR denominated bonds, but rather debt issued in a different currency to the company of that issuing. For example, a Samurai bond–that is to say a bond issued in JPY by a nonJapanese issuer–is also a type of Eurobond.
As with Eurobonds, eurocurrencies can reflect many different underlying real currencies. In fact, one could talk about a Euroyen, for JPY, or even a Euroeuro, for EUR. Yet the Eurodollar dwarfs them: we shall show the scale shortly.
More(pheous) background
So how did the Eurodollar system come to be, and how has it grown into the behemoth it is today? Like all global systems, there are many conspiracy theories and fantastical claims that surround the birth of the Eurodollar market. While some of these stories may have a grain of truth, we will try and stick to the known facts.
A number of parallel events occurred in the late 1950s that led to the Eurodollar’s creation – and the likely suspects sound like the cast of a spy novel. The Eurodollar market began to emerge after WW2, when US Dollars held outside of the US began to increase as the US consumed more and more goods from overseas. Some also cite the role of the Marshall Plan, where the US transferred over USD12bn (USD132bn equivalent now) to Western Europe to help them rebuild and fight the appeal of Soviet communism.
Of course, these were just USD outside of the US and not Eurodollars. Where the plot thickens is that, increasingly, the foreign recipients of USD became concerned that the US might use its own currency as a power play. As the Cold War bit, Communist countries became particularly concerned about the safety of their USD held with US banks. After all, the US had used its financial power for geopolitical gains when in 1956, in response to the British invading Egypt during the Suez Crisis, it had threatened to intensify the pressure on GBP’s peg to USD under Bretton Woods: this had forced the British into a humiliating withdrawal and an acceptance that their status of Great Power was not compatible with their reduced economic and financial circumstances.
With rising fears that the US might freeze the Soviet Union’s USD holdings, action was taken: in 1957, the USSR moved their USD holdings to a bank in London, creating the first Eurodollar deposit and seeding our current UScentric global financial system – by a country opposed to the US in particular and capitalism in general.
There are also alternative origin stories. Some claim the first Eurodollar deposit was made during the Korean War with China moving USD to a Parisian bank.
Meanwhile, the Eurodollar market spawned a widely-known financial instrument, the London Inter Bank Offer Rate, or LIBOR. Indeed, LIBOR is an offshore USD interest rate which emerged in the 1960s as those that borrowed Eurodollars needed a reference rate for larger loans that might need to be syndicated. Unlike today, however, LIBOR was an average of offered lending rates, hence the name, and was not based on actual transactions as the first tier of the LIBOR submission waterfall is today.
Dozer and Tank
So how large is the Eurodollar market today? Like the Matrix – vast. As with the origins of the Eurodollar system, itself nothing is transparent. However, we have tried to estimate an indicative total using Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data for:
- On-balance sheet USD liabilities held by non-US banks;
- USD Credit commitments, guarantees extended, and derivatives contracts of non-US banks (C, G, D);
- USD debt liabilities of non-US non-financial corporations;
- Over-the-Counter (OTC) USD derivative claims of non-US non-financial corporations; and
- Global goods imports in USD excluding those of the US and intra-Eurozone trade.
The results are as shown below as of end-2018: USD57 trillion, nearly three times the size of the US economy before it was hit by the COVID-19 virus. Even if this measure is not complete, it underlines the scale of the market.
It also shows its vast power in that this is an equally large structural global demand for USD. Every import, bond, loan, credit guarantee, or derivate needs to be settled in USD.
Indeed, fractional reserve banking means that an initial Eurodollar can be multiplied up (e.g., Eurodollar 100m can be used as the base for a larger Eurodollar loan, and leverage increased further). Yet non-US entities are NOT able to conjure up USD on demand when needed because they don’t have a central bank behind them which can produce USD by fiat, which only the Federal Reserve can.
This power to create the USD that everyone else transacts and trades in is an essential point to grasp on the Eurodollar – which is ironically also why it was created in the first place!
