What is a Post-Jesus Christian?

 

Post-Jesus Christians are “Christians” who have decided to postpone following Jesus’s teaching until Jesus returns and ushers in 1000 years of peace.

Post-Jesus Christians hold that Jesus’s teachings do not need to be followed in our present era if they are a hindrance to obtaining the power they fear they need to help usher in the Kingdom of God.

Post-Jesus Christians (privately) hold that Jesus’s teachings are a nice thing to follow when dealing with the in-group of their fellow PJCs but may be disregarded when dealing with non-PJC neighbors.

Prophecy: What God Can Do For You

Post-Jesus Christians talk a lot about about prophecy, and unlike the Biblical Prophets, when they do, they punch down, rather than up:

You will know them by their fruit, because they only have one key message – God is going to “enlarge your tent” and “expand your influence“, he’s going to “give you great favor” and “bless you mightily”.

Later Craig Greenfield writes:

In Biblical times, there were two types of prophets.

  1. Firstly, there were those who feasted at the King’s table because they had been co-opted to speak well of evil leaders (1 Kings 18:19). They were always bringing these smarmy words of favor and influence and prosperity to the king. And the king lapped it up. Like a sucka.
  2. Secondly, there were those who were exiled to the caves, or beheaded (like John the Baptist) because they spoke out about the injustice or immorality of their leaders (1 Kings 18:4). The king didn’t like them very much. He tried to have them knee-capped.

An Inversion of Ben Franklin’s Morality

While many Post-Jesus Christians appeal to a historical “Christian Nation” , Post-Jesus Christians appear to be an inversion of founding father Ben Franklin, who in historian John Fea’s description, wanted to discard Jesus’s Divinity but retain and celebrate his ethical teachings.

Examples:

So what does this look like in practice?

Below are public quotations from prominent Court Evangelicals.  These quotations are less extreme that I would expect to hear in private.  A friend of mine speaks to supporters in private.  He reports that they would (privately) celebrate the stuffing of election ballots in favor of their preferred candidate as a righteous act.

1) Court Evangelical: Anti-Sermon on the Mount


John Fea wrote about a conversation he had with Rob Schenck  for the “Schenck Talks Bonhoeffer” podcast @ 19:27.  Here’s a quote from Schenck talking about a conversation he had with a prominent evangelical at the Trump Inaugural Prayer Service:

I must tell you something of a confession here. I was present at the Trump Inaugural Prayer Service held at the National Cathedral — not the smaller one held  at  Saint John’s Episcopal church across from the white house, but the one following the inauguration at the National Cathedral and I saw one of the notable Evangelicals that you’ve named in in our conversation. One of them, I won’t say which and we had it short exchange and I, I suggested to him that we needed to recalibrate our moral compass and that one way to do that might be to return to The Sermon on the Mount as a reference point. And he very quickly barked back at me. “We don’t have time for that. We have serious work to do.”

2) Jerry Falwell Jr:  Anti-Turn the other cheek

John Fea writes:

We have blogged about Liberty University’s Falkirk Center before.  The more I learn about this center the more I am convinced that it does not represent the teachings of Christianity.   Recently someone on Twitter pointed out this paragraph in the Falkirk Center mission statement:

Bemoaning the rise of leftism is no longer enough, and turning the other cheek in our personal relationships with our neighbors as Jesus taught while abdicating our responsibilities on the cultural battlefield is no longer sufficient. There is too much at stake in the battle for the soul of our nation. Bold, unapologetic action and initiative is needed, which is why we just launched the Falkirk Center, a think tank dedicated to restoring and defending American ideals and Judeo-Christian values in all aspects of life.

John Fea’s Update:

Several smart people have suggested that I may have misread Liberty University’s statement.  They have said that the Falkirk Center was not denying that Jesus’s call to “turn the other cheek” is “insufficient” for individuals.  Instead, the Falkirk Center is saying that we should not “abdicate” (the key word here) our responsibilities to engage on the “culture battlefield.”

I think this is a fair criticism, and I indeed may have misread the statement.  For that I am sorry.  But I don’t think I want to back away too strongly from what I wrote above.  While several have correctly pointed out that Liberty University is not saying Jesus’s command to “turn the other cheek” is “insufficient” for individual Christians, the Falkirk Center does seem to be suggesting that it is “insufficient” for culture engagement.

