censorship

Netflix has blocked an episode of its show “Patriot Act With Hasan Minhaj” from streaming in Saudi Arabia after the Saudi government complained that the episode — which is critical of the crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman — violated its cybercrime laws.

In the episode, first shown in October, Mr. Minhaj critiques the United States’ longstanding relationship with Saudi Arabia after the murder of the dissident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

“Now would be a good time to reassess our relationship with Saudi Arabia,” Mr. Minhaj said, “and I mean that as a Muslim and an American.”

After receiving a takedown request last month from the Saudi government’s Communications and Information Technology Commission, Netflix removed the episode from viewing in Saudi Arabia last week.

In a statement, Netflix defended its decision: “We strongly support artistic freedom worldwide and only removed this episode in Saudi Arabia after we had received a valid legal request — and to comply with local law.”

.. The episode remains available to Netflix customers elsewhere in the world, and it can also be seen by viewers in Saudi Arabia through the show’s YouTube channel

.. Mr. Minhaj has not commented publicly on the removal of the episode. But in an interview published in The Atlantic last month, Mr. Minhaj spoke of the fear he felt after creating it.

“There was a lot of discussion in my family about not doing it,” he said in the interview. “I’ve just come to personal and spiritual terms with what the repercussions are.”

Article 6 of the Saudi anti-cyber crime law, which was cited by the Saudi commission in its request to Netflix, prohibits the “production, preparation, transmission or storage of material impinging on public order, religious values, public morals and privacy” on the internet. Journalism advocates call it a powerful and all-encompassing instrument for the Saudi government to censor virtually any speech online.

The Committee to Project Journalists, which rates Saudi Arabia the third most censored country in the world, has documented the growing crackdown on journalists since the appointment last year of Prince Mohammed, who was first promoted as an agent of modernization and reform.

Under Prince Mohammed’s rule, “authorities have wielded state mechanisms ostensibly focused on terrorism to silence journalists,” according to a blog post published in September by the Committee to Project Journalists.

It is not unheard of for Western news organizations to have critical reports censored in authoritarian countries. But that action is often taken by local partners, and sometimes without notice.

In 2014, for example, a report about Pakistan’s relationship to Al Qaeda was deleted from thousands of print copies of the International New York Times in Pakistan — resulting in a blank spot on the front page — “without our knowledge or agreement,” a representative of The Times said at the time.

The story of Origo’s transformation from independent news source to government cheerleader offers a blueprint of how Mr. Orban and his allies pulled this off. Rather than a sudden and blatant power grab, the effort was subtle but determined, using a quiet pressure campaign.

Origo’s editors were never imprisoned and its reporters were never beaten up. But in secret meetings — including a pivotal one in Vienna — the website’s original owner, a German-owned telecommunications company, relented. The company, Magyar Telekom, first tried self-censorship. Then it sought a nonpartisan buyer.

But, ultimately, Origo went to the family of Mr. Orban’s former finance minister.

“When Orban came to power in 2010, his aim was to eliminate the media’s role as a check on government,” said Attila Mong, a former public radio anchor and a critic of Mr. Orban. “Orban wanted to introduce a regime which keeps the facade of democratic institutions but is not operated in a democratic manner — and a free press doesn’t fit into that picture.”

On the surface, Hungary’s democratic institutions seem to be operating normally. The judiciary is nominally independent. Elections are held. Newsstands are stacked with dozens of private publications.

.. “We would never sink so low,” Mr. Orban said in a September speech, “as to silence those with whom we disagree.”

But below the surface, the system has been degraded. The Constitutional Court is stacked with judges appointed by Fidesz. The judiciary and the prosecution service are headed by two of Mr. Orban’s oldest supporters. Both the electoral system and the electoral map have been altered to favor Mr. Orban’s party.

Other than a handful of mainly online outlets, the Hungarian media has been either silent about or supportive of these moves.

.. Mr. Orban’s appointees controlled the state media, as well as Hungary’s two main media regulators. He had given regulators more power to fine and punish independent news outlets, or to drive them off air, yet Origo did not seem cowed.

.. But things changed with Mr. Orban’s election in 2010. He levied an “emergency” tax on the telecoms sector, in a bid to reduce government debt after the global financial crisis. The tax was also seen as part of a wider backlash against foreign firms that had bought up large sections of the Hungarian economy after the fall of communism.