Tri-ffi-nity
Given the colourful history, ubiquitous nature, and critical importance of the Eurodollar market, a second question then arises: Why don’t people know about The Matrix?
The answer is easy: because once one is aware of it, one immediately wishes to have taken the Blue Pill instead.
Consider what the logic of the Eurodollar system implies. Global financial markets and the global economy rely on the common standard of the USD for pricing, accounting, trading, and deal making. Imagine a world with a hundred different currencies – or even a dozen: it would be hugely problematic to manage, and would not allow anywhere near the level of integration we currently enjoy.
However, at root the Eurodollar system is based on using the national currency of just one country, the US, as the global reserve currency. This means the world is beholden to a currency that it cannot create as needed.
When a crisis hits, as at present, everyone in the Eurodollar system suddenly realizes they have no ability to create fiat USD and must rely on national USD FX reserves and/or Fed swap lines that allow them to swap local currency for USD for a period. This obviously grants the US enormous power and privilege.
The world is also beholden to US monetary policy cycles rather than local ones: higher US rates and/or a stronger USD are ruinous for countries that have few direct economic or financial links with the US. Yet the US Federal Reserve generally shows very little interest in global economic conditions – though that is starting to change, as we will show shortly.
A second problem is that the flow of USD from the US to the rest of the world needs to be sufficient to meet the inbuilt demand for trade and other transactions. Yet the US is a relatively smaller slice of the global economy with each passing year. Even so, it must keep USD flowing out or else a global Eurodollar liquidity crisis will inevitably occur.
That means that either the US must run large capital account deficits, lending to the rest of the world; or large current account deficits, spending instead.
Obviously, the US has been running the latter for many decades, and in many ways benefits from it. It pays for goods and services from the rest of the world in USD debt that it can just create. As such it can also run huge publicor private-sector deficits – arguably even with the multitrillion USD fiscal deficits we are about to see.
However, there is a cost involved for the US. Running a persistent current-account deficit implies a net outflow of industry, manufacturing and related jobs. The US has obviously experienced this for a generation, and it has led to both structural inequality and, more recently, a backlash of political populism wanting to Make America Great Again.
Indeed, if one understands the structure of the Eurodollar system one can see that it faces the Triffin Paradox. This was an argument first made by Robert Triffin in 1959 when he correctly predicted that any country forced to adopt the role of global reserve currency would also be forced to run ever-larger currency outflows to fuel foreign appetite – eventually leading to the breakdown of the system as the cost became too much to bear.
Moreover, there is another systemic weakness at play: realpolitik. Atrophying of industry undermines the supply chains needed for the defence sector, with critical national security implications. The US is already close to losing the ability to manufacture the wide range of products its powerful armed forces require on scale and at speed: yet without military supremacy the US cannot long maintain its multi-dimensional global power, which also stands behind the USD and the Eurodollar system.
This implies the US needs to adopt (military-) industrial policy and a more protectionist stance to maintain its physical power – but that could limit the flow of USD into the global economy via trade. Again, the Eurodollar system, like the early utopian version of the Matrix, seems to contain the seeds of its own destruction.
Indeed, look at the Eurodollar logically over the long term and there are only three ways such a system can ultimately resolve itself:
- The US walks away from the USD reserve currency burden, as Triffin said, or others lose faith in it to stand behind the deficits it needs to run to keep USD flowing appropriately;
- The US Federal Reserve takes over the global financial system little by little and/or in bursts; or
- The global financial system fragments as the US asserts primacy over parts of it, leaving the rest to make their own arrangements.
See the Eurodollar system like this, and it was always when and not if a systemic crisis occurs – which is why people prefer not focus on it all even when it matters so much. Yet arguably this underlying geopolitical dynamic is playing out during our present virus-prompted global financial instability.
Down the rabbit hole
But back to the rabbit hole that is our present situation. While the Eurodollar market is enormous one also needs to look at how many USD are circulating around the world outside the US that can service it if needed. In this regard we will look specifically at global USD FX reserves.
