Putin Backs Proposal Paving Way for New Presidential Term

MOSCOW—President Vladimir Putin backed a constitutional amendment to reset his term count, a move that could eventually prolong his two-decade grip on power until 2036.

The State Duma, Russia’s lower house of parliament, on Tuesday adopted a proposal that would allow Mr. Putin to run again in 2024, when his second sequential presidential term ends and he is currently required by the constitution to stand down.

Tuesday’s move was the latest step in a carefully choreographed process that began in January and has involved a change of government and Russia’s biggest constitutional overhaul since the end of the Soviet Union.

In a speech to lawmakers, punctuated by frequent applause, Mr. Putin said that he would back the changes if the country’s constitutional court didn’t object. They would be part of a wider package of constitutional amendments to be put to a national plebiscite in April.

Russia has had enough revolutions,” Mr. Putin said. “The president is the guarantor of the constitution, and to say more simply, the guarantor of the security of our state, its internal stability and internal, evolutionary development.

The amendment would allow Mr. Putin to serve another two back-to-back six-year presidential terms until 2036, when he would be 83.

With his conditional approval of the amendment, Mr. Putin is giving himself more options for after his term ends, said former government adviser Konstantin Gaaze, a Moscow-based political analyst.

Putin is convincing himself that he is irreplaceable,” Mr. Gaaze said. “So he re-established himself as a personal guarantor of the elite’s future.

Mr. Putin, 67, has held power in Russia since 1999, as either president or prime minister, though his popularity has begun to flag in recent months amid U.S. sanctions over Russia’s conflict with Ukraine and low oil and gas prices bruised the economy and living standards for Russians. The coronavirus outbreak and the recent fall in oil prices have presented further challenges for him.

“We see how difficult the situation is in world politics, in the field of security, in the global economy,” Mr. Putin said Tuesday. “The coronavirus also flew to us, and oil prices dance and jump, and with them the national currency and the exchange rate.”

In January, Mr. Putin proposed constitutional changes aimed at redistributing formal powers between the president, prime minister and parliament. Mr. Putin also reshuffled the government, removing longtime ally Dmitry Medvedev as prime minister and putting the former head of the tax service, Mikhail Mishustin, in charge.

The constitutional changes fueled speculation that Mr. Putin was seeking ways to continue to wield political power after 2024.

Mr. Putin, however, has denied that he wants to remain in power, saying he isn’t in favor of the Soviet-era tradition of having leaders who die in office.

A national vote on the constitutional amendments is scheduled for April 22. The changes include proposals to improve social policy and public administration.

While Mr. Putin’s plans to overhaul politics in Russia haven’t been met with a significant rise in public resistance, several thousand people attended a rally in the Russian capital last month, ostensibly to mark the murder of an opposition leader, in what they said was a rebuke to Mr. Putin’s plans to stay in power.

Across the globeparticularly in Africa, some autocratic leaders have changed national constitutions to remain in power indefinitely. In 2018, China abolished a two-term limit on the presidency, effectively allowing President Xi Jinping to remain in power for life.

So far, however, Mr. Putin has followed the letter of the law. In 2008, he stepped down as president and became prime minister while Mr. Medvedev served as president for four years.

On Tuesday, Valentina Tereshkova, a lawmaker and the first woman to have flown in space, proposed to scrap presidential term limits to allow Mr. Putin to run for re-election.

“In fact, this isn’t about him [Putin]; this is about us, citizens, and the future of the country,” she said. “What I know for sure is that the very fact of the availability of this opportunity for the incumbent president, considering his huge authority, is a stabilizing factor for our society.

Mr. Putin rejected the need for early parliamentary elections, another idea being debated at the Duma. Elections are currently scheduled for 2021.

Valentina Matviyenko, the speaker of Russia’s upper house, said that whether Mr. Putin decides to run again in 2024 or not, the election will be competitive and that “nothing is predetermined.”

Opposition leaders appeared unconvinced.

“It’s all clear: There won’t be early elections. Putin will be president for life,” Alexei Navalny, Russia’s most prominent opposition figure, said in a tweet.

Evangelical Fear Elected Trump

The history of evangelicalism in America is shot through with fear—but it also contains an alternative.

White conservative evangelicals in America are anxious people. I know because I am one.

Our sense of fear, perhaps more than any other factor, explains why evangelicals voted in such large numbers for Donald Trump in 2016 and continue to support his presidency.

The Pulitzer Prize-winning novelist and essayist Marilynne Robinson once wrote, “Fear is not a Christian habit of mind.” The great poet of the Jersey shore, Bruce Springsteen, sings, “Fear’s a dangerous thing, it can turn your heart black, you can trust. It’ll take your God-filled soul and fill it with devils and dust.”

Robinson and Springsteen echo verses in nearly every book of the Bible, the sacred text that serves as the source of spiritual authority in evangelical life.

  1. Moses told the Israelites to “Fear not, stand firm, and see the salvation of the Lord, which he will work for you today.” The Hebrew
  2. God told Job: “At the destruction and famine you shall laugh, and shall not fear the beasts of the earth.”
  3. The Psalmist wrote: “Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil, for you are with me; your rod and your staff they comfort me.”

The Gospel of John teaches Christians that “there is no fear in love, but perfect love casts out fear.” St. Luke writes: “Fear not, little flock, for it is your Father’s good pleasure to give you the kingdom.”

Despite all these scriptural passages, it is still possible to write an entire history of American evangelicalism as the story of a people failing miserably at overcoming fear with hope, trust, and faith in their God. But it is also possible to find evangelicals, drawing deeply from Christian theological resources, who sought to forge an alternative history.
A history of evangelical fear might begin with the 17th-century Puritans in Salem, Massachusetts, who feared that there were witches in their midst threatening their “city upon a hill” and their status as God’s new Israel. They responded to this fear by hanging 19 people.

But other evangelical options were available. As Puritans began to lose control over Massachusetts Bay, they might have turned to their sovereign God for guidance and trusted in his protection to lead them through a new phase in the history of the colony. Or they could have heeded the warnings put forth by those—such as Roger Williams, Anne Hutchinson, or the growing number of Baptists in the colony—who saw potential problems with such a close relationship between church and state.

Our history of evangelical fear might also include a chapter on the early 19th-century Protestants who feared the arrival of massive numbers of Catholic immigrants to American shores. They translated their panic into political organizations such as the nativist Know-Nothing Party and religious tracts cautioning fellow believers of the threat that such “popery” posed to their Christian nation.

But other evangelical options were available. Biblical faith requires evangelicals to welcome strangers in their midst as a sign of Christian hospitality. While some of the most prominent evangelicals of the era, such as Charles Finney and Lyman Beecher, were spewing anti-Catholic rhetoric, other evangelicals could not reconcile such hatred with Christian love. These evangelicals, as the historian Richard Cawardine has written, “could be found in all evangelical denominations” in the 1840 and 1850s.

