Erik Prince’s company plans business in China province under human rights scrutiny according to financial disclosure

An American citizen stands to profit as his security company expands operations into a Chinese province described as a modern-day police state by human rights activists, and where the Chinese government is detaining up to a million Muslims in “re-education” camps.

Erik Prince, a former U.S. Navy SEAL officer and brother of U.S. Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos, is the deputy chairman and minority shareholder of Frontier Services Group (FSG), a Hong Kong-listed security, logistics and insurance company he co-founded in 2014. Prior to FSG, Prince founded Blackwater, a private military contractor that was mired in controversy for its actions in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars — specifically when its employees were convicted of killing unarmed civilians.

(MORE: China is using app to collect personal information on its citizens, report says)
FSG plans to spend approximately $15.4 (HK$120.8) million in Pakistan and Xinjiang, China by May 2020, according to a recent financial disclosure. The Trump administration announced sanctions this week against multiple Chinese entities tied to Xinjiang, citing the alleged human rights violations taking place in the region.

America’s Great Divide: Frank Luntz Interview | FRONTLINE

Frank Luntz is a strategist and pollster who has worked on behalf of the Republican Party for nearly three decades. Luntz’s candid, full interview was conducted with FRONTLINE during the making of the two-part January 2020 documentary series “America’s Great Divide: From Obama to Trump.”

Watch Part One here: https://youtu.be/SnMBYMOTwEs And Part Two here: https://youtu.be/l5vyDPN19ww —————

This interview is being published as part of FRONTLINE’s Transparency Project, an effort to open up the source material behind our documentaries. Explore the transcript and interactive version of this interview, and others, on the FRONTLINE website: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/in…

 

Autism Spectrum Quotient

Choose one response that best describes how strongly each item applies to you.

Definitely Agree | Slightly Agree | Slightly Disagree | Definitely Disagree

1. I prefer to do things with others rather than on my own.
2. I prefer to do things the same way over and over again.
3. If I try to imagine something, I find it very easy to create a picture in my mind.
4. I frequently get so strongly absorbed in one thing that I lose sight of other things.
5. I often notice small sounds when others do not.
6. I usually notice car number plates or similar strings of information.
7. Other people frequently tell me that what I’ve said is impolite, even though I think it is polite.
8. When I’m reading a story, I can easily imagine what the characters might look like.
9. I am fascinated by dates.
10. In a social group, I can easily keep track of several different people’s conversations.
11. I find social situations easy.
12. I tend to notice details that others do not.
13. I would rather go to a library than to a party.
14. I find making up stories easy.
15. I find myself drawn more strongly to people than to things.
16. I tend to have very strong interests, which I get upset about if I can’t pursue.
17. I enjoy social chitchat.
18. When I talk, it isn’t always easy for others to get a word in edgewise.
19. I am fascinated by numbers.
20. When I’m reading a story, I find it difficult to work out the characters’ intentions.
21. I don’t particularly enjoy reading fiction.
22. I find it hard to make new friends.
23. I notice patterns in things all the time.
24. I would rather go to the theater than to a museum.
25. It does not upset me if my daily routine is disturbed.
26. I frequently find that I don’t know how to keep a conversation going.
27. I find it easy to “read between the lines” when someone is talking to me.
28. I usually concentrate more on the whole picture, rather than on the small details.
29. I am not very good at remembering phone numbers.
30. I don’t usually notice small changes in a situation or a person’s appearance.
31. I know how to tell if someone listening to me is getting bored.
32. I find it easy to do more than one thing at once.
33. When I talk on the phone, I’m not sure when it’s my turn to speak.
34. I enjoy doing things spontaneously.
35. I am often the last to understand the point of a joke.
36. I find it easy to work out what someone is thinking or feeling just by looking at their face.
37. If there is an interruption, I can switch back to what I was doing very quickly.
38. I am good at social chitchat.
39. People often tell me that I keep going on and on about the same thing.
40. When I was young, I used to enjoy playing games involving pretending with other children.
41. I like to collect information about categories of things (e.g., types of cars, birds, trains, plants).
42. I find it difficult to imagine what it would be like to be someone else.
43. I like to carefully plan any activities I participate in.
44. I enjoy social occasions.
45. I find it difficult to work out people’s intentions.
46. New situations make me anxious.
47. I enjoy meeting new people.
48. I am a good diplomat.
49. I am not very good at remembering people’s date of birth.
50. I find it very easy to play games with children that involve pretending.

The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities | SOAS University of London

The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities was a talk given by Professor John J Mearsheimer at the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, SOAS University of London on 21 January 2019.  Find out more at http://bit.ly/2Dv5nlZ

It is widely believed in the West that the United States should spread liberal democracy across the world, foster an open international economy, and build institutions. This policy of remaking the world in America’s image is supposed to protect human rights, promote peace, and make the world safe for democracy. But this is not what has happened. Instead, the United States has ended up as a highly militarized state fighting wars that undermine peace, harm human rights, and threaten liberal values at home. Mearsheimer tells us why this has happened.

Speaker
John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, where he has taught since 1982. He graduated from West Point in 1970 and then served five years as an officer in the U.S. Air Force. He then started graduate school in political science at Cornell University in 1975. He received his Ph.D. in 1980. He spent the 1979-1980 academic year as a research fellow at the Brookings Institution, and was a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs from 1980 to 1982. During the 1998-1999 academic year, he was the Whitney H. Shepardson Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

Professor Mearsheimer has written extensively about security issues and international politics more generally. He has published six books: Conventional Deterrence (1983), which won the Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., Book Award; Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (1988); The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001, 2014), which won the Joseph Lepgold Book Prize and has been translated into eight different languages; The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (with Stephen M. Walt, 2007), which made the New York Times best seller list and has been translated into twenty-two different languages; Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about Lying in International Politics (2011), which has been translated into ten different languages; and The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (2018).

