John Ralston Saul: The Collapse of Globalism

In the early 1970s, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher declared, “there is no alternative,” to economic prescriptions to help liberalize the marketplace and expand trade. This approach came to be known as globalization. Rising to fill the vacancy left after 45 years of Keynesianism, it made many promises, which John Ralston Saul says, have all failed. He sits down with Piya Chattopadhyay to discuss his book, “The Collapse of Globalism and The Reinvention of the World.”

Mark Blyth – Why People Vote for Those Who Work Against Their Best Interests

Mark Blyth’s best seller Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea https://amzn.to/2Lcw556 Mark Blyth is a British political scientist from Scotland and a professor of international political economy at Brown University.
37:43
here’s a story when they did the Podesta
email Hawks when they got the Democrats
emails somebody took the data from
WikiLeaks and decided it was called geo
locate the data in other words what were
the place names that the leading
Democrats who are the last part of her
mentor represent all of us remember
right not the elite Republicans what
were the police names that he talked
about and their private communications
and their selection what was the number
one most frequently named place in their
communications can you guess have a
guess Martha Martha’s Vineyard yeah
number two Eastern Southampton then New
York then San Francisco then I think it
was Ellie in DC and the rest of the
country two standard deviations out so
what’s the imaginary of a party this
seeks to represent all if that’s all the
places did they talk about because
that’s where the money is and it’s not
just to castigate the Democrats the
British Labour Party was like this under
blare of the German SPD under shorter
it’s done that’s the left is
systematically failed the people that it
supposedly represents so why should we
be in the least surprised that they
defect and then go to any one at all
that actually says here I know that
everyone’s ignored you for 25 years I at
least hear the fact that you’re crying
and I understand why people’s everyday
experience is very different from a
national average walking out and telling
people that the price of iPods has
fallen which means that really they’ve
got more money than they think at a time
when they can’t afford to send their
kids to college or their kids would be
insane to take on that much debt because
it’s like having a house with no ASSA
it’s just parts on izing and the example
of immigration occupied to that one it’s
very different depending on where you
live
immigration to me is another person from
another interesting country who has a
phd but that’s what it means where I
live right but that’s because I’m in the
top 20% if you’re living in public
housing in France right and those
resources are been finite and those
resources are being cut and you’re the
ones are confronted with incredibly
different cultures coming and not
integrating with you taking the
resources from you at least as you
perceive it and that’s what’s been
narrated by the National Front don’t
expect them not to make end roads
because it gels with everybody’s common
sense regardless of whether we can say
well on average and migrants benefit the
economy no one lives in an average now
the problem here now close with us is
.. prompted the following response I think

the election of Trump has been good for
climate change because it stops the rest
of the world waiting around for America
to solve the problem
so if the gentleman’s and the Chinese
now get together and do technolog
greentech bring it to scale China for
example has installed more solar in the
past few years in the United States has
right if they end up doing that we’re
the suckers because we should have been
leading the investment we’ll be buying
it from them
but in a way if that forces them to do
that and that’s good in a global sense
go for it so does that mean Trump was a
good leader in that regard well that’s a
different question right but it can have
a positive effect so the mark like let’s
not summit all up to you know the one
leader the genius the charisma whatever
the doesn’t that’s not good we are
thinking about it they can’t make a
difference but the key thing is when
they’ve actually got the trust of
everybody who’s who wants them to lead
that’s when societies work better but
when you have leaders who are divisive
who pet people against each other I
never walk so for anybody that’s the
type of populism you want to avoid all

What Are Conservatives Actually Debating?

What the strange war over “David French-ism” says about the right.

In March the religious journal First Things published a short manifesto, signed by a group of notable conservative writers and academics, titled “Against the Dead Consensus.” The consensus that the manifesto came to bury belonged to conservatism as it existed between the time of William F. Buckley Jr. and the rise of Donald Trump: An ideology that packaged limited government, free markets, a hawkish foreign policy and cultural conservatism together, and that assumed that business interests and religious conservatives and ambitious American-empire builders belonged naturally to the same coalition.

This consensus was never as stable as retrospective political storytelling might suggest; even successful Republican politicians inevitably left many of its factions sorely disappointed, while conservative intellectuals and activists feuded viciously with one another and constantly discerned crises and crackups for their movement. But the crisis revealed or created (depending on your perspective) by our own age of populism seems more severe, the stresses on the different factions more serious, and it is just possible that the longstanding conservative fusion might be as dead as the First Things signatories argued.

Among them was Sohrab Ahmari, the op-ed editor at The New York Post, whose public career embodies some of those shifts and stresses: An immigrant whose family fled the Islamic Republic of Iran, he began his career on the right as an ex-Marxist secular neoconservative at The Wall Street Journal editorial page and has since become a traditionally inclined Catholic (a journey detailed in his striking memoir, “From Fire, By Water”) and also more Trump-friendly and populist into the bargain.