A history of evangelical fear might also note that Catholics made up just one front in the battle for a Protestant America. “Infidels” made up the other front. At the turn of the 19th century, evangelicals went to war against unbelievers, deists, skeptics, freethinkers, and other assorted heretics who threatened the Godly character of the republic.

Elias Boudinot, a former president of the Continental Congress, agonized that unless he and his team of evangelical Federalists curbed the influence of the followers of Thomas Paine, the United States would end up like the Church of Laodicea in the Book of Revelation: “Because you are lukewarm [in your faith] … I am about to spit you out of my mouth.”

Jedidiah Morse, a Massachusetts minister and the author of geography textbooks, worried that the Bavarian Illuminati, a German anti-Christian secret society, had infiltrated America to “abjure Christianity, justify suicide, advocate sensual pleasures agreeable to Epicurean philosophy, decry marriage, and advocate a promiscuous intercourse among the sexes.”

When “godless” Thomas Jefferson was elected president of the United States in 1800, frightened New England evangelicals thought the Virginian’s henchmen would soon be arriving in their towns and homes on a mission to take away their Bibles.
But other evangelical options were also available. While Federalists like Boudinot and Morse railed against Jefferson and his followers, frontier evangelicals—mostly Baptists and Methodists—flocked to Jefferson in droves. They understood that Jefferson’s defense of religious freedom would allow evangelical faith to flourish in America. They were right. When religion in America was separated from state sponsorship, it resulted in a massive religious revival which historians have described as the Second Great Awakening.

In the antebellum South, evangelicals, according to some historians, made up close to 80 percent of the region’s population. Southern evangelicals were caught up in a slave system that kept them in constant fear for their lives and the lives of their families. Slave rebellions against their white masters were relatively scarce, but when insurrections did take place they brought paranoia and panic. One South Carolina widow claimed to lie in bed each night fearing that at any moment one of her slaves would break into her house and hack her to death with an axe.

The aggressive moral rhetoric and publishing campaigns of Northern opponents of slavery threatened the white Southern evangelical way of life and prompted fears of a race war. In response, some of the South’s best evangelical minds went to work constructing a complex biblical and theological defense of slavery.

But other evangelical options were available. Modern-day attempts by Southern evangelicals—especially those in the Southern Baptist Convention—to come to terms with its slaveholding and racist past imply that the Northern abolitionists, the thousands of evangelicals who came to South during Reconstruction, and those who fought for racial equality during Jim Crow, were on the religious high ground. They represented a much more consistent evangelical ethic on this moral problem.

The very short history of evangelical fear would certainly need to spend some time in the decades following the Civil War as evangelicals waged intellectual and religious battles against Darwinism and the higher criticism of the Bible. Some of the worst aspects of American evangelicalism converged in the Fundamentalist movement of the early 20th century. It was stridently anti-Catholic, and on occasion worked closely with the Ku Klux Klan to guard the white Protestant character of the country.

Fundamentalists, committed to the otherworldly teachings of the Holiness or “Higher Life” movement, chose to separate from the world rather than engage it. They promoted a theology of the “end times” that led them to spend considerable energy trying to identify the appearance of the Antichrist on the global stage.

In defending the “fundamentals of the faith,” these anti-modernists relied on authoritarian clergymen. These fear-mongers gained followers, built large congregations, and established national reputations by sounding the alarm of the modernist threat whenever they saw it rearing its ugly head. They took on the role of ecclesiastical strongmen, protecting their congregations from outsiders who threatened to destroy their faith and the Christian identity of the nation.

But once more, other evangelical options were available. Those concerned about doctrinal drift could have learned something from the biblical virtues of love and humility. The sense of certainty that defined the fundamentalist movement in America might have been replaced with a sense of mystery and the embrace of a God who could not always be confined to man-made doctrinal formulations and end-times speculations. Perhaps such an approach might have tempered the militancy of the movement and provided fundamentalism with a more respected public platform in the decades following the 1925 Scopes Trial.

Since World War II, evangelical anxiety has intensified. In 1947, in the landmark case Everson v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court announced a “wall of separation between church and state [that] must be kept high and impregnable.” The court drew on this decision when it banned prayer and mandatory Bible reading in public schools in 1962 and 1963 respectively.

The demographic makeup of the country was also changing. The Hart-Cellar Act of 1965 opened American shores to millions of Africans, Asians, and Middle Easterners. Many of these new immigrants brought their non-Christian religious beliefs and practices with them, creating unprecedented religious diversity.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Supreme Court efforts at desegregating Christian academies and colleges led to fierce resistance from Southern evangelicals who viewed the federal government as taking away their local autonomy and the religious freedom to control their own admissions policies. (These arguments were not unlike to those put forth by the Southern states that seceded from the Union in 1860 and 1861.) By the late 1960s, the feminist movement was posing a threat to the long-held conservative evangelical commitment to patriarchal households, and in 1973 the Supreme Court legalized abortion in Roe v. Wade. For those who saw all these things contributing to the decline of a Christian culture in the United States, there was much to fear.

Any effort to make sense of the 81 percent of evangelicals who voted for Donald Trump cannot ignore evangelicals’ fear of the Barack Obama administration. Obama was an exotic figure to many white conservative evangelicals. He grew up in Hawaii and spent time as a child in a predominantly Muslim country. He was the son of a white woman and an African man. He had a strange name; that his middle name was “Hussein” did not help.

Obama had a Christian conversion story, but it was not the kind of conversion story from which many white conservative evangelicals would find inspiration. His embrace of Christianity took place in a liberal African American congregation in Chicago under the guidance of a pastor, Jeremiah Wright, who was not shy about calling America to task for its past sins of slavery and racism.
Obama’s social policies alienated conservative evangelicals. Though “pro-life” could be used to describe his views on

  • immigration,
  • health care,
  • the death penalty,
  • the fight against poverty, and
  • civil rights for racial and ethnic minorities,

Obama was “pro-choice” on abortion and, for most evangelicals, that was all that really mattered.

And then there was gay marriage. When Obama ran for president in 2008, he supported same-sex unions, but defended marriage as a union between a man and woman. During his first two years in office, he supported the Defense of Marriage Act, a law that prohibited married same-sex couples from collecting federal benefits.

But in February 2011, he changed his position on the Act and instructed Attorney General Eric Holder to stop defending it in court. In a May 2012 interview with ABC News, Obama announced that he had gone through an “evolution” on the issue. He was now willing to affirm that “same-sex couples should be able to get married.”

In 2013, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Windsor, declared the Defense of Marriage of Act unconstitutional and the Obama administration began extending federal rights and benefits to same-sex married couples. By 2015, when the Court ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges that the United States government would recognize same-sex marriages, the practice was legal in 36 states and Washington, D.C. On the evening after the Obergefell decision, Obama showed his appreciation by illuminating the White House in rainbow colors.