He has also written many articles that have appeared in academic journals like International Security, and popular magazines like Foreign Affairs and the London Review of Books. Furthermore, he has written a number of op-ed pieces for the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times dealing with topics like Bosnia, nuclear proliferation, American policy towards India, the failure of Arab-Israeli peace efforts, the folly of invading Iraq, and the causes of the Ukrainian crisis.

Finally, Professor Mearsheimer has won a number of teaching awards. He received the Clark Award for Distinguished Teaching when he was a graduate student at Cornell in 1977, and he won the Quantrell Award for Distinguished Teaching at the University of Chicago in 1985. In addition, he was selected as a Phi Beta Kappa Visiting Scholar for the 1993-1994 academic year. In that capacity, he gave a series of talks at eight colleges and universities. In 2003, he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Chair
This event will be chaired by Professor Arshin Adib-Moghaddam. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam is Professor in Global Thought and Comparative Philosophies at SOAS University of London and Fellow of Hughes Hall, University of Cambridge.

33:50
Madeleine Albright’s comments we are the
indispensable nation we have a right we
have the responsibility and now we have
the military power since we’re Godzilla
to turn the world into a different place
to remake it in America’s image think
about the concept of American
exceptionalism no American politician
can you know move one micrometer away
from American exceptionalism right you
know that Barack Obama who got
criticized on this issue was forced to
say that America is the indispensable
nation he used those words
it’s American exceptionalism we’re
different we’re better but that
nationalism juiced the liberalism the
nationalism coupled with the liberalism
coupled with the fact that we were so
powerful coupled with the fact that we
had this template in their head about
how we were going to make the world a
much better place and we were off to the
races what’s the track record let’s talk
about the Bush Doctrine and the greater
Middle East the Ukraine crisis and
us-russia relations I’ve talked a bit
about that and then the failure of
engagement with China these are the
three most glaring examples of failure
the bush doctor the Bush Doctrine was
designed to turn the Middle East into a
sea of democracies in keeping with
liberal hegemony it’s very important to
understand that the war in Iraq 2003 was
not going to be in the minds of the
liberal hegemonist the last war in the
Middle East it was the first stop on the
train line
the second stop on the train line if you
want to include Afghanistan we didn’t go
much further in terms of invading other
countries because Iraq turned into a
fiasco but the idea was that we could
use military force or the threat of
military force the threat of military
force to overthrow governments in the
region and install liberal democracies
in their place and therefore produce
peace in the Middle East that solved the
proliferation and terrorism problems I
know this sounds crazy now but this is
the way we were thinking you remember
Afghanistan is finally under American
control by December 2001 and then in
early 2002 the Americans are talking
about maybe invading Iraq the Israelis
catch wind of the fact that we’re going
to do Iraq and the Israelis send a
high-level delegation to Washington to
say why are you doing Iraq you should be
doing Iran it’s the greater threat the
Americans say don’t worry Iraq is the
low-hanging fruit we’re gonna go in and
do a rack and then when we’re done with
Iraq will either do Syria or Iran next
but we won’t have to do one or two more
of these military invasions before
everybody in the region understands how
powerful we are and throws up their hand
and jumps on the american bandwagon the
israelis foolishly believe the americans
thinking that we have found the magic
formula for winning wars and they then
begin to champion an invasion of iraq
right what’s the result total disaster
it’s truly amazing the amount of murder
and mayhem that the united states is
responsible for in the Middle East truly
amazing
virtually no successes and nothing but
failures and failures were huge numbers
of people died countries are physically
wrecked
Afghanistan now the longest war in
American history I know not a single
37:47
national security analyst who thinks
37:49
there’s any possibility we can win that
37:51
war and all we’re doing is checking
37:52
can down the road now so that Obama
37:55
doesn’t get blamed for losing
37:58
Afghanistan and now Trump doesn’t get
38:00
blamed for losing Afghanistan to Iraq we
38:03
wrecked that country Syria where the
38:06
United States displayed of a very
38:08
important role in trying to topple Assad
38:11
that’s hardly ever repeat reported in
38:14
the media that’s a total disaster the
38:17
amount of murder and mayhem we’ve
38:19
created in Syria no Libya we did a great
38:21
job there right with the help of the
38:23
Europeans my god right the Bush Doctrine
38:27
in the greater Middle East an abject
38:29
failure then there’s the Ukraine crisis
38:31
and us-russia relations I’ve talked a
38:34
little bit about this you know in the
38:35
West here in Europe and certainly in the
38:38
United States we blame the Russians for
38:40
the crisis well I don’t buy this
38:44
argument for one second from the time we
38:47
started talking about NATO expansion the
38:50
Russians made it very clear that it was
38:52
unacceptable to them they were too weak
38:55
to stop it in 1999 that’s when the first
38:58
tranche took place they were to stop too
39:01
weak to stop in 2004 which is when the
39:04
second tranche of expansion took place
39:06
but after 2008 when we were talking
39:09
about doing Georgia and talking about
39:11
doing Ukraine they said this is not
39:14
gonna happen
39:15
it was April 2008 at the bucura summit
39:19
the bucura Sneyd au summit April 2008
39:21
where when the meeting was over with the
39:24
declaration was issued by NATO that said
39:27
Georgia and Ukraine would become part of
39:30
NATO the Russians went ballistic it’s no
39:33
accident ladies and gentlemen that a
39:35
couple of months later in August 2008
39:38
you had a war over Georgia Georgia
39:40
Russia war August 2008 Bucharest summit
39:42
April 2008 and then on February 22nd
39:46
2014 you had a major crisis break out
39:49
over Ukraine the Russians had no
39:54
intention of letting either Georgia or
39:57
Ukraine become a Western bulwark on
40:00
their doorstep and the end result is
40:04
that neither one of those countries has
40:06
come Western bulwark and the Russians
40:09
are going to great lengths to wreck
40:10
those countries and the Russians are now
40:13
going to great lengths to split NATO
40:15
apart and split the EU apart so that
40:17
they can expand further eastward and
40:20
further where we have terrible relations
40:24

