Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the C.I.A.
On March 12, 2003, during a waterboarding session, so much water was forced into Mohammed that his “abdomen was somewhat distended and he expressed water when the abdomen was pressed,” the Senate report says, quoting from a C.I.A. cable. One of the medical officers present said that, even though Mohammed was vomiting during the sessions, his “gastric contents” had become so diluted that he was “not concerned about regurgitated gastric acid damaging KSM’s esophagus.” Instead, the medical officer said, he was worried that Mohammed had been filled with so much water that there was a danger that the electrolytes in his blood had become dangerously diluted; the officer requested that C.I.A. interrogators use salted water during the waterboarding sessions.
The Senate report, which drew almost entirely on the C.I.A.’s internal communications, makes a convincing case that while the interrogation of Mohammed produced some valuable information, the interrogators never got what they wanted. No information provided by Mohammed led directly to the capture of a terrorist or the disruption of a terrorist plot.
.. On September 27, 2001, a C.I.A. officer sent an e-mail to his colleagues about Asset X titled “Access to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad.” Asset X was willing to help, for a price, the e-mail said.
Then something went wrong. The C.I.A. agent who was meeting Asset X recommended that Asset X be paid a certain amount of money for his help, but the request was denied. Asset X disappeared. The Senate report says, “Over the next nine months, the CIA continued to believe that ASSET X had the potential to develop information about KSM and his location, and sought, but was unable to reestablish contact with ASSET X.”