The LGBT community saw the Obergefell decision as the culmination of a long struggle for civil rights. Conservative evangelicals cringed. For them it all happened too fast. In the hours after the decision they turned to their blogs, websites, and media outlets and wrote apocalyptic opinion pieces on how to cope in a post-Christian society.

This history of evangelical fear would come to an end, at least for the moment, with a chapter on Hillary Clinton. After a recent lecture on Trump and his evangelical supporters, a woman approached me at the lectern and identified herself as an evangelical who voted for Trump. “I am part of the 81 percent,” she said, “but what choice did I have?” I have heard something similar many times from evangelicals who voted for Trump.

Evangelicals are not supposed to hate. But many hate Hillary Clinton. The history of that antipathy is long, reaching back at least to Bill Clinton’s first presidential campaign in 1992. But it was solidified among white evangelical baby boomers when revelations of her husband’s marital infidelities surfaced in 1998. Conservatives who challenged Bill Clinton’s character were outraged when Hillary attacked her husband’s accusers and went on The Today Show and claimed that the impeachment charges against her husband were part of a “vast right-wing conspiracy.”

Hillary Clinton did not help herself among evangelicals in the 2016 election campaign. She lied about using a private email server in her role as secretary of state. She placed Trump supporters in a “basket of deplorables.” She made no effort to court evangelical votes, a strategy that the progressive evangelical writer and Clinton supporter Ronald Sider called “dumbfounding and incredibly stupid.”
On the policy front, Clinton was, for most white evangelicals, an extension of the Obama presidency—a candidate who would steamroll their long-cherished conservative values.

Faced with a choice between Clinton and a race-baiting, xenophobic, lying adulterer who promised to support conservative Supreme Court justices, white conservative evangelicals chose the latter. In 2016, American evangelicals were looking for a strongman to protect them from the progressive forces wreaking havoc on their Christian nation. Donald Trump was the strongman.

Most evangelicals did not believe more traditional candidates of the Christian right such as Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio, or Ben Carson could protect them as well as the bombastic big-talking New York real-estate tycoon. As Robert Jeffress, the pastor of the First Baptist Church in Dallas and early Trump supporter put it, “I couldn’t care less about a leader’s temperament or his tone of his vocabulary. Frankly, I want the meanest, toughest son of a gun I can find. And I think that’s the feeling of a lot of evangelicals. They don’t want Casper Milquetoast as the leader of the free world.”

Ironically, some evangelicals have found a savior. They sought after Trump, he answered them, and he delivered them from all their fears.

But other evangelical options are available. Evangelicals are people of hope, not fear. The practice of Christian hope points us to a life beyond this world, but it also requires us to act in such a way that models God’s coming kingdom. The Kingdom of God is characterized by the love of enemies, the welcoming of strangers, the belief in the human dignity of all people, a humble and self-sacrificial posture toward public life, and a trust in the sovereign God of the universe. Fear is a natural human response to social change, but evangelicals betray their deepest spiritual convictions when they choose to dwell in it.

The Trump era presents a host of new challenges for evangelicals who believe in the Gospel—the “good news” of Jesus Christ. The first step in addressing these challenges must come through a reckoning with our past. Evangelicals have taken many wrong turns over the decades even though better, more Christian, options could be found by simply opening up the Bible and reading it. We must stop our nostalgic gaze into a Christian golden age in America that probably never existed to begin with and turn toward the future with renewed hope. It is time, as the great theologian of hope Jurgen Moltmann taught us, to “waken the dead and piece together what has been broken.”

American Paganism

It’s not what the Religious Right thinks it is.

Claims of moral decline are a perennial feature of conservative rhetoric. But in recent years, pro-Trump Christians have emphasized a new reason to be afraid. The United States, they say, is devolving into such wanton “paganism” that the country may not survive. The true America awaits rescue by the Christian faithful, and in such an existential struggle, nearly any means are justified—even reelecting a morally abhorrent president.

Examples of this rhetoric are not in short supply, among pundits and even in more scholarly work. In an essay praising Donald Trump’s “animal instinct” for “order” and “social cohesion,” Sohrab Ahmari opposed an America of “traditional Christianity” to one of “libertine ways and paganized ideology.” These are our only choices, he insisted. Between such incompatible enemies, there can be only “war and enmity,” so true believers should be ready to sacrifice civility in the battles ahead to reconquer the public squareRod Dreher has speculated that Trump, while unpalatable, could be a divine emissary holding back the horrors of Christian persecution, like the biblical figure of He Who Delays the Antichrist, an implicit nod to old pagan enemies. “If Christians like me vote for Trump in 2020,” Dreher warns, “it is only because of his role as katechon in restraining what is far worse.” Though in a calmer tone, Ross Douthat entertained similar ideas in his column “The Return of Paganism,” wondering if the pantheist tendencies in American civil religion could morph into a neo-paganism hostile to Christian faith.

Douthat cites a recent book by law professor Steven D. Smith, Pagans & Christians in the City: Culture Wars from the Tiber to the Potomac. According to Smith, what we know as “secularismis actually ancient paganism in modern guise. Since paganism is inherently anti-Christian, this means Christians should oppose both secular politics and secular universities at any cost. They are not fighting against a neutral arbiter, but against the wiles of pagan Rome redivivus, a strain of this-worldly sexualized spirituality nearly eradicated by Christianity, but now mutated and all the more lethal.

Smith is only the most recent Christian author to invoke the specter of paganism. R. R. Reno, the editor of First Things, wrote Resurrecting the Idea of a Christian Society on the eve of the 2016 election, apparently anticipating a Clinton victory. The book’s title alludes to T. S. Eliot’s 1938 essay on “The Idea of a Christian Society,” in which Eliot condemns the rise of “modern paganism.” Reno told his readers to view 2016 in light of 1938. “Would the West seek a Christian future or a pagan one?” he asked. “We face a similar decision today. Will we seek to live in accord with the idea of a Christian society, or will we accept the tutelage of a pagan society?” Yuval Levin called Reno’s book a “call to arms against a postmodern paganism.”

This charge of looming paganism exerts a twofold political function. First, it

  1. rationalizes Trumpism, casting our situation as a state of emergency that threatens the survival of U.S. Christians.
  2. Second, the sacrilege of pagan religion prevents Trump’s supporters from indulging in political moderation by making that seem like a form of apostasy. It’s probably not a coincidence that “paganism” is on the rise just as Christian conservatives decide whether to support the current administration in an election year. It is challenging to explain how Trump’s policies are Christian. It is far easier to label his opponents as pagans, and thus align the president with Christianity by default. But there are fundamental problems with the conservative narrative of a resurgent paganism.