In the last week Ahmari has roiled the conservative intellectual world with a critique of something he calls David French-ism, after David French of National Review, another prominent conservative writer. This controversy, like the debate over Tucker Carlson and capitalism earlier this year, has been a full-employment bill for conservative pundits. But it probably seems impossibly opaque from the outside, since superficially Ahmari and French belong to the same faction on the right — both religious conservatives, both strongly anti-abortion, both deeply engaged in battles over religious liberty (where French is a longtime litigator). Indeed it is somewhat opaque even from the inside, prompting conservatives engaging with the dispute to wonder, “What are we debating?”

I’m going to try to answer that question here. We’ll see how it goes.

Basically the best way to understand the Ahmari-French split is in light of the old fusion, the old consensus, that the First Things manifesto attacked. French is a religious conservative who thinks that the pre-Trump conservative vision still makes sense. He thinks that his Christian faith and his pro-life convictions have a natural home in a basically libertarian coalition, one that wants to limit the federal government’s interventions in the marketplace and expects civil society to flourish once state power is removed. He thinks that believers and nonbelievers, secular liberals and conservative Christians, can coexist under a classical-liberal framework in which disputes are settled by persuasion rather than constant legal skirmishing, or else are left unsettled in a healthy pluralism. He is one of the few remaining conservatives willing to argue that the invasion of Iraq was just and necessary. And he opposes, now as well as yesterday, the bargain that the right struck with Donald Trump.

Ahmari, on the other hand, speaks for cultural conservatives who believe that the old conservative fusion mostly failed their part of the movement — winning victories for tax cutters and business interests while marriage rates declined, birthrates plummeted and religious affiliation waned; and appeasing social conservatives with judges who never actually got around to overturning Roe v. Wade. These conservatives believe that the current version of social liberalism has no interest in truces or pluralism and won’t rest till the last evangelical baker is fined into bankruptcy, the last Catholic hospital or adoption agency is closed by an A.C.L.U. lawsuit. They think that business interests have turned into agents of cultural revolution, making them poor allies for the right, and that the free trade and globalization championed by past Republican presidents has played some role in the dissolution of conservatism’s substrates — the family, the neighborhood, the local civitas. And they have warmed, quickly or slowly, to the politics-is-war style of the current president.

But what, specifically, do these conservatives want, besides a sense of thrill-in-combat that French’s irenic style denies them? I don’t think they are completely certain themselves; in a useful contribution to the Ahmari affair, R.R. Reno, the editor of First Things, describes their animating spirit as a feeling that something else is needed in American society besides just classical-liberal, limited-government commitments, without any certainty about what that something ought to be.

Still, you can see three broad demands at work in their arguments. First, they want social conservatives to exercise more explicit power within the conservative coalition.

This may sound like a strange idea, since, after all, it is social conservatism’s growing political weakness, its cultural retreat, that led the religious right to throw in with a cruel sybarite like Trump. But there’s a plausible argument that even with its broader influence reduced, religious conservatism should still wield more power than it does in Republican politics — that it outsources too much policy thinking to other factions, that it goes along with legislation written for business interests so long as the promised judicial appointments are dangled at the end, and that it generally acts like a junior partner even though it delivers far more votes.

The Italian Economy’s Moment of Truth

Unlike many other European countries, Italy still has not restored economic growth to its pre-crisis level – a fundamental failing that lies at the heart of many of its political problems. Now that a new anti-establishment government is taking power, it remains to be seen if the economy will be remade, or broken further.

..  Italy has become the first major EU member state to be governed by a populist coalition.
.. M5S and the League both openly question the benefits of eurozone membership, though neither party made leaving the euro a specific commitment of their governing program in the election campaign, a failure that Italian President Sergio Mattarella seized upon in vetoing key cabinet pick.
.. They also disdain globalization more generally
.. The League, in particular, is obsessed with cracking down on immigration.
.. promised to tackle corruption and topple what they see as a self-serving political establishment, while introducing radical policies to reduce unemployment and redistribute incomes.
.. There are rumors that the parties want to write down Italy’s sovereign debt
.. In such a scenario, Italian banks currently holding considerable amounts of government debt would suffer substantial balance-sheet damage. The risk of deposit flight could not be excluded.
.. Italy’s nominal (non-inflation-adjusted) growth is too weak to produce substantial deleveraging, even at today’s low interest rates.
.. Italy’s real per capita GDP remains well below its 2007 pre-crisis peak
.. a worldwide retreat from globalization and growing demands for national governments to reassert control over the flow of goods and services, capital, people, and information/data.
.. For years, global market forces and powerful new technologies have plainly outstripped governments’ capacity to adapt to economic change.
.. Italy could soon find that its leading export is talented young people.
.. the Italian government needs to root out corruption and self-dealing, and demonstrate a much stronger commitment to the public interest.
.. Italy needs to develop the entrepreneurial ecosystems that underpin dynamism and innovation. As matters stand, the financial sector is too closed, and it provides too little funding and support for new ventures.
.. collaboration between government, business, and labor has played a key role in the countries that have adapted better to globalization and technology-induced structural change.