Discerning History: Authority

00:00
it’s been a long time since we were here
00:02
together and so Gettysburg is our topic
00:06
as I’m sure you remember and I want to
00:09
start tonight by seeing if there are
00:10
things that have occurred to you in this
00:13
interval that you want to bring up any
00:14
leftover things from last time or any
00:17
nagging problems or aggravating
00:22
statements that you’ve been mulling over
00:25
since we last met Scott you look like
00:27
you’re assuming the asking a question
00:29
position is that correct I do have a
question I one of the things that I as
like a historian of the Civil War and
you kind of touched on this in the essay
you wrote on here the struggle to like
figure out who to believe and who did
not believe and how you decipher all
these different accounts and I feel like
in this book which one are you pointing
to Alexander yeah versus some of other
things we’ve read he has a different
perspective on like whether they should
have continued the battle on the first
day and that he’d be he offered the
opposite point of view I thought that in
a number of instances than what we read
and I struggle especially because a lot
of this stuff is written so far after
the war to decipher like you know and
particularly you who’ve studied a more
asking how do you understand and how do
you kind of consolidate two different
perspectives and who’s right and you
would actually have you you read a lot
of things and play them off against one
another and make judgments about which
people which historical actors tend to
be reliable and which are liars that a
number of them are just in better Liars
they lie about everything he is he is I
told you before everybody else came in I
think he is the single best writer about
the war among all the people who
experienced the war and wrote about it
02:04
from the Confederate side and I think on
02:06
the Union side the only one
02:08
better than geniuses u.s. grant us grant
02:11
and Porter Alexander are the two best
02:12
memoirs military memoirs of the Civil
02:15
War he wrote another book as you know if
02:18
you read the introduction in here
02:20
carefully that he published in nineteen
02:21
seven and Alexander did called military
02:23
memoirs of a Confederate it’s so good
02:25
that it has never been out of print
02:27
two hundred and thirteen years later
02:28
that books never gone out of print
02:30
he wrote this one however before he
02:33
wrote military memoirs and military
02:34
memoirs has a misleading title because
02:37
it isn’t a memoir it’s really a history
02:39
of the Army of Northern Virginia
02:41
he wrote this one first wrote it only
02:44
for his children which gives him a tone
02:49
that simply is almost never present in a
02:52
memoir as you know he’s very hard on
02:55
robert e lee in various places in there
02:57
almost no former Confederates were hard
02:58
on these very hard on Stonewall Jackson
03:00
he quotes profanity he quotes instances
03:03
of cowardice he’s absolutely up front
03:06
about Confederate soldiers who killed
03:07
black soldiers who tried to surrender at
03:10
the Battle of the crater he’s not very
03:11
matter-of-fact they killed them they
03:13
came they heard there were black
03:14
soldiers they came from way down at the
03:16
other end of the line so they could kill
03:17
one of them it’s it’s it’s an amazing
03:21
book in many ways and it was a
03:23
revelation to me not only to me but to
03:26
people who knew Alexander well and in
03:28
the literature very well I think that
03:30
has become the single most quoted book
03:34
on Lee’s army by anyone who was in his
03:37
army and it’s just because he’s I’ve
03:40
been able to check lots of things over
03:41
the years his descriptions and so forth
03:43
and he he’s amazingly accurate was an
03:47
engineer he’s really smart he’s
03:48
obnoxious Lee smart can tell by reading
03:50
this that he was a pain to a lot of
03:52
people because he was smarter than they
03:54
were and they knew he was smarter than
03:55
they were one of one of those kinds of
03:57
people we all know those people we maybe
04:00
those people but anyway he’s one of
04:02
those people and he had there’s a
04:04
description in there of a place on the
04:06
North Anna River he was at that place
04:08
one time for 30 minutes in his life and
04:12
he described how the Federals started to
04:14
shell that position and how the house
04:16
had recessed windows
04:20
said they thought they were about a foot
04:21
and he jumped up in one of the windows
04:23
and pressed himself against that as the
04:26
shells came in and one of the union
04:27
shells hit a chimney that was up to to
04:30
his left and destroyed part of it and we
04:33
took a tour there this has been 15 years
04:35
ago now got to that house and it’s
04:38
exactly as he described it recessed
04:41
windows a chimney with a repair on the
04:44
top of it right to the top left of the
04:46
window which was on the side of the
04:48
house where he said he was it’s just
04:49
astonishing of what his memory was like
04:52
but he also had a diary that helped jog
04:55
his memory
04:56
and he had letters that he’d written
04:57
during the war that he also used when he
04:59
wrote this so it’s so it’s an amazing
05:02
account that doesn’t mean it’s
05:03
infallible and it doesn’t mean there’s
05:05
no second guessing there’s always second
05:06
guessing in a memoir even more generally
05:09
I mean it talks about in the the other
05:11
book about how even in the war council
05:14
would need like there were all the
05:17
different people who were there and have
05:19
first-hand accounts have dipped recount
05:21
like the weather men had reservations
05:25
about and they don’t all agree and if
05:31
three weeks from now somebody looked all
05:34
of us up and asked us to give them an
05:36
account of this class meeting there
05:39
would be many things that would be
05:41
difficult to reconcile we would you’re
05:43
all going to very different memories of
05:44
what goes on in here you hear different
05:47
things you process different things
05:49
differently and you’ll just have
05:51
different memories I think I’m very
05:53
suspicious of oral histories as a
05:55
category of evidence they’ve they’re
05:58
very much used now they’re going to be
06:00
used more and more because people don’t
06:01
write letters anymore and they try to
06:03
destroy email even though they really
06:05
can’t but they get it beyond the reach
06:06
of historians so it’s going to be a real
06:11
problem I think an even bigger problem
06:13
than it has been in the past
06:15
yes and
06:17
worse because if we were sharing our
06:20
view of this class we wouldn’t have an
06:21
agenda oh you might have an agenda
06:24
we might everybody has an agenda I’m not
06:27
that compared to people who are trying
06:29
to chose not comparative people whose
06:31
reputations are on the line
06:32
yes not compared to Daniel sickles
06:34
arguing with George Gordon Meade about
06:37
what went on on the second day of the
06:39
Battle of Gettysburg no they have a lot
06:41
right now I have a lot riding on that
06:43
yes I think kind of a different way that
06:48
liyan means are treated is really
06:51
interesting it seems like Lee gets away
06:53
with making a lot of mistakes and
06:55
everybody forgives him and his
06:56
reputation still really strong and it
06:58
seems all neat successes are kind of
07:00
characterizes not sort of good luck you
07:05
mean his successes at Gettysburg yeah
07:07
good kind of good fortune and I is it
07:10
does we get away with it because of the
07:12
charisma because I want to know what you
07:16
think the answer to your own question is
07:18
that was the one thing I could come up
07:21
with and also maybe Longstreet just
07:23
going on such a tiring after Gettysburg
07:25
probably helpfully out in a huge way but
07:29
it did it I think if we could bring Mead
07:32
and Lee into this room and have them
07:36
here they would leave and then we would
07:38
talk about them and you would have a
07:40
very different impression of lead than
07:43
you did me no matter what you thought
07:45
and you might have an impression going
07:46
in by the time they left I think you
07:50
would leave was just one of those people
07:52
who commanded spaces and impressed
07:57
people even people who didn’t especially
07:59
think they wanted to like him me was
08:02
grumpy and he doesn’t have a lot of
08:05
successes over all his career I mean Lee
08:06
comes into Gettysburg with this resume
08:08
with a number of really quite
08:10
spectacular successes on it almost all
08:13
against the odds and me doesn’t have
08:16
that on these resume
08:17
never has that on his resume and has the
08:19
bad fortune about a year after
08:23
Gettysburg to find himself traveling
08:25
he’s still the commander the army but
08:27
grant is traveling with the army and so
08:29
it’s not means army it’s grants army if
08:32
anything good happens it’s grants army
08:34
if anything bad happens it could be
08:36
means army well so what
08:38
you never think that lea would do
08:41
something like media Chamberlain like
08:44
give him like 120 men and just like well
08:48
me didn’t do that to Chamberlain
08:50
underlings did it I mean it happened it
08:52
was way down the chain of command it was
08:54
the brigade commander who told
08:55
Chamberlain a guy named strong Vincent
08:58
and you’ll see his little marker where
09:00
he was mortally wounded strong Vincent
09:01
told Joshua Chamberlain strong Vincent
09:03
commanded this brigade and in the fifth
09:07
Corps and Joshua Chamberlain’s main
09:09
regiment was one of the regiment’s in
09:10
that when you walk along Little Round
09:12
Top when you’re there they’re the main
09:14
regiment then there’s an 83rd
09:16
Pennsylvania and there’s a Michigan
09:18
regiment and a New York regiment those
09:20
are the four regiments in a brigade and
09:21
it just so happened that Chamberlain
09:23
ended up on the left but of course you
09:25
mean what would we put soldiers in a
09:28
position like that yeah
09:29
just like that oh he would just
09:32
absolutely like that
09:34
yep yep say though that meat has like
09:36
nothing like what Lee has on his resume
09:38
but he was the commander of the army
09:41
when the Union won the biggest battle of
09:45
the war so isn’t that a huge resume
09:46
building no because it’s grants army in
09:49
everybody’s mind it’s because US Grant
09:51
is with that army the entire way
09:53
once he gets east which is to say the
09:56
only battle where George Meade is really
09:58
the commander of the army of the coma is
10:00
this one but it’s a big one but it is a
10:03
big one it’s a really big one it’s a big
10:05
one that left
10:06
Abraham Lincoln with what idea about me
10:10
did he let Lee get away and finished you
10:13
had a chance to really finish the job
10:15
and he didn’t do it didn’t do it
10:18
immensely frustrated by this once grant
10:21
comes Meade is part of the eye and I
10:25
think meat was a good soldier don’t get
10:27
me wrong but meat is not the soldier
10:29
could win the war for the United States
10:31
I mean there’s not the slightest chance
10:34
that he could have been a soldier who
10:35
won the war the United States he just
10:37
doesn’t just doesn’t have it why do you
10:40
think he was so and and I was surprised
10:45
by the essay on meeting here because
10:47
he’s like touted as this great very
10:51
positive este positive but when you read
10:53
it there he doesn’t do that much he just
10:55
like repositions some people and gets a
10:57
lot of credit for that but obviously
10:59
clearly Sowers is he’s very good at
11:01
repositioning you know that sounded so
11:05
snarky actually was good at
11:08
repositioning and that is important
11:10
we’ll taco I mean this is yeah so we’ll
11:13
talk about that what’s your body is
11:14
narrow if you got bottom line to this
11:16
particular set of comments all effort
11:19
those trying to dish I was trying to
11:20
defend the point that meat had nothing
11:22
on his resume because well coming into
11:24
Gettysburg here’s range resume he was a
11:27
pretty good division commander he
11:29
commanded the Pennsylvania reserves he
11:30
commanded the division at Antietam then
11:32
he’s promoted the corps commander he’s a
11:34
corps commander at Chancellorsville but
11:36
he doesn’t really do anything he was
11:38
still a division commander at
11:39
Fredericksburg and his guys got shot
11:41
just like everybody else’s he did okay
11:43
but he didn’t really stand out so he’s
11:46
an okay corps commander he was a pretty
11:48
good division commander and he’s an army
11:50
commander who’s been in command for
11:51
three days that’s a pretty blank resume
11:55
I think for someone who’s an i and in
11:58
contrast Lee has the seven-day second
12:00
Bull Run the Maryland campaign
12:01
Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville on
12:03
his resume vastly different maybe back
12:08
to Kara’s question a little bit Scott’s
12:09
um does the difference between what
12:14
Howley and he’ll meet or perceived as a
12:16
maybe to some of that stem from they’re
12:20
just they’re different leadership styles
12:21
as well the fact that it does seem like
12:23
pretty consistent Lili is the central
12:27
figure right he’s figurehead he’s an
12:29
idol all all decisions flow to him he
12:32
has a very small staff and much too
12:35
small right and
12:36
admittedly and and at the same time mead
12:39
is having counsels and group discussions
12:43
and votes about what should be done and
12:46
I wonder if that distributive form of
12:50
power just that kind of a distributive
12:52
power structure if maybe that also these
12:54
because it makes it easy for meets
12:56
critics to look them and say oh he
12:58
didn’t decide anything the group did
13:00
okay right but at the same time in my
13:03
mind it seems like that actually might
13:05
be a more effective more effective but
13:08
that was one of the questions that I
13:09
wanted to talk about that I wanted to do
13:11
at last but I don’t care how we do this
13:13
I will get to lots of things tonight and
13:15
since this is supposed to be a more
13:17
freeform evening we can do just exactly
13:20
whatever you want to do as long as you
13:22
don’t get wildly out of control but if
13:25
we want to talk about that I’m happy to
13:27
talk about that they have very different
13:29
leadership styles leak and make a
13:30
decision Lee doesn’t need votes to
13:34
decide what he’s going to he talks to
13:35
people talks to Longstreet every day
13:37
we’ll do more of this next week talking
13:39
about the subordinates goes and talks to
13:41
you’ll and his subordinates on the night
13:43
of the first talks to you again that
13:45
night he’s worried about you all he’s
13:47
already figuring out that you’ll he’s
13:49
not Stonewall Jackson which he didn’t
13:51
know before now he’s figuring that out
13:53
but he never says let’s vote never says
13:57
that’s all getting the room and vote
13:58
that’s not he does not need to do that
14:01
but me certainly you can have some
14:04
sympathy for being in this situation
14:06
that having been in command for three
14:08
days and never been an army commander
14:12
before he’s junior to some of the pizza
14:14
some of the other corps commanders he
14:15
isn’t even the senior corps commander
14:17
he’s junior to John Reynolds he’s junior
14:19
to John Sedgwick it’s not even the
14:21
senior corps commander in the army and
14:23
people in the army are very meticulous
14:26
about rank during the Civil War and even
14:30
now but then they certainly were if I’m
14:33
a Major General and Bryce is a
14:35
major-general but I was a major-general
14:36
a month before Bryce I’m not going to be
14:39
entirely comfortable if Bryce is put in
14:42
charge of me because I rank him
14:46
and that’s the case with me at
14:48
Gettysburg it’s two of his subordinates
14:50
who are senior to him in the army Justin
14:53
I was gonna say isn’t someone telling as
14:55
well at one time that he did pole that
14:56
he wanted to kind of back away the
14:58
reposition and was it all the corps
15:00
commanders we wanted to stay all the
15:02
ones who were awake yes and one was
15:05
asleep and one didn’t vote but yes all
15:07
those who voted but what is the point
15:10
