Benedict Evans: Ways to think about cars

First, the shift to electric reduces the mechanical complexity of cars a great deal. No transmission or internal combustion engine means far fewer moving parts. That may also change the sophistication and capital required to design and build cars, which, in turn, may change who can build them and how they get built. Gear boxes and premium sports transmissions turn into software in the same way that electromechanical calculating machines or cameras got turned into software.

.. Second, the rise of on-demand car services changes what it means to own a car and changes who buys them, and that in turn may also change what they look like. These models won’t work for everyone everywhere: there will be a point of equilibrium in each urban area where supply, demand and price stabilize at a sustainable level (after the price wars and sign-up bonuses are gone), and that point of equilibrium will look different in different places. The number of people who stop having a car (or using one) or who stop using public transport will vary, and won’t be universal, but will be substantial.

..  That in turn means that the cars get bought the way Hertz buys cars, or – critically – the way corporate PCs get bought. In this world what matters is ROI and a check-list of features, not flair, design, innovation or fit and finish.

..  That poses a challenge for Apple, and indeed Tesla. If the users are not the buyers, the retracting door handles or diamond-cut chamfers don’t matter.

.. From a technology point of view, what’s really happening is that we move road transport from circuit-switching (with manual switchboard operators) to packet-switching.

 

 

The Academic Paper That Broke the Volkswagen Scandal

At a small lab in West Virgina, it turns out. In 2012, a group of researchers at West Virginia University won a $50,000 grant from the International Council on Clean Transportation to do performance testing on clean diesel cars. Arvind Thiruvengadam, a research assistant professor in mechanical and aerospace engineering, told NPR this week that the team was merely excited do the research—which involved driving the clean diesel cars outside the lab—and write a journal paper based on the data. They never expected that they would discover one of the biggest frauds in automotive history.

.. David Carder, another researcher on the West Virginia University team, told Reuters that the fallout at hand is surprising because this data was made public over a year and a half ago.

.. Volkswagen insisted to EPA officials that the discrepancies were due to a technical issue rather than deliberate cheating. Only when the EPA threatened not to approve Volkswagen’s 2016 clean diesel cars for sale in the U.S. did the company finally fess up.

Volkswagen Test Rigging Follows a Long Auto Industry Pattern

Beyond emissions, the industry has long been contemptuous of regulation. Henry Ford II called airbags “a lot of baloney,” and executives have bristled at rules requiring higher mileage per gallon.

.. General Motors paid $45 million in 1995 and recalled nearly half a million Cadillacs that were equipped with a chip that shut off emissions control systems while the air-conditioner was being used, to improve the car’s performance.

.. “We call it the tip of the iceberg,” said Jos Dings, the director of Transport and Environment. “We don’t think this will be limited to Volkswagen. If you look at the testing numbers for the other manufacturers, they are just as bad.”

The F-150’s Aluminum Diet

When Ford rolls out its redesigned F-150 pickup truck here on Monday morning to kick off two days of press previews for the 2014 North American International Auto Show, the automaker will be making one of the boldest product gambles in its 111-year history.

.. By Ford’s calculations, the 2015 truck, equipped with a new 2.7-liter EcoBoost V6 and a 6-speed automatic transmission, will be capable of achieving “close to” 30 miles a gallon in the Environmental Protection Agency’s highway test when it goes on sale this year

.. Engineers involved with the program credit Alan Mulally, Ford’s chief executive, with supporting the lightweight F-Series plan throughout the financial crisis, when Ford was forced to drop some vehicle programs and mortgage assets to avoid the financial hardships that hit General Motors and Chrysler.