I think that Americans—and this is not true just now, but over the years—are not fundamentally opposed to war. They’re fundamentally opposed to losing wars. And that’s one reason why President Bush lost support for the Iraq War in the period of 2004 to 2006.
Goldberg: Do we have to win wars quickly to make them popular?
Cotton: I don’t think we have to win quickly necessarily, but we have to win.
.. I think there’s something to that, if he wants to try and create a balance of power between Sunni and Shiites and simply exit the Middle East, or at least continue an ill-advised pivot to East Asia. I say ill-advised not because East Asia is not an important part of the world, but because the global superpower can’t pivot. You have to be focused everywhere.
In preparation for the assault on Mosul, the United States and its allies are trying to weaken the Islamic State by cutting its supply lines. Kurdish forces, backed by American-led air power, have recently positioned themselves near an important crossroads at Kiske, 25 miles west of Mosul. “The isolation of Mosul is going on now,” said the official at Central Command.
.. Another challenge will come if the city is retaken. While Mosul is overwhelmingly Sunni, the Iraqi attacking force is likely to be overwhelming Shiite, which may create friction with the local population. The Sunni Arab population could be alienated if their neighborhoods were held by Shiite-dominated units or pesh merga forces.
The good news right now is largely on the military front. Iraqi, Kurdish and American forces appear to be turning the tide against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL.
.. On top of that, many of Iraq’s recent conquests were won by Iranian-backed Shiite militias. The government does not like to admit it, but these Shiite militias often lead Iraqi attacks and form the backbone of their defenses.
.. In these circumstances, offensive operations into the Sunni heartland — Anbar, Nineveh and Salah al-Din Provinces — could be disastrous.
The Sunni populace is terrified by reports of Shiite troops and militiamen conducting brutal ethnic cleansing operations. Without a new power-sharing agreement, promises that they will not be mistreated, and a program for reconstruction, the Sunnis may well see Iraqi government forces (and even the Kurds) not as liberators, but as a conquering Shiite army.
.. If Washington were willing to offer additional military training, hardware and support forces, as well as diplomatic, technical, financial and targeted economic assistance, it could persuade Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites to accept less from one another in expectation of getting more from the United States.
“We had so much time to sit and plan,” he continued. “It was the perfect environment. We all agreed to get together when we got out. The way to reconnect was easy. We wrote each other’s details on the elastic of our boxer shorts. When we got out, we called. Everyone who was important to me was written on white elastic. I had their phone numbers, their villages. By 2009, many of us were back doing what we did before we were caught. But this time we were doing it better.”
.. The first thing he did when he was safe in west Baghdad was to undress, then carefully take a pair of scissors to his underwear. “I cut the fabric from my boxers and all the numbers were there. We reconnected. And we got to work.” Across Iraq, other ex-inmates were doing the same. “It really was that simple,” Abu Ahmed said, smiling for the first time in our conversation as he recalled how his captors had been outwitted. “Boxers helped us win the war.”