In the first place, the term “paganism” only works in this maneuver because it is vague and perspectival. It always has been, ever since Christians invented it. Ancient Christians stuck the name on those who continued the traditional rites of Greco-Roman religion rather than adopt the true faith. Indeed the largely urban Christians meant it as a mild pejorative for the rural country bumpkins, the pagani, who lived far from imperial centers and persisted in their benighted worship of the old gods. In our terms, the first “pagans” lived in flyover country and clung to their traditional religion. 

Since “pagan” has come to mean “un-Christian,” every invocation of “pagan” brings with it an implicit understanding of “Christian.” The meaning of the former is parasitic on the latter. Misunderstanding the essence of paganism, therefore, also means misunderstanding the demands of Christianity, and vice versa.

More left-leaning Christians might well agree with Smith and Reno in one sense: there is indeed an ascendant paganism afoot in our country today. It threatens the social and moral fabric of American public life and contends directly against the voice of Christian truth. One can brook no compromise in resisting it. The difference comes in how that paganism is defined. The debate is not whether paganism is real, but where it lives, how it appears, and what it does. If conservatives have mistaken its location, they might be training their weapons in the wrong direction.

Much hangs, then, on accurately discerning the meaning of “modern paganism.” Let us consider three proposals: Steven Smith’s recent version, T. S. Eliot’s original version, and another timely version from First Things.

Christians were the most conspicuous defenders of divine immanence in the ancient world. It was pagans who derided Christians for violating the self-evident truths of divine transcendence.

Steven Smith suggests that secularism is not a neutral space, but conceals its own religious identity, which is essentially pagan. It venerates the sacred within the natural world, knows only the cycle of birth and death, and thus celebrates a libertine sexuality. As opposed to Abrahamic religions that affirm the “transcendent sacred,” paganisms old and new prefer the “immanent sacred.” Smith delves into the emergence of Christians in the Roman Empire and vividly evokes the oddity of Christianity in the ancient world, heeding the scholarship of Peter Brown, Jan Assmann, and Kyle Harper (but Edward Gibbon most of all). Smith then applies his ancient model to American constitutional law and finds it confirms conservative positions on religious freedom, public symbols, and sexual norms.

But there are serious problems with Smith’s argument. Since the 1970s, scholars of religion have largely retired the vague categories formerly used to organize speculation about comparative religions—sacred and secular, immanent and transcendent, holy and profane, this-worldly and other-worldly. Major religious traditions are massive and multifarious in the ways they sustain rituals, ethics, and beliefs. Their communities cut across languages, continents, empires, and epochs, teeming with exceptions and discontinuities. The blunt tools applied by Smith are simply not up to the task of uncovering the essence of one religion, let alone two or three, and they are certainly not able to trace the notoriously complicated history of the “secular.”

For the sake of argument, though, let us grant Smith his chosen terms, and even focus on his central claim, that Christianity can lead the way in challenging modern secularity, since it insists on the “transcendent sacred” in a way that secular paganism does not. Smith’s proposal rests upon a fundamental analogy: paganism is to Christianity as immanence is to transcendence. Christians pray to the God beyond the world; pagans encounter divinity inside the weft of nature.

Even a cursory knowledge of Christianity is enough to refute this analogy. It is true that Judaism teaches the absolute transcendence of the one God, as do Islamic theologians today, and as did Neoplatonist pagan philosophers in antiquity who sought a divine One beyond every thought, word, and image. By contrast, orthodox Christians claim that God arrived and now eternally resides within the fabric of nature, as the Creator enters into creation in the body of Jesus Christ. To cite Smith’s definition of “paganism,” it is Christianity, in fact, that “refers to a religious orientation that locates the sacred within this world.” The Christian belief in the Incarnation is nothing if not a belief in the “immanent sacred.”

The new Christian movement distinguished itself from Greek philosophy, Roman cults, and Jewish faith alike by affirming an extensive and peculiar list of divine incursions into immanence: the Incarnation of God in the body of Jesus; Anne’s immaculate conception of Mary; Mary’s virginal conception and vaginal birth of the Son of God, making her Theotokos; the real flesh of Jesus suffering on the cross, against the Gnostics (Tertullian); the real presence of Jesus in the Eucharistic bread and wine, also against the Gnostics; the Resurrection of the body after death; the bodily assumption of Mary; the martyrdom of the body as bloody birth into heaven (Perpetua) or as the grinding of flesh into bread (Ignatius of Antioch); the church birthed through the bleeding side wound of a dying Jesus; the church as maternal breast suckling the Christian with milk; the union of Christ and Christians as the exemplar of which sexual union is the image (Ephesians 5, Origen of Alexandria). Above all, the scandalous immanence that might have sounded pagan to Jesus’s disciples: “Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you do not have life within you” (John 6). The enemy of these traditional Christian teachings is not sacred immanence, but rather a gnosticism that dematerializes and disembodies the real presence of God within creation.

The radically immanent sacred of Christians scandalized the Romans. As Ramsay MacMullen observes, Christians worshipping a new transcendent deity would have passed unremarked. But the Christian belief that Jesus was neither prophet nor sage but a fleshly God would have been mocked by pagan intellectuals as a risible error. The late New Testament scholar Larry Hurtado writes: “In the philosophical traditions, an ultimate and radically transcendent deity was often postulated, but you did not typically engage that transcendent deity directly.… But there was a still more unusual and, in the eyes of pagan sophisticates, outlandish Christian notion: the one, true, august God who transcended all things and had no need of anything, nevertheless, had deigned to create this world and, a still more remarkable notion, also now actively sought the redemption and reconciliation of individuals.” For pagan intellectuals, Hurtado concludes, “all this was, quite simply, preposterous.”

For instance, in his work On the True Doctrine (178 CE), the pagan philosopher Celsus is ready to accept that God exists, creates all things, and transcends nature. But in shades of Sam Harris or Richard Dawkins, Celsus laughs away the claim that God was incarnated in Jesus, or that the body could be resurrected. “I mean, what sort of body is it that could return to its original nature or become the same as it was before it rotted away?” he mocks. “And of course they have no reply for this one, and as in most cases where there is no reply they take cover by saying ‘Nothing is impossible with God.’ A brilliant answer indeed! But the fact is, God cannot do what is contrary to nature.”

Christian philosophers saw the divide similarly. Tertullian admits that pagan philosophers might even discern that God exists by their own lights. But they always miss that God descended into a virgin and was made flesh in her womb. Augustine reports that he learned from the pagan philosopher Plotinus that the Logos was transcendent—but only Christians taught him how the Logos embraced the human body in all of its weakness and vulnerability, and its awful exposure to the whims of imperial violence.