this essay this favorable essay to him
15:12
what’s the point that he makes in that
15:14
essay that’s a decision that people
15:16
appointed too many times this show that
15:18
me just can’t meet has to get he needs a
15:20
consensus he needs to find out what
15:22
everybody wants to do what’s the yes I
15:24
say about that said he’d already made up
15:29
his mind to stay before he asked for the
15:32
vote but he hadn’t made up his mind
15:34
about was whether to remain on the
15:37
defensive or to attack the next day but
15:39
he’d already made the decision and
15:41
already sent a message to the War
15:42
Department about his intention to stay
15:46
so he made one decision without talking
15:48
to but of course that raises the
15:51
question what if what if six of the nine
15:54
people in the room and said well we
15:55
think we need to go we don’t think we
15:57
should stay then I think George mean why
16:02
not of stage who knows we can’t know
16:05
about that but I think that police is
16:09
right behind this specific better which
16:12
is a big one isn’t better this kind of
16:15
leadership style because you have so
16:17
many battle fronts and then you can
16:19
instead of like waiting the kind of
16:21
hours to come to talk to you and send
16:23
another decision like everybody just
16:25
decide by themselves and you know you
16:28
kid
16:29
on a faster speed than the enemy because
16:31
it’s so centralized it they cannot go as
16:35
fast as you can no because no and that’s
16:37
so that’s smart so he brings everybody
16:40
in and he asks Hancock what’s going on
16:46
in your part of the line and he asks
16:47
Warren let’s go what have you seen I
16:49
mean and everybody can tell him bring
16:52
their intelligence from the very parts
16:53
of the line sure that’s I would think
16:55
that’s a smart
16:56
to do that’s a smart thing to do for the
16:58
next day to plan is wailing and again
17:01
for the same day battles but once the
17:04
battle starts then of course it becomes
17:05
very difficult because communication is
17:07
so problematical on a Civil War
17:10
battlefield really problematical you
17:12
want to send a message to Hancock and
17:15
you so you get your staff officer Scott
17:19
and start point him in the direction of
17:21
where you think Hancock is supposed to
17:23
be and he goes and well Hancock has gone
17:26
over to talk to somebody else so he’s
17:28
not there or Scott gets shot on the way
17:31
over or he gets lost or his horse gets
17:33
shot I mean anything it’s really really
17:36
difficult to maintain what we would
17:40
consider reasonable control of a
17:42
battlefield when you’re talking about
17:43
there are 160,000 men on that
17:48
battlefield within a few miles of one
17:50
another
17:51
Jake said that was a question I had
17:52
reading the paper we’re talking the
17:55
first day a lot about we was exerted
17:58
yeah I actually talked about that but
18:00
you’re being kind yeah how much the
18:06
communication of the time I mean how
18:08
much it was can user well here’s the
18:10
influence he can exert on the first day
18:12
the waited what did Lee wants what are
18:14
these orders in his army what’s the
18:17
situation on the first day is Lee is
18:19
riding toward Gettysburg that morning of
18:24
July 1st anybody to have to avoid a big
18:26
engagement he has ordered his
18:28
lieutenants not to bring on a general
18:30
engagement quiet his whole army isn’t
18:33
done yet Longstreet pickets armies all
18:35
over southern Pennsylvania he wants them
18:37
back together it’s the same thing
18:38
happened to her in the Maryland campaign
18:40
his army was scattered all over Maryland
18:42
and he was pushed into a fight so here
18:45
he wants the army back together before
18:47
he gets into a fight those are the
18:50
instructions the night before oh so what
18:52
happens in the morning okay ap Hill
19:00
tales
19:01
Henry Heath he can walk into Gettysburg
19:03
to look for shoes who is not doing this
19:07
job right there what what is what
19:09
missing component here Jim Stewart if
19:13
Jeff Stewart had been there with the
19:14
cavalry we would have known there were
19:16
pebbles in Gettysburg you would have
19:18
known and Henry Heath would not have
19:20
walked into Gettysburg with his big
19:22
clunking division which is not what big
19:25
clunking divisions of infantry do you
19:27
don’t line 7,000 guys up on the road for
19:30
a breast and walk toward something
19:32
you’re not sure about but that’s what
19:34
was that’s what happened just annoying
19:36
is what was the definition of general
19:38
engagement in terms of so in my mind and
19:40
reading kind of essentially this was you
19:43
know heavy reconnaissance this was you
19:45
know there’s some engagement but it
19:46
wasn’t the full-on Army’s colliding well
19:49
what happens when you start shooting at
19:50
each other
19:51
put the Hoosier how many are shooting it
19:53
does doesn’t it but button but let me
19:56
reframe my question what can happen when
19:59
you if you have an infantry division
20:00
that starts shooting at other people
20:02
that can easily turn you together I mean
20:05
the best way not to bring on a general
20:07
engagement is don’t go start shooting at
20:09
somebody if you’re an infantry division
20:11
let your cavalry sort of do what cavalry
20:14
do and don’t send an infantry division
20:17
forward and so by the time
20:21
soli hears this firing in the direction
20:24
of Gettysburg and decides to go take a
20:27
look so he gets there – any of you
20:30
remember about when you got there up to
20:33
Oklahoma about two o’clock he shows up
20:35
on her Ridge you’ll see her ridge when
20:37
you get there it’s one Ridge over from
20:39
McPherson Ridge so here comes Lee here’s
20:43
Gettysburg here’s Burridge merson’s
20:47
Ridge seminary Ridge Oak Hill and
20:52
Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill wildly out
20:55
of proportion but generally the soli
20:58
shows up here to what has gone on down
21:02
to that point in the day what’s the
21:04
situation when he gets there can anybody
21:07
give us a quick account 25 seconds
21:12
what’s happened
21:13
he’s moving in on this road he come in
21:16
two on the Chambersburg pike modern
21:18
route 30
21:19
with his 7000 infantry
21:21
and he gets this far he gets to her
21:24
Ridge any runs into Buford’s cavalry
21:28
which is here and on McPherson Ridge and
21:30
the cavalry make heath deploy which
21:33
takes them takes a long time to get 7000
21:36
men from being four abreast walking
21:40
along road to in battle lines like this
21:43
so you go for its call from going you’re
21:46
in column on the road and you go into
21:48
line into a battle formation takes an
21:50
hour for Heath to do that then they
21:54
fight here and it’s a and the battle is
21:57
on an east-west axis we’ve talked about
21:58
all of this the cavalry fights about an
22:01
hour and then John Reynolds comes up
22:04
with the first Corps and then it becomes
22:05
an infantry fight Justin this is why
22:07
it’s you don’t want your infantry
22:08
walking along Pennsylvania and running
22:11
into somebody now you have an entire
22:14
infantry Corps fighting a Confederate
22:17
division now you’ve got $15,000 17,000
22:21
guys shooting at each other that’s
22:22
getting very close to being a general
22:24
engagement already but you get a
22:27
stalemate here because the Federals are
22:30
in a good position on McPherson’s Ridge
22:32
you’ll see that ground it’s very good
22:35
ground
22:35
some veterans are on her rich but just
22:39
before Lee gets on the battlefield
22:42
Robert Rhoades is division of Richard
22:46
Ewell’s Corps shows up on Oak Hill and
22:50
when you stand on Oak Hill it’s a
22:51
stunning aspect from Oak Hill the Union
22:55
battle line is like this facing it that
22:58
way
22:59
Confederate artillery on Oak Hill and
23:01
they’re looking right down the whole
23:03
Union line it’s an artillerist dreams
23:06
you can’t miss if you shoot a little bit
23:09
short you’ll hit Federals here if you
23:11
shoot a little bit long you’ll hit
23:13
Federals here you’d have to be an
23:15
absolute dope knocking at federal
23:18
somewhere if you’re an artillerist up
23:20
here where they come in then Confederate
23:23
infantry shows up here and that
23:25
reorients the entire battle now the
23:27
Federals have to bring the 11th Corps
23:29
they bring the 11th Corps out here and
23:31
part of the first Corps now has to
23:33
which and paste that way now it’s a
23:36
battle that has a north-south axis and
23:39
an east-west axis and when Lee gets here
23:41
what he sees is the Confederates it’s
23:44
sheer luck as we talked about last time
23:46
they’re coming in at exactly the right
23:49
place every time the Federals get a
23:52
battle line in place Confederates come
23:54
in beyond their line and so Lee sees
23:57
that and he is the one who makes the
23:59
decision here
24:00
he says push it so he has changed his
24:04
orders at that point don’t bring on a
24:05
general engagement oh wait a minute this
24:08
general engagement looks like it’s
24:09
really going our way and so here is
24:12
combative aggressive side comes out and
24:15
he says push it but that’s a key
24:17
decision for him to make but he makes it
24:20
on the basis of what he can actually see
24:22
from there he can see the elements
24:24
coming together tactically it makes
24:27
sense we see Iran when I began I had to
24:29
that’s do you see retreat right he what
24:32
retreat or like doesn’t get into
24:35
engagement convenient many things you
24:37
said no don’t fight roll like don’t
24:39
retreat if you need to then yeah not so
24:42
much reach but yes and what had happened
24:44
to very the the day before this big
24:49
brigade under the bright North
24:51
Carolinian we talked about James
24:52
Johnston Pettigrew he had taken his
24:55
Brigade just the way heat went in on the
24:57
first Pettigrew did it on the 30th he
24:59
saw Union cavalry and what did he do he
25:01
immediately withdrew because his orders
25:04
were not to bring on a general
25:05
engagement that’s the other reaction
25:07
that is the reaction that that are that
25:10
reaction is the one that these orders
25:12
make pretty clear to anybody who has the
25:15
uniform on is desired reaction do not
25:18
start a fight because once you start a
25:21
fight anything can happen anything can
25:24
happen so Pettigrew hadn’t started a
25:27
fight the day before he gets into a
25:29
fight here but by the time Lee gets
25:31
there too these elements are coming
25:33
together and it seems to make sense to
25:37
let that let them but the by and go yes
25:40
so
25:41
there was a problem I know in other
25:42
battles used hot air balloons table you
25:44
might have been don’t know high air
25:45
balloons here that Confederates Porter
25:48
Alexander talks about the only instance
25:49
in the entire war for the Confederates
25:52
use a hot air balloon it’s during the
25:53
the Peninsula Campaign and it became
25:56
unboard and just floated down the James
25:57
the the Federals have a balloon core
26:01
sort of under a man named Thaddeus Lowe
26:04
who had balloons up during the seven
26:08
days balloons up at credit sure they’re
26:09
very unwieldy and in a really active
26:12
campaign like this the odds would be
26:14
against having them move with the army
26:17
and low fell out with the government the
26:19
government was paying him so much to be
26:21
a balloon guy it wasn’t in the army then
26:24
they they said willing to pay you half
26:26
as much and he said we’ll go to hell I’m
26:28
going to California and and that’s he
26:30
ended up out in Pasadena and mount Lowe
26:32
out there’s a named after low so they
26:34
have balloonist but Melinda’s are on
26:36
only a handful of battlefields in the
26:38
civil war they work you could get up see
26:41
everything they’d run a telegraph wire
26:42
up and so the balloonists are up there
26:44
tapping out what they can see down below
26:46
and the other side is trying to shoot
26:49
them down they dig holes put the trails
26:51
of the cameras in so they can get more
26:52
elevation and try to shoot them down but
26:54
they they don’t play a crucial role on
26:57
any battlefield okay sisters absence
27:01
that we talked about last night I feel
27:03
like I think it’s three days and
27:05
Gettysburg kind of offers him some
27:07
excuses and terms of only Alan Nolan
27:10
does because Alan Nolan wants all of it
27:12
on Lee so how does he let Stewart off
27:13
the book he says the league is in
27:15
country king borders and that he wants
27:19
him to protect the right flank but he
27:20
also you
27:22
I was hitting spy I uh you know what my
27:28
feelings are about is I I don’t think
27:30
you can let Stewart off the hook because
27:32
Stewart knew what his job was there’s
27:34
absolutely no question that he knew what
27:37
his job was his job was to screen the
27:40
armies movement is it went north and
27:41
gather intelligence about the Federals
27:44
that’s what his job is he’s really good
27:47
at it really good at it but he wasn’t
27:51
really good at it here in Allen who’s
27:53
the lawyer a really good lawyer Allen
27:56
was the senior partner in the biggest
27:58
law firm in Indiana and was on the
28:00
Harvard Law Review and he writes and
28:02
thinks like a lawyer which means he
28:05
doesn’t know how to use evidence because
28:07
lawyers here’s how lawyers use evidence
28:10
huh I want to argue a I’ve got 30 pieces
28:16
of evidence 11 of them support a 19 of
28:22
them support B but I want to argue B so
28:25
I’m going to use my 11 piece of evidence
28:27
and are you a that’s how you win cases
28:30
in a court you don’t have to tell about
28:32
the 19 pieces of evidence to the jury
28:34
but if you’re a historian and you’ve got
28:37
30 pieces of evidence and 2/3 of them
28:40
say me not a you have to think pretty
28:43
hard about arguing hey keep your
28:46
historian not if you’re a lawyer Alan
28:48
and I have many great discussions fueled
28:51
by he liked a really good scotch and
28:54
cigars and we would argue about this and
28:57
they’d say no historians don’t know how
28:59
to use evidence and I’m saying you know
29:01
really Alan come to terms with this but
29:05
that is that is how he makes his case
29:08
against Lee what’s the gist of a
29:10
lanolin’s case against Lee what is out
29:14
what really gets under Alan’s skin about
29:17
Stewart left some Calvary for him in a
29:20
broader sense oh no he did Stewart did
29:22
Lee cavalry he did leave cavalry you’re
29:24
running a company all of you you’ve got
29:28
six key subordinates you’ve got paid
29:32
really wonderful you’ve got be who’s
29:35
mighty damn good
29:36
you’ve got see who’s almost mighty damn
29:38
good you’ve got Dee who’s a complete
29:41
pain in the ass and can’t get along with
29:43
anybody else but it’s pretty good at
29:44
what he does you’ve got II who should be
29:47
sent to Siberia and kept away from Wars
29:49
and you’ve got it who is worse than e
29:52
Jeff Stewart takes these three with him
29:54
and leaves those three with lead so yes
29:58
he doesn’t need cavalry with Lee and
30:00
these two are cavalry who would fit into
30:04
the bar seeing in Star Wars this one is
30:07
good well you can’t get along with
30:09
anybody so it’s true that he leaves
30:12
cavalry that’s the truth but it’s not
30:15
cavalry that’s very good and so if you
30:19
have if you have a really critical
30:21
operation you’ve got three really good
30:23
underlings and three who are not really
30:27
very good and you decide these are the
30:30
ones you’re going to let it just me
30:32
that’s not a close call just to push
30:34
back inside though it wasn’t that big
30:36
failed at Gettysburg these three you
30:38
know deeper back it’s that you weren’t
30:39
even there
30:40
I mean why would you well the best one
30:43
the best one d and I’ll put a name on
30:46
him his name is William e Jones and his
30:48
nickname was grumbled that’s his actual
30:51
nickname he was known as grumble Jones
30:53
in the army
30:55
grumble Jones was left basically
30:58
watching the rear echelons of the army
31:00
which is an important place for him to
31:01
be the other two guys Beverly Robertson
31:05
who was a North Carolinian who should
31:07
have been court-martialed just before
31:09