For Magyar Telekom, it meant an additional $100 million tax bill. Company executives feared more bad news in 2013, when Mr. Orban’s government was due to renew its frequency licenses. Ahead of a September deadline, negotiations would determine how much of the market would be assigned to Telekom, and at what price.

The talks were not going well. Months before the deadline, René Obermann, Deutsche Telekom’s chief executive, became embroiled in a shouting match with Mr. Orban at a private meeting in Germany, two people briefed on the exchange said.

.. Throughout the year, Magyar Telekom executives met with Janos Lazar, Mr. Orban’s second-in-command, to negotiate the license renewal and a multimillion-dollar contract to install broadband internet throughout rural Hungary. Initially, Origo was not a topic of discussion.

But that changed in the early summer at a secret meeting in Vienna between Mr. Lazar and two senior company executives, according to three people with knowledge of the discussion. Mr. Lazar said that Origo’s journalists had historically struggled to grasp the government’s perspective on certain matters and proposed a remedy: a secret line of communication between Origo’s editors and the highest levels of government.

Mr. Lazar was careful not to frame the request as a quid pro quo for new licenses, or as a form of censorship. But the Magyar Telekom executives took it seriously.

.. By autumn, Origo had signed a contract with a media consultancy run by Attila Varhegyi, the former director of Mr. Orban’s party. As a consultant, Mr. Varhegyi had played a major role in turning Hungarian state media into a mouthpiece for Mr. Orban and now his attention had pivoted to the private sector.

Under the deal, Mr. Varhegyi’s firm could call Origo’s editor with suggestions about coverage.

That same month, the government extended its license agreements with the country’s three mobile telephone operators.

.. Mr. Lazar complained about the story in a meeting with two Magyar Telekom executives in February 2014, according to two people with knowledge of the discussion, and his disapproval was quickly relayed to Origo’s management. It was one of several attempts by Magyar Telekom management, and Mr. Varhegyi’s firm, to sway the investigation, both before and after the broadband deal was announced later that month, according to four people familiar with the controversy.

Undeterred, Origo continued to scrutinize Mr. Lazar’s travel. Origo eventually began court proceedings to request specific travel records, and published several embarrassing stories about the minister’s movements.

But by the start of summer, Mr. Saling’s superiors had run out of patience. Mr. Orban had won re-election in April. Mr. Saling was fired in early June, nominally by mutual agreement.

The decision was ultimately made by Miklos Vaszily, Origo’s chief executive. But it came only after months of pressure on Mr. Vaszily from Magyar Telekom’s management and Mr. Varhegyi’s firm, according to three people at the company.

.. The winner was named in November 2015: a firm called New Wave Media, which outbid two rival companies.

New Wave’s profile immediately raised eyebrows. Their bid was financed by funds controlled by two banks, one owned by Mr. Orban’s government, and another owned by Tamas Szemerey, a cousin of one of Mr. Orban’s former ministers. In addition, New Wave was part-owned by Mr. Szemerey’s longtime business partner, company records show.

Mr. Szemerey had made earlier attempts to buy Origo directly. But by his own telling, Magyar Telekom executives had discouraged such a direct attempt, on the grounds that he would be perceived as too close to the government.

.. There was no evidence of favoritism: New Wave had simply made the highest bid. But bolstered by money from the state, New Wave could afford to pay whatever it took to avoid the outlet being sold to businesses not aligned with the government.

.. Though nominally still private, Origo now became a vessel for the government. Bought in part with government money, Origo now published news that echoed the government’s stance — in particular on migration, Mr. Soros and the European Union, whose officials have frequently criticized Mr. Orban.

Before, Origo had struggled financially. Now it was flush with government advertising revenue, which more than tripled after the sale. In 2017, the son of Mr. Orban’s former finance minister became New Wave’s chief executive, and government advertising revenues kept rising, even as Origo’s coverage became even more aggressively pro-Orban.

At the time, the 2015 sale of Origo could have been considered an outlier. Then, Origo became one of just 31 outlets owned by Mr. Orban’s allies, according to research by Atlatszo, an investigative news website.

Today, there are more than 500.

openpolitics.com

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