It’s true we could also include US cash holdings in the offshore private sector. Given that US banknotes cannot be tracked no firm data are available, but estimates range from 40% – 72% of total USD cash actually circulates outside the country. This potentially totals hundreds of billions of USD that de facto operate as Eurodollars. However, given it is an unknown total, and also largely sequestered in questionable cash-based activities, and hence are hopefully outside the banking system, we prefer to stick with centralbank FX reserves.
Looking at the ratio of Eurodollar liabilities to global USD FX reserve assets, the picture today is actually healthier than it was a few years ago.
Indeed, while the Eurodollar market size has remained relatively constant in recent years, largely as banks have been slow to expand their balance sheets, the level of global USD FX reserves has risen from USD1.9 trillion to over USD6.5 trillion. As such, the ratio of structural global USD demand to that of USD supply has actually declined from near 22 during the global financial crisis to around 9.
Yet the current market is clearly seeing major Eurodollar stresses – verging on panic.
Fundamentally, the Eurodollar system is always short USD, and any loss of confidence sees everyone scramble to access them at once – in effect causing an invisible international bank run. Indeed, the Eurodollar market only works when it is a constant case of “You-Roll-Over Dollar”.
Unfortunately, COVID-19 and its huge economic damage and uncertainty mean that global confidence has been smashed, and our Eurodollar Matrix risks buckling as a result.
The wild gyrations recently experienced in even major global FX crosses speak to that point, to say nothing of the swings seen in more volatile currencies such as AUD, and in EM bellwethers such as MXN and ZAR. FX basis swaps and LIBOR vs. Fed Funds (so offshore vs. onshore USD borrowing rates) say the same thing. Unsurprisingly, the IMF are seeing a wide range of countries turning to them for emergency USD loans.
The Fed has, of course, stepped up. It has reduced the cost of accessing existing USD swap lines–where USD are exchanged for other currencies for a period of time–for the Bank of Canada, Bank of England, European Central Bank, and Swiss National Bank; and another nine countries were given access to Fed swap lines with Australia, Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, Singapore, and Sweden all able to tap up to USD60bn, and USD30bn available to Denmark, Norway, and New Zealand. This alleviates some pressure for some markets – but is a drop in the ocean compared to the level of Eurodollar liabilities.
The Fed has also introduced a new FIMA repo facility. Essentially this allows any central bank, including emerging markets, to swap their US Treasury holdings for USD, which can then be made available to local financial institutions. To put it bluntly, this repo facility is like a swap line but with a country whose currency you don’t trust.
Allowing a country to swap its Treasuries for USD can alleviate some of the immediate stress on Eurodollars, but when the swap needs to be reversed the drain on reserves will still be there. Moreover, Eurodollar market participants will now not be able to see if FX reserves are declining in a potential crisis country. Ironically, that is likely to see less, not more, willingness to extend Eurodollar credit as a result.
You have two choices, Neo
Yet despite all the Fed’s actions so far, USD keeps going up vs. EM FX. Again, this is as clear an example as one could ask for of structural underlying Eurodollar demand.
Indeed, we arguably need to see even more steps taken by the Fed – and soon. To underline the scale of the crisis we currently face in the Eurodollar system, the BIS concluded at the end of a recent publication on the matter:
“…today’s crisis differs from the 2008 GFC, and requires policies that reach beyond the banking sector to final users. These businesses, particularly those enmeshed in global supply chains, are in constant need of working capital, much of it in dollars. Preserving the flow of payments along these chains is essential if we are to avoid further economic meltdown.
Channeling dollars to non-banks is not straightforward. Allowing non-banks to transact with the central bank is one option, but there are attendant difficulties, both in principle and in practice. Other options include policies that encourage banks to fill the void left by market based finance, for example funding for lending schemes that extend dollars to non-banks indirectly via banks.”