the campaign started the other was a guy
31:10
named Albert
31:11
Jenkins who commanded this cavalry from
31:14
the western part of Virginia’s it was
31:15
just unspeakably unreliable they’re the
31:19
ones who were closest to what’s going on
31:21
with the army so it’s an Jeff Stewart
31:23
has Wade Hampton and fits you and he’s
31:26
got his best bits laid he’s got his very
31:28
best people with him up by Carlisle
31:32
Pennsylvania on the 1st of July
31:34
I mean they’re just they know but the
31:36
main thing the main thing as I said
31:37
before it isn’t even which subordinates
31:40
are or aren’t there the main thing is
31:41
the Jeff Stewart he’s the key
31:44
he’s the one he said that he’s in charge
31:45
of this so should we have given him that
31:49
responsibility of course he should
31:50
because he’s never letting down he’s
31:52
been a superb cavalry officer even
31:56
though it’s he’s been superb as long as
31:58
leads he’s been there ever since Lee’s
32:01
been in the Army Jeff Stewart has been
32:02
there right from the beginning and his
32:04
absolutely reliable just as reliable
32:08
does the way Longstreet has nothing
32:11
prepared lead for how long he’d be hated
32:13
Gettysburg not be prepared Lee in
32:15
contrast to you’ll whom Lee didn’t know
32:19
very much about he knows about Stewart
32:21
Stewart is an absolutely known quantity
32:23
to lead and so’s Longstreet okay I
32:28
didn’t get we’re trying to get like with
32:30
the cavalry I mean how custard assign
32:32
each cover he would take and did he need
32:36
because Lee Lee style of command we
32:39
talked about this before it’s a very
32:41
it’s a very loose rein that he exercises
32:44
over these people he really trusts he
32:46
tells Stewart what he wants him to do
32:48
and then what’s worrying about it and
32:50
just assumes that Stewart will do it
32:52
because Stewart has always done it
32:54
before so Stewart what Lee didn’t know
32:56
is it Stewart was going to take these
32:58
three brigades and ride off to the east
32:59
and end up out of contact with the army
33:03
through the absolutely critical part of
33:06
the campaign there was no way he could
33:08
have anticipated that no way and for his
33:11
thoughts did he need the best cover he
33:13
or Lee no it’s true Stewart was it
33:16
necessary or no could have performance
33:19
well if any of us I mean if we had been
33:22
if I were Jeff Stewart I would have
33:24
taken those guys too and so would any of
33:26
you because they’re the people you rely
33:28
on the most it’s not their fault it’s
33:31
not his subordinates Stewart’s fault
33:33
yeah yeah yeah sure I would have taken
33:34
the best ones he did not think he was
33:38
good he didn’t think that he was leaving
33:39
Lee in the hands of these other
33:41
cavalryman’s Stewart did not think that
33:43
Stewart thought he was gonna be doing
33:44
what he was supposed to be doing he
33:46
didn’t know the army the Potomac was
33:48
going to start moving with him on the
33:50
other side of it and there they go
33:53
stuck
33:54
bryce what wasn’t that part of was it
33:57
nolan’s
33:57
I think it was no arguing that wasn’t
34:00
that part of it the breakdown was that
34:02
Lee had given Stuart so many orders
34:05
three or four different directives like
34:07
Alan argues that poor Jam would have
34:10
just been confused about what I was
34:12
supposed to defend and screen and gather
34:16
resources and swing around the army but
34:19
not too far but not too close he did not
34:21
tell him to swing around the in army to
34:23
be 12 but that’s a big okay if you do
34:26
they tell we did not come to swing
34:28
around the Union Army that’s Jeff York’s
34:30
decision okay that that would I don’t
34:34
think there I think if he thought he was
34:36
going to retrieve the reputation that
34:37
was taken a blow at brandy station or
34:41
Stuart almost lost the biggest cavalry
34:43
battle of the war after he’d been in his
34:45
peak Hokkien best of having big reviews
34:49
and balls tonight and having everybody
34:52
come and look at how wonderful he was
34:54
all those things and they was almost
34:56
defeated and he was humiliated
34:58
is it reasonable to expect that he could
35:01
have been confused by what seemed to be
35:04
contradictory orders you know what I
35:06
think he would have said if he was
35:08
confused he would have said generally
35:09
I’m not quite sure what you want me to
35:12
do here please clarify that’s all he
35:15
would have had to do if he would I don’t
35:17
think he was confused but if he were
35:19
confused that’s what you would do that’s
35:22
what anybody would do let me just make
35:25
sure this is what you want me to do
35:26
that’s all it would have taken they’re
35:27
together they’re in the same place he
35:30
can just go to Lee’s tent and say may I
35:33
have five minutes with the general I
35:34
have one thing I would like to clarify
35:35
what he thought we would have had to do
35:40
Dannan then my question is when he’s
35:42
dealing with someone like you all who
35:44
was not a known quantity who is
35:46
completely paralyzed by yes we know that
35:50
right he didn’t know that right so
35:52
that’s so that then that’s the question
35:54
is how does he deal with someone like
35:55
that you know in in a big confrontation
35:58
like Gettys
35:59
to say you know it indicates that you
36:03
were going to be paralyzed by my lack of
36:06
how did lady when did lead begin to have
36:09
it’s a real doubts about you Karen he
36:14
said that you should take it practical
36:16
and it’s that evening I think that Lee
36:20
began to think oh this isn’t okay it’s
36:24
not Stonewall Jackson and I better go
36:26
see just how far from Stonewall Jackson
36:28
this is soon wrote over to yields
36:30
headquarters that night and what have
36:32
you find when he got there when he let
36:34
them know that he wanted to maintain the
36:36
aggressive the next day what was the
36:38
reaction at at mules its you’ll and
36:41
Jubal Early who’s a division commander
36:43
Robert Rhoades who’s a division
36:45
commander those are the main people in
36:47
place there what’s their response the
36:52
response is just a passenger they try to
36:55
test the authenticity we don’t want to
36:58
be the main part of this offensive why
37:00
don’t you let somebody else be the main
37:02
part and we’ll we’ll play a secondary
37:04
role isn’t what Lee wanted to hear from
37:07
them not what he wanted to hear in that
37:09
room and not what he would have heard
37:12
from I hate to say it again Stonewall
37:14
Jackson it isn’t what he would have
37:16
heard from Stonewall Jackson and it’s
37:18
not what he would have heard from
37:19
Longstreet in most instances either he’s
37:21
spending at least gonna get a number of
37:23
little wake-up calls on July 1st at
37:26
Gettysburg ease already had one about
37:28
Stewart and he gets one about you he
37:31
gets one about Longstreet when they have
37:33
their first sort of tense conversation
37:36
in the afternoon Brian yeah kinda on
37:38
that that one more interesting passages
37:41
was Craig talking about the leading
37:43
causes of southern fetus first Stewart’s
37:47
absence second I guess you’ll Xin
37:50
competence right third long he puts on
37:52
cheek confidence brought you agreeing
37:53
with that I you know I think Stewart is
37:58
in a separate category because if
38:00
Stewart’s that there wouldn’t even have
38:01
been a battle if Stewart had been doing
38:03
what Stewart was supposed to do once
38:04
they’re on the battlefield I think I
38:07
think Longstreet is more culpable
38:09
I think poor you’ll have
38:10
reasons for not attacking late in the
38:13
afternoon he knew things that Lee didn’t
38:15
know he said he would attack if ap Hill
38:17
supported him on the right Lee was
38:20
literally with ap Hill when he got that
38:23
word from you and Lee never told AP hill
38:25
to attack which seems that seems odd to
38:29
me that Lee would sort of not have he’ll
38:31
attack but would expect you’ll to attack
38:33
and it seems reasonable to want a
38:36
coordinated attack so I I think Lee is
38:38
culpable there and I don’t know he never
38:40
explained why he didn’t tell Hill to
38:43
attack Hill had one division that hadn’t
38:45
fired a single shot his biggest division
38:47
hadn’t even been in the action yet
38:49
commanded by a guy named Anderson from
38:52
South Carolina hadn’t even been in the
38:54
fight so I don’t know what’s going on
38:57
with Lee there that to me is
38:58
inexplicable but boy did he he put a
39:02
black mark next to eul’s name
39:06
metaphorically at that point and it and
39:09
it never got erased it only has any put
39:11
up more but this is the first one that
39:13
night first he had an attack then he
39:16
didn’t seem aggressive when Lee went and
39:18
talked to him leave with Lee it’s pure
39:21
one of his subordinates you might not
39:24
always succeed but he would want you to
39:28
be aggressive and want to succeed and
39:31
want to harm the enemy if he doesn’t get
39:35
that kind of vibe from you it’s not good
39:38
for you terms about he’s going to think
39:41
about you
39:46
basically said that Lee was on the field
39:49
it was with health would would you let
39:51
some to some extent I said that I did at
39:58
0.2 like this were like a business and
40:01
your CIO yeah not doing well it’s gonna
40:04
be a CEO that takes responsibility takes
40:06
the fall
40:07
I agree completely I don’t understand
40:09
why unless it in legal terms of is just
40:12
all charisma at some point a remand ago
40:16
does the tax except Lee estates all
40:18
culpability and it seems like these
40:19
commanders are the scapegoat he other
40:23
people made everyone but lead the
40:25
scapegoats at Gettysburg and I think
40:27
there’s plenty of blame to pass around
40:29
but you can’t Lee doesn’t get a pass
40:30
here he is the one and he is on the
40:33
scene with Hill he’s right there so that
40:36
is in he is he’s the one who decides to
40:38
make it a big battle he’ll doesn’t
40:40
decide to make it a big battle Lee
40:41
decides to make it a big battle when
40:43
he’s on the scene and then he decides
40:46
not to do something else with he’ll he’s
40:48
but once he gets once he rides Traveler
40:52
up off the Chambersburg pike on to her
40:56
Ridge it is his battle down til then you
40:59
can point to lots of people why did
41:01
he’ll let Heath go in why did he do that
41:02
where’s Jeff Stewart once Lee is there
41:05
and the chalk is smacking all over the
41:08
ground then he’s the heat there we agree
41:13
with you completely the responsibilities
41:14
on his shoulders absolutely on his
41:16
shoulders then his defenders would say
41:19
well Lee wanted to do this and his
41:21
subordinates letting down he hoped they
41:24
would do this and they didn’t do that
41:25
and he but he is in charge once he gets
41:29
to the field at two o’clock I agree was
41:33
that part of what
41:35
he was official communications never
41:39
disingenuous about what happened or
41:42
maybe not disingenuous but he put it in
41:44
an air that he was trying to get certain
41:46
things done but trying to be defensive
41:49
if at all possible he was forced into
41:52
this and ultimately I guess passed a
41:54
little bit of the buck in terms of the
41:56
fact that it was his decision well I
41:59
actually know I don’t think Lee I think
42:02
one of the things I think is Admiral
42:04
badly is that he does take
42:05
responsibility he took the
42:07
responsibility in a letter the Jefferson
42:09
Davis right after he said I’m I it’s my
42:11
fault I asked the troops to do more than
42:13
they can do it’s my fault now he in his
42:16
post-war conversations which he didn’t
42:19
think would ever become published and
42:21
which did eventually become published he
42:24
he had a hierarchy of blame and he did
42:28
blame Jeff Stewart and he was hard on he
42:32
lumped all his corps commanders together
42:33
he said they fought the battle in a
42:35
halting way and his clear you’ll would
42:38
be at the top of that list but but
42:40
healing is on happening with the ellen
42:41
long stream as well so yes he does point
42:43
the finger at people but doesn’t in his
42:45
official report and he doesn’t publicly
42:47
and he didn’t with his own men right
42:49
after the battle he rode right out among
42:51
them you walk out on that part of the
42:53
field and said this is all my it’s all
42:55
my fault not it’s all my fault that’s
42:57
mostly my fault or it’s our fault it’s
42:59
my fault he said I salute also thinking
43:07
only and going to this point that was
43:11
also him complaining a lot about not
43:13
having commanders or generals to talk
43:16
with a versity but that he was already
43:18
in the war for a while so he’s an he’s
43:21
also his folk that he didn’t develop to
43:24
other Cornell’s or general brigades
43:29
because you know he knew the size was
43:31
getting in he knew he wanted to spread
43:34
out
43:35
more they corpse but he didn’t do well
43:41
bring you up more officers right well
43:44
here’s the here’s we talked about this
43:46
problem before and when you’re all
43:48
running high-powered country there are
43:49
companies you’ll probably find this out
43:52
too it’s hard to be certain that
43:55
somebody who’s done very well at this
43:57
level is going to do very well at this
44:00
level you just can’t tell sometimes they
44:03
do sometimes they’re spectacular
44:04
sometimes they end up with your job
44:06
button you try all the fuel somehow and
44:08
what he’s trying this is their first
44:10
battle since Stonewall Jackson died so
44:13
this is the very first time that his to
44:15
unknown quantities are going to be corps
44:18
commanders hill and you’ll they’ve never
44:20
commanded this many men before it’s new
44:23
for them this is their first time at bat
44:26
at that level of command so no he has no
44:29
record to go on there no record to go
44:31
there is no the way to try them all well
44:35
the other way to try them out is they
44:36
command at the next lowest level he’s
44:38
not going to tell Stonewall Jackson take
44:39
a battle op I want to see how he’ll does
44:41
as a guard commander know it’s donal
44:44
jackson’s their stonewall jackson’s in
44:46
charge it’s a it’s a brutal process in
44:51
the Civil War when do you have to
44:52
replace someone usually someone who’s
44:54
any good when they’re killed that’s when
44:57
you have to do it so Jackson is dead
45:00
what are we going to do one of the key
45:02
decisions that we made right after
45:05
Jackson died is the army had always been
45:07
in two pieces Jackson and half of it in
45:10
Longstreet had half of it Lee decided
45:13
that he probably shouldn’t trust anyone
45:16
else with that much so he may cut it
45:18
into three pieces instead of two and so
45:21
whereas Jackson and Longstreet that each
45:26
had a core with four divisions in it
45:28
that’s the old army in Northern Virginia
45:30
eight divisions in two Corps when they
45:33
create the new 3rd Corps they take that
45:36
division goes there that division goes
45:39
there and they bring a new division into
45:41
the army so it is so now James
45:44
Longstreet score is smaller than it was
45:46
before Richard you’ll got a smaller
45:48
version of the Corps that that Jackson
45:51
had commanded in AP Hill got a brand new
45:54
Corps that had his old division in it
45:56
which came out of Jackson’s court plus
45:59
one division from Longstreet’s Corps and
46:01
then the new one that hadn’t been with
46:03
the army before
46:03
that’s one decision Lee made and I think
46:06
that decision in itself shows that he’s
46:09
Lewis that’s almost one way to see how
46:12
these guys will do you’re giving them
46:13
not as quite as much responsibility as
46:16
Longstreet and Jackson had under the old
46:19
organization you’ve reorganized the army
46:21
and reduced the amount of responsibility
46:24
that each of your first tier of
46:26
subordinates has but it was a
46:29
requirement to do West Point
46:31
no it’s not a requirement but the other
46:37
side they had channels that were gone
46:41
they had one yeah one Corps commander
46:44
Dan sickles
46:46
is the only car commander in either army
46:48
who didn’t go to West Point in the
46:50
general to get religion there are lots
46:54
of Colonels lots of because there aren’t