To put it bluntly: paganism cannot simply mean divine immanence. On the contrary, Christians were the most conspicuous defenders of that principle in the ancient world. It was pagans who derided Christians for violating the self-evident truths of divine transcendence.

The resemblances between the modern paganism feared by T.S. Eliot in 1938 and conservative politics in 2020 are uncanny.

A better starting point for defining “paganism” is T. S. Eliot’s essay “The Idea of a Christian Society,” written in the dark days of 1938, where he proposes that the greatest enemy of modern Christianity is “modern paganism.” Reno and Smith alike summon Eliot as a sober authority in perilous times, but neither presents Eliot’s own account of the term in question. So how did Eliot define paganism? It’s important to stay as close as possible to his own words.

First, Eliot says paganism embraces an authoritarian politics that confuses religion and nationhood. The “distinguishing mark” of a Christian society, Eliot writes, is its productive “tension” between church and state, but pagan society seeks to “fuse” them. Pagan culture “de-Christianises” individuals gradually and unwittingly, as authoritarianism creeps in. Soon, he warns, one’s hymns are no longer to God alone, but also to the dear leader.

Second, Eliot says that modern paganism incites ecological destruction. The Christian lives in harmony with nature; the pagan destroys public resources for private profit. “Unregulated industrialism” and “the exhaustion of natural resources,” writes Eliot, lead to “the exploitation of the earth, on a vast scale.” In a formulation that strikingly anticipates Laudato si’, he puts it succinctly: “A wrong attitude towards nature implies, somewhere, a wrong attitude towards God.

Third, modern paganism imposes a puritanical public morality. It promotes, in Eliot’s words, “regimentation and conformity, without respect for the needs of the individual soul” and “the puritanism of a hygienic morality in the interest of efficiency.” According to Eliot, in fact, modern paganism will even attempt to elevate the status of Christian identity in society. But paganism embraces Christianity not because it’s true, but because it consolidates the nation and discourages dissent. He notes that authoritarians have always celebrated public morality. They want, in a way, more morality, even if their priorities are haphazardly formulated. Eliot warns that such a moralistic Christianity is not only a perversion of the faith: “It is not enthusiasm, but dogma, that differentiates a Christian from a pagan society.” Such versions of Christianity might even “engender nothing better than a disguised and peculiarly sanctimonious nationalism, accelerating our progress toward the paganism which we say we abhor.”

The resemblances between the modern paganism feared by Eliot in 1938 and conservative politics in 2020 are uncanny. The “paganism” that future Christians will need to identify and resist, he warned, will appear as

  • unrestrained capitalist greed; as
  • authoritarianism seeking to weaken democratic norms; as
  • callous environmental degradation; as a
  • superficial Christian moralism seeking to fuse church and state; and as a
  • petty “sanctimonious nationalism.” 

In the poignant final paragraph of his essay, Eliot confesses that the churning political surprises of the 1930s had left him shaken, not only because of the events themselves, but in the revelation of his own country’s moral poverty. In the face of Britain’s failure to mount an adequate response to modern pagan violence, Eliot felt a justified “humiliation” that demanded of him “personal contrition” along with “repentance, and amendment.” He felt “deeply implicated and responsible” and began to question his country’s frequent claims to moral authority. When Eliot enjoins his readers to fight against modern paganism, it is specifically because its brew of authoritarianism and capitalism were already beginning to charm Christian intellectuals who should know better. Eliot’s final sentences prick the conscience today:

We could not match conviction with conviction, we had no ideas with which we could either meet or oppose the ideas opposed to us. Was our society, which had always been so assured of its superiority and rectitude, so confident of its unexamined premises, assembled round anything more permanent than a congeries of banks, insurance companies and industries, and had it any beliefs more essential than a belief in compound interest and the maintenance of dividends? Such thoughts as these formed the starting point, and must remain the excuse, for saying what I have to say.

The paganism we should fear is not secularism, sacred immanence, or pantheist naturalism. It is power celebrating its violence, perceiving the world empty of everything save the contest of will.

But there was at least one other account of paganism in the pages of First Things as Trump campaigned for the presidency—this time from Matthew Schmitz, an editor at the magazine. Over the summer of 2016, Schmitz displayed an admirable prescience while Christian conservatives were still hesitating to endorse the eventual Republican nominee. The “faith taught by Christ,” he wrote, “is a religion of losers. To the weak and humble, it offers a stripped and humiliated Lord.… In Trump, it [Christian faith] has curdled into pagan disdain.”

Schmitz’s analyses from April and August of 2016 really must be considered at length, given where they were published. Take this representative passage:

At a campaign event in Iowa, Trump shocked the audience by saying that he had never asked God for forgiveness. All his other disturbing statements—his attacks on every vulnerable group—are made intelligible by this one…. Human frailty, dependency, and sinfulness cannot be acknowledged; they must be overcome. This opens up the possibility of great cruelty toward those who cannot wish themselves into being winners. A man who need not ask forgiveness need never forgive others. He does not realize his own weakness, and so he mocks and reviles every sign of weakness in his ­fellow men.

And here’s another:

In his contempt for losers, he [Trump] embodies one of the most unchristian ideals ever advanced in American politics. With a unique consistency and vehemence, he expresses his hatred of weakness. He ridicules the disabled, attacks women, and defends abortionists. This is the opposite of Christianity, which puts the weak first and exalts every loser…. Liberalism, much as I hate it, has preserved this Christian inheritance. The GOP before Trump, despite all its contempt for the 47 percent, was leavened by the influence of sincere Christians and so was never so sneering. Trump is an altogether more pagan figure.

By 2019, however, in the wake of the midterm battles over immigration and the mythic “caravan” of refugees at the southern border, Schmitz joined others to cheer on the “new nationalism” that Trump promoted at his rallies. Within a few months, Schmitz had decided that Christianity and liberalism could never be reconciled, since modern society—wait for it—had become paganized. “The Church,” he now saw, “is at odds with an increasingly pagan culture.”

If there was an ancient paganism of sacred immanence, it was soon outstripped by the more radical immanence of Christians in their claims of an Incarnation, a Resurrection, and above all the enduring food of the Eucharist. In every Mass the priest washes his hands in imitation of the pagan Pilate, but now as an act of humility and celebration. The  Catholic repeats as her own the words of the pagan centurion—Lord, I am not worthy—but now as an intimate prayer on the threshold of Communion. That version of paganism was overtaken and dissolved from within by the Christian sacralization of the body.

But there is another paganism that has survived into the present, and has emerged so vividly in contemporary politics that even First Things in 2016 could not miss it. This is not the paganism of immanence, but the paganism of cruelty and violence. It mocks the vulnerable, reviles the weak, and gains strength through hatred. We don’t have to look too far to discover the “postmodern paganism” threatening American Christianity today. 