In other words, the BIS is making clear that somebody (i.e., the Fed) must ensure that Eurodollars are made available on massive scale, not just to foreign central banks, but right down global USD supply chains. As they note, there are many practical issues associated with doing that – and huge downsides if we do not do so. Yet they overlook that there are huge geopolitical problems linked to this step too.
Notably, if the Fed does so then we move rapidly towards logical end-game #2 of the three possible Eurodollar outcomes we have listed previously, where the Fed de facto takes over the global financial system. Yet if the Fed does not do so then we move towards end-game #3, a partial Eurodollar collapse.
Of course, the easy thing to assume is that the Fed will step up as it has always shown a belated willingness before, and a more proactive stance of late. Indeed, as the BIS shows in other research, the Fed stepped up not just during the Global Financial Crisis, but all the way back to the Eurodollar market of the 1960s, where swap lines were readily made available on large scale in order to try to reduce periodic volatility.
However, the scale of what we are talking about here is an entirely new dimension: potentially tens of trillions of USD, and not just to other central banks, or to banks, but to a panoply of real economy firms all around the Eurodollar universe.
As importantly, this assumes that the Fed, which is based in the US, wants to save all these foreign firms. Yet does the Fed want to help Chinese firms, for example? It may traditionally be focused narrowly on smoothly-functioning financial markets, but is that true of a White House that openly sees China as a “strategic rival”, which wishes to onshore industry from it, and which has more interest in having a politically-compliant, not independent Fed? Please think back to the origins of Eurodollars – or look at how the US squeezed its WW2 ally UK during the 1956 Suez Crisis, or how it is using the USD financial system vs. Iran today.
Equally, this assumes that all foreign governments and central banks will want to see the US and USD/Eurodollar cement their global financial primacy further. Yes, Fed support will help alleviate this current economic and brewing financial crisis – but the shift of real power afterwards would be a Rubicon that we have crossed.
Specifically, would China really be happy to see its hopes of CNY gaining a larger global role washed away in a flood of fresh, addictive Eurodollar liquidity, meaning that it is more deeply beholden to the US central bank? Again, please think back to the origins of Eurodollars, to Suez, and to how Iran is being treated – because Beijing will. China would be fully aware that a Fed bailout could easily come with political strings attached, if not immediately and directly, then eventually and indirectly. But they would be there all the same.
One cannot ignore or underplay this power struggle that lies within the heart of the Eurodollar Matrix.
I know you’re out there
So, considering those systemic pressures, let’s look at where Eurodollar pressures are building most now. We will use World Bank projections for short-term USD financing plus concomitant USD current-account deficit requirements vs. specifically USD FX reserves, not general FX reserves accounted in USD, as calculated by looking at national USD reserves and adjusting for the USD’s share of the total global FX reserves basket (57% in 2018, for example). In some cases this will bias national results up or down, but these are in any case only indicative. How to read these data about where the Eurodollar stresses lie in Table 1? Firstly, in terms of scale, Eurodollar problems lie with China, the UK, Japan, Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, Singapore, Canada, and South Korea, Germany and France. Total short-term USD demand in the economies listed is USD28 trillion – around 130% of USD GDP. The size of liabilities the Fed would potentially have to cover in China is enormous at over USD3.4 trillion – should that prove politically acceptable to either side.
Outside of China, and most so in the Cayman Islands and the UK, Eurodollar claims are largely in the financial sector and fall on banks and shadow banks such as insurance companies and pension funds. This is obviously a clearer line of attack/defence for the Fed. Yet it still makes these economies vulnerable to swings in Eurodollar confidence – and reliant on the Fed.
Second, most developed countries apart from Switzerland have opted to hold almost no USD reserves at all. Their approach is that they are also reserve currencies, long-standing US allies, and so assume the Fed will always be willing to treat them as such with swap lines when needed. That assumption may be correct – but it comes with a geopolitical power-hierarchy price tag. (Think yet again of how Eurodollars started and the 1956 Suez Crisis ended.)