46:56
enough West pointers to command these
46:58
gigantic armies so the vast majority of
47:00
officers in the armies did not go to
47:03
West Point but the top echelon of
47:06
command in both armies overwhelming in
47:10
all the Civil War armies overwhelmingly
47:12
went to West Point sickles is the only
47:14
one who didn’t and sickles is sort of
47:16
the odd man out in the army a lot of the
47:19
other officers don’t like him he’s not
47:22
part of the club in any way that didn’t
47:25
blade for Lydia also a problem to
47:28
choosing officers high rank because oh
47:30
you have to be West Point so don’t know
47:31
certainly gyro classic he would have
47:34
just know everybody he considered was a
47:37
West pointer everybody who was
47:39
conceivably a candidate to be a corps
47:41
commander
47:42
see that there was also like necessary
47:46
or he was too careful no I don’t think
47:50
there was anybody if I were at least I
47:51
wouldn’t even know where you’d have to
47:53
go so far down to get somebody who was
47:55
in the West pointer the idea of taking
47:57
them from they might be a brigade
47:59
commander so you go from commanding 1500
48:01
min to 20,000 men that’s too that’s too
48:03
big a jump to take too big a jump at the
48:06
very end of the war there was a man
48:08
named John Gordon who you’ll you’ll see
48:13
where they’ll talk about him at
48:15
Gettysburg Marines will I’m sure when
48:17
you’re there he ends up as a corps
48:19
commander at the very at Appomattox he’s
48:21
a Corps commander he’s a non West
48:23
pointer who’s just a kind of brilliant
48:25
military figure but he takes him a long
48:28
time and the only reason he gets up
48:29
there is because everybody else is
48:31
getting shot and he ends up in that
48:34
position
48:41
there’s a pause here yet yes do we start
48:45
a new line yes let’s start a new thread
48:47
I’m going to make another feeble attempt
48:50
to get you to say something nice about
48:51
books I’d say a lot of nice things on
48:53
long street when I was free was very
48:55
tall but I was going what I was trying
48:59
to find when I was digging through my
49:00
mom Street this was some I remember
49:02
reading at some point there was some
49:04
study someone did they actually tried to
49:07
duplicate his large on the second day
49:11
and they said and I wanted no fingers I
49:14
remember that he got to a point where he
49:18
was exposed so we had to backtrack and
49:20
take a look around can do you know yeah
49:23
do you know what I’m talking about
49:24
I guess I’ve made them you tell me I’ve
49:26
taken many groups on that March it is
49:28
it’s it’s an importer Alexander he talks
49:31
about it he they wanted to get around to
49:34
the Union left and you you come down a
49:38
road and I don’t know whether the
49:39
Marines maybe they’ll take you on the
49:40
smart shoe you come up to this little
49:42
piece of high ground you’re looking a
49:43
little ramp up and round top and their
49:46
Union signalman up there and they don’t
49:47
want to be discovered so when they see
49:49
that they drop back down off it RIA
49:51
today does this long counter March and
49:52
gets down in the bottom he’s got a gap
49:54
of about five hundred yards you need to
49:56
get from here to right down here without
49:58
being seen so he does this long well
50:00
Porter Alexander reached that same place
50:02
earlier in the day for his artillery
50:04
caught up and all they saw that what was
50:07
his solution to the problem he dropped
50:09
down went about 400 yards off to his
50:12
right and ended up down where he was
50:13
supposed to be cooking maybe 20 minutes
50:15
to do it 20 minutes with him when he
50:17
goes well yeah I was artillery the
50:19
artillery was out in front of the
50:21
infantry it’s not how many guys you have
50:22
it’s how do you solved the problem he
50:24
solved the problem in a very efficient
50:26
indirect way Longstreet solved the
50:28
problem in the most cumbersome
50:30
imaginable way but ate up lots of
50:32
precious time and Alexander remarked in
50:35
another context he didn’t see why the
50:37
infantry when they got there just didn’t
50:38
follow his horse droppings around to see
50:41
how they got where they were going
50:43
because it’s just and when you stand
50:44
there the ground just lays out the
50:47
camera is Little Round Top we’re
50:49
standing on this little road here
50:50
there’s of the ridge goes just like this
50:52
and we drop back this
50:54
our and we just come around go around
50:58
the back row and we end up where the
50:59
camera is and nobody can see us
51:02
I mean you can see it all from right
51:03
there can see how so you could have to
51:07
find another thing to get Longstreet up
51:09
okay that was not going to work that one
51:11
he should have been able to figure out
51:12
he did things he didn’t start to get his
51:17
column ready to march until his last big
51:19
aid was up and now this is inside the
51:22
beltway minutia but I mean this is he
51:24
waits for a bit for his very last reggae
51:26
to get out before he starts to get ready
51:28
to go why didn’t he get ready to go and
51:31
when the last Brigade comes up go but
51:34
didn’t he do that because he didn’t
51:35
agree with the orders and yes yeah what
51:38
kind of subordinate does that because it
51:39
doesn’t agree with the orders I mean
51:42
really if he really doesn’t want to do
51:44
it then say General Lee I can’t I’m
51:46
sorry I disagree so violently with what
51:49
you’re doing that I think you should put
51:51
someone else in my place that’s what you
51:53
do if you’re not gonna try your best
51:55
that’s what you do get out of the way I
51:58
hate to play you called Payton so I’m
52:01
only going to run at half speed on this
52:03
account I know the ball is gonna come to
52:04
me but I’m not going to run very fast I
52:06
think you should have called a slam yes
52:09
kind of a go you don’t get to do that if
52:12
you’re the receiver and Peyton Manning
52:14
calls the play or you what our I
52:16
guarantee you you won’t be a receiver
52:18
very long if you do that two or three
52:20
times and he knows you’re doing it you
52:23
don’t get to do that in an army and and
52:27
I do and I think you put your finger
52:29
right on I think that’s exactly what
52:30
Longstreet was doing he’s making a point
52:32
but let’s save him for next week we’ll
52:35
talk about Longstreet a lot next week
52:37
we’re supposed to focus on need and Lee
52:41
Jenny right I’m buying you affirm but I
52:46
thought we were doing tonight
52:47
that’s why I feel so empowered but
52:50
talking about we and just shouldn’t go
52:54
in across some timing
52:56
that’s a huge that’s what I had actually
52:58
intended to start with tonight but this
53:00
is sort of stream of consciousness the
53:03
way we’re coming out this so now we’re
53:04
back in the aftermath of
53:06
Chancellorsville right should he have
53:08
even gone
53:09
what does Alan know and think about that
53:10
well he kind of displays the argument a
53:13
bit yes and they’ll take it to the north
53:16
but it seems that it’s too aggressive
53:18
like Alan think you said pee on my ear
53:20
yeah
53:21
what should we have done according to
53:23
Alan I should have just gone a bit
53:25
defensively hunker down baby and select
53:28
the Yankees come to you just like at
53:30
Fredericksburg right oh I see the whole
53:33
points we talked about last class by
53:35
going to the Nord lure the army away
53:37
from Richmond you know using your army
53:39
to just dissipate making Morgan’s have a
53:43
call for peace but I feel like it’s a
53:46
huge hold of the guy and I don’t see why
53:48
the North with so many more men couldn’t
53:51
split their army and sack Richmond as
53:54
well as engaged Lee in Pennsylvania did
53:56
they all they just took him to
54:00
Pennsylvania right there I mean yes that
54:02
mate they left they left away what did
54:04
occur want to do when we march north he
54:08
wanted to go to Richmond but but why did
54:12
I mean but Lee understands what are the
54:14
realities what what would the northern
54:16
population say if General Lee’s headed
54:19
for Pennsylvania and the Army of the
54:22
Potomac goes the other way how is that
54:24
going to play behind the lines in the
54:25
United State is not it is not an option
54:28
there’s the biggest most famous rebel
54:31
army is in the United States what’s the
54:34
reaction you go get them and get them
54:37
out of the United States you don’t get
54:38
to go the other way but no they have
54:41
enough men to they can you babe I mean
54:42
there’s a how many armies do they have
54:45
next to Washington one one they have the
54:49
army Potomac what’s the army of the
54:50
tomek’s job deal with the army in
54:54
Northern Virginia where the army
54:55
Northern Virginia goes the army Potomac
54:58
god damn better well though or there are
55:00
going to be problems they’re going to be
55:02
tremendous problems for the Lincoln it
55:04
station so that is not an option to go
55:07
the other way not an option
55:08
Italy understood that even though hooker
55:11
having been crushed mentally by Li at
55:14
Chancellorsville wanted to do that I
55:17
still find that sort of hilarious that
55:19
the army commander would say well I want
55:20
to go the other way I know he’s headed
55:22
to the United States now’s my perfect
55:24
chance to go to Richmond but he didn’t
55:27
understand this Richmond is not the key
55:28
the key is Lee’s army so you thinking
55:31
sacrifice men we were just gone on
55:33
terrorizing Pennsylvania throughout I
55:35
mean I think there was no chance he was
55:37
going to sacrament there’s a zero
55:39
percent chance that politically he would
55:42
be allowed to do that this absolutely no
55:44
chance not a slim chance no chance that
55:47
he’s going to be allowed to do that
55:49
these are two Democratic Republic’s at
55:52
war this is one of the things we talked
55:54
about the first day politics and
55:56
military affairs are like this the
56:00
military the armies do not operate in a
56:03
military vacuum they operate in an
56:06
intensely politicized atmosphere and
56:08
people pay attention people being
56:10
civilians at home the boat pay attention
56:14
oh there’s no chase I’ll be right back
56:16
there in just a second oh sorry cuz last
56:18
class you said that he had to take the
56:22
army out of Virginia he said that yes
56:25
ledian yeah so how else you do that
56:28
without going to know that’s the only
56:30
way to do that we haven’t talked about
56:32
the main reason he said he wanted to get
56:34
it out of Virginia what’s the main
56:36
reason Lee wants to get the army out of
56:39
Virginia and then they want to give him
56:40
a chance to regrow there it’s logistics
56:42
he wants to give the farmers in Virginia
56:45
respite and he wants to get into
56:47
Pennsylvania and just siphon everything
56:50
his army can use out of that lush
56:53
central Pennsylvania countryside that’s
56:55
I think that’s the number one thing on
56:57
his mind
56:59
number two is he says you’re talking
57:01
about how big the armies are what is he
57:03
20 so he says if we don’t if we just sit
57:05
and wait what is going to happen we say
57:08
okay we won the Battle of
57:09
Chancellorsville I’m just gonna sit here
57:11
at Fredericksburg what’s going to happen
57:15
what’s going to happen what are the
57:17
federals could have do what are the
57:19
faendal is going to do in from Lee’s
57:21
perspective what does he say what’s the
57:24
scenario that he sketches out basically
57:26
he sees the war of attrition with the
57:28
north continuing to engage and bring the
57:30
war to the south one danger wherever
57:33
they choose to bring it he says they’re
57:36
bigger than we are they have more men
57:38
than we have if we just sit here we’re
57:41
going to allow our more powerful
57:42
opponent to take their time perfect
57:45
their plans and project their power at
57:48
the point of their choice and eventually
57:52
where does he say the army Northern
57:54
Virginia will end up yes it will end up
57:56
defending Richmond will end up in
57:58
Richmond and when he gets in Richmond
58:00
his view is the war is over
58:02
because it will end up as a siege and a
58:05
siege can only end one way with a
58:08
smaller force hunkered down and a larger
58:10
force enveloping it and he will do
58:14
almost anything to avoid death what
58:16
makes the comparison between Lee and
58:18
Washington wasn’t that was pretty
58:19
interesting yes Washington walking his
58:21
Lee’s idle right Washington let’s the
58:24
British take New York he lets them take
58:26
Boston you doesn’t have anything they
58:27
want we didn’t exactly let them take New
58:30
York they took New York the enthusiam
58:32
out but yes so the be moving into
58:35
Pennsylvania is basically the same as
58:37
Washington going to Valley Forge and
58:40
just kind of making his way down selves
58:41
and having to catch for loss at Yorktown
58:44
so from that perspective the war of
58:47
attrition isn’t a bad thing for Lee Lee
58:50
does not fight the war the way
58:51
Washington fought the revolution
58:52
absolutely Washington avoids big battles
58:54
but when Lee is afraid of this war of
58:57
attrition should he have been he’s
59:01
afraid of being besieged in Richmond
59:03
yeah he absolutely should have been what
59:04
how did the war in when he got besieged
59:06
in Richmond and Petersburg that’s when
59:08
the war ended yeah but like politically
59:11
the North was going to get tired of this
59:13
if we had avoided the big battle is that
59:15
fair to say if there weren’t big battles
59:18
the United States civilian population
59:21
probably wouldn’t have gotten tired of
59:23
it
59:23
as they got tired of it when their
59:25
soldiers were suffering hideous
59:27
casualties in these big bells it’s a
59:30
it’s a it’s this race for the
59:33
Confederates from Lee’s perspective a
59:35
race between attrition that comes with
59:40
winning the kinds of victories you’re
59:41
winning the depressed northern morale
59:42
and how quickly northern morale which is
59:45
going to have it is the North going to
59:46
give up first or we can run out of em
59:48
first that is the equation that Lee has
59:50
in his mind in an end the northern
59:53
morale proved resilient enough to absorb
59:56
a third of a million casualties and
59:58
still push on through all both came very
60:01
close in the summer of 64 not the
60:03
sticking to it I mean this close this
60:06
close you can you can make a great case
60:10
that it would have been better if Lee
60:12
hasn’t suffered so many casualties we’d
60:14
have to be an idiot not to make that
60:15
case but what you can’t supply and what
60:18
Alan Nolan could never answer I would
60:22
ask you how do you guarantee a supply of
60:24
Ambrose Burnside’s
60:26
to give you a bunch of battles of
60:28
Fredericksburg where you put your army
60:29
and really strong ground and your
60:31
opponent comes up and just attacks
60:32
uphill against you all day you only ever
60:36
found one of those guys in command of
60:38
the Union Army
60:39
excited about you know that that is what
60:44
caused the Union at that moment divided
60:46
what you do the same in the opposite way
60:48
because they would have all day fighting
60:51
uphill attacking a very entrenched
60:53
position they were going to lose I’m
60:55
Linda Park and right what worse what
60:59
you’re saying that while is that he
61:00
should have known that he would fail at
61:02
Gettysburg and should have known that
61:04
attacking a nindroid position uphill at
61:07
that moment is also the timing to be
61:11
affable
61:11
here’s the problem with that thinking he
61:15
did that it gains his mill in late June
61:19
18 he had a 50,000 man assault that
61:21
gains his smell biggest assault of the
61:23
war early that succeeded he had
61:27
assaulted Chancellorsville exactly two
61:29
months before the picket Pettigrew
61:32
assault where his infantry who were
61:34
outnumbered were attacking
61:36
who retrenched and they succeeded there
61:39
are and I think this is what led him I’m
61:42
not getting I’m just trying to explain
61:44
why I think he did this and it’s because
61:46
I think he believed in the end that his
61:49
infantry could just take care of
61:52