Last summer the Trump administration argued in court that more than two thousand migrant and refugee children should be separated from their parents, concentrated in crude detention camps with minimal supervision, and locked in chilled rooms with the lights left on all night. The administration has yet to condemn the petty cruelty of some camp guards and instead has mused that such violence might be politically useful. Hundreds of children as young as two are deliberately denied diapers, soap, and toothbrushes for months at a time to punish their parents. Community donations of the same are turned away. Young women are denied tampons. Young children are denied inexpensive flu vaccines, and if they contract a terminal cancer, they are deported without medical care. Chickenpox and shingles are common. Federal contractors win upwards of $700 per day for each imprisoned child. Seven children have died in custody to date, and many more have been hospitalized. Doctors worry they cannot serve in the camps without violating the Hippocratic oath. The camps themselves were continued from the Obama administration, but the withdrawal of basic necessities is Trump’s innovation. What is this if not the very paganism conservatives decry?

This modern paganism ultimately means the nihilistic exercise of power for its own sake, especially power over weak and vulnerable bodies. In its purest form, it is expressed as conspicuous cruelty, both to render one’s power maximally visible and to increase that power by engendering fear. The cruelty is the point. This is the joyful paganism that Nietzsche sought to revive as the Wille zur Macht, retrieving from ancient Rome the glorious pleasure in cruelty that rewards the strong who exercise their strength. This is the reason Italian fascist Julius Evola hated Christianity for its compassion for the poor and weak.

We find this paganism exposed in the ancient world as well, in the Athenian mockery and massacre of the Melians in Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian War, in Thrasymachus’s authoritarian attacks on Socrates in Plato’s Republic, or in Augustine’s shrewd deconstruction of imperial power in The City of God against the Pagans. John Milbank calls this Nietzschean worldview an ontology of eternal violence opposed to an Augustinian counter-ontology of eternal peace. As Schmitz himself suggests, the perfect example of pagan disdain for vulnerability and conspicuous cruelty is the Roman practice of public crucifixion. Pagan is to Christian not as immanent is to transcendent, but as Rome is to the Crucified—a cruel empire to its tortured victims.

But modern paganism can also assume subtler forms, whenever the common good is reduced to ruthless economic competition, confirming Eliot’s fears that we have no values more essential than our “belief in compound interest and the maintenance of dividends.” The paganism we should fear is not secularism, sacred immanence, or pantheist naturalism. It is power celebrating its violence, perceiving the world empty of everything save the contest of wills, a nihilism ruled by the libido dominandi.

This paganism views moral responsibility as a fool’s errand for the weak, since all that matters is to dominate or be dominated. It sacralizes the emperor as an agent of God, scorns truth, despises the weak, and tortures the vulnerable. And it cloaks its nihilism, to cite Eliot once again, in “a disguised and peculiarly sanctimonious nationalism, accelerating our progress toward the paganism which we say we abhor.”