analysis was based on the idea that
57:28
there is a genuine effort in u.s.
57:31
foreign policy to export democracy and
57:36
some would say that you know this was
57:39
more like a Trojan horse to expand US
57:42
dominance or hegemony or however you
57:44
want to call it and that example such as
57:47
Pinochet in Latin
57:48
America or the Shah in Iran or or you
57:51
know us alliances with with autocracies
57:53
all over the world do not really
57:56
unprovided of evidence for a real
57:59
genuine effort to spread democracy in
58:02
the way it was done in in Europe with a
58:04
Marshall Plan that was really a genuine
58:06
effort to democratize absolutely agree

with you the European continent but with
the Iraq invasion in particular there
was no Marshall Plan there was no really
systemic structure competent effort to
create a democracy the only
administrator that was guarded after the
invasion was the oil ministry and none
of the others so this is just a point
for my for my own understanding about
the trajectory of of you know what
happened to to the liberal United States
and we used to no good
these are two great issues and let me do
my best to answer them I take them in
reverse order first of all with regard
to what happened with the Shah would
happen with Pinochet Guatemala in 1954
and your comments on the Marshall Plan
remember my argument is that liberal
agenda only takes effect with the end of
the Cold War really about 1990 so I
would argue that the this is just
dovetails with what you said the United
States has a rich history of
overthrowing democratically elected
leaders right and furthermore preventing
the emergence of Democrats in other
cases and furthermore aligning itself
with murderous thugs and dictators and
my argument would be then in a world of
realpolitik where security competition
is it play you’re going to see a lot of
that kind of behavior so I’m not
challenging that part of the story in
any way what I’m saying is that after
59:58
1990 Oh
but so recently up until Trump the
United States I believe was genuinely
committed to spreading democracy around
the world now a number of people
including some of my really good friends
make the argument that you make which is
dead even after 1990 this is a Trojan
horse their argument is John this is you
know the atavistic realist United States
taking advantage of the unipolar moment
to dominate the globe and then
disguising its aggressive behavior with
liberal rhetoric okay now uh I think
that’s wrong okay and I think whether
you’re you and my friends are right or
I’m right is largely an empirical
question it may be the case in thirty
years when they open the public records
there is an abundance of evidence that
supports your perspective which is that
we behaved in a very realist
we tried to become a global hegemon and
we successfully covered it up and we
bamboozled people like John okay that
that may happen I cannot deny that okay
but my argument to you and to my friends