Third, most developing countries still do not hold enough USD for periods of Eurodollar liquidity stress, despite the painful lessons learned in 1997-98 and 2008-09. The only exception is Saudi Arabia, whose currency is pegged to the USD, although Taiwan, and Russia hold USD close to what would be required in an emergency. Despite years of FX reserve accumulation, at the cost of domestic consumption and a huge US trade deficit, Indonesia, Mexico, Malaysia, and Turkey are all still vulnerable to Eurodollar funding pressures. In short, there is an argument to save yet more USD – which will increase Eurodollar demand further.
We all become Agent Smith?
In short, the extent of demand for USD outside of the US is clear – and so far the Fed is responding. It has continued to expand its balance sheet to provide liquidity to the markets, and it has never done so at this pace before (Figure 5). In fact, in just a month the Fed has expanded its balance sheet by nearly 50% of the previous expansion observed during all three rounds of QE implemented after the Global Financial Crisis. Essentially we have seen nearly five years of QE1-3 in five weeks! And yet it isn’t enough.
Moreover, things are getting worse, not better. The global economic impact of COVID-19 is only beginning but one thing is abundantly clear – global trade in goods and services is going to be hit very, very hard, and that US imports are going to tumble. This threatens one of the main USD liquidity channels into the Eurodollar system.
Table 2 above also underlines looming EM Eurodollar stress-points in terms of import cover, which will fall sharply as USD earnings collapse, and external debt service. The further to the left we see the latest point for import cover, and the further to the right we see it for external debt, the greater the potential problems ahead.
As such, the Fed is likely to find it needs to cover trillions more in Eurodollar liabilities (of what underlying quality?) coming due in the real global, not financial economy – which is exactly what the BIS are warning about. Yes, we are seeing such radical steps being taken by central banks in some Western countries, including in the US – but internationally too? Are we all to become ‘Agent Smith’?
If the Fed is to step up to this challenge and expand its balance sheet even further/faster, then the US economy will massively expand its external deficit to mirror it.
That is already happening. What was a USD1 trillion fiscal deficit before COVID-19, to the dismay of some, has expanded to USD3.2 trillion via a virus-fighting package: and when tax revenues collapse, it will be far larger. Add a further USD600bn phase three stimulus, and talk of a USD2 trillion phase four infrastructure program to try to jumpstart growth rather than just fight virus fires, and potentially we are talking about a fiscal deficit in the range of 20-25% of GDP. As we argued recently, that is a peak-WW2 level as this is also a world war of sorts.
On one hand, the Eurodollar market will happily snap up those trillions US Treasuries/USD – at least those they can access, because the Fed will be buying them too via QE. Indeed, for now bond yields are not rising and USD still is.
However, such fiscal action will prompt questions on how much the USD can be ‘debased’ before, like Agent Smith, it over-reaches and then implodes or explodes – the first of the logical endpoints for the Eurodollar system, if you recall. (Of course, other currencies are doing it too.)
Is Neo The One?
In conclusion, the origins of the Eurodollar Matrix are shrouded in mystery and intrigue – and yet are worth knowing. Its operations are invisible to most but control us in many ways – so are worth understanding. Moreover, it is a system under huge structural pressure – which we must now recognise.
It’s easy to ignore all these issues and just hope the Eurodollar Matrix remains the “You-Roll-Dollar” market – but can that be true indefinitely based just on one’s belief?
Is the Neo Coronavirus ‘The One’ that breaks it?
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ORACLE: “Well now, ain’t this a surprise?”
ARCHITECT: “You’ve played a very dangerous game.”
ORACLE: “Change always is.”
ARCHITECT: “And how long do you think this peace is going to last?”
ORACLE: “As long as it can….What about the others?”
ARCHITECT: “What others?”
ORACLE: “The ones that want out.”
ARCHITECT: “Obviously they will be freed.”