business no matter what the obstacles
61:55
because he had seen them do it in an
61:59
offensive mode 4 times before Gettysburg
62:03
but when you stand there and look across
62:06
you’ll stand on Cemetery Ridge and look
62:08
across at Cemetery Ridge and I mean you
62:11
I’m sure you’ll thank gosh we’re going
62:13
to line up here and walk over there with
62:17
people seven tenths of a mile with
62:19
people shooting at us with cannons and
62:20
mutlu whew it’s it’s it’s really
62:26
distressing to do that so should he have
62:30
nothing he had this great quotation
62:32
later he said i bided known that it
62:34
wouldn’t work even as dull a fellow as i
62:36
am would have done something different
62:39
but he didn’t know it wouldn’t work
62:42
Longstreet thought it wouldn’t work
62:44
and I think Longstreet Jim for all your
62:47
posturing about how I don’t like
62:49
Longstreet I think Longstreet’s idea was
62:51
better at getting Braddock Porter
62:53
Alexander’s idea is the best what if he
62:55
say Lee should have done after his big
62:57
victory on the first day Alexander says
63:00
there are three options and he says the
63:02
best one is one for the Confederates yes
63:06
hunker down we smacked the Federals
63:10
around on the first day they’re there on
63:12
this line here here we are on seminary
63:16
Ridge which is a nice defensive position
63:18
as well just we’ll hunker down and make
63:21
them attack us they never drive us from
63:24
positions said and Alexander said the
63:27
onus is on them to get us out of the
63:29
United States the place where Lee was
63:32
most disingenuous in his official report
63:34
is when he said that he the battle was
63:37
forced on him because his supply
63:39
situation was tenuous and in the essence
63:41
he had to attack that that is just not
63:43
true now Alexander calls him on that
63:46
he said well we stayed there for three
63:48
more days and fought a big battle and
63:50
then we stayed another 10 days north of
63:53
the Potomac if he had published that
63:57
book if Alexander had when he wrote it
63:59
he would have come in for incredible
64:01
criticism across the south incredible
64:03
for being so harsh on Lee anybody want
64:06
to do something else would leave right
64:08
now or shall we give this did this class
64:10
is no different than any other class
64:11
where it’s all about Lee we haven’t
64:13
spent much time on George media but any
64:16
kind of Lee aftershocks I’ll say after
64:22
I’ve made the answer to that note but we
64:25
are going to circle back to leave Mead
64:29
we’ve had a semi elephant defensively as
64:33
someone who was who did a very good job
64:36
in difficult circumstances I want to
64:39
hear someone offer a critique of need
64:42
that might not be quite so positive
64:44
if anyone reached that kind of
64:47
conclusion about it are you all need ice
64:49
in there so have a crack at a gym yes
64:58
that’s yes basically defending me and
65:03
saying that it really was a critical
65:05
place seemed to me to be mostly about
65:16
and it was you’ll see his he wasn’t
65:19
blown up but there were lots of
65:21
cannonballs coming around and then so he
65:22
left so the entire narrative of his
65:26
actions during the day seemed like he
65:29
wasn’t really interesting that much the
65:31
biggest effect that’s all I came out
65:33
about him was that he yes he did make
65:34
this a that one decision early on
65:36
brought everyone together to get
65:39
information out of a consensus
65:41
the decision but everything else seems
65:45
to just fall into place because the boom
65:49
commanders or his subordinates did their
65:53
job well or just kind of happened when
65:57
did he get to the battlefield when this
65:59
meat show up and get his birth the night
66:04
of day one how late on the night of is
66:08
almost midnight
66:09
so almost midnight so that’s
66:11
everything’s over with he has to make a
66:14
decision that night too I mean he there
66:17
he has a decision to make am I going to
66:19
stay here tomorrow or not what about on
66:23
the second
66:23
what are his biggest what’s his biggest
66:26
crisis on the second sickles yes what’s
66:34
what so what’s the deal with sickles
66:38
you’re George Gordon Meade what do you
66:41
think is happening on your line on the
66:44
second until you find out differently
66:46
you put your line together how are you
66:49
thinking what the hell are you doing
66:51
well no now wait a minute I said what
66:53
are you thinking before you find out
66:54
what’s it doing how would you put your
66:56
line together in a nice interior lines
66:59
on high ground you don’t probably don’t
67:01
even it’s right goes from it goes from
67:03
cold tail this is such a mess here now
67:05
we’re going to start over like you’re
67:08
doing with all these warranties
67:10
this is great we have boards and boards
67:13
co-ceo Cemetery Hill which confusingly
67:18
has the same initials Cemetery
67:22
there’s a little brown top so you think
67:26
you have a West Point case there so his
67:31
original lie on the second goes like
67:34
this and sickles is supposed to be in
67:37
the farthest left it kind of goes down
67:39
to Little Round Top that’s what he
67:41
thinks is is happening and then early in
67:45
the afternoon what does he find out cuz
67:47
happened what what is sickles done so
67:51
all the little kids work advance here’s
67:53
the peach orchard which is higher than
67:56
so sickles has just taken his his core
67:59
this is the Emmitsburg Road coming into
68:02
town he’s taking his core he’s put it
68:04
one division there and then the other
68:06
one my map is so bad it comes down to
68:09
Devil’s Den which he will see and he
68:11
didn’t what did he tell me about this
68:16
nothing did not tell me he did this so
68:21
now the Union line just stops right here
68:23
and what’s the weakness of sickles isn’t
68:27
that sickles the point is that this is
68:28
higher than this ground and sickles is
68:30
sensitive about that because of what
68:32
happened to in the Chancellorsville and
68:33
when you go there you’ll see that the
68:35
peach orchard is higher than this but
68:37
when he moves out there what is the
68:41
defensive problem with his being out
68:43
there along the Emmitsburg Road you can
68:45
just get cut off this flank was in the
68:48
air this life is in the air he’s just
68:50
floating out there all by himself with
68:52
his ten thousand men and so needs
68:56
what’s needs reaction to this what is
68:58
possible reactions to this what could he
69:01
do when he finds out this is HAP I don’t
69:03
mean he cursed he cursed a lot but Mead
69:05
Mead had a very rich vocabulary hubbub
69:08
vulgar isms and blasphemies that he
69:12
would deploy at the drop of a hat but
69:13
apart from that what what are the what
69:17
could he do here okay darn it sickles
69:20
has gone out there golly
69:23
no oh fudge he’s not worried supposed to
69:26
be he tried he thought about but yeah he
69:33
went out and looked
69:34
why can’t he order him back because this
69:36
started fighting the Confederates are
69:38
showing that’s right the Confederates
69:40
are showing up so yes he does he pulls
69:48
in troops from two other Corps to try to
69:50
shore up this this weak line and
69:53
somebody made the semi dismissive
69:57
comment Justin I don’t know who did that
69:59
what me did was move people around and
70:01
he gets a lot of points for that that is
70:04
essentially what he does his move people
70:06
around he moves them around so that his
70:09
life is strongest at the point of
70:11
greatest danger he moves them from culty
70:15
virtually strips everybody from our far
70:17
right CH site and moves them down here
70:21
so there’s hardly anybody left up there
70:23
anyways other people it’s all about
70:25
supporting his left flank
70:27
which is in real danger throughout the
70:30
fighting on the second and he uses these
70:33
inferior lines very well so he doesn’t
70:35
good he does a very good job of that but
70:38
that would be something you’d have to be
70:42
a really bad officer not to know how to
70:45
use interior lines because that’s one of
70:47
the things that everybody knew I mean
70:49
that’s a huge advantage everybody
70:51
nobody’s but still let’s give him points
70:52
for that he did a good job of that what
70:56
else did we do that we find that
70:58
especially impressive to us I mean I
71:00
could never understand why sequels who
71:02
went what why did sickles go out there I
71:05
could not Michelle wants to know why I
71:09
have chalk all over my pants and why
71:11
sickles went out from his line on
71:13
Cemetery Ridge why did he do that and
71:16
somebody but not you Jim I don’t want
71:19
you to answer this I want somebody else
71:21
to answer tab and Chancellor bill yeah
71:23
higher position those order to get it up
71:25
called Hazel Grove yes and what happened
71:28
when he gave it up that thing the United
71:31
States positive battle that’s right
71:33
other than that nothing bad happened
71:35
done canary so was so it’s all about
71:39
Chancellorsville it’s all about
71:41
Chancellorsville what does I mean he
71:43
just says and he told Henry hunt who’s
71:46
the union artillerist our chief of
71:48
artillery I can defend better from that
71:50
high ground than I can from back here
71:53
but the fallacy in that is have enough
71:55
men to make a line that makes sense by
71:59
going out to the peach orchard and
72:00
defending that high ground so that’s a
72:04
good argument in theory but on the
72:06
ground it doesn’t stand up all those
72:09
sickles dependent and sickles said What
72:12
did he say his move did retrospectively
72:16
when they’re arguing about who’s his
72:18
arguments what the caused me to send
72:23
reinforcements sooner which was kind of
72:26
again for to it what did it do with the
72:27
Confederates according to sickles
72:30
anybody picked up on that yeah and get
72:33
like saved the Union mind because the
72:35
killer would have gotten around their
72:36
flank because they were throwing dirt
72:38
around hops so the confederation said
72:40
attacked him up in the peach orchard and
72:42
that cave it’s almost like a delaying
72:44
action made them focus there and they
72:47
broke a lot of their strength trying to
72:50
carry this ground that sickles took up
72:52
and by the time they over ran the peach
72:54
orchard and wheat field they ran up
72:57
against Union lines that by that point
72:59
we’re able to hold on the high ground so
73:01
he argues it saved the battle and his
73:04
critics said it came this close to
73:06
undoing the army you idiot political
73:11
craven political Tammany Hall tool you
73:14
almost lost the battle by what you did
73:17
in his responses no that’s exactly wrong
73:19
by moving out there I made Longstreet
73:22
deployed farther away than he would have
73:24
and he broke himself on my line which
73:27
was farther to the West than it would
73:29
otherwise yes I would I wouldn’t part of
73:35
this because he was and no one else was
73:44
yes and so there was already a lot of
73:46
bad baggage to begin with and so there
73:49
was no trust there’s no respect and so I
73:52
don’t
73:52
I wonder if sickle would have made the
73:55
same decisions to disobey the orders had
73:57
they actually gotten along if he made he
73:59
had gotten along right regardless the
74:01
chance or a hooker had given him the
74:02
orders or someone that he got along with
74:04
him given the orders I think that I
74:07
think there’s no way we can let him off
74:10
the hook for not telling his army
74:12
commander what he was doing I mean you
74:13
just can’t do that you can’t move an
74:15
entire infantry Corps out of where
74:19
you’re ordered to be without letting
74:21
your commander know what you’re doing so
74:23
I don’t think we can let him off the
74:24
hook there but I do think he is it’s
74:27
it’s understandable because he is an
74:29
almost complete outsider in the high
74:32
command but not only because he got
74:34
along with hooker who was a West pointer
74:36
but because he is he’s a politician he’s
74:38
not a West pointer he has this very
74:40
clouded and controversial and notorious
74:44
history that he brought with him as well
74:47
and was not considered the gentleman and
74:49
was not coming he just doesn’t fit in it
74:50
doesn’t fit in at all with this in the
74:53
culture of the Army of the Potomac
74:55
but even saying all of that he’s still a
74:58
soldier and a subordinate and you just
75:01
can’t do that even if it’s the right
75:03
move if he had told me initially that
75:06
meat cooks that okay you go there and
75:08
we’ll do this in this and this as we set
75:10
up the line the Marines I’m sure are
75:12
going to talk to you about that line the
75:15
line in a number of places that hooker
75:17
that sickles put together didn’t have
75:19
enough infantry to make an infantry line
75:21
there are lots of places where you had
75:22
artillery and in the Civil War you can’t
75:26
have artillery all by itself it can’t be
75:28
by itself because it’s absolutely
75:30
vulnerable to infantry if it’s all by
75:32
itself so it was a terrible line didn’t
75:34
have enough men to do that it’s on the
75:37
other hand it took the Confederates a
75:40
lot of casualties to get
75:41
sicles line so and it’s impossible to
75:46
decide which of them is absolutely right
75:48
or absolutely wrong but I don’t think
75:52
it’s impossible to decide that he can’t
75:55
have a principal subordinate who is
75:57
freelances this way in a situation like
76:00
that but I but I want somebody to argue
76:02
with me if you think that that if there
76:04
are circumstances when you should have a
76:05
subordinate do that when it makes sense
76:08
right poor hands wet up let’s go isn’t
76:10
that the way that lead kind of ran
76:12
things right I mean to a certain extent
76:14
certainly not to to the point of
76:16
insubordination but he didn’t he push
76:19
down certain decision-making power and
76:21
say if you get to a point in the battle
76:22
and I’m not there and there’s a decision
76:25
to be made you make it and you become
76:27
the aggressor and so it seems like if
76:29
sickles had been in Lee’s army Lee might
76:32
have almost praised him for taking that
76:35
kind of an initiative I mean at what
76:38
point is an insubordination and at what
76:40
point is it just taking the initiative
76:42
and taking higher ground that you see is
76:43
better it’s that the problem with taking
76:47
the higher ground I think I think that’s
76:49
a great way to put it I think there
76:50
would be much more leeway in Lee’s army
76:52
than in the Union Army to do that but
76:54
the problem with the action is that he
76:56
doesn’t improve the army situation there
76:59
he creates this salient where he is hope
77:01
or is now completely vulnerable and
77:04
unless people do other things to rectify
77:07
that situation he’s he’s put at risk
77:10
basically 1/5 of the army here so I
77:13
think that’s his problem it’s it’s not
77:15
as if he’s pushing and aggressive he’s
77:17
not going after the Confederates here
77:19
he’s just funding the defensive
77:20
alignment but I think your point about
77:23
whether this kind of behavior at least
77:26
to a degree would be more acceptable in
77:28
Lee’s army I think the answer is yes to
77:30
that how can you explain good then we
77:33
didn’t let Longstreet or Hood go around
77:36
the flank in us exactly Lee Lee’s not
77:38
part of that equation
77:39
that’s Longstreet being a bad
77:41
subordinate again in my view hood should
77:43
have been allowed to do that Lee would
77:45
have allowed to do that because Lee had
77:48
allowed Longstreet to do
77:50
at Manassas he had allowed Jackson to do
77:52
it at Chancellorsville you get to the
77:53
ground and you see that the situation is
77:55
different and you know something that I
77:58
don’t know then you’re allowed to adjust
78:01
the circumstances on the ground and
78:02
that’s what hood was asking to do
78:04
it’s Longstreet who said no General Lee
78:07
told us to do it this way and we can’t
78:09
change General Lee’s orders
78:10
well Longstreet knew that wasn’t true
78:12
because Longstreet had changed these
78:14
orders at different points because all
78:16
of that on Longstreet I put 100% of that
78:19
on Longstreet because Lydia is way back
78:21