is that I believe that’s wrong and I
61:23
believe that the people who are who have
61:29
been conducting American foreign policy
61:30
are not that clever they’re fools
61:32
they’re fools and they are remarkably
61:36
idealistic and I think there is an
61:39
abundance of evidence to support my
61:41
position right I can’t adduce it all
61:44
here or we can’t have a big debate about
61:45
it but I do think that’s true and the
61:48
reason I go to the case of NATO and I
61:50
say that NATO was not about containment
61:53
cuz I’m anticipating your question
61:56
necessarily from you maybe from somebody
61:59
in the audience
61:59
right and I’m trying to show you that
62:01
NATO expansion was not realpolitik at
62:04
work
62:05
it was liberal hegemony but again I
62:09
think I’m right in the terms of the
62:11
story that I’m telling you
62:12
but again this is an empirical question
62:14
and as you well know we want to be
62:16
humble in this business because we’re
62:18
sometimes proved wrong your question
62:21
about nationalism and liberalism I’m
62:23
gonna make two responses to that first
62:26
of all I do think one can make an
62:28
argument that liberal democracy is in
62:31
trouble in the United States with Donald
62:34
Trump as the president I think most
62:37
people believe that there is some chance
62:40
some reasonable chance he will get
62:42
reelected I think eight years with him
62:45
could do a great deal of damage to
62:47
liberal democracy but I would take it a
62:52
step further and say that Trump is a
62:54
manifestation of you know underlying
62:58
forces that are at play here that don’t
63:03
bode well for liberal democracy so I’m
63:05
not at all making light of what a
63:09
dangerous situation were in and of
63:11
course not only applies to the United
63:14
States as I told you folks in my talk if
63:17
you go look at Freedom House’s data
63:19
since 2006 the number of liberal
63:22
democracies in the world has been going
63:24
down now another fascinating issue you
63:28
raise is the whole question of the sort
63:36
of omnipresent state in the United
63:39
States right that doesn’t look like a
63:42
liberal state it looks like it’s
63:44
interfering in the management of almost
63:48
everyone’s daily life I don’t want to go
63:53
into this in any great detail but
63:54
basically when I talked about rights I
63:59
was talking about negative rights I was
64:02
talking about freedoms and the problem
64:05
is that in the modern world this is all
64:07
to be a good thing we’re not just
64:09
interested in negative rights were
64:10
interested in positive rights and the
64:14
best example of that is just think about
64:16
this the right to an equal opportunity
64:20
it’s not just the right to life liberty
64:22
and the pursuit of happiness we you’re
64:24
talking about freedoms those were
64:26
we’re talking about rights like the
64:28
right to health care the right to equal
64:33
opportunity those are called positive
64:35
rights and they’re very important in
64:38
every society today including the United
64:41
States and the point is once you start
64:44
talking about positive rights as well as
64:47
negative rights the state begins to get
64:50
involved in a really serious way and you
64:53
remember folks when I told you about the
64:55
three solutions that liberals have to
64:59
dealing with potential for violence
65:01
I said inalienable rights tolerance and
65:04
the state and remember that I said that
65:07
it’s very important to have a limited
65:09
state and the point that you’re making
65:11
is that we’re moving away from that
65:13
limited state and I think in modern
65:17
societies it’s very hard not to do that
65:22
I’m agreeing with you because of the end
65:24
is because of the emphasis on positive
65:26
rights and then when you start thinking
65:30
about things like artificial
65:31
intelligence the national security state
65:34
the ability of the state to intervene in
65:36
our daily lives you see that liberal
65:39
democracy is a fragile device that
65:44
really has to be protected so I’m
65:47
agreeing with you in very important ways
65:50
in terms of ever saying that was
65:53
essentially the point that we are all in
65:56
the same boat in many ways trying to
65:58
struggle to keep the rights alive when
66:00
trying to struggle to keep a democracy
66:03
alive here but questions from from the
66:07
audience and if I may I take two at a
66:10
time John is that okay it’s perfectly
66:12
fine I should have said at the beginning
66:13
by the way switch off your mobile phones
66:15
I mean Jeff reminded myself with a so –
66:19
two questions the lady with the colored
66:23
jumper yes I forgot to bring over a big
66:31
piece of paper
66:33
hello thank you very much for your talk
66:35
in your talk you mentioned international
66:37
institutions particularly the WTO and
66:40
the IMF as kind of instruments of
66:43
liberal hegemony I’m wondering what do
66:45
you see the future of those
66:47
international institutions now that
66:49
there’s a failure of in of liberal
66:52
hegemony thank you okay one more
66:54
question the gentleman in the back just
66:57
right at the back yes with the highest
66:59
hand ah yes that’s what the blue blue
67:01
sweatshirt hi thanks you said that
67:08
obviously liberal Germany is faltering
67:12
is it any more or less faltering than
67:17
autocracies such as China Russia Thank
67:21
You Jon first question had to do with
67:32
the future of international institutions
67:34
I believe that in a highly
67:40
interdependent world and we live in a
67:43
highly interdependent world a globalized
67:46
world a hyper globalized world cult
67:49
whatever you want international
67:52
institutions are absolutely essential
67:55
and that doesn’t mean that certain
67:59
international institutions won’t die but
68:02
if they do they’ll be replaced by new
68:04
international institutions there’s just
68:07
no way you can do business without
68:11
international institutions international
68:13
institutions is I learned a long time
68:15
ago when I wrote an article on this
68:17
subject are basically rules and you need
68:20
rules for all sorts of reasons when
68:23
you’re doing business and that business
68:25
can be economic it can be military I
68:28
mean if you have military alliance NATO
68:31
as an institution the Warsaw Pact as an
68:33
institution if you’re gonna fight the
68:35
Cold War all over again you’re going to
68:36
do it with a mill
68:37
Alliance which is an institution you
68:39
need the WTO although I think you need a
68:42
different variant of it you need the IMF
68:45
the World Bank the Chinese have created
68:48
the aii big institutions are here to
68:50
stay
68:51
Donald Trump can get rid of NAFTA but he
68:54
in effect just produced another
68:56
institution that looks like NAFTA so
68:59
institutions aren’t going away no
69:01