20-30% of the Population is Authoritarian in Europe and US

44:03
sentences I apologize so I’m a New Deal
44:05
Democrat from Massachusetts just like
44:07
you what do we do about the thirty
44:10
percent of the population that believes
44:12
everything Trump says every conspiracy
44:15
theory they’ve been going like that
44:17
since the Southern Strategy started in
44:19
the 70s and under Reagan in the 80s I
44:22
can give money I can make phone calls
44:25
I believe in swinging left or whatever
44:27
it’s called but no red state person is
44:30
going to listen to
44:31
someone like me I am the elite and they
44:34
hate us 30 just you answered your own
44:37
question in a way we’ve always had 30
percent of the twenty to thirty percent
of the country has always been unfairly
far-right
and I think one of the
troubling things about now is you kind
of mainstream some of that old-fashioned
I’ll call it right-wing extremism that
leaves 70 percent of the country I think
you week there’s a majority to be had
there I guess I’m not worried that there
are a certain number of people who
believe anything you know some of our
opponents think of out of us seventy
percent I think your figure is broadly
right it might even be a little less
than thirty percent and we can make
democracy work on the basis of those
number point is not unanimity we need
majorities to accomplish ends we report
on a study in yes okay wait you can’t
leave them hang on the study and then
your point is the majority has spoken
they want to hear it yeah the pool of
the pool of people who would vote for
far-right parties in Europe hasn’t
changed the percentage for for thirty
years what makes the difference is the
activity at the leadership level
the
kind of Appeals that are being made the
the structure of the electoral system
that sometimes diminishes their
mobilization and activity and other
times brings them to the fore so we need
other voices at the leadership level
both in communities and nationally
46:21
speaking out and that will make a
46:24
difference my concern
46:44
many families you go home at
46:45
Thanksgiving and there’s somebody who
46:47
have had that on in almost as background
46:50
noise for 25 years and there’s a lot of
46:53
misinformation I can talk to people and
46:56
hear their pain and relate on that level
46:59
but if they’ve been hearing something
47:01
for 25 years and believe things that are
47:03
demonstrably untrue to be true my
47:06
question is a is it worth it to try to
47:09
deal with that and be is do you actually
47:12
think that that had an influence on this
47:14
past election yeah well we have a lot on
47:18
this in the book which by the way makes
47:21
a great holiday gift not too early for
47:25
Christmas
47:26
Monica thanks Pete he says it with every
47:29
book one ferocious Shana one for Yom
47:32
Kippur or another one for Sukkot you
47:37
know one we have a very large problem
47:39
when you lose the public square and when
47:41
people cocoon in and get the information
47:44
they want to there is a big problem on
47:47
the right because there’s a deliberate
47:49
attempt to lie and distort and give
47:51
people false facts and large numbers of
47:55
people believe those things three
47:56
there’s a term called motivated
47:58
reasoning where once you believe
48:00
something and you get incontrovertible
48:02
evidence to the contrary you are
48:04
motivated to deny that and believe
48:07
something that’s untrue and dealing with
48:10
that is an enormous problem in the
48:12
country and there’s no clear answer one
48:16
of the things we have to do is recreate
48:18
a public square and hope that if we
48:19
build it they will come
48:21
and we see some of this with public
48:22
media we need to find other ways to do
48:25
it and we need to be relentless in
48:27
fact-checking
48:28
even if some people aren’t going to
48:30
believe it to make sure that a larger
48:32
group of people who don’t pay a lot of
48:33
attention don’t come to believe that for
48:36
example Sciences evenly divided on
48:39
climate change and you they need to
48:43
understand reality and that is our job
48:45
as well
48:50
oh yeah yeah he wants he’s from the
48:57
other side yeah please do you mind
48:59
let could yeah go ahead uh yeah you’re
49:04
loud and clear
49:05
I grew up overseas was born in Nebraska
49:07
raised overseas in a British school
49:10
system and it was much more
49:12
authoritarian much more regimented like
49:16
the military can you hear me
49:18
let him speak please go ahead anyway the
49:21
Queen was in charge of the British
49:23
Empire so as a little kid I sang god
49:25
save the queen every morning rather than
49:26
the Pledge of Allegiance came back here
49:28
every six years to reaffirm my
49:30
citizenship and learn how to talk like
49:32
an American and spell like one and do my
49:35
cursive like one and from overseas the
49:40
the 60s we’re evolving and LA was
49:43
burning and the riots and the drugs and
49:45
sexual revolution and it looked like
49:48
from overseas that our country was just
49:49
starting to go down the toilet well here
49:52
we are 50 years later and divorce rates
49:55
have not gone down children are not much
49:58
more respectful of their parents the
50:01
legal system is under constant attack
50:03
from every source and within and without
50:06
terrorism’s running rampant the
50:08
economy’s in danger so my question is
50:10
we’re not progressing and somehow in the
50:13
midst of all that collapsing over 60
50:16
years Trump won I’m not sure how he did
50:18
I don’t like many of the things he’s
50:21
done or reported to me have done and if
50:24
Muller finds finds out that he’s part of
50:27
the swamp that needs to be drained I
50:29
hope he gets trained but until that
50:31
point whether it takes a year or two
50:33
years I think we should be polite
50:34
citizens and show that we’re mature
50:37
American world citizens and allow the
50:40
rule of law to work because that’s what
50:42
we’re based on hey are you done sir
50:45
thank you very much at first thanks for
50:48
nine hours of prayers for the country we
50:50
needed could I just say really quickly I
50:53
very much agree with something in what
50:57
you said which is we do want to uphold
50:59
our laws and our Constitution but part
51:03
of what that provides for is the
51:06
opportunity to dissent against the
51:08
government that obviously many of the
51:10
people in this room some probably about
51:13
half of the country now feels is under
51:16
some real threat from the president
51:19
because of how he behaves on a whole
51:21
series of issues we try to make the case
51:24
in our book that there is reason to be
51:27
vigilant against a president whose
51:30
habits sometimes resemble those of other
51:33
leaders who have undercut democracy
51:35
itself and we also think that the
51:38
policies Trump is pursuing paradoxically
51:41
are likely to worsen the situation of
51:43
many of the people who voted for him
51:45
particularly for example the repeal of
51:47
the Affordable Care Act but if you want
51:50
to talk to us I’d be happy to extend the
51:52
argument with you or the conversation
51:54
but I appreciate your speaking up thank
51:55
you sir
51:56
thank you we’ll get you afterwards yeah
52:06
how much time we spend in the general
52:09
media on diversion distraction denial
52:16
duplicity and not separating all of that
52:21
activity in great words and pictures
52:24
from do what’s really going on how can
52:28
we help great papers like the Washington
52:31
Post and New York Times which I added to
52:33
subscription because I want people to go
52:35
on to separate in the paper all of the
52:39
four DS there’s a distraction because
52:42
they still want to show it and to dues
52:44
what’s going on so we can look at that
52:47
and not get distracted at about you know
52:50
one thing I will say what each a and I
52:52
did one a on Friday it was actually
52:55
really wonderful exchange and they the
52:57
Week in Review section but we never got
53:01
to for example Tom Price four hundred
53:05
thousand dollars and taxpayer money to
53:07
take
53:09
charter jets and that’s one of the key
53:12
questions here the the kleptocracy this
53:15
sort of abuse of government some of this
53:17
gets drowned out by distraction and I
53:21
think apart what we’re hoping to do with
53:23
the book is to get people focused back
53:24
on these larger questions but there’s a
53:27
natural tendency both in a media looking
53:29
for eyeballs and for subscriptions to go
53:34
to the controversy and one of the things
53:36
that Trump understands in his gut
53:38
whenever the news Titans is to get out
53:41
there and create a new distraction and
53:43
some of what we’re dealing with today is
53:45
positive but let’s face it some of it is
53:47
an attempt to distract away from the
53:49
others Greg quickly he makes it really
53:51
hard because you can’t really not cover
53:54
what he said about Colin Kaepernick and
53:58
Steph Curry and you can’t just let it go
54:01
even though if you could make a very
54:04
good case that what we actually should
54:06
be talking about is the health care bill
54:07
and what the world they’re going to do
54:09
on taxes and we just got to figure out
54:11
how to do a couple of things at the same
54:12
time and not let one drown out the other
54:15
but it’s really hard I’m struck by the
54:18
absence of any discussion about
54:22
corporate power and citizens united in
54:25
this process and I was wondering if you
54:26
could comment on that my colleagues have
54:29
been fighting citizens united they
54:31
survive forever so it’s in the book we
54:33
have a big big chunk on campaign finance
54:36