up by Lee has no idea what’s going on
78:23
and they’re not communicating with Lee
78:26
Longstreet is just saying Lee would not
78:28
allow that and so we can’t do that
78:34
getting back to me so the part of waters
78:37
kind of imposing your will of the enemy
78:39
was there ever a time that the Meade
78:41
attempted to do that because I feel like
78:43
he was just reacting a large part this
78:45
is all reactive yes right and so that
78:49
brings us to the next lead question and
78:51
Mary I saw your hand go up I’ll come
78:53
here in just a minute
78:53
what where is Meade’s opportunity to
78:56
impose his will on the army Northern
78:58
Virginia does he have any option
79:06
as as he’s watching the detritus of the
79:10
picket Pettigrew assault in front of him
79:14
it seems and when he has the sixth core
79:17
right behind him which is the biggest
79:19
core in the army the Potomac and it
79:20
hasn’t fought yet it seems like there’s
79:23
an option there for him to do something
79:25
I saw other hands go up too is that what
79:29
everyone was going to say now what’s the
79:32
counter-argument to that why what would
79:37
prevent his doing that give us some
79:39
factors late Brian it’s late is it
79:43
almost dark what time’s it get dark in
79:47
Gettysburg Pennsylvania in July of 1863
79:53
what isn’t there in the summer of 1863
79:57
the reason daylight savings time gets
79:59
dark around 8 by 8 o’clock
80:02
through the guard so imagine you’re in
80:05
Arizona and that’s what time is like in
80:08
Pennsylvania what and what time in the
80:11
afternoon is Pickett’s charge over with
80:14
about four we’ve got four hours of
80:16
daylight left now that’s either a lot of
80:21
time or not much time to move 15,000 men
80:24
around and get them to do something it
80:26
takes a long time to move a lot of men
80:28
around and get them in position to do
80:30
something why else might he not have
80:36
done anything here yeah
80:43
the tonier voice is so you’re I mean
80:46
your heart is not in that and another
80:48
thing maybe this and that and you know I
80:50
might have said you have like that or
80:51
yeah it seems like after a victory like
80:54
that put yourself in need skin what’s
80:58
going through your head right now
81:00
they’re retreating
81:02
I’m sorry go ahead here make your point
81:04
before I thought you also or I my
81:07
impression from the reading
81:08
that he was still worried that the
81:10
Confederates might recruit that they
81:12
weren’t done he’d seen so much success
81:15
letting them mess up on their own behalf
81:17
that I think that probably gave him the
81:20
confidence to just hang on the defense
81:22
even let him attack again right Scott
81:25
well the if I was him I would have felt
81:30
like we won this battle and I don’t want
81:33
to risk anything we would have exhaled
81:34
and thought wow but the big argument in
81:38
the essay I believe is that like in all
81:41
this repositioning everything every
81:43
other chorus had gotten like so mixed up
81:45
and everything was just kind of they
81:48
were this defensive position and it was
81:51
all patchwork and to Hancock was wounded
81:54
and if the reason three courts I think
81:57
it said yeah had all been badly wounded
81:59
and to try to regroup and get people
82:02
where they needed to be deleted charge
82:04
would have been very difficult and I
82:08
think your point about me he’s really
82:10
new on the scenes this is Earth’s huge
82:12
battle he’s in charge of the entire army
82:13
to see success and then say okay and now
82:16
I’m going to go
82:17
the Confederates firm and the you know
82:21
leadership styles stuff it seems like
82:23
that would be a big stretch for Emily at
82:26
this point yeah I personally think
82:30
that’s a lot of what’s going on but just
82:33
flip this the scenarios though can you
82:35
imagine that Lee would let an
82:38
opportunity like that go by I really
82:41
can’t imagine that I think he would have
82:43
put something together and tried to do
82:45
something – because it’s chaotic I mean
82:48
it wait
82:49
how many we’ve been I can’t remember I
82:51
know I asked him how many of you been to
82:52
Gettysburg how many they’ve stood on
82:53
Cemetery Ridge and looked I mean you
82:56
know what that Vista is like and to see
82:58
nothing but defeat and chaos on the part
83:03
of your opponent as far as you can see
83:07
in both directions in front of your line
83:08
I mean that is something Porter
83:12
Alexander he talks about the Union
83:14
experience of Chancellorsville when they
83:16
started to retreat from the clearing of
83:19
Chancellorsville and Alexander hurried
83:21
his guns his battalions of artillery
83:23
down into position to where they could
83:26
fire into this is he put a defenseless
83:29
mass of retreating man he said that’s
83:31
the part of a battle that can be
83:33
denominated pie that’s what you wait for
83:36
that’s what you dream up and then you
83:38
just inflict the greatest possible
83:41
damage at that point and that’s not
83:43
happening in the wake of the picot
83:45
Pettigrew assault it’s not at all what
83:49
about over the next several days what
83:52
what happens over the next one what is
83:54
Lee what date is Lee retreat the port
83:59
same day Vicksburg surrenders God is on
84:03
the side of the United States is what
84:05
the people in the United States decide
84:07
it’s the fourth of July and we’ve won
84:09
two big victories so Lee hands for the
84:12
Potomac
84:13
what is he fine
84:18
he’s retreating in this gigantic
84:21
rainstorm the rivers up and he can’t get
84:25
across how many days before he can get
84:29
across and ten days he can’t get across
84:36
and how much fighting takes place in
84:39
those ten days
84:42
no it’s God but but that’s probably good
84:46
for the Union because at least the way
84:49
that Alexander described it they’ve
84:51
become so entrenched in that defensive
84:53
position even though that their backs
84:55
are to the river into the wall that they
84:58
were like hoping for a battle at that
85:00
point they were they were I’ll just ask
85:04
you to flip this around again the
85:05
Federals are hunkered down along the
85:07
Potomac they’re about forty-five
85:08
thousand of them and there are 80,000
85:13
Confederates who are coming after them
85:15
and they want the Confederates to attack
85:18
I think the can think it’s just it’s
85:20
just an interesting contrast in mindsets
85:25
or cultures of command or whatever you
85:28
want to call it it’s a very striking
85:30
contrast it really is it’s I mean Lee is
85:36
encumbered by these huge trains of
85:38
wounded man I’m trains wagon trains they
85:40
call them trains his train stretched
85:43
total supplies and wounded he has more
85:49
than 40 miles of trains on different
85:52
roads heading for the Potomac forty
85:54
miles as he leaves the battlefield that
85:57
seems like a pretty vulnerable target
86:00
yeah I’m shocked even if the union’s
86:03
head and kind of surrounded them or
86:05
Indian just lightly engaged you have
86:08
kept them from crossed they can’t cross
86:09
if they’re engaged wait yeah they’re not
86:12
even pressing all-out attack but just no
86:13
need to harass and then definitely half
86:16
of them yeah but they can’t cross if
86:18
they’re under fire right and in the end
86:20
Lee gets across in one night crosses his
86:23
army in one night he did the same thing
86:25
after Antietam one night that’s
86:28
incredibly efficient going across the
86:30
Potomac there it’s I I think I think
86:36
Meade is in a really hard position and
86:39
does a really good job in a lot of ways
86:41
but I can understand Lincoln’s
86:44
frustration in the wake of Gettysburg
86:48
I really can relying upon the council
87:02
officers I didn’t get the sense that
87:05
there was a big boys repelling there’s
87:09
not there’s there’s there’s not there’s
87:13
no one saying you must you’ve got to let
87:16
me do this just let me go even if no one
87:18
else goes let me know I think
87:30
I think it’s cultural I think it’s I
87:33
think that the whole reaction on the
87:36
part of these union officers is part of
87:39
this McClellan culture that was so
87:43
profoundly important in the forging of
87:47
the army and it’s absolutely and the
87:49
clouds absence makes no difference and
87:51
is still there even though McClellan
87:53
isn’t there anymore and this most
87:55
aggressive corps commander is Hancock
87:57
and Hancock is his wound is really badly
88:02
wounded and and Reynolds his most senior
88:06
corps commander is dead so not that he
88:09
was that aggressive but that may be part
88:11
of it so you’ve got new people in
88:13
command of those Corps to just as usual
88:15
as new and who knows what he’s going to
88:17
do now you have new people in command
88:19
and sickles so there’s somebody new in
88:21
command of the 3rd Corps in command of
88:23
the 1st Corps incoming it’s in command
88:24
of the 2nd Corps but the 6th Corps
88:28
hadn’t even thought it’s the biggest one
88:29
in the Army it seems like the 6th Corps
88:31
would have been available for at least
88:36
light harassing duty something something
88:41
Scott is another kind of positive on me
88:46
one of the things that I saw is a
88:47
contrast and images because and they
88:50
have just been because of the situation
88:51
was when the Federals were under fire
88:56
and and you know he was taking his
88:58
headquarters were taking fire he still
89:01
like got out there and went and like
89:04
checked in with almost around Anders and
89:07
what I mean they have a good story about
89:09
the he tells the story about the guys
89:12
hip standing behind the wagon and how it
89:14
didn’t give any more protection yeah
89:16
whereas it seems like me at least in
89:18
this situation is very removed
89:22
any of the actual combat and I know I
89:25
saw that as something that was an act of
89:28
valor to still be out there in the
89:30
trenches when he’s at risk right well he
89:35
definitely is moving around the
89:37
battlefield he lead acted that way at
89:39
Antietam moving all over the line and
89:40
coming under fire I think we pretty much
89:43
stayed close to where the Virginia
89:45
Monument is now when you’re there you’ll
89:46
have a good sense of where he was and he
89:48
was and just sort of yeah listening to
89:51
fighting to his left fighting to his
89:53
right and he’s not moving all around
89:56
nope nope I’m not sure what his presence
89:59
his presence down were hood in
90:01
Longstreet were would have made a
90:03
difference I think because i i’ve no
90:05
doubt leo said well sure move around
90:06
there that makes sense you can get clear
90:09
around the flank that way but anyway
90:12
hood didn’t get to go and then hood got
90:14
shot almost immediately
90:17
hideous wound a very bad wound for old
90:20
hood
90:26
nobody’s gotten a neat tattoo I guess
90:28
since we met last time not a single one
90:30
I think need but I’m also I have a real
90:35
sense you’re much more interested in Lee
90:37
here he seems more interesting to you
90:42
why is that how why is he more
90:44
interesting to you so take us back
91:00
Alexander account he was even proper
91:04
enough to go to Tennessee and I think
91:06
Longstreet Montreat want wanted to yeah
91:08
yeah oh no no absolutely and it’s a
91:17
question it underscores how important he
91:20
was because virtually everybody else we
91:22
talked about this I think we did I can’t
91:24
remember I’m pretty sure we did they
91:27
debated this in April and May the
91:28
Confederates how to allocate their
91:30
resources and most people politicians
91:32
generals and Jefferson Davis favored
91:35
weakening Lee and reinforcing either the
91:38
army dependent Vicksburg or Braxton
91:40
Bragg’s army which was essentially
91:42
defending Chattanooga and they made good
91:46
arguments and but Lee said no and in the
91:49
end Davis
91:50
wouldn’t go against me which is a
91:52
measure of the argument in a loans are
91:57
in him the two books that you are
92:00
looking at non Connelly that argue that
92:03
Lee was just one of many generals he
92:05
says the same as all the others he’s not
92:06
the same as all the others he’d be they
92:08
get five votes and he gets five and a
92:10
half boats in this Lincoln when he took
92:13
when he pulled his cabinet and everybody
92:14
voted no and he voted yes and then he
92:16
said the eyes have it it’s that kind of
92:18
thing with Lee it’s hard to go against
92:21
the only guy who ever wins anything for
92:23
you it’s really hard to do Harriette
92:25
anything though if we move so far you
92:28
don’t remember what
92:29
going to say well I think it’s
92:31
interesting that we find leave we
92:34
definitely may because we brought a lot
92:36
more about him but at the end of the day
92:38
I’d rather be mean with the right
92:39
strategy than charismatic slightly
92:42
dogmatic and Lee with the wrong strategy
92:44
so it’s just really interesting to think
92:47
that Mead because he didn’t go on the
92:50
offensive to be more likely his harshly
92:52
criticized and Lee who basically loses
92:55
the war because he will not do anything
92:58
but be the aggressor now you’re
93:01
channeling now I know him that’s right
93:03
Lee loses the war because he’s too
93:05
aggressive you could also say that means
93:07
not be you don’t say means not be more
93:09
likely because obviously he’s not be
93:10
more like grant who also would have done
93:13
something to hurt the rebels after
93:15
pursuing grant would have been all over
93:17
them to me does empower people though
93:21
right like he just empowers the top
93:23
level at the decision-making point and
93:25
then expects people to listen well by
93:29
empower you mean listens to their
93:31
arguments and then makes it yeah sure
93:34
yeah he does he does yep I wouldn’t say
93:38
that I think you know you look at the
93:39
two people that from the war that are
93:42
still have these huge sizes these are
93:43
Lincoln and Lee and I think that the
93:44
reason they had this perceived or
93:47
publicly perceived ideology that they
93:49
were operating on and I think that’s
93:50
what people like find fascinating that
93:52
they were so yeah there’s a slower Lee
93:56
being driven by it is like love for home
93:58
and Lincoln major by you know his like
94:02
love of country or however you know and
94:05
the whole nation and so I think that
94:06
people find that fascinating that they
94:08
were so Dhirubhai that that that it like
94:10
dictated all of their actions and in
94:12
fact of the way and so I think that’s
94:14
why you know ends up being this
94:15
long-term fascination whereas me like
94:17
did the right things but it’s like
94:18
there’s not a backstory there I think
94:20
it’s harder to like connect with why he
94:22
did the things he did
94:25
and with Lee it’s also I think I mean if
94:28
you all of these qualities that people
94:31
like would have meant nothing if he
94:33
haven’t won a bunch of victories in 1862
94:35
and 1861 the matter oh he’s a great
94:37
Christian gentleman yeah but he’s a
94:39
loser let me toss to all these battles I
94:41
don’t care buddy but letting be a
94:43
preacher not a general because he’s not
94:45
many battles that’s the key that’s the
94:47
real people Lee is that he wins battles
94:49
and gives civilians hope that’s the key
94:53
all the other stuff is nice wonderful
94:56
dressing in gigas and scrollwork and
94:58
crown moldings but the basic thing is
95:03
that he’s successful and successful to
95:08
the degree that Gettysburg isn’t held
95:11
against him that’s what to me is one of
95:13
the most remarkable aspects of his
95:16
position in the Confederacy Gettysburg
95:18
essentially has no impact on his
95:21
reputation none none it’s amazing but
95:29
true amazing but true it really is okay
95:34
we’re a minute over will do subordinates
95:38
next week I’m going to bring a musket
95:40
next week I have to drive to Washington
95:42
or would have brought it tonight and who
95:43
knows in Washington with a musket what
95:45
might happen to me but I will have it
95:47
next week when we end what I already
95:51
gave you hardtack tonight I didn’t bring
95:56
hardtack know you’ll get hardtack to
95:58
hardtack and a must
96:01
you’ll be the only kids on your block
96:03
with hardtack I promise