question in my mind on that the
69:05
gentleman up here asked me about whether
69:07
you know the Chinese political system
69:10
and the Russian political system were
69:12
also failing and maybe failing more so
69:15
than liberal democracy I don’t know what
69:19
the answer is to that at this point in
69:21
time I think that both the Chinese and
69:26
the Russians are doing reasonably well
69:28
at this point in time what the long-term
69:31
future of those political systems is
69:35
it’s hard to say so I’m just not too
69:41
sure I think in in both the Chinese in
69:45
the Russian case a lot depends on the
69:47
economy and I think a lot depends on how
69:53
much progress they make on the economic
69:57
front over the future but I think at
70:00
this point in time to some extent
70:02
everybody’s in trouble okay two more
70:05
questions
70:06
the lady in the back all the way
70:16
my question is about based on the
70:20
relationship between China and United
70:22
States do you think we are entering oh
70:26
we are already living you know in new
70:29
Cold War era and secondly do you think
70:34
that sports country US and China will
70:37
end up in Susa dated Trump’s will end up
70:41
way so City Detra okay second question
70:52
yes the gentleman right here would you
70:57
wait for the microphone it’s right that
71:02
it’s in the front yeah thank you
71:04
it’s okay sorry to make you run hi John
71:09
thank you for your talk much of the US
71:12
political discourse lately around Trump
71:15
seems to be focused apart from the
71:17
collusion with Russia seems to be on the
71:20
lack of coherence of foreign policy and
71:23
I think looking at some of trumps
71:26
rhetoric in recent years it seems to
71:29
align a lot with the core tenets of your
71:31
book tragedy of great power politics and
71:33
in particular we see Trump adopting an
71:35
offensive realist position towards China
71:37
we see him somewhat buck-passing Syria
71:40
to Russia and we see a kind of offshore
71:42
balancing with regards to NATO in Europe
71:45
so my question is to what extent do you
71:48
think that Trump is a meerschaum
71:50
heurists
71:50
so to speak truth
71:51
[Music]
71:54
okay John okay I’ll take the first
72:01
question on China and the United States
72:04
and the young woman in the back asked me
72:07
if I thought there was a new Cold War in
72:10
store between those two countries I
72:13
think the answer is yes my basic view of
72:18
international politics is that the great
72:20
powers in an ideal world want to
72:23
dominate their region of the world and
72:26
they want to do like the United States
72:29
did in the Western Hemisphere they want
72:30
to be the only great power and they
72:34
don’t want any other distant great
72:36
powers coming into their backyard and if
72:40
you look at China today China’s growing
72:44
economically and militarily and I think
72:49
that the Chinese are very interested as
72:51
they should be in dominating Asia and
72:55
that means not only being the most
72:58
powerful country in the region but also
73:01
making sure the Americans are pushed out
73:04
the Americans well the Chinese talk
73:11
constantly these days about the century
73:14
of national humiliation which ran from
73:17
the late 1840s until the late 1940s the
73:21
Chinese were weak over that hundred year
73:24
period and they were exploited by the
73:28
Japanese the Americans and the European
73:30
great powers they have never forgotten
73:32
that
73:32
and their goal is to make sure they are
73:35
really powerful in the future if you
73:38
were to go up to a Jap to a Chinese
73:40
policymaker or remember the Chinese
73:43
foreign policy League and say to that
73:45
person you have two choices you can be
73:48
twenty times more powerful than Japan or
73:51
Japan can be 20 more times powerful than
73:54
you do you think it makes any difference
73:56
they would laugh in your face they would
73:59
tell you we know what happened the last
74:00
time Japan was 20
74:02
more times powerful than us we intend to
74:04
be 20 times more powerful than Japan in
74:07
the future and then when you ask the
74:09
Chinese behind closed doors what they
74:11
think about the Americans running ships
74:13
and aircraft up their coast and having
74:16
ground forces off their coasts and
74:18
places like Korea and Japan they will
74:21
tell you in no uncertain terms if they
74:24
get powerful enough they will try to
74:25
push us out beyond us meaning the
74:27
Americans beyond the first island chain
74:29
and then beyond the second island chain
74:32
and if you look at how they think about
74:33
the waters around them they’ve made it
74:35
very clear that they think the South
74:37
China Sea belongs to them and we’ve made
74:40
it clear to them we don’t agree with
74:42
that they’ve made it clear they think
74:44
the East China Sea belongs to them and
74:47
there’s a real possibility they’ll get
74:49
into a fight with the Japanese over
74:51
those small islands in the East China
74:53
Sea
74:53
then there’s Taiwan which is a potential
74:56
flashpoint of great significance China
74:59
is not a status quo power so the Chinese
75:03
as they get more and more powerful are
75:06
going to try and become more and more
75:09
influential in East Asia and they’re
75:12
going to try and push the Americans out
75:13
and you know what the Americans are
75:15
going to do the Americans are going to
75:16
pivot to Asia and they’re going to try
75:18
and contain the Chinese and they’re
75:20
going to push back so I would argue that
75:24
there is likely to be trouble ahead and
75:29
put it in your terms you are likely to
75:31
get a new Cold War in Asia second
75:38
question had to do with Trump and he
75:43
accused me of being in bed with Donald
75:46
Trump intellectually this is a
75:49
frightening thought
75:54
yes right that’s right then we know
75:58
there is no connection look to be
76:03
serious I think that I think that Donald
76:06
Trump has no coherent foreign policy I
76:10
think he flies by the seat of his pants
76:12
and he has certain intuitions and I do
76:18
think apropos your question that some of
76:21
those intuitions are consistent with a
76:23
realist perspective in other words when
76:26
Trump says that he is not interested in
76:30
using military force to spread democracy
76:33
around the planet that’s an argument
76:35
that resonates with realists there’s
76:38
just no question about it now another
76:41
example that you used was containment of
76:44
China right that of course resonates
76:47
with realist logic but also you want to
76:50
remember that the person who articulated
76:52
the pivot to Asia was Hillary Clinton
76:54
and the Obama administration the Clinton
76:56
administration was also interested in
76:58
the pivot to Asia so this is not
77:00
something new to trump but it gets
77:03
consistent both with the Democrats and
77:05