and citizens united and and the problem
54:40
the problem is it’s it’s less corporate
54:43
power than it’s the power of a handful
54:47
of billionaires who who are looking to
54:50
amuse themselves and and to realize
54:53
their their fantasies about a world they
54:58
would like to create in this country and
55:02
so we have a number of suggestions for
55:04
it I mean it there’s no easy answer
55:05
especially after Merrick garland was not
55:10
allowed a hearing and a vote on the
55:13
court and now it’s going to be tougher
55:15
and tougher but we need a new
55:17
jurisprudence that will get us beyond
55:20
focusing simply on corrupt
55:23
to deal with the broader problems of of
55:27
representation accountability and in our
55:30
government so it’s it’s it’s less that
55:34
their divisions within the corporate
55:37
structure of America as we see very much
55:41
new and old and and and I think we
55:46
talked about but we also talked about
55:47
reforming the corporation in other words
55:49
I think you have a point about I think
55:51
we all agree you have a point about
55:53
corporate power and that’s why we have
55:56
this Charter for social responsibility
55:58
which is about reforming the corporation
56:01
because as long as the corporation is
56:03
focused only only on shareholder value
56:06
and the bottom line this is this is not
56:08
George Romney capitalism you know if you
56:11
go back and look at George Romney this
56:13
was a vision of capitalism that was
56:15
about making your companies successful
56:17
but also being concerned about the
56:19
commonweal in some sense what made the
56:21
company this society that made the
56:23
company’s successful and I don’t wanna
56:25
be nostalgic about that because
56:26
nostalgia never works but there was
56:28
something about that approach to
56:29
capitalism that was different than the
56:32
one that we’ve had recently social media
56:42
and Facebook for example and what seems
56:47
to be coming out is the possibility that
56:53
there are other secret ways of
56:55
influencing people who don’t have any
56:57
idea what’s going on social media more
57:02
broadly is one of the drivers here when
57:05
you have tribal media and it can be
57:07
amplified by social media and lies can
57:09
spread through a number of different
57:11
vehicles and all of us regularly get
57:13
emails from friends and relatives that
57:15
say can you believe this with a link to
57:19
something and just remember if you get
57:21
something that says can you believe this
57:22
don’t believe it but but there’s
57:28
enormous that’s right well it might be a
57:31
cat video that’s different
57:33
but there’s a larger point about
57:35
Facebook a couple of large points the
57:37
first is when Facebook agreed to give
57:39
out this information this was not Mark
57:42
Zuckerberg in a patriotic gesture saying
57:46
we are gonna open up they were pushed to
57:48
do it
57:49
they didn’t say much when they got a
57:51
hundred and fifty million dollars in
57:52
revenue but there’s another element of
57:54
this what those ads did was
57:56
extraordinarily sophisticated in
57:58
targeting particular groups of voters
58:00
and a very large share of the country
58:02
gets its information about politics from
58:04
Facebook somebody not a Russian gave
58:09
them that information at a sophisticated
58:12
level and what we can hope is that the
58:16
Muller investigation will dig down even
58:18
deeper and remember that this wasn’t
58:20
just about a presidential contest there
58:22
was targeting including WikiLeaks that
58:26
hit particular members of Congress and
58:28
then ads including from Paul Ryan’s PAC
58:32
that went after those a lot of people
58:36
here colluded and if we don’t get to the
58:39
bottom of this and if we don’t in sit as
58:41
an action make sure that states are
58:42
protected against problems in the future
58:47
then we will have lost our democracy
58:48
this is that as big a threat to
58:51
democracy as anything I can imagine in
58:54
under semi-normal times the President of
58:58
the United States would make it the
59:01
number one domestic priority to deal
59:04
with with a commission and with an
59:07
effort to see that we protect our
59:10
electoral system I think we’ll take two
59:15
more questions the people are at the
59:16
microphone yeah I’m a Bernie guy I want
59:19
to go back to the primary
59:22
that Bernie V Trump out pulled the
59:26
ever-lovin mess out of Hillary v Trump
59:30
do any of you think that Bernie could
59:33
have beat Trump in the general election
59:36
I’m I got to say I think I’m an agnostic
59:39
on that question I’m not certain here on
59:41
the first of all Hillary did suffer some
59:44
some of the votes against Hillary were
59:46
sexist so that doesn’t hurt Bernie
59:48
so that’s on that side and that Bernie
59:51
clearly carried some of the
59:54
constituencies where Trump made big
59:56
inroads working quite well we got ultra
59:58
ultra left socialists versus ultra ultra
60:02
right not so anybody I mean the device
60:05
not a man surprise I’ll bet there and
60:07
that that’s on the other side of the
60:08
equation other words I think Bernie
60:09
might have had some appeal to some of
60:11
the constituencies that Trump did
60:13
extremely well in I’m wondering what he
60:15
would have lost on the other side that
60:17
Bernie never came in for that very much
60:20
harsh attack from the Clinton campaign
60:22
because they assume they win the primary
60:24
and did not want to alienate Bernie’s
60:26
voters and we’ve never had a trial run
60:28
of what an anti Bernie campaign really
60:31
would have a looked to like so I think
60:32
there’s something on the side that he
60:34
could have won but I don’t think we
60:36
really tested the proposition very well
60:38
in the primary so I as I say I’m
60:40
agnostic on the question I I don’t one I
60:43
don’t think we should let some Bernie
60:44
people like Susan Sarandon off the hook
60:47
people who said Trump would be even
60:50
better than Hillary or there’s no
60:51
difference here have some responsibility
60:54
with what we’re getting now but second
60:58
you cannot look at a Bernie who went
61:01
through a primary process as a kind of
61:03
folk hero even though he lost soundly
61:05
you have to look at what Bernie would
61:07
have looked like after a billion dollars
61:09
coming from Russia the right and others
61:13
would have done to Bernie and you know
61:16
we had a mini scandal with Bernie and
61:18
his wife over the collapse of her
61:20
college he didn’t release his own tax
61:22
returns
61:23
just imagine what they would have made
61:25
out of little things there so never look
61:27
at somebody who didn’t run or didn’t win
61:30
that’s true Abidin as well without
61:31
thinking of what it would have been like
61:33
if they’d been through this meat grinder
61:35
last question thank you for moderating
61:41
thank you for hosting I look forward to
61:43
new location which I’m gonna call
61:46
politics pros and baseball near
61:48
Nationals Park that’s a great name
61:52
okay I want to incorporate baseball into
61:56
it an election is like a baseball game
61:58
you want to have your best pitcher in
62:01
the seventh game and every four years we
62:03
have a seventh game it’s called the
62:06
presidential election is this the best
62:08
two pitchers both parties could have put
62:10
on the mound for their teams do I have
62:13
to go listen to this nonsense oh the
62:15
game with 18 innings and we and it’s a
62:17
draw 1-1 because this pitcher wasn’t
62:20
available that pitcher wasn’t available
62:22
because he pitched yesterday Joe Biden
62:25
was available John Kasich was available
62:30
and if the party’s the Democratic our
62:33
Democratic the Republican Party pulled
62:35
us nonsence again guess what I may see
62:39
it in 2028 but I look forward to seeing
62:42
the first present knighted States from
62:44
neither party thank you we do agree on
62:51
we definitely agree the place is a side
62:53
bet on that just really quickly I be Joe
62:56
Biden obviously did run it would have
62:58
been a fascinating contest if he had run
63:00
against Hillary Clinton as norm said I
63:03
think you could run the same analysis
63:05
and see what would have happened to Joe
63:06
Biden he clearly had some assets that he
63:10
could have brought to the table but if
63:12
you look at Hillary Clinton put aside
63:13
whether people I suspect looking at the
63:16
voting of our area this had fairly
63:18
pro-clinton crowd but whether you’re pro
63:20
or anti Clinton it’s clearly a case that
63:23
she was one of the most qualified
63:24
candidates who was ever on the ballot
63:26
like or or not and that the and on the
63:32
Republican side what I really think
63:34
happened there is you had a tragedy of
63:36
the Commons where all of the other
63:38
Republican candidates were kind of
63:41
hoping either that they would be the
63:44
last person standing against Trump and
63:46
would beat him or in the case of Ted
63:48
Cruz
63:49
that he would eventually lose and then
63:52
Cruz would inherit the Trump support I
63:54
think in the Republican Party they let
63:57
him go through didn’t realize the danger
63:59
they faced until it was too late and
64:01
then he won the Republican nomination so
64:03
I think you can blame that on the
64:05
strategists inside the Republican Party
64:07
cuz I agree with you I like John Kasich
64:09
better than I like Donald Trump but we
64:12
can all agree that max scherzer would
64:13
make a great candidate okay and I think
64:18
we can all agree that you guys were
64:20
fabulous thank you all and we could all
64:29
agree that Debra is fabulous
64:31
[Applause]
64:42
you