Why Steve Kerr Loves a Coach in Liverpool

NBA coaches quote him and SEC football coaches study him. It seems that everyone in sports has a manager crush on Liverpool’s Jürgen Klopp.

Klopp has been a forcefully endearing figure since long before he landed in Liverpool. As a player at Mainz in the second tier of German soccer, he described himself as having fourth-division skills but a first-division brain. Those skills still made him one of the club’s all-time leading scorers, even as a defender, since he would routinely shift into attack when Mainz badly needed a goal, which was often.

“I was watching, but not specifically him,” said Andi Herzog, a former Austrian star now managing the Israeli national team. “Nobody knew that he would be the best coach in the world.”

Klopp was so popular at Mainz that the club made him its manager immediately after he quit playing in 2001. Over the next 14 years, first at Mainz and then at Borussia Dortmund, he refined his coaching style. Klopp called it “heavy-metal football.”

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His personal style is more dad rock. While the top European managers wear tailored designer suits, Klopp dresses like he’s taking his kids to kindergarten in Brooklyn. His take on sideline couture includes tracksuits, baseball caps and running shoes, all topped off with a thick beard and hipster glasses.

“Everybody’s gotta have their statement thing,” said Florida football coach Dan Mullen, a Liverpool die-hard and Klopp admirer. “I wear my visor. He’s got his little beard-glasses look.”

But the way Klopp handles himself—not how he looks—is the reason he’s adored. Mullen gushes about how he adapts his system to his players. Claude Le Roy, the French manager of Togo’s national soccer team, envies his ability to sidestep the shenanigans of many other coaches in the game. “He’s a natural leader,” said Le Roy, who has never met him. “He proves that you don’t have to insult people, that you don’t have to cheat, that you don’t have to constantly repeat, ‘I’m the boss.’”

Gregg Berhalter, the head coach of the U.S. men’s national team, played in the German second division when Klopp was starting out, but he could already tell that the intense, sometimes maniacal young coach on the sideline had a special quality. “He gives a sense of being a real person,” Berhalter said. “People relate to that.”

Klopp is the latest in a series of highly successful coaches over the last decade—Pete Carroll, Joe Maddon, Kerr himself—who have reimagined their position of authority for the 21st century. They are highly respected but not tyrannical. They have a metronomic pulse of their locker rooms. They’re not necessarily strategic geniuses, but they have an unmatched ability to unlock talent, and they maintain their own power by empowering their players.

“You can sometimes feel a coach’s influence,” Kerr said. “When a team takes on the personality of a coach, you feel this connectedness and this collective will, and then magic happens.”

Klopp’s players feel it more than most. As they come off the field, their 6-foot-3 boss doesn’t bother with a formal handshake. He wraps them in bear hugs.

A touchy, feely cheerleader is not what you would expect from a manager in the most cutthroat league on earth—let alone a German one. But even Germany can’t get enough of Klopp’s schtick. At a time when the nation’s economy is screeching to a halt, he is seen as a model of modern management: Klopp recently posed for a national magazine called Manager under the headline “Der Feelgood-Boss.”

Alexander Stöckl, Der Feelgood-Boss of Norway’s powerhouse ski-jumping team that dominated the last Olympics, is not a soccer fan so much as he’s a Klopp fan. “He has an aura that fascinates many,” Stöckl said. “It seems to me has a fantastic philosophy of coaching.”

That philosophy demands total commitment from his players. While soccer’s attacking ideal in the late 2000s became the intricate passing play of Pep Guardiola’s Barcelona, Klopp was developing a violently athletic approach based on fast breaks and high pressure. The battle between the two styles is now playing out in the Premier League, where Klopp’s Liverpool and Guardiola’s Manchester City are battling for the title for a second straight year—they’ll meet for the first time this season at Anfield on Sunday.

Everyone in sports has a manager crush on Jürgen Klopp. PHOTO: DARREN STAPLES/ZUMA PRESS

And there will be at least one coach of a championship team watching from eight time zones away. Kerr, whose sister lives in England and whose nephews are Arsenal supporters, had always enjoyed English soccer even if he didn’t know much about it. But he knew enough to know that he needed to adopt a team for himself. He’d been captivated by Egyptian star Mo Salah in the World Cup. Salah played for Liverpool. Kerr was suddenly a Liverpool fan.

“I randomly (or not-so-randomly) picked them because of one player,” Kerr said. “But it was, like, oh my god, there’s all this other stuff that’s so awesome to follow.”

He quickly learned about the show tune fans sing before kickoff whose refrain has become Liverpool’s mantra. ”YOU’LL NEVER WALK ALONE!!!!!!!!!!!” Kerr tweeted after the victory over Barcelona. And he immediately gravitated toward the one aspect of the sport that he did know something about.

“I started to notice Jürgen Klopp,” Kerr said. “You could just see what a bright guy he was, his emotional intelligence and his love for his players without sacrificing that competitive fire—in fact actually fueling it.”

Kerr is still waiting to meet Klopp. Which makes him like pretty much every member of Klopp’s fan club. But until they can meet him, they have to settle for pretending to be him.

Liverpool’s wild 4-0 win to erase a 3-0 deficit in their Champions League semifinal against Barça happened on May 7. The Warriors, without Kevin Durant, came from behind to beat the Rockets on May 8—one of the most satisfying wins in Kerr’s coaching career.

Kerr decided this was the perfect time to channel his inner Klopp. Klopp had given himself permission to swear after determining that children were probably asleep by then. Kerr made sure he apologized to his mother before calling his players bleeping giants.

Three weeks later, Kerr was coaching in the NBA Finals once again, and Klopp was dealing with some business of his own: Liverpool was busy winning the Champions League.