with Trump with basic realist logic my
77:08
problem with Trump is that he’s done a
77:10
half-baked job of pivoting and dealing
77:14
with our Asian allies Trump’s big
77:16
problem and this is where you know he
77:18
parts for realism his realist believed
77:21
that alliances matter allies matter and
77:24
if you’re gonna deal with an adversary
77:28
like China right you need help from
77:31
countries in East Asia and you don’t
77:34
want to be slapping him around which is
77:36
what he does I also think the TPP the
77:39
trans-pacific partnership which was an
77:41
economic institution that was designed
77:44
to contain China right it was designed
77:48
for economic purposes but also for
77:49
security purposes he vetoed that or he
77:53
killed that when he came
77:54
to office that was a big mistake so I
77:58
think a lot of what he has done is
78:00
inconsistent with a realist approach but
78:03
there is no question that he does have
78:04
realist tendencies although again it’s
78:07
not part of any sort of grand theory of
78:11
how the world works okay last round of
78:14
questions
78:16
the gentleman white sweatshirt thank you
78:24
so much for your talk it’s very
78:26
enlightening I just have a question with
78:30
regards to the Iraq invasion
78:33
so you said and I quote there are
78:36
virtually no successes in Iraq and I
78:39
personally think that there were some
78:40
successes for the United States let’s
78:44
put aside all of the inexplicable damage
78:46
that has been wrought on to the Iraqi
78:49
population I think that there were
78:53
benefits for it for its economic
78:56
interests in the long term we can see
78:59
today that although what was done in
79:01
Iraq was a failure in many ways many oil
79:05
contracts if not all were given to
79:08
American country companies like
79:10
ExxonMobil war was created which
79:14
increases the demand for for weapons
79:17
which in turn can increase manufacturing
79:20
and selling of weapons by American
79:23
companies although all these contributes
79:27
to the economic superiority of the
79:29
United States and its prominent
79:31
companies so we need a question I will
79:34
come to the question because we’re
79:35
running out of time all right I
79:37
apologize for that so we can’t imagine
79:40
the United States today without its
79:42
superior economy right so I ask can the
79:49
Iraqi invasion be seen as a commercial
79:51
success for the United States
79:53
thank you very much the second question
80:05
hi thank you very much for your talk
80:08
my question is regarding the European
80:10
Union as America focuses on itself more
80:13
and liberalism takes a backseat do you
80:16
think there is a future for the European
80:18
Union and what do you think the future
80:19
holds for Western Europe thank you I
80:29
should go okay thank you
80:31
with regard to your question about Iraq
80:33
I thought you were gonna argue that it
80:36
had some benefits for Iraq but obviously
80:39
you’re arguing that it had benefits to
80:41
the United States economic benefits for
80:43
the United States I don’t believe that
80:46
I think it’s estimated that the two wars
80:53
won in Afghanistan and two in Iraq and
80:56
the Iraqi war is the more expensive the
80:58
two of the two is gonna cost us
81:00
somewhere between four to six trillion
81:03
dollars over time again when you think
81:08
of all that money and and and and the
81:11
consequences for the Iraqi people it’s
81:14
just stunning right but for the six
81:16
trillion dollars I don’t think the oil
81:19
companies ended up making much of profit
81:24
as a result of the invasion and I think
81:28
in terms of arms sales yes we sold some
81:31
more arms but not enough to really
81:34
matter not enough to really affect the
81:36
economy so I don’t think I don’t think
81:42
that you’re right that the the United
81:44
States benefited economically from this
81:47
war but again even if it did it wouldn’t
81:49
justify you know what happened in Iraq
81:53
and by the way remember that one of the
81:55
principal consequences of the invasion
81:58
of Iraq was the creation of Isis just
82:01
don’t want to lose sight of that
82:04
second question a very interesting
82:06
question on the EU and the future of the
82:08
European Union and you prefaced it by
82:11
saying America’s losing interest in
82:15
Europe to some extent and as American
82:18
interest in Europe wanes what does that
82:21
mean for the EU I make two points first
82:26
of all I believe that one of the reasons
82:29
probably the main reason that European
82:32
integration has been so successful and
82:35
there has been peace in Europe is
82:37
because of the presence of the American
82:40
military in Europe its NATO it’s the
82:45
American pacifier as I often say to
82:48
audiences you know I’ve spent a lot of
82:50
time going around Europe since 1990 when
82:52
the Cold War ended I have never met a
82:56
single policymaker a single pundit a
82:59
single academic a single representative
83:03
of the foreign policy establishment in
83:05
any country in Europe who wants to see
83:07
the Americans leave Europe this is quite
83:09
remarkable and now I was recently
83:12
Romania as recently in Denmark the
83:15
Romanians and the den Danes do not want
83:18
us to leave Europe and it’s because they
83:20
understand that this I’m throw but the
83:23
American military presence that NATO
83:25
underpins the EU and peace and security
83:29
in Europe okay that’s my view so in
83:33
terms of the future of the EU what
83:37
really matters in terms of the United
83:39
States is that we stay in NATO keep NATO
83:43
intact and keep American forces here the
83:47
second point I would make to you the
83:49
problems in the EU today despite all
83:52
Donald Trump’s rhetoric have nothing to
83:55
do with the United States they’re mainly
83:59
Eurocentric problems problems associated
84:02
with the euro problems associated with
84:05
brexit if you look at what’s going on in
84:07
Italy and a lot of these problems by the
84:10
way have to do
84:10
with nationalism right I’m not going to
84:12
get into that in any detail here but
84:14
there are real problems in the EU today
84:17
but those problems are not the result of
84:21
the United States right so the Europeans
84:24
have to figure out how to fix those
84:25
problems but more importantly for the
84:28
Europeans they got to keep the Americans
84:30
here in my opinion I think the America
84:33
the European elites understand correctly
84:35
that an American military presence is a
84:38
pacifying factor here in Europe the main
84:43
pacifying factor thank you very much
84:46
John unfortunately we have to leave it
84:48
at that there will be a drinks reception
84:51
outside in the foyer but join me once
84:54
again to in thanking professor much I’m
84:58
afraid
84:58
excellent
85:00
[Applause]
85:05
you
85:06
[Applause]

Neuroscientist: Why Trumpists Will Never Abandon Trump

–Bobby Azarian, cognitive neuroscientist and blogger for Psychology Today, joins David to discuss how Donald trump continues to hold on to his base’s support

 

 

reason that this is relates to the
unwavering support so this effect is is
amplified in conservatives because
conservatives have this hypersensitivity
to threat generally speaking so by that
I mean they tend to focus on threat more
and they tend to have this exaggerated
fear response to threatening messages so
we know this from a number of different
studies for example one study took
sir motives and liberals and had them
sit in front of a computer screen where
they showed a bunch of different images
some of the images were threatening
somewhere neutrals some are positive and
they track their eye movements and what
they found is that conservatives fixated
on the threatening images longer and
they oriented toward the threatening
images more quickly then liberals so
yeah we call that being hyper-vigilant
for threat and a couple other studies
showed that conservatives tend to have a
larger amygdala and a more reactive
amygdala in response to threat yes oh
the amygdala is a brain structure that
is involved in processing threat and
it’s also associated with the fear
response
so when Donald Trump is saying these
scary messages their brains are engaged
even more strongly his messages are more
salient because they’re in a way tuned
into threat and I’m not really trying to
pick on conservatives here that’s what
the studies show also you know someone
could interpret that differently and you
could see it as Republicans or
conservatives might also be better
equipped to respond to a threat in the
case that you know something does happen
because they’re they’re hyper vigilant
absolutely fascinating stuff we’ve been
speaking with cognitive neuroscientist
Bobby Azarian who also blogs for
Psychology Today you can follow him on
twitter at bobby Azarian and check out

Capitalism in America: Alan Greenspan and Adrian Wooldridge in Conversation with Gillian Tett

it’s useful to understand how the system
works and the key turning point is a
very remarkable period it’s William
Jennings Bryan William Jennings Bryan in
1896 was a fairly young 36 year old
Nebraskan who got up in the middle of
that particular I guess you could say
Association of then the Democratic Party
and it was the one of those
extraordinary events which turns
politics around the Democratic Party was
a highly conservative party prior to
them and essentially it’s characterized
by presidents who thought that the least
government the best it was essentially
lazy fair he got up Bryan got up and
made this extraordinary speech which is
now historical and then cross of gold
speech about the American worker and the
American farmer of being crucified on a
cross of gold called being the gold
standard and that propelled him
strangely enough into the head of the
party he got nominated he never became
president because he kept losing
you think he went three times and failed
each time but left a very major
indelible stamp which led to Woodrow
Wilson and all the way through to
Franklin Roosevelt and I you know I
looked at Bryan as the root of Franklin
Roosevelt’s New Deal
that’s fascinating cause I think most
people that part of it’s often being
obscured in history it’s again one of
the reasons why this book is so
interesting is it throws up these
creating the existing tax pattern [M]y
view is that that’s the right thing to
do provided you funded the result of
that is a bit of variance is going to be
a very large federal budget deficit and
federal budget deficits invariably down
the road out qualification in gender
inflation at the moment we have the
tightest labor market I have ever seen
that is the number of job openings is
significantly greater than the number of
people looking for work and that must
inevitably begin to push on wages it
always has and always will but it’s
always delayed
and my told you that is something has
got to give and that’s I don’t know
where it all comes out well your blyat
comes out with inflation well the
problem basically is if we do nothing
we’re going to end up with probably
stagflation which is an inflation rate I
should say it’s partly stagnation which
as mentioned was very significantly
slowed output per our output per hour
now which used to be 3/4 percent per
year
back in the early post-world war ii
period it’s now well under 1% which
brings me very nicely on to the next
question from the audience which is
someone has asked for you to share your
thoughts about president Trump’s recent
criticism of Jay Powell and the Fed I
like him to answer that with all the
answers I think it’s very short-sighted
the issue of the Federal Reserve is
required by the Congress to maintain a
stable currency which means no inflation
no deflation and the policy they’re
embarked upon at the moment seems very
sense it will be caused as I mentioned
before the wage rates are beginning to
show signs of moving and you cannot have
real wages rising without it ultimately
think if they continue on the road would
that we will
going Pretlow I should say that the
president wants to go we’re gonna end up
with a very significant budget deficit
and very significant inflation
ultimately not not in the short term
that it takes a while
political system doesn’t care about
deficits what they do care about is
inflation when the inflation rate was 4%
in the 1970s
President Nixon imposed wage and price
controls were nowhere near there yet but
it’s wrong our way
if we are though heading towards a
potential rise in inflation rise in debt
at a time of growing populism do you
think there’s a chance that the Federal
Reserve will lose independence I’m
trying to follow you which I mean well
cheating is a chance at Congress or the
president will try to control the
Federal Reserve or take away some of its
independence I really don’t know one of
those forecasting aspects which is
difficult another question from the
audience as the Federal Reserve’s reach
grows do you think that leged of
oversight will become necessary again
that’s above my pay grade
or do you think that Congress should
exert more control or oversight of the
Fed I think the Federal Reserve is by
statute
remember the Federal Reserve Act of 1913
which essentially did something very
unusual we had a long period we
discussed this in the book in which
financial crises kept surging up and
then collapsing which is a typical cycle
with
which went on to a decade upon decade
and the populism that evolved as a
consequence of this looked at
ever-increasing lead to find a way to
solve the problem of why the crises
occur and the general solution was if
the economy is accelerating and it’s
running out of gold species and you’re
going to get into a situation in which
they are always going to be crises so
what the Federal Reserve Act actually
did was very very interesting it
substituted the sovereign credit of the
United States for gold and then if no we
stayed on the gold standard technically
that was a major change in American
financial history and debate the basic
consequence of that is that Federal
Reserve determines what in effect is a
sensible level of money supply expansion
and one of the reasons the Federal
Reserve Act was actually passed was to
prevent the political system when
becoming so very dominant in determining
monetary policy which is exactly what
you don’t want to happen and I mean I
was you know eighteen and a half years
as you mentioned getting letters from
everybody who won very little
congressmen or otherwise who wants it’s
a the issue of and don’t worry about the
issue of inflation
and nobody was well when I would be
getting people who say we want lower
interest rates I got tons of that mail I
never got a single letter saying please
raise them and it tells you that there
are some views which go against reality
and reality always wins but if you look
at that the history of populism some of
the worst populism you got was in the
1970s some of the work that the anger
that was generated by inflation in the
nineteen seventies were roiled right the
way through the political system
eventually leads to the rise of of
Ronald Reagan because and who comes in
and then you know crushes crushes
inflation so inflation is is not a
solution to populism it drivers it makes
people very angry do you think the
current populism is going to get worse
chairman Greenspan well let’s remember
where populism comes from it’s I don’t
know whether this is a general
proposition but I find it’s difficult to
get around the answer that when the
inflation rate or that must the
inflation ratings as much as the levels
of income slow down when you get
productivity for example which is that
the major determinant of income and you
get productivity slowing down you get a
much lower increase in JD GDP and gross
domestic income and wages and salaries
alike and there’s a great deal of unease
in the population which is saying things
are not good somebody come help us and
somebody necessarily on the white horse
because comes up and says I’ve got a way
to handle this and if you look at Latin
America the history of
goodly part of Latin America is a
remarkable amount of people like Peron
coming in and all the subsequent post
World War two governments in Latin
America and it’s really quite
unfortunate and surprising it’s not that
they try it and it fails which it does
always it always fails but it doesn’t
eliminate the desire to do it in other
words of Peru Brazil and like they’ve
all undergone very significant periods
of huge inflation and collapsing and
nobody wears a lesson
yeah well we’re almost out of time but
there’s one other question from the
audience which I think cuts to the heart
of a lot of what we’re talking about
right now which is this does the success
of capitalism come at the cost of
enormous wealth disparity is it possible
to have this vision of creative
destruction of capitalism of dynamism
without having massive income inequality
I doubt it and I doubt it for the reason
I said earlier namely that we’ve got the
problem that human beings don’t change
but technology as it advances and it’s
embodied in the growth of an economy is
always growing and when you have
something that’s growing and the other
thing that’s flat you get obviously
inequality and the political
consequences of that can I qualify that
just a little bit I mean there – there
are different sorts of inequality
there’s a there’s the inequality that
you get from suddenly like Bill Gates or
Steve Jobs producing a fantastic new
innovation and idea which means that
they reap a lot of reward
for that but which means that society as
a whole gets richer and better off and
there’s the inequality that comes from
crony capitalism from people using
political influence blocking innovation
and and sucking out and do rewards for
themselves so I think we need to be
absolutely very very sensitive to the
wrong source of inequality while
celebrating the right sort of inequality
and also had that Joseph Schumpeter that
great man once said that the the nature
of capitalist progress doesn’t consist
of Queens having a million or two
million pairs of silk stockings it
consists of what used to be the
prerogative of a queen being spread
throughout the whole of society silk
stockings you know that become something
that go from being very rare and only
worn by Queens to being worn by all
sorts of people all over the place so
it’s the nature of capitalism is to
create new innovations which are at
first rare but spread throughout the
whole of society and everybody uses so
if you think think of the the iPhone or
something like that some that was
something that was incredibly rare and a
few people had those sort of
communications vais now everybody
carries them around all the time and the
great capitalists the Bill Gates the
Steve Jobs don’t get rich by selling one
really really good iPhone to one purpose
and they get into selling their products
to all sorts of people so there’s a
sense in which there is no real
trade-off between very rich people
getting very rich and the rest of
society getting getting better off you
know they only get rich because they
create things which everybody most
people want to have and buy you know
it’s it’s it’s it’s the Silk Stocking
question really I you know I accept that
qualifications let me just say one thing
you going back to his mentioning here
Walter Isaacson’s book on innovation he
wrote that book and I remember reading
it and my final conclusion was and I
asked him why is it that most innovation
is in the United States
it’s American and he said you know I’ve
never thought of that I don’t think he
was aware of the fact that he here and
all these innovation
to developers and they all turned out to
be American which leads me to conclude
that there’s something fundamental in
the psyche of American history in the
American public which creates it it’s
not an accident which is why I won in it
who too often so which is what you of
course you sought to explain the book so
if you had a chance to take this book
into the Oval Office today or into the
Treasury and give it to the President
and say this is a history of America
here are the key lessons what is a top
bit of advice that you would give to the
administration today to keep capitalism
growing in America well you know we do
have we haven’t mentioned that there’s
an underlying financial problem which we
haven’t addressed in the best way to
discuss it as when I first became aware
of it
I would haven’t been looking at data and
accidentally created a chart which
showed the relationship between
entitlements spending which is social
benefits in the rest of the world and
gross domestic savings and I’m from 1965
to the current period the ratio of
entitlements to the sum of those two is
flat as a percent of gross domestic
product which means or at least implies
that one is crowding out the other and
when you look at the individuals they
are actually looking different and
enable one goes up the other goes down
and so forth and I think that’s
suggestively the fact that there is
something in the sense of when we say
that entitlements by which a rising and
the baby boom generation is essentially
crowding out gross domestic savings
which in turn coupled with
the borrowing from abroad is how we
finance our gross domestic investment
which is the key factor in productivity
right so entitlement reform well I look
forward to a tweet about entitlement
reform I look forward to this very
important book being part of the
discussion about how to keep America
America’s economy great and growing but
in the meantime thank you both very much
indeed for sharing your thoughts it is
indeed a fascinating book and quite an
achievement and best of luck in getting
this very important message out so thank
you both very much indeed